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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


FROM  THE  LIBRARY  OF 
FRANK  J.  KLINGBERG 


THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 


"THE   GREAT   ILLUSION" 
CONTROVERSY 

'  Mr.  Angell's  pamphlet  was  a  work  as  unimposing  in  form  as  it  was  daring  in  CTpres- 
sion.  For  a  time  nothing  was  heard  of  it  in  public,  but  many  of  us  will  remember  the 
curious  way  in  which  ...  "  Norman  Angellism  "  suddenly  became  one  of  the  principal 
topics  of  discussion  amongst  politicians  and  journalists  all  over  Eurofye.  Naturally  at 
first  it  was  the  apparently  extravagant  and  paradoxical  elements  that  were  fastened  upon 
most — that  the  whole  theory  of  the  commercial  basis  of  war  was  wronR,  that  no 
modem  war  could  make  a  profit  for  the  victors,  and  that — most  astonishing  thing  of  all 
— a  successful  war  might  leave  the  conquerors  who  received  the  indemnity  relatively 
worse  off  than  the  conquered  who  raid  it.  People  who  had  been  brought  up  in  the 
acceptance  of  the  idea  that  a  war  between  nations  was  analogous  to  the  struggle  of  two 
errand  boys  for  an  apple,  and  that  victory  inevitably  meant  economic  gain,  were  amazed 
into  curiosity.  Men  who  had  never  examined  a  Pacifist  argument  before  read  Mr. 
Angell's  book.  Perhaps  they  thought  that  his  doctrines  sounded  so  extraordinarily 
like  nonsense  that  there  really  must  be  some  sense  in  them  or  nobody  would  have 
dared  to  propound  them." — The  New  Stateman,  October  ii,  1913. 

'The  fundamental  proposition  of  the  book  is  a  mistake.  .  .  .  And  the  proposition 
that  the  extension  of  national  territory — that  is  the  bringing  of  a  large  amount  of  prop- 
erty under  a  single  administration — is  not  to  the  financial  advantage  of  a  nation  appears 
to  me  as  illusory  as  to  maintain  that  business  on  a  small  capital  is  as  profitable  as  un  a 
large.  ...  The  armaments  of  European  States  now  are  not  so  much  for  protection 
against  conquest  as  to  secure  to  themselves  the  utmost  possible  share  of  the  tinexploited 
or  imperfectly  exploited  regions  of  the  world." — The  late  Admiral  Mahan. 

'I  have  long  ago  described  the  policy  of  The  Great  Illusion  .  .  .  not  only  as  a  childish 
absurdity  but  a  mischievous  and  immoral  sophism.' — Mr.  Frederic  Harrison. 

*  Among  the  mass  of  printed  books  there  are  a  few  that  may  be  counted  as  acts, 
not  books.  The  Contrat  Social  was  indisputably  one;  and  I  venture  to  suggest  to  you 
that  The  Great  Illusion  is  another.  The  thesis  of  Galileo  was  not  more  diametrically 
opposed  to  current  ideas  than  those  of  Norman  Angell.  Yet  it  had  in  the  end  a  certain 
measure  of  success.' — Viscotrt^x  Esher. 

'When  all  criticisms  are  spent,  it  remains  to  express  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  Mr.  Angell. 
He  belongs  to  the  cause  of  internationalism — the  greatest  of  all  the  causes  to  which  a  man 
can  set  his  bands  in  these  days.  The  cause  will  not  triuiriph  by  economics.  But  it 
cannot  reject  any  ally.  And  if  the  economic  appeal  is  not  final,  it  has  its  weight.  "  We 
shall  perish  of  hunger,"  it  has  been  said,  "in  order  to  have  success  in  murder."  To  those 
who  have  ears  for  that  saying,  it  cannot  be  said  too  often.' — Political  Thought  in  England, 
from  Herbert  Spencer  to  the  Present  Day,  by  Ernest  Barker. 

'A  wealth  of  closely  reasoned  argument  which  makes  the  book  one  of  the  most  damag- 
ing indictments  that  have  yet  appeared  of  the  principles  governing  the  relation  of 
civilized  nations  to  one  another,' — The  Quarterly  Review. 

'Ranks  its  author  with  Cobden  amongst  the  greatest  of  our  pamphleteers,  perhaps 
the  greatest  since  Swift.' — The  Nation. 

'No  book  has  attracted  wider  attention  or  has  done  more  to  stimulate  thought  in  the 
present  century  than  The  Great  Illusion.' — The  Daily  Mail. 

'One  of  the  most  'orilliant  contributions  to  the  literature  of  international  relations 
which  has  appeared  for  a  very  long  time.' — Journal  0/  the  Institute  of  Bankers. 

'After  five  and  a  half  years  in  the  wilderness,  Mr.  Norman  Angell  has  come  back.  .  .  . 
His  book  provoked  one  of  the  great  controversies  of  this  generation.  .  .  .  To-day,  Mr. 
Angell,  whether  he  likes  it  or  not,  is  a  prophet  whose  prophesies  have  come  true.  .  .  . 
It  is  hardly  possible  to  open  a  current  newspaper  without  the  eye  lighting  on  some  fresh 
vindication  of  the  once  despised  aod  rejected  doctrine  of  Norman  Angellism.' — TheDaily 
News,  February  35*  1930. 


THE 
FRUITS   OF  VICTORY 

A  SEQUEL  TO 

"THE  GREAT  ILLUSION" 

BY 
NORMAN  ANGELL 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1921 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 

PATRIOTISM   UNDER  THREE  FLAGS 

THE  GREAT  ILLUSION 

THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITV 

WHY   FREEDOM    MATTERS 

WAR  AND   THE   WORKER 

AMERICA  AND  THE  WORLD  STATE    (aMERICA) 

PRUSSIANISM   AND  ITS  DESTRUCTION 

THE  world's   HIGHWAY    (aMERICA) 

WAR  AIMS 

DANGERS   OF    HALF-PREPAREDNESS    (aMERICA) 

POLITICAL  CONDITIONS   OF  ALLIED   SUCCESS    (aMERICa) 

THE  BRITISH  REVOLUTION  AND  THE  AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY    (aMERICA) 

THE  PEACE  TREATY  AND  THE  ECONOMIC  CHAOS 


Copyright,  1921,  by 
The  Centxjry  Co. 


Printed  in  the  U.  S.  A. 


Colleg* 
Library 

HC 
S7 

AS 


f 


To  H.  S. 


1567C76 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.archive.org/details/fruitsofvictorysOOangeiala 


INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  AMERICAN  EDITION 

The  case  which  is  argued  in  these  pages  includes  the  exami- 
nation of  certain  concrete  matters  which  very  obviously  and 
directly  touch  important  American  interests — ^American  for- 
eign trade  and  investments,  the  exchanges,  immigration,  ar- 
maments, taxation,  industrial  unrest  and  the  effect  of  these  on 
social  and  political  organisation.  Yet  the  greatest  American 
interest  here  discussed  is  not  any  one  of  those  particular 
issues,  or  even  the  sum  of  them,  but  certain  underlying  forces 
which  more  than  anything  else,  perhaps,  influence  all  of  them. 
The  American  reader  will  have  missed  the  main  bearing  of 
the  argument  elaborated  in  these  pages  unless  that  point  can 
be  made  clear. 

Let  us  take  a  few  of  the  concrete  issues  just  mentioned. 
The  opening  chapter  deals  with  the  motives  which  may  push 
Great  Britain  still  to  struggle  for  the  retention  of  predomi- 
nant power  at  sea.  The  force  of  those  motives  is  obviously 
destined  to  be  an  important  factor  in  American  politics,  in 
determining,  for  instance,  the  amount  of  American  taxa- 
tion. It  bears  upon  the  decisions  which  American  voters  and 
American  statesmen  will  be  called  upon  to  make  in  American 
elections  within  the  next  few  years.  Or  take  another  aspect 
of  the  same  question:  the  peculiar  position  of  Great  Britain 
in  the  matter  of  her  dependence  upon  foreign  food.  This  is 
shown  to  be  typical  of  a  condition  common  to  very  much  of 
the  population  of  Europe,  and  brings  us  to  the  problem  of  the 
pressure   of   population   in   the   older   civilisations   upon   the 


viii     INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

means  of  subsistence.  That  "biological  pressure"  is  certain, 
in  some  circumstances,  to  raise  for  America  questions  of 
immigration,  of  relations  generally  with  foreign  countries,  of 
defence,  which  American  statesmanship  will  have  to  take  into 
account  in  the  form  of  definite  legislation  that  will  go  on  to 
American  Statute  books.  Or,  take  the  general  problem  of 
the  economic  reconstruction  of  Europe,  with  which  the  book 
is  so  largely  occupied.  That  happens  to  bear,  not  merely  on 
the  expansion  of  American  trade,  the  creation  of  new  markets, 
that  is,  and  on  the  recovery  of  American  debts,  but  upon  the 
preservation  of  markets  for  cotton,  wheat,  meat  and  other 
products,  to  which  large  American  communities  have  in  the 
past  looked,  and  do  still  look,  for  their  prosperity  and  even 
for  their  solvency.  Again,  dealing  with  the  manner  in  which 
the  War  has  affected  the  economic  organisation  of  the  Euro- 
pean society,  the  writer  has  been  led  to  describe  the 
process  by  which  preparation  for  modern  war  has  come 
to  mean,  to  an  increasing  degree,  control  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  national  resources  as  a  whole,  thus  setting 
up  strong  tendencies  towards  a  form  of  State  Socialism.  To 
America,  herself  facing  a  more  far-reaching  organisation  of 
the  national  resources  for  military  purposes  than  she  has 
known  in  the  past,  the  analysis  of  such  a  process  is  certainly 
of  very  direct  concern.  Not  less  so  is  the  story  of  the  relation  of 
revolutionary  forces  in  the  industrial  struggle — "Bolshevism" 
— to  the  tendencies  so  initiated  or  stimulated. 

One  could  go  on  expanding  this  theme  indefinitely,  and  write 
a  whole  book  about  America's  concern  in  these  things.  But 
surely  in  these  days  it  would  be  a  book  of  platitudes,  elabo- 
rately pointing  out  the  obvious.  Yet  an  American  critic  of 
these  pages  in  their  European  form  warns  me  that  I  must  be 
careful  to  show  their  interest  for  American  readers. 

Their  main  interest  for  the  American  is  not  in  the  kind  of 
relationship  just  indicated,  very  considerable  and  immediate 
as  that  happens  to  be.     Their  chief  interest  is  in  this:  they 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION      ix 

attempt  an  analysis  of  the  ultimate  forces  of  policies  in  West- 
ern society;  of  the  interrelation  of  fundamental  economic 
needs  and  of  predominant  political  ideas — ^public  opinion,  with 
its  constituent  elements  of  "human  nature,"  social — or  anti- 
social— instinct,  the  tradition  of  Patriotism  and  Nationalism, 
the  mechanism  of  the  modern  Press.  It  is  suggested  in  these 
pages  that  some  of  the  main  factors  of  political  action,  the 
dominant  motives  of  political  conduct,  are  still  grossly  neg- 
lected by  "practical  statesmen";  and  that  the  statesmen  still 
treat  as  remote  and  irrelevant  certain  moral  forces  which 
recent  events  have  shown  to  have  very  great  and  immediate 
practical  importance.  (A  number  of  cases  are  discussed  in 
which  practical  and  realist  European  statesmen  have  seen 
their  plans  touching  the  stability  of  alliances,  the  creation  of 
international  credit,  the  issuing  of  international  loans,  in- 
demnities, a  "new  world"  generally,  all  this  frustrated  because 
in  drawing  them  up  they  ignored  the  invisible  but  final  factor 
of  public  feeling  and  temper,  which  the  whole  time  they  were 
modifying  or  creating,  thus  unconsciously  undermining  the 
edifices  they  were  so  painfully  creating.  Time  and  again  in 
the  last  few  years  practical  men  of  affairs  in  Europe  have 
found  themselves  the  helpless  victims  of  a  state  of  feeling  or 
opinion  which  they  so  little  understood  that  they  had  often 
themselves  unknowingly  created  it.) 

In  such  hard  realities  as  the  exaction  of  an  indemnity,  we  see 
governments  forced  to  policies  which  can  only  make  their  task 
more  difficult,  but  which  they  are  compelled  to  adopt  in  order 
to  placate  electoral  opinion,  or  to  repel  an  opposition  which 
would  exploit  some  prevailing  prejudice  or  emotion. 

To  understand  the  nature  of  forces  which  must  determine 
America's  main  domestic  and  foreign  policies — as  they  have 
determined  those  of  Western  Society  in  Europe  during  the 
last  generation — is  surely  an  "American  interest";  though 
indeed,  in  neglecting  the  significance  of  those  "hidden  currents 
flowing  continually  beneath  the  surface  of  political  history," 


X        INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

American  students  of  politics  would  be  following  much 
European  precedent.  Although  public  opinion  and  feeling  are 
the  raw  material  with  which  statesmen  deal,  it  is  still  considered 
irrelevant  and  academic  to  study  the  constituent  elements 
of  that  raw  material. 

Americans  are  sufficiently  detached  from  Europe  to  see  that 
in  the  way  of  a  better  unification  of  that  Continent  for  the 
purposes  of  its  own  economic  and  moral  restoration  stand 
disruptive  forces  of  "Balkanisation,"  a  development  of  the 
spirit  of  Nationalism  which  the  statesmen  for  years  have 
encouraged  and  exploited.  The  American  of  to-day  speaks 
of  the  Balkanisation  of  Europe  just  as  the  Englishman  of 
two  or  three  years  ago  spoke  of  the  Balkanisation  of  the 
Continent,  of  the  wrangles  of  Poles,  Czecho-Slovaks,  Hun- 
garians, Rumanians,  Italians,  Jugo-Slavs.  And  the  attitude 
of  both  Englishman  and  American  are  alike  in  this:  to  the 
Englishman,  watching  the  squabbles  of  all  the  little  new  States 
and  the  breaking  out  of  all  the  little  new  wars,  there  seemed 
at  work  in  that  spectacle  forces  so  suicidal  that  they  could 
never  in  any  degree  touch  his  own  political  problems;  the 
American  to-day,  watching  British  policy  in  Ireland  or  French 
policy  towards  Germany,  feels  that  in  such  conflict  are  moral 
forces  that  could  never  produce  similar  paralysis  in  American 
policy.  "Why,"  asks  the  confident  American,  "does  England 
bring  such  unnecessary  trouble  upon  herself  by  her  military 
conduct  in  Ireland?  Why  does  France  keep  three- fourths  of 
a  Continent  still  in  ferment,  making  reparations  more  and 
more  remote"?  Americans  have  a  very  strong  feeling  that 
they  could  not  be  guilty  of  the  Irish  mess,  or  of  prolonging 
the  confusion  which  threatens  to  bring  Europe's  civilisation 
to  utter  collapse.  How  comes  it  that  the  English  people,  so 
genuinely  and  so  sincerely  horrified  at  the  thought  of  what  a 
Bissing  could  do  in  Belgium,  unable  to  understand  how  the 
German  people  could  tolerate  a  government  guilty  of  such 
things,  somehow  find  that  their  own  British  Government  is 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION      xi 

doing  very  similar  things  in  Cork  and  Balbriggan ;  and  finding 
it,  simply  acquiesce?  To  the  American  the  indefensibility  of 
British  conduct  is  plain.  "America  could  never  be  guilty  of 
it."  To  the  Englishman  just  now,  the  indefensibility  of  French 
conduct  is  plain.  The  policy  which  France  is  following  is 
seen  to  be  suicidal  from  the  point  of  view  of  French  inter- 
ests. The  Englishman  is  sure  that  "English  political  sense" 
would  never  tolerate  it  in  an  English  government. 

The  situation  suggests  this  question :  would  Americans  deny 
that  England  in  the  past  has  shown  very  great  political  genius, 
or  that  the  French  people  are  alert,  open-minded,  "realist," 
intelligent?  Recalling  what  England  has  done  in  the  way  of 
the  establishment  of  great  free  communities,  the  flexibility 
and  "practicalness"  of  her  imperial  policy,  what  France  has 
contributed  to  democracy  and  European  organisation,  can  we 
explain  the  present  difficulties  of  Europe  by  the  absence,  on  the 
part  of  Englishmen  or  Frenchmen,  or  other  Europeans,  of  a 
political  intelligence  granted  only  so  far  in  the  world's  history 
to  Americans?  In  other  words,  do  Americans  seriously 
argue  that  the  moral  forces  which  have  wrought  such  havoc 
in  the  foreign  policy  of  European  States  could  never  threaten 
the  foreign  policy  of  America?  Does  the  American  plead  that 
the  circumstances  which  warp  an  Englishman's  or  French- 
man's judgment  could  never  warp  an  American's?  Or  that  he 
could  never  find  himself  in  similar  circumstances?  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  of  course,  that  is  precisely  what  the  American — ^like 
the  Englishman  or  Frenchman  or  Italian  in  an  analogous  case 
— does  plead.  To  have  suggested  five  years  ago  to  an  English- 
j  man  that  his  own  generals  in  India  or  Ireland  would  copy 
Bissing,  would  have  been  deemed  too  preposterous  even  for 
anger:  but  then  equally,  to  Americans,  supporting  in  their 
millions  in  1916  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  would  the  idea 
have  seemed  preposterous  that  a  few  years  later  America,  hav- 
ing the  power  to  take  the  lead  in  a  Peace  League,  would  re- 
fuse to  do  so,  and  would  herself  be  demanding,  as  the  result 


/ 


xii     INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

of  participation  in  a  war  to  end  war,  greater  armament  than 
ever — ^as  protection  against  Great  Britain. 

I  suggest  that  if  an  EngHsh  government  can  be  led  to  sanction 
and  defend  in  Ireland  the  identical  things  which  shocked  the 
world  when  committed  in  Belgium  by  Germans,  if  France  to- 
day threatens  Europe  with  a  military  hegemony  not  less  mis- 
chievous than  that  which  America  determined  to  destroy,  the 
causes  of  those  things  must  be  sought,  not  in  the  special 
."wickedness  of  this  or  that  nation,  but  in  forces  which  may 
operate  among  any  people. 

One  peculiarity  of  the  prevailing  political  mind  stands  out. 
It  is  evident  that  a  sensible,  humane  and  intelligent  people, 
even  with  historical  political  sense,  can  quite  often  fail  to 
realise  how  one  step  of  policy,  taken  willingly,  must  lead  to  the 
taking  of  other  steps  which  they  detest.  If  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
is  supporting  France,  if  the  French  Government  is  proclaiming 
policies  which  it  knows  to  be  disastrous,  but  which  any  French 
Government  must  offer  to  its  people  or  perish,  it  is  because 
somewhere  in  the  past  there  have  been  set  in  motion  forces 
the  outcome  of  which  was  not  realised.  And  if  the  outcome 
was  not  realised,  although,  looking  back,  or  looking  at  the 
situation  from  the  distance  of  America  from  Europe,  the  in- 
evitability of  the  result  seems  plain  enough,  I  suggest  that  it 
is  because  judgment  becomes  warped  as  the  result  of  certain 
feelings  or  predominant  ideas;  and  that  it  will  be  impossible 
wisely  to  guide  political  conduct  without  some  understanding 
of  the  nature  of  those  feelings  and  ideas,  and  unless  we  realise 
with  some  humility  and  honesty  that  all  nations  alike  are"  sub- 
ject to  these  weaknesses. 

We  all  of  us  clamantly  and  absolutely  deny  this  plain  fact 
when  it  is  suggested  that  it  also  applies  to  our  own  people. 
What  would  have  happened  to  the  publicist  who,  during  the 
War,  should  have  urged:  "Complete  and  overwhelming  vic- 
tory will  be  bad,  because  we  shall  misuse  it?"  Yet  all  the 
victories  of  history  would  have  been  ground  for  such  a  warning. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION     xiii 

Universal  experience  was  not  merely  flouted  by  the  uninstnic- 
ted.  One  of  the  curiosities  of  war  literature  is  the  fashion 
in  which  the  most  brilliant  minds,  not  alone  in  politics,  but  in 
literature  and  social  science,  simply  disregard  this  obvious  truth. 
We  each  knew  "our"  people — British,  French,  Italian,  Ameri- 
can— ^to  be  good  people:  kindly,  idealistic,  just.  Give  them 
the  power  to  do  the  Right — to  do  justice,  to  respect  the  rights 
of  others,  to  keep  the  peace — and  it  will  be  done.  That  is 
why  we  wanted  "unconditional  surrender"  of  the  Germans, 
and  indignantly  rejected  a  negotiated  peace.  It  was  admitted, 
of  course,  that  injustice  at  the  settlement  would  fail  to  give 
us  the  world  we  fought  for.  It  was  preposterous  to  suppose 
that  we,  the  defenders  of  freedom  and  democracy,  arbitration, 
self-determination, — America,  Britain,  France,  Japan,  Russia, 
Italy,  Rumania — should  not  do  exact  and  complete  justice.  So 
convinced,  indeed,  were  we  of  this  that  we  may  search  in 
vain  the  works  of  all  the  Allied  writers  to  whom  any 
attention  was  paid,  for  any  warning  whatsoever  of  the  one 
danger  which,  in  fact,  wrecked  the  settlement,  threw  the 
world  back  into  its  oldest  difficulties,  left  it  fundamentally 
just  where  it  was,  reduced  the  War  to  futility.  The  one  con- 
dition of  justice — ^that  the  aggrieved  party  should  not  be  in 
the  position  of  imposing  his  unrestrained  will — ,the  one  truth 
which,  for  the  world's  welfare,  it  was  most  important  to  pro- 
claim, was  the  one  which  it  was  black  heresy  and  blasphemy 
to  utter,  and  which,  to  do  them  justice,  the  moral  and  intel- 
lectual guides  of  the  nations  never  did  utter. 

It  is  precisely  the  truth  which  Americans  to-day  are  refusing 
to  face.  We  all  admit  that,  "human  nature  being  what  it  is," 
preponderance  of  power,  irresponsible  power,  is  something 
which  no  nation  (but  our  own)  can  be  trusted  to  use  wisely 
or  with  justice.  The  backbone  of  American  policy  shall  there- 
fore be  an  effort  to  retain  preponderance  of  power.  If  this  be 
secured,  little  else  matters.  True,  the  American  advocate  of 
isolation  to-day  says:    "We  are  not  concerned  with  Europe. 


xiv     INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

We  ask  only  to  be  let  alone.  Our  preponderance  of  power, 
naval  or  other,  threatens  no-one.  It  is  purely  defensive."  Yet 
the  truth  is  that  the  demand  for  preponderance  of  armaments 
itself  involves  a  denial  of  right.    Let  us  see  why. 

No  one  denies  that  the  desire  to  possess  a  definitely  prepon- 
derant navy  is  related,  at  least  in  some  degree,  to  such  things 
as,  shall  we  say,  the  dispute  over  the  Panama  tolls.  A  growing 
number  feel  and  claim  that  that  is  a  purely  American  dispute. 
To  subject  it  to  arbitral  decision,  in  which  necessarily  Euro- 
peans would  have  a  preponderance,  would  be  to  give  away  the 
American  case  beforehand.  With  unquestioned  naval  prepon 
derance  over  any  probable  combination  of  rivals,  America  is  in 
a  position  to  enforce  compliance  with  what  she  believes  to  be 
her  just  rights.  At  this  moment  a  preponderant  navy  is  being 
urged  on  precisely  those  grounds.  In  other  words,  the  demand 
is  that  in  a  dispute  to  which  she  is  a  party  she  shall  be  judge, 
and  able  to  impose  her  own  judgement.  That  is  to  say,  she 
demands  from  others  the  acceptance  of  a  position  which  she 
would  not  herself  accept.  There  is  nothing  at  all  unusual  in 
the  demand.  It  is  the  feeling  which  colours  the  whole  attitude 
of  combative  nationalism.  But  it  none  the  less  means  that 
"adequate  defence"  on  this  basis  inevitably  implies  a  moral 
aggression — a  demand  upon  others  which,  if  made  by  others 
upon  ourselves,  we  should  resist  to  the  death. 

It  is  not  here  merely  or  mainly  the  question  of  a  right: 
American  foreign  policy  has  before  it  much  the  same  alter- 
natives with  reference  to  the  world  as  a  whole,  as  were  pre- 
sented to  Great  Britain  with  reference  to  the  Continent  in  the 
generation  which  preceded  the  War.  Her  "splendid  isolation" 
was  defended  on  grounds  which  very  closely  resemble  those 
now  put  forward  by  America  as  the  basis  of  the  same  policy. 
Isolation  meant,  of  course,  preponderance  of  power,  and  when 
she  declared  her  intention  to  use  that  power  only  on  behalf  of 
even-handed  justice,  she  not  only  meant  it,  but  carried  out 
the  intention,  at  least  to  an  extent  that  no  other  nation  has 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION      xv 

done.  She  accorded  a  degree  of  equality  in  economic  treat- 
ment which  is  without  parallel.  One  thing  only  led  her  to 
depart  from  justice:  that  was  the  need  of  maintaining  the 
supremacy.  For  this  she  allowed  herself  to  become  involved 
in  certain  exceedingly  entangling  Alliances.  Indeed,  Great 
Britain  found  that  at  no  period  of  her  history  were  her  domestic 
politics  so  much  dominated  by  the  foreign  situation  as  when 
she  was  proclaiming  to  the  world  her  splendid  isolation  from 
foreign  entanglements.  It  is  as  certain,  of  course,  that  Ameri- 
can "isolation"  would  mean  that  the  taxation  of  Gopher 
Prairie  would  be  settled  in  Tokio;  and  that  tens  of  thousands 
of  American  youth  would  be  sentenced  to  death  by  unknown 
elderly  gentlemen  in  a  European  Cabinet  meeting.  If  the 
American  retorts  that  his  country  is  in  a  fundamentally  differ- 
ent position,  because  Great  Britain  possesses  an  Empire  and 
America  does  not,  that  only  proves  how  very  much  current 
ideas  in  politics  fail  to  take  cognizance  of  the  facts.  The 
United  States  to-day  has  in  the  problem  of  the  Philippines, 
their  protection  and  their  trade,  and  the  bearing  of  those  things 
upon  Japanese  policy ;  in  Hayti  and  the  West  Indies,  and  their 
bearing  upon  America's  subject  nationality  problem  of  the 
negro;  in  Mexico,  which  is  likely  to  provide  America  with  its 
Irish  problem;  in  the  Panama  Canal  tolls  question  and  its 
relation  to  the  development  of  a  mercantile  marine  and  naval 
competition  with  Great  Britain,  in  these  things  alone,  to  men- 
tion no  others,  subjects  of  conflict,  involving  defence  of 
American  interests,  out  of  which  will  arise  entanglements  not 
differing  greatly  in  kind  from  the  foreign  questions  which 
dominated  British  domestic  policy  during  the  period  of  British 
isolation. 

Now,  what  America  will  do  about  these  things  will  not  de- 
pend upon  highly  rationalised  decisions,  reached  by  a  hundred 
million  independent  thinkers  investigating  the  facts  concerning 
the  Panama  Treaty,  the  respective  merits  of  alternative  alli- 
ance combinations,  or  the  real  nature  of   negro  grievances. 


xvi     INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

American  policy  will  be  determined  by  the  same  character  of 
force  as  has  determined  British  poHcy  in  Ireland  or  India, 
in  Morocco  or  Egypt,  French  policy  in  Germany  or  in  Poland, 
or  Italian  policy  in  the  Adriatic.  The  "way  of  thinking"  which 
is  applied  to  the  decisions  of  the  American  democracy  has 
behind  it  the  same  kind  of  moral  and  intellectual  force  that 
we  find  in  the  society  of  Western  Europe  as  a  whole.  Behind 
the  American  public  mind  lie  practically  the  same  economic 
system  based  on  private  property,  the  same  kind  of  political 
democracy,  the  same  character  of  scholastic  training,  the  same 
conceptions  of  nationalism,  roughly  the  same  social  and  moral 
values.  If  we  find  certain  sovereign  ideas  determining  the 
course  of  British  or  French  or  Italian  policy,  giving  us  certain 
results,  we  may  be  sure  that  the  same  ideas  will,  in  the  case 
of  America,  give  us  very  much  the  same  results. 

When  Britain  spoke  of  "splendid  isolation,"  she  meant  what 
America  means  by  the  term  to-day,  namely,  a  position  by  virtue 
of  which,  when  it  came  to  a  conflict  of  policy  between  herself 
and  others,  she  should  possess  preponderant  power,  so  that 
she  could  impose  her  own  view  of  her  own  rights,  be  judge 
and  executioner  in  her  own  case.  To  have  suggested  to  an 
Englishman  twenty  years  ago  that  the  real  danger  to  the  secu- 
rity of  his  country  lay  in  the  attitude  of  mind  dominant  among 
Englishmen  themselves,  that  the  fundamental  defect  of  Eng- 
lish policy  was  that  it  asked  of  others  something  which  English- 
men would  never  accord  if  asked  by  others  of  them,  and  that 
such  a  policy  was  particularly  inimical  in  the  long  run  to  Great 
Britain,  in  that  her  population  lived  by  processes  which  dom- 
inant power  could  not,  in  the  last  resort,  exact — such  a  line 
of  argument  would  have  been,  and  indeed  was,  regarded  as 
too  remote  from  practical  affairs  to  be  worth  the  attention  of 
practical  politicians.  A  discussion  of  the  Japanese  Alliance, 
the  relations  with  Russia,  the  size  of  foreign  fleets,  the  Bagdad 
railway,  would  have  been  regarded  as  entirely  practical  and 
relevant.    These  things  were  the  "facts"  of  politics.    It  was 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION     xvii 

not  regarded  as  relevant  to  the  practical  issues  to  examine 
the  role  of  certain  general  ideas  and  traditions  which  had 
grown  up  in  England  in  determining  the  form  of  British 
policy.  The  growth  of  a  crude  philosophy  of  militarism, 
based  on  a  social  pseudo-Darwinism,  the  popularity  of  Kipling 
and  Roberts,  the  jingoism  of  the  Northcliffe  Press — ^these 
things  might  be  regarded  as  items  in  the  study  of  social  psy- 
chology; they  were  not  regarded  as  matters  for  the  practical 
statesman.     "What  would  you  have  us  do  about  them,  any- 


way 


It  has  happened  to  the  present  writer,  in  addressing  Ameri- 
can students,  to  lay  stress  upon  the  role  of  certain  dominant 
ideas  in  determining  policy  (upon  the  idea,  say,  of  the  State 
as  a  person,  upon  the  conception  of  States  as  necessarily  rival 
entities),  and  afterwards  to  get  questions  in  this  wise:  "Your 
lecture  seems  to  imply  an  internationalist  policy.  What  is  your 
plan?  What  ought  we  to  do?  Should  we  make  a  naval  alli- 
ance wth  Great  Britain,  or  form  a  new  League  of  Nations, 
or  denounce  Article  X,  or  ...  ?"  I  have  replied :  "The  first 
thing  to  do  is  to  change  your  ideas  and  moral  values;  or  to 
get  to  know  them  better.  That  is  the  most  practical  and  im- 
mediate platform,  because  all  others  depend  on  it.  We  all  pro- 
fess great  love  of  peace  and  justice.  What  will  you  pay  for 
it,  in  terms  of  national  sovereignty?  What  degree  of  sover- 
eignty will  you  surrender  as  your  contribution  to  a  new 
order?  If  your  real  feeling  is  for  domination,  then  the  only 
effect  of  writing  constitutions  of  the  League  of  Nations  will 
be  to  render  international  organisation  more  remote  than  ever, 
by  showing  how  utterly  incompatible  it  is  with  prevailing  moral 
values." 

But  such  a  reply  is  usually  regarded  as  hopelessly  "unprac- 
tical." There  is  no  indication  of  something  to  be  "done" — ^a 
platform  to  be  defended  or  a  law  to  be  passed.  To  change 
fundamental  opinions  and  redirect  desires  is  not  apparently  to 
"do"  anything  at  all.     Yet  until  that  invisible  thing  is  done 


xviii  INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

our  Covenants  and  Leagues  will  be  as  futile  as  have  been  the 
numberless  similar  plans  of  the  past,  "concerning  which,"  as 
one  seventeenth  century  critic  wrote,  "I  know  no  single  im- 
perfection save  this :  That  by  no  possibility  would  any  Prince 
or  people  be  brought  to  abide  by  them."  It  was,  I  believe, 
regarded  as  a  triumph  of  practical  organisation  to  have  obtained 
nation-wide  support  for  the  'League  to  Enforce  Peace'  pro- 
posal, "without  raising  controversial  matters  at  all" — ^leaving 
untouched,  that  is,  the  underlying  ideas  of  patriotism,  of 
national  right  and  international  obligation,  the  prevailing  moral 
and  political  values,  in  fact.  The  subsequent  history  of  Ameri- 
ca's relation  to  the  world's  effort  to  create  a  League  of  Nations 
is  sufficient  commentary  as  to  whether  it  is  "practical"  to  de- 
vise plans  and  constitutions  without  reference  to  a  prevailing 
attitude  of  mind. 

America  has  before  her  certain  definite  problems  of  foreign 
policy — ^Japanese  immigration  into  the  United  States  and  the 
Philippines;  concessions  granted  to  foreigners  in  Mexico;  the 
question  of  disorder  in  that  country;  the  relations  with  Hayti 
(which  will  bear  on  the  question  of  America's  subject  nation- 
ality, the  negro)  ;  the  exemption  of  American  ships  from  tolls 
in  the  Panama  Canal ;  the  exclusion  of  foreign  shipping  from 
"coastwise"  trade  with  the  Philippines.  It  would  be  possible 
to  draw  up  plans  of  settlement  with  regard  to  each  item 
which  would  be  equitable.  But  the  development  of  foreign 
policy  (which,  more  than  any  other  department  of  politics,  will 
fix  the  quality  of  American  society  in  the  future)  will  not 
depend  upon  the  more  or  less  equitable  settlement  of  those 
specific  questions.  The  specific  differences  between  England 
and  Germany  before  the  War  were  less  serious  than  those 
between  England  and  America — and  were  nearly  all  settled 
when  war  broke  out.  Whether  an  issue  like  Japanese  immi- 
gration or  the  Panama  tolls  leads  to  war  will  not  depend  upon 
its  intrinsic  importance,  or  whether  Britain  or  Japan  or  Amer- 
ica make  acceptable  proposals  on  the  subject.   Mr  ex- Secretary 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION     xix 

Daniels  has  just  told  us  that  the  assertion  of  the  right  to  estab- 
lish a  cable  station  on  the  Island  of  Yap  is  good  ground  for 
risking  war.)  The  specific  issues  about  which  nations  fight 
are  so  little  the  real  cause  of  the  fight  that  they  are  generally 
completely  forgotten  when  it  conies  to  making  the  peace.  The 
future  of  submarine  warfare  was  not  mentioned  at  Versailles. 
Given  a  certain  state  of  mind,  a  diflference  about  cables  on  the 
Island  of  Yap  is  quite  sufficient  to  make  war  inevitable.  We 
should  probably  regard  it  as  a  matter  of  national  honour,  con- 
cerning which  there  must  be  no  argument.  Another  mood, 
and  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  the  faintest  ripple  of  interest 
in  the  subject. 
i  It  was  not  British  passion  for  Serbian  nationality  which 
I  brought  Britain  to  the  side  of  Russia  in  1914.  It  was  the 
/  fear  of  German  power  and  what  might  be  done  with  it,  a  fear 
wrought  to  frenzy  pitch  by  a  long  indoctrination  concerning 
German  wickedness  and  aggression.  Passion  for  the  sub- 
jugation of  Germany  persisted  long  after  there  was  any  ground 
of  fear  of  what  German  power  might  accomplish.  If  America 
fights  Japan,  it  will  not  be  over  cables  on  Yap ;  it  will  be  from 
fear  of  Japanese  power,  the  previous  stimulation  of  latent 
hatreds  for  the  strange  and  foreign.  And  if  the  United  States 
goes  to  war  over  Panama  Canal  tolls,  it  will  not  be  because 
the  millions  who  will  get  excited  over  that  question  have  ex- 
amined the  matter,  or  possess  ships  or  shares  in  ships  that  will 
profit  by  the  exemption;  it  will  be  because  all  America  has 
read  of  Irish  atrocities  which  recall  school-day  histories  of 
British  atrocities  in  the  American  Colonies;  because  the 
"person,"  Britain,  has  become  a  hateful  and  hostile  person, 
and  must  be  punished  and    coerced. 

War  either  with  Japan  or  Britain  or  both  is,  of  course,  quite 
within  the  region  of  possibility.  It  is  merely  an  evasion  of 
the  trouble  which  facing  reality  always  involves,  to  say  that 
war  between  Britain  and  America  is  "unthinkable."  If  any 
war,  as  we  have  known  it  these  last  ten  years,  is  thinkable, 


XX      INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION 

war  between  nations  that  have  already  fought  two  wars  is  obvi- 
ously not  unthinkable.  And  those  who  can  recall  at  all  vividly 
the  forces  which  marked  the  growth  of  the  conflict  between 
Britain  and  Germany  will  see  just  those  forces  beginning  to 
colour  the  relations  of  Britain  and  America.  Among  those 
forces  none  is  more  notable  than  this :  a  disturbing  tendency 
to  stop  short  at  the  ultimate  questions,  a  failure  to  face  the 
basic  causes  of  divergence.  Among  people  of  good  will  there 
is  a  tendency  to  say:  "Don't  let's  talk  about  it.  Be  discreet. 
Let  us  assume  we  are  good  friends  and  we  shall  be.  Let  us 
exchange  visits."  In  just  such  a  way,  even  within  a  few  weeks 
of  war,  did  people  of  good  will  in  England  and  Germany 
decide  not  to  talk  of  their  differences,  to  be  discreet,  to  exchange 
visits.  But  the  men  of  ill  will  talked — ^talked  of  the  wrong 
things — ^and  sowed  their  deadly  poison. 

These  pages  suggest  why  neither  side  in  the  Anglo-German  | 
conflict  came  down  to  realities  before  the  War.    To  have  come  ! 
to  fundamentals  would  have  revealed  the  fact  to  both  parties 
that  any  real  settlement  would  have  asked  things  which  neither  ; 
would  grant.     Really  to  have  secured  Germany's  future  eco-  * 
nomic  security  would  have  meant  putting  her  access  to  the 
resources  of  India  and  Africa  upon  a  basis  of  Treaty,  of  con- 
tract.   That  was  for  Britain  the  end  of  Empire,  as  Imperialists 
understood   it.     To   have   secured   in  exchange   the   end   of 
"marching  and  drilling"  would  have  been  the  end  of  military 
glory  for  Prussia.    For  both  it  would  have  meant  the  surrender 
of  certain  dominations,  a  recasting  of  patriotic  ideals,  a  revo- 
lution of  ideas. 

Whether  Britain  and  America  are  to  fight  may  very  well 
depend  upon  this:  whether  the  blinder  and  more  unconscious 
motives  rooted  in  traditional  patriotisms,  and  the  impulse  to 
the  assertion  of  power,  will  work  their  evil  before  the  develop- 
ment of  ideas  has  brought  home  to  us  a  clearer  vision  of  the 
abyss  into  which  we  fall;  before  we  have  modified,  in  other 
words,  our  tradition  of  patriotism,  our  political  morjilities,  our 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  EDITION     xxi 

standard  of  values.  Without  that  more  fundamental  change 
no  scheme  of  settlement  of  specific  differences,  no  platforms, 
Covenants,  Constitution  can  avail,  or  have  any  chance  of 
acceptance  or  success. 

As  a  contribution  to  that  change  of  ideas  and  of  values 
these  pages  are  offered. 


SUMMARY  OF  ARGUMENT 

The  central  conclusion  suggested  by  the  following  analysis 
of  the  events  of  the  past  few  years  is  that,  underlying  the  dis- 
ruptive processes  so  evidently  at  work — especially  in  the  inter- 
national field — is  the  deep-rooted  instinct  to  the  assertion  of 
domination,  preponderant  power.  This  impulse  sanctioned  and 
strengthened  by  prevailing  traditions  of  'mystic'  patriotism, 
has  been  unguided  and  unchecked  by  any  adequate  realisation 
either  of  its  anti-social  quality,  the  destructiveness  inseparable 
from  its  operation,  or  its  ineffectiveness  to  ends  indispensable 
to  civilisation. 

The  psychological  roots  of  the  impulse  are  so  deep  that  we 
shall  continue  to  yield  to  it  until  we  realise  more  fully  its  dan- 
ger and  inadequacy  to  certain  vital  ends  like  sustenance  for  our 
people,  and  come  to  see  that  if  civilisation  is  to  be  carried  on  we 
must  turn  to  other  motives.  We  may  then  develop  a  new 
political  tradition,  which  will  'discipline'  instinct,  as  the  tradi- 
tion of  toleration  disciplined  religious  fanaticism  when  that 
passion  threatened  to  shatter  European  society. 

Herein  lies  the  importance  of  demonstrating  the  economic 
futility  of  military  power.  While  it  may  be  true  that  conscious 
economic  motives  enter  very  little  into  the  struggle  of  nations, 
and  are  a  very  small  part  of  the  passions  of  patriotism  and 
nationalism,  it  is  by  a  realisation  of  the  economic  truth  regard- 
ing the  indispensable  condition  of  adequate  life,  that  those  pas- 
sions will  be  checked,  or  redirected  and  civilised. 

This  does  not  mean  that  economic  considerations  should 


xxiv  SUMMARY  OF  ARGUMENT 

dominate  life,  but  rather  the  contrary — that  those  considera- 
tions will  dominate  it  if  the  economic  truth  is  neglected.  A 
people  that  starves  is  a  people  thinking  only  of  material  things 
— food.  The  way  to  dispose  of  economic  pre-occupations  is 
to  solve  the  economic  problem. 

The  bearing  of  this  argument  is  that  developed  by  the 
present  writer  in  a  previous  book,  The  Great  Illusion,  and  the 
extent  to  which  it  has  been  vindicated  by  events,  is  shown  in 
the  Addendum. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I      OUR   DAILY   BREAD  3 

II      THE  OLD  ECONOMY  AND  THE  POST-WAR  STATE  .        61 

III      NATIONALITY,    ECONOMICS,   AND  THE  ASSERTION   OF 

RIGHT 81 

IV      MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE — AND  INSECURITY   .  .112 

V      PATRIOTISM   AND  POWER  IN   WAR  AND   PEACE:     THE 

SOCIAL   OUTCOME 142 

VI      THE  ALTERNATIVE  RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT      169 

VII      THE  SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT      .  .       199 

ADDENDUM  :      SOME    NOTES    ON    'tHE    GREAT    ILLU- 
SION' AND  ITS  PRESENT  RELEVANCE      .  .  .      253 

I.  The  'Impossibility  of  War'  Myth.  II.  'Economic' 
and  'Moral'  Motives  in  International  Affairs.  III.  The 
'Great  Illusion'  Argument.  IV.  Arguments  now  out  of 
date.  V.  The  Argument  as  an  attack  on  the  State, 
VI.  Vindication  by  Events.  VII.  Could  the  War  have 
been  prevented? 


XXT 


SYNOPSIS 
CHAPTER  I  (pp.  3-60) 

OUR  DAILY  BREAD 

An  examination  of  the  present  conditions  in  Europe  shows 
that  much  of  its  dense  population  (particularly  that  of  these 
islands)  cannot  live  at  a  standard  necessary  for  civilisation 
(leisure,  social  peace,  individual  freedom)  except  by  certain 
co-operative  processes  which  must  be  carried  on  largely  across 
frontiers.  (The  prosperity  of  Britain  depends  on  the  pro- 
duction by  foreigners  of  a  surplus  of  food  and  raw  material 
above  their  own  needs.)  The  present  distress  is  not  mainly 
the  result  of  the  physical  destruction  of  war  (famine  or  short- 
age is  worst,  as  in  the  Austrian  and  German  and  Russian  areas, 
where  there  has  been  no  destruction).  The  Continent  as  a 
whole  has  the  same  soil  and  natural  resources  and  technical 
knowledge  as  when  it  fed  its  populations.  The  causes  of  its 
present  failure  at  self-support  are  moral:  economic  paralysis 
following  political  disintegration,  'Balkanisation* ;  that,  in  its 
turn,  due  to  certain  passions  and  prepossessions. 

A  corresponding  phenomenon  is  revealed  within  each  national 
society:  a  decline  of  production  due  to  certain  moral  dis- 
orders, mainly  in  the  political  field;  to  'unrest,*  a  greater 
cleavage  between  groups,  rendering  the  indispensable  co- 
operation less  effective. 

xxvi 


SYNOPSIS  xxvii 

The  necessary  co-operation,  whether  as  between  nations  or 
groups  within  each  nation,  cannot  be  compelled  by  physical 
coercion,  though  disruptive  forces  inseparable  from  the  use  of 
coercion  can  paralyse  co-operation.  Allied  preponderance  of 
power  over  Germany  does  not  suffice  to  obtain  indemnities,  or 
even  coal  in  the  quantities  demanded  by  the  Treaty.  The  out- 
put of  the  workers  in  Great  Britain  would  not  necessarily  he 
improved  by  adding  to  the  army  or  police  force.  As  inter- 
dependence increases,  the  limits  of  coercion  are  narrowed. 
Enemies  that  are  to  pay  large  indemnities  must  be  permitted 
actively  to  develop  their  economic  life  and  power;  they  are 
then  so  potentially  strong  that  enforcement  of  the  demands 
becomes  correspondingly  expensive  and  uncertain.  Knowledge 
and  organisation  acquired  by  workers  for  the  purposes  of 
their  labour  can  be  used  to  resist  oppression.  Railwaymen  or 
miners  driven  to  work  by  force  would  still  find  means  of  re- 
sistance. A  proletarian  dictatorship  cannot  coerce  the  produc- 
tion of  food  by  an  unwilling  peasantry.  The  processes 
by  which  wealth  is  produced  have,  by  increasing  complexity, 
become  of  a  kind  which  can  only  be  maintained  if  there  be 
present  a  large  measure  of  voluntary  acquiescence,  which 
means,  in  its  turn,  confidence.  The  need  for  that  is  only  made 
the  more  imperative  by  the  conditions  which  have  followed  the 
virtual  suspension  of  the  gold  standard  in  all  the  belligerent 
States  of  Europe,  the  collapse  of  the  exchanges  and  other  mani- 
festations of  instability  of  the  currencies. 

European  statesmanship,  as  revealed  in  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, and  in  the  conduct  of  international  affairs  since  the 
Armistice,  has  recognised  neither  the  fact  of  interdependence 
— ^the  need  for  the  economic  unity  of  Europe — nor  the  futility 
of  attempted  coercion.  Certain  political  ideas  and  passions 
give  us  an  unworkable  Europe.  What  is  their  nature?  How 
have  they  arisen?  How  can  they  be  corrected?  These  ques- 
tions are  part  of  the  problem  of  sustenance;  which  is  the  first 
indispensable  of  civilisation. 


xxviii  SYNOPSIS 

CHAPTER  II  (pp.  61-80) 

THE  OLD  ECONOMY  AND  THE  POST-WAR   STATE 

The  trans-national  processes  which  enabled  Europe  to  sup- 
port itself  before  the  War  were  based  mainly  on  private  ex- 
changes prompted  by  the  expectation  of  individual  advantage. 
They  were  not  dependent  upon  political  power.  (The  fifteen 
millions  for  whom  German  soil  could  not  provide  lived  by  trade 
with  countries  over  which  Germany  had  no  political  control,  as 
a  similar  number  of  British  live  by  similar  non-political  means.) 

The  old  individualist  economy  has  been  largely  destroyed  by 
the  State  Socialism  introduced  for  war  purposes:  the  nation, 
taking  over  individual  enterprise,  became  trader  and  manu- 
facturer in  increasing  degree.  The  economic  clauses  of  the 
Treaty,  if  enforced,  must  prolong  this  tendency,  rendering  a 
large  measure  of  such  Socialism  permanent. 

The  change  may  be  desirable.  But  if  co-operation  must  in 
future  be  less  as  between  individuals  for  private  advantage, 
and  much  more  as  between  nations,  governments  acting  in  an 
economic  capacity,  the  political  emotions  of  nationalisation  will 
play  a  much  larger  role  in  the  economic  processes  of  Europe. 
If  to  Nationalist  hostilities  as  we  have  known  them  in  the  past 
is  to  be  added  the  commercial  rivalry  of  nations  now  converted 
into  traders  and  capitalists,  we  are  likely  to  have  not  a  less  but 
a  more  quarrelsome  world,  unless  the  fact  of  interdependence 
is  much  more  vividly  realised  than  in  the  past. 

CHAPTER  III  (pp.  81-111) 

NATIONALITY,   ECONOMICS,  AND  THE  ASSERTION  OF  RIGHT 

The  change  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter  raises  a  profound 
question  of  Right — Have  we  the  right  to  use  our  power  to  deny 
to  others  the  means  of  life?  By  our  political  power  we  can 
create  a  Europe  which,  while  not  assuring  advantage  to  the 


SYNOPSIS  xxix 

victor,  deprives  the  vanquished  of  means  of  existence.  The 
loss  of  both  ore  and  coal  by  the  Central  Powers  might  well 
make  it  impossible  for  their  future  populations  to  find  food. 
What  are  they  to  do?  Starve?  To  disclaim  responsibility  is 
to  claim  that  we  are  entitled  to  use  our  power  to  deny  them 
life. 

This  *right*  to  starve  foreigners  can  only  be  invoked  by  in- 
voking the  conception  of  nationalism — 'Our  nation  first.'  But 
the  policy  of  placing  life  itself  upon  a  foundation  of  prepon- 
derant force,  instead  of  mutually  advantageous  co-operation, 
compels  statesmen  perpetually  to  betray  the  principle  of 
nationality;  not  only  directly,  (as  in  the  case  of  the  annexa- 
tion of  territory,  economically  necessary,  but  containing  peoples 
of  alien  nationality,)  but  indirectly;  for  the  resistance  which 
our  policy  (of  denying  means  of  subsistence  to  others)  pro- 
vokes, makes  preponderance  of  power  the  condition  of  survival. 
All  else  must  give  way  to  that  need. 

Might  cannot  be  pledged  to  Right  in  these  conditions.  If 
our  power  is  pledged  to  Allies  for  the  purpose  of  the  Balance 
(which  means,  in  fact,  preponderance),  it  cannot  be  used 
against  them  to  enforce  respect  for  (say)  nationality.  To 
turn  against  Allies  would  break  the  Balance.  To  maintain 
the  Balance  of  Power  we  are  compelled  to  disregard  the  moral 
merits  of  an  Ally's  policy  (as  in  the  case  of  the  promise  to 
the  Czar's  government  not  to  demand  the  independence  o 
Poland).  The  maintenance  of  a  Balance  (i.e.  preponderance) 
is  incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  Right.  There  is  a 
conflict  of  obligation. 

CHAPTER  IV  (pp.  112-141) 

MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE — AND   INSECURITY 

The  moral  questions  raised  in  the  preceding  chapter  have 
a  direct  bearing  on  the  effectiveness  of  military  power  based 


'^ 


XXX  SYNOPSIS 

on  the  National  unit,  or  a  group  of  National  units,  such  as  an 
Alliance.  Military  preponderance  of  the  smaller  Western  Na- 
tional units  over  large  and  potentially  powerful  groups,  like 
the  German  or  the  Russian,  must  necessitate  stable  and  pro- 
longed co-operation.  But,  as  the  present  condition  of  the 
Alliance  which  fought  the  War  shows,  the  rivalries  inseparable 
from  the  fears  and  resentments  of  'instinctive*  nationalism, 
make  that  prolonged  co-operation  impossible.  The  qualities  of 
Nationalism  which  stand  in  the  way  of  Internationalism  stand 
also  in  the  way  of  stable  alliances  (which  are  a  form  of  Inter- 
nationalism) and  make  them  extremely  unstable  foundations 
of  power. 

The  difficulties  encountered  by  the  Allies  in  taking  com- 
bined action  in  Russia  show  that  to  this  fundamental  insta- 
bility due  to  the  moral  nature  of  Nationalism,  must  be  added, 
as  causes  of  pnilitary  paralysis,  the  economic  disruption  which 
reduces  the  available  material  resources,  and  the  social  unrest 
(largely  the  result  of  the  economic  difficulties)  which  under- 
mines the  cohesion  even  of  the  national  unit. 

These  forces  render  military  predominance  based  on  the 
temporary  co-operation  of  units  still  preserving  the  Nationalist 
outlook  extremely  precarious  and  unreliable. 

CHAPTER  V  (pp.  142-168) 

PATRIOTISM   AND  POWER   IN   WAR  AND  PEACE:    THE 
SOCIAL  OUTCOME 

The  greatest  and  most  obvious  present  need  of  Europe,  for 
the  salvation  of  its  civilisation,  is  unity  and  co-operation. 
Yet  the  predominant  forces  of  its  politics  push  to  conflict 
and  disunity.  If  it  is  the  calculating  selfishness  of  'realist'  states- 
men that  thus  produces  impoverishment  and  bankruptcy,  the 
calculation  would  seem  to  be  defective.  The  Balkanisation 
of  Europe  obviously  springs,  however,  from  sources  belong- 
ing to  our  patriotisms,  which  arc  mainly  uncalculating  and 


SYNOPSIS  xxxi 

instinctive,  'mystic'  impulses  and  passions.  Can  we  safely 
give  these  instinctive  pugnacities  full  play? 

One  side  of  patriotism — ^gregariousness,  'herd  instinct' —  has 
a  socially  protective  origin,  and  is  probably  in  some  form  in- 
dispensable. But  coupled  with  uncontrolled  pugnacity,  tribal 
gregariousness  grows  into  violent  partisanship  as  against  other 
groups,  and  greatly  strengthens  the  instinct  to  coercion,  the 
desire  to  impose  our  power. 

In  war-time,  pugnacity,  partisanship,  coerciveness  can  find 
full  satisfaction  in  the  fight  against  the  enemy.  But  when 
the  war  is  over,  these  instincts,  which  have  become  so  highly 
developed,  still  seek  satisfaction.  They  may  find  it  in  two 
ways :  in  conflict  between  Allies,  or  in  strife  between  groups 
within  the  nation. 

We  may  here  find  an  explanation  of  what  seems  otherwise 
a  moral  enigma:  that  just  after  a  war,  universally  lauded  as 
a  means  of  national  unity,  'bringing  all  classes  together,'  the 
country  is  distraught  by  bitter  social  chaos,  amounting  to 
revolutionary  menace;  and  that  after  the  war  which  was  to 
wipe  out  at  last  all  the  old  differences  which  divided  the  Allies, 
their  relations  are  worse  than  before  the  War  (as  in  the  case  of 
Britain  and  America  and  Britain  and  France). 

Why  should  the  fashionable  lady,  capable  of  sincere  self- 
sacrifice  (scrubbing  hospital  floors  and  tending  canteens)  for 
her  countrymen  when  they  are  soldiers,  become  completely 
indifferent  to  the  same  countrymen  when  they  have  returned 
to  civil  life  (often  dangerous  and  hard,  as  in  mining  and  fish- 
ing) ?  In  the  latter  case  there  is  no  common  enmity  uniting 
duchess  and  miner. 

Another  enigma  may  be  solved  in  the  same  way:  why  mili- 
tary terrorism,  unprovoked  war,  secret  diplomacy,  autocratic 
tyranny,  violation  of  nationality,  which  genuinely  appal  us 
when  committed  by  the  enemy,  leave  us  unmoved  when  'politi- 
cal necessity'  provokes  very  similar  conduct  on  our  part;  why 
the  ideals  for  which  we  went  to  war  become  matters  of  in- 


xxxii  SYNOPSIS 

difference  to  us  when  we  have  achieved  victory.  Gregarious- 
ness,  which  has  become  intense  partisanship,  makes  right  that 
which  our  side  does  or  desires;  wrong  that  which  the  other 
side  does. 

This  is  fatal,  not  merely  to  justice,  but  to  sincerity,  to  in- 
tellectual rectitude,  to  the  capacity  to  see  the  truth  objectively. 
It  explains  why  we  can,  at  the  end  of  a  war,  excuse  or  espouse 
the  very  policies  which  the  war  was  waged  to  make  impossible. 

CHAPTER  VI  (pp.  169-198) 

THE  ALTERNATIVE  RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT 

Instinct,  being  cp-terminous  with  all  animal  life,  is  a  mo- 
tive of  conduct  immeasurably  older  and  more  deeply  rooted 
than  reasoning  based  on  experience.  So  long  as  the  instinctive, 
'natural'  action  succeeds,  or  appears  to  succeed  in  its  object, 
we  do  not  trouble  to  examine  the  results  of  instinct  or  to 
reason.    Only  failure  causes  us  to  do  that. 

We  have  seen  that  the  pugnacities,  gregariousness,  group 
partisanship  embodied  in  patriotism,  give  a  strong  emotional 
push  to  domination,  the  assertion  of  our  power  over  others 
as  a  means  of  settling  our  relations  with  them.  Physical  coer- 
cion marks  all  the  early  methods  in  politics  (as  in  autocracy 
and  feudalism),  in  economics  (as  in  slavery),  and  even  in  the 
relations  of  the  sexes. 

But  we  try  other  methods  (and  manage  to  restrain  our  im- 
pulse sufficiently)  when  we  really  discover  that  force  won't 
work.  When  we  find  we  cannot  coerce  a  man  but  still  need 
his  service,  we  offer  him  inducements,  bargain  with  him,  enter 
a  contract.  This  is  the  result  of  realising  that  we  really  need 
him,  and  cannot  compel  him.  That  is  the  history  of  the  de- 
velopment from  status  to  contract. 

Stable  international  co-operation  cannot  come  in  any  other 
way.  Not  until  we  realise  the  failure  of  national  coercive 
power  for  indispensable  ends   (like  the  food  of  our  people) 


SYNOPSIS  xxxiii 

shall  we  cease  to  idealise  power  and  to  put  our  intensest  politi- 
cal emotions,  like  those  of  patriotism,  behind  it. 

The  alternative  to  preponderance  is  partnership  of  power. 
Both  may  imply  the  employment  of  force  (as  in  policing),  but 
the  latter  makes  force  the  instrument  of  a  conscious  social 
purpose,  offering  to  the  rival  that  challenges  the  force  (as  in 
the  case  of  the  individual  criminal  within  the  nation)  the 
same  rights  as  those  claimed  by  the  users  of  force.  Force  as 
employed  by  competitive  nationalism  does  not  do  this.  It 
says  'You  or  me,'  not  'You  and  me.'  The  method  of  social 
co-operation  may  fail  temporarily;  but  it  has  the  perpetual 
opportunity  of  success.  It  succeeds  the  moment  that  the  two 
parties  both  accept  it.  But  the  other  method  is  bound  to  fail ; 
the  two  parties  cannot  both  accept  it.  Both  cannot  be  masters. 
Both  can  be  partners. 

The  failure  of  preponderant  power  on  a  nationalist  basis 
for  indispensable  ends  would  be  self-evident  but  for  the  push 
of  the  instincts  which  warp  our  judgment. 

Yet  faith  in  the  social  method  is  the  condition  of  its  suc- 
cess. It  is  a  choice  of  risks.  We  distrust  and  arm.  Others, 
then,  are  entitled  also  to  distrust ;  their  arming  is  our  justifica- 
tion for  distrusting  them.  The  policy  of  suspicion  justifies 
itself.  To  allay  suspicion  we  must  accept  the  risk  of  trust. 
That,  too,  will  justify  itself. 

Man's  future  depends  on  making  the  better  choice,  for 
either  the  distrust  or  the  faith  will  justify  itself.  His  judg- 
ment will  not  be  fit  to  make  that  choice  if  it  is  warped  by  the 
passions  of  pugnacity  and  hate  that  we  have  cultivated  as 
part  of  the  apparatus  of  war. 

CHAPTER  VII  (pp.  199-251) 

THE  SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT 

If  our  instinctive  pugnacities  and  hates  are  uncontrollable, 
and  they  dictate  conduct,  no  more  is  to  be  said.    We  are  the 


xxxiv  SYNOPSIS 

helpless  victims  of  outside  forces,  and  may  as  well  surrender. 
But  many  who  urge  this  most  insistently  in  the  case  of  our 
patriotic  pugnacities  obviously  do  not  believe  it :  their  demands 
for  the  suppression  of  'defeatist'  propaganda  during  the  War, 
their  support  of  war-time  propaganda  for  the  maintenance 
of  morale,  their  present  fears  of  the  'deadly  infection'  of 
Bolshevist  ideas,  indicate,  on  the  contrary,  a  very  real  belief 
that  feelings  can  be  subject  to  an  extremely  rapid  modification 
or  redirection.  In  human  society  mere  instinct  has  always 
been  modified  or  directed  in  some  measure  by  taboos,  tradi^ 
tions,  conventions,  constituting  a  social  discipline.  The  charac- 
ter of  that  discipline  is  largely  determined  by  some  sense  of 
social  need,  developed  as  the  result  of  the  suggestion  of  trans- 
mitted ideas,  discussions,  intellectual  ferment. 

The  feeling  which  made  the  Treaty  inevitable  was  the  re^ 
suit  of  a  partly  unconscious  but  also  partly  conscious  propa- 
ganda of  war  half-truths,  built  up  on  a  sub-structure  of 
deeply  rooted  nationalist  conceptions.  The  systematic  exploita- 
tion of  German  atrocities,  and  the  systematic  suppression  of 
similar  AlIied^oflFences,  the  systematic  suppression  of  every 
gooayced-<kme'"by--oar  enemy,  constituted  a  monstrous  half- 
truth.  It  had  the  effect  of  fortifying  the  conception  of  the 
enemy  people  as  a  single  person;  its  complete  collective  re- 

\  sponsibility.    Any  one  of  them — child,  woman,  invalid — couldx 
properly  be  punished  (by  famine,  say)   for  any  other's  guilt.j  ^ 
Peace  became  a  problem  of  repressing  or  destroying  this  en 
tirely  bad  person  by  a  combination  of  nations  entirely  good 
This  falsified  the  nature  of  the  problem,  gave  free  rein  to 
natural  and  instinctive  retaliations,  obscured  the  simplest  hu- 
man realities,  and  rendered  possible  ierpcioug.  cruelty  on  the 

,4Jart  of  the  Allies.  There  would  have  been  in  any  case  a  strong 
tendency  to  ignore  even  the  facts  which  in  Allied  interest 
should  have  been  considered.  In  the  best  circumstances  it 
would  have  been  extremely  difficult  to  put  through  a  Wilsonian 
(type  1918)  policy,  involving  restraint  of  the  sacred  egoisms, 


■f^ 


SYNOPSIS  XXXV 

the  impulsive  retaliations,  the  desire  for  dominion  inherent  in 
'intense'  nationahsms.  The  efficiency  of  the  machinery  by 
which  the  Governments  for  the  purpose  of  war  formed  the 
mind  of  the  nation,  made  it  out  of  the  question. 

If  ever  the  passions  which  gather  around  the  patriotisms 
disrupting  and  Balkanising  Europe  are  to  be  disciplined  or 
directed  by  a  better  social  tradition,  we  must  face  without 
pretence  or  self-deception  the  results  which  show  the  real 
nature  of  the  older  political  moralities.  We  must  tell  truths 
that  disturb  strong  prejudices. 


THE   FRUITS  OF   VICTORY 


THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 


CHAPTER  I 

OUR    DAILY    BREAD 


The  relation  of  certain  economic  facts  to  Britain's 
independence  and  Social  Peace 

Political  instinct  in  England,  particularly  in  the  shaping  of 
naval  policy,  has  always  recognised  the  intimate  relation  which 
must  exist  between  an  uninterrupted  flow  of  food  to  these 
shores  and  the  preservation  of  national  independence.  An 
enemy  in  a  position  to  stop  that  flow  would  enjoy  not  merely 
an  economic  but  a  political  power  over  us — the  power  to  starve 
us  into  ignominious  submission  to  his  will. 

The  fact  has,  of  course,  for  generations  been  the  main  argu- 
ment for  Britain's  right  to  maintain  unquestioned  command 
of  the  sea.  In  the  discussions  before  the  War  concerning 
the  German  challenge  to  our  naval  power,  it  was  again  and 
again  pointed  out  that  Britain's  position  was  very  special: 
what  is  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  her  had  no  equivalent 
importance  for  other  powers.  And  it  was  when  the  Kaiser 
announced  that  Germany's  future  was  upon  the  sea  that 
British  fear  became  acute!  The  instinct  of  self-preservation 
became  aroused  by  the  thought  of  the  possible  possession  in 
hostile  hands  of  an  instrument  that  could  sever  vital  arteries. 

The  fact  shows  how  impossible  it  is  to  divide  off  into  water- 

3 


4  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

tight  compartments  the  'economic*  from  the  political  or  moral. 
To  preserve  the  capacity  to  feed  our  people,  to  see  that  our 
children  shall  have  milk,  is  certainly  an  economic  aflfair — a 
commercial  one  even.  But  it  is  an  indispensable  condition 
also  of  the  defence  of  our  country,  of  the  preservation  of  our 
national  freedom.  The  ultimate  end  behind  the  determination 
to  preserve  a  preponderant  navy  may  be  purely  nationalist  or 
moral;  the  means  is  the  maintenance  of  a  certain  economic 
situation. 

Indeed  the  task  of  ensuring  the  daily  bread  of  the  people 
touches  moral  and  social  issues  nearer  and  more  intimate  even 
than  the  preservation  of  our  national  independence.  The  in- 
exorable rise  in  the  cost  of  living,  the  unemployment  and  loss 
and  insecurity  which  accompany  a  rapid  fall  in  prices,  are 
probably  the  predominating  factors  in  a  social  unrest  which 
may  end  in  transforming  the  whole  texture  of  Western  society. 
The  worker  finds  his  increased  wage  continually  nullified  by 
increase  of  price.  Out  of  this  situation  arises  an  exasperation 
which,  naturally  enough,  with  peoples  habituated  by  five  years 
of  war  to  violence  and  emotional  mass-judgments,  finds  ex- 
pression, not  necessarily  in  organised  revolution — ^that  implies, 
after  all,  a  plan  of  programme,  a  hope  of  a  new  order — but 
rather  in  sullen  resentment;  declining  production,  the  menace 
of  general  chaos.  However  restricted  the  resources  of  a 
country  may  have  become,  there  will  always  be  some  people 
under  a  regime  of  private  capital  and  individual  enterprise 
who  will  have  more  than  a  mere  sufficiency,  whose  means  will 
reach  to  luxury  and  even  ostentation.  They  may  be  few  in 
number;  the  amount  of  waste  their  luxury  represents  may  in 
comparison  with  the  total  resources  be  unimportant.  But 
their  existence  will  suffice  to  give  colour  to  the  charge  of 
profiteering  and  exploitation  and  to  render  still  more  acute  the 
sullen  discontent,  and  finally  perhaps  the  tendency  to  violence. 

It  is  in  such  a  situation  that  the  price  of  a  few  prime  neces- 
saries— bread,  coal,  milk,  sugar,  clothing — becomes  a  social. 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  5 

political,  and  moral  fact  of  the  first  importance.  A  two- 
shilling  loaf  may  well  be  a  social  and  political  portent. 

In  the  week  preceding  the  writing  of  these  lines  five  cabinets 
have  fallen  in  Europe.  The  least  common  denominator  in  the 
cause  is  the  grinding  poverty  which  is  common  to  the  peoples 
they  ruled.  In  two  cases  the  governments  fell  avowedly  over 
the  question  of  bread,  maintained  by  subsidy  at  a  fraction  of 
its  commercial  cost.  Everywhere  the  social  atmosphere,  the 
temper  of  the  workers,  responds  to  stimulus  of  that  kind. 

When  we  reach  the  stage  at  which  mothers  are  forced  to  see 
their  children  slowly  die  for  lack  of  milk  and  bread,  or  the 
decencies  of  life  are  lost  in  a  sordid  scramble  for  sheer  physical 
existence,  then  the  economic  problem  becomes  the  gravest 
moral  problem.    The  two  are  merged. 

The  obvious  truth  that,  if  economic  preoccupations  are  not 
to  dominate  the  minds  and  absorb  the  energies  of  men  to  the 
exclusion  of  less  material  things,  then  the  fundamental  eco- 
nomic needs  must  be  satisfied ;  the  fact,  that  though  the  founda- 
tions are  certainly  not  the  whole  building,  civilisation  does  rest 
upon  foundations  of  food,  shelter,  fuel,  and  that  if  it  is  to  be 
stable  they  must  be  sound — these  things  have  been  rendered 
commonplace  by  events  since  the  Armistice.  But  before  the 
War  they  were  not  commonplaces.  The  suggestion  that  the 
economic  results  of  war  were  worth  considering  was  quite  com- 
monly rejected  as  'offensive,'  implying  that  men  went  to  war 
for  'profit.'  Nations  in  going  to  war,  we  were  told,  were  lifted 
beyond  the  region  of  'economics.'  The  conception  that  the 
neglect  of  the  economics  of  war  might  mean — as  it  has  meant — 
the  slow  torture  of  tens  of  millions  of  children  and  the  disin- 
tegration of  whole  civilisations,  and  that  if  those  who  professed 
to  be  the  trustees  of  their  fellows  were  not  considering  these 
things  they  ought  to  be — this  was,  very  curiously  as  it  now 
seems  to  us  at  this  date,  regarded  as  sordid  and  material.  We 
now  see  that  the  things  of  the  spirit  depend  upon  the  solution 
of  these  material  problems. 


6  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

The  one  fact  which  stood  out  clear  above  all  others  after  the 
Armistice  was  the  actual  shortage  of  goods  at  a  time  when  mil- 
lions were  literally  dying  of  hunger.  The  decline  of  productivity 
was  obvious.  It  was  due  in  part  to  diversion  of  energies  to 
the  task  of  war,  to  the  destruction  of  materials,  failure  in  many 
cases  to  maintain  plant  (factories,  railways,  roads,  housing) ; 
to  a  varying  degree  of  industrial  and  commercial  demoralisation 
arising  out  of  the  War  and,  later,  out  of  the  struggle  for  poli- 
tical rearrangements  both  within  States  and  as  between  States ; 
to  the  shortening  of  the  hours  of  labour ;  to  the  dislocation,  first 
of  mobilisation,  and  then  of  demobilisation;  to  relaxation  of 
effort  as  reaction  from  the  special  strain  of  war;  to  the  de- 
moralisation of  credit  owing  to  war-time  financial  shifts.  We 
had  all  these  factors  of  reduced  productivity  on  the  one  side, 
and  on  the  other  a  generally  increased  habit  and  standard  of 
expenditure,  due  in  part  to  a  stimulation  of  spending  power 
owing  to  the  inflation  of  the  currency  and  in  part  to  the  reck- 
lessness which  usually  follows  war ;  and  above  all  an  increasingly 
insistent  demand  on  the  part  of  the  worker  everywhere  in 
Europe  for  a  higher  general  standard  of  living,  that  is  to  say, 
not  only  a  larger  share  of  the  diminished  product  of  his  labour, 
but  a  larger  absolute  amount  drawn  from  a  diminished  total. 

This  created  an  economic  impasse — the  familiar  'vicious 
circle.'  The  decline  in  the  purchasing  power  of  money  and  the 
rise  in  the  rate  of  interest  set  up  demands  for  compensating 
increases  both  of  wages  and  of  profits,  which  increases  in  turn 
added  to  the  cost  of  production,  to  prices.  And  so  on  da  capo. 
As  the  first  and  last  remedy  for  this  condition  one  thing  was 
urged,  to  the  exclusion  of  almost  all  else — increased  production. 
The  King,  the  Cabinet,  economists.  Trades  Union  leaders,  the 
newspapers,  the  Churches,  all  agreed  upon  that  one  solution. 
Until  well  into  the  autumn  of  1920  all  were  enjoining  upon  the 
workers  their  duty  of  an  ever-increasing  output. 

By  the  end  of  that  year,  workers,  who  had  on  numberless 
occasions  been  told  that  their  one  salvation  was  to  increase 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  7 

their  output,  and  who  had  been  upbraided  in  no  mild  terms 
because  of  their  tendency  to  diminish  output,  were  being  dis- 
charged in  their  hundreds  of  thousands  because  there  was  a 
paralysing  over-production  and  glut!  Half  a  world  was  fam- 
ished and  unclothed,  but  vast  stores  of  British  goods  were 
rotting  and  multitudes  of  workers  unemployed.  America  re- 
vealed the  same  phenomena.  After  stories  of  the  fabulous 
wealth  which  had  come  to  her  as  the  result  of  the  War  and  the 
destruction  of  her  commercial  competitors,  we  find,  in  the  win- 
ter of  1920-21  that  over  great  areas  in  the  South  and  West  her 
farmers  are  near  to  bankruptcy  because  their  cotton  and  wheat 
are  unsaleable  at  prices  that  are  remunerative,  and  her  indus- 
trial unemployment  problem  as  acute  as  it  has  been  in  a  genera- 
tion. So  bad  is  it,  indeed,  that  the  Labour  Unions  are  unable 
to  resist  the  Open  Shop  campaign  forced  upon  them  by  the 
employers,  a  campaign  menacing  the  gains  in  labour  organisa- 
tion that  it  has  taken  more  than  a  generation  to  make.  Ameri- 
ca's commercial  competitors  being  now  satisfactorily  disposed 
of  by  the  War,  and  'the  economic  conquest  of  the  world'  being 
now  open  to  that  country,  we  find  the  agricultural  interests 
(particularly  cotton  and  wheat)  demanding  government  aid 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  these  aforesaid  competitors  once 
more  on  their  feet  (by  loan)  in  order  that  they  may  buy 
American  products.  But  the  loans  can  only  be  repaid  and  the 
products  paid  for  in  goods.  This,  of  course,  constitutes,  in 
terms  of  nationalist  economics,  a  'menace.'  So  the  same  Con- 
gress which  receives  demands  for  government  credits  to  Euro- 
pean countries,  also  receives  demands  for  the  enactment  of 
Protectionist  legislation,  which  will  effectually  prevent  the  Eu- 
ropean creditors  from  repaying  the  loans  or  paying  for  the 
purchases.  The  spectacle  is  a  measure  of  the  chaos  in  our 
thinking  on  international  economics.^ 

'  But  British  policy  can  hardly  be  called  less  contradictory.  A  year 
after  the  enactment  of  a  Treaty  which  quite  avowedly  was  framed  for 
the  purpose  of  checking  the  development  of  German  trade,  we  find 


8  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

But  the  fact  we  are  for  the  moment  mainly  concerned  with 
is  this :  on  the  one  side  millions  perishing  for  lack  of  corn  or 
cotton ;  on  the  other  com  and  cotton  in  such  abundance  that  they 
are  burned,  and  their  producers  face  bankruptcy. 

Obviously  therefore  it  is  not  merely  a  question  of  production, 
but  of  production  adjusted  to  consumption,  and  vice  versa ;  of 
proper  distribution  of  purchasing  power,  and  a  network  of 
processes  which  must  be  in  increasing  degree  consciously  con- 
trolled. We  should  never  have  supposed  that  mere  production 
would  suffice,  if  there  did  not  perpetually  slip  from  our  minds 
the  very  elementary  truth  that  in  a  world  where  division  of 
labour  exists  wealth  is  not  a  material  but  a  material  plus  a 

the  unemployment  crisis  producing  on  the  part  of  the  New  Statestnan 
the  following  comment: — 

'It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  present  wave  of  depression 
and  unemployment  is  far  more  an  international  than  a  national  problem. 
The  abolition  of  "casual  labour"  and  the  adoption  of  a  system  of  "in- 
dustrial maintenance"  would  appreciably  affect  it.  The  international 
aspect  of  the  question  has  always  been  important,  but  never  so  over- 
whelmingly important  as  it  is  to-day. 

'The  present  great  depression,  however,  is  not  normal.  It  is  due 
in  the  main  to  the  breakdown  of  credit  and  the  demoralisation  of  the 
"exchanges"  throughout  Europe.  France  cannot  buy  locomotives  in 
England  if  she  has  to  pay  60  francs  to  the  pound  sterling.  Germany, 
with  an  exchange  of  260  (instead  of  the  pre-war  20)  marks  to  the 
pound,  can  buy  scarcely  anything.  Russia,  for  other  reasons  cannot 
buy  at  all.  And  even  neutral  countries  like  Sweden  and  Denmark, 
which  made  much  money  out  of  the  war  and  whose  "exchanges"  are 
fairly  normal,  are  financially  almost  hors  de  combat,  owing  presumably 
to  the  ruin  of  Germany.  There  appears  to  be  no  remedy  for  this 
position  save  the  economic  rehabilitation  of  Central  Europe. 

'As  long  as  German  workmen  are  unable  to  exercise  their  full  pro- 
ductive capacity,  English  workmen  will  be  unemployed.  That,  at 
present,  is  the  root  of  the  problem.  For  the  last  two  years  we,  as  an 
industrial  nation,  have  been  cutting  off  our  nose  to  spite  our  face.  In 
so  far  as  we  ruin  Germany  we  are  ruining  ourselves ;  and  in  so  far  as 
we  refuse  to  trade  with  revolutionary  Russia  we  are  increasing  the  likeli- 
hood of  violent  upheavals  in  Great  Britain.  Sooner  or  later  we  shall 
have  to  scrap  every  Treaty  that  has  been  signed  and  begin  again  the 
creation  of  the  New  Europe  on  the  basis  of  universal  co-operation  and 
mutual  aid.    Where  we  have  demanded  indemnities  we  must  offer  loans. 

'A  system  of  international  credit — founded  necessarily  on  British 
credit — is  as  great  a  necessity  for  ourselves  as  it  is  for  Central  Eu- 
rope. We  must  finance  our  customers  or  lose  them  and  share  their 
ruin,  sinking  deeper  every  month  into  the  morass  of  doles  and  relief 
works.  That  is  the  main  lesson  of  the  present  crisis,'— (Jan.  1st.,  1921.) 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  9 

process — a  process  of  exchange.  Our  minds  are  still  dominated 
by  the  mediaeval  aspect  of  wealth  as  a  'possession'  of  static 
material  such  as  land,  not  as  part  of  a  flow.  It  is  that  over- 
sight which  probably  produced  the  War;  it  certainly  produced 
certain  clauses  of  the  Treaty.  The  wealth  of  England  is  not 
coal,  because  if  we  could  not  exchange  it  (or  the  manufactures 
and  services  based  on  it)  for  other  things — mainly  food — it 
certainly  would  not  even  feed  our  population.  And  the  process 
by  which  coal  becomes  bread  is  only  possible  by  virtue  of  certain 
adjustments,  which  can  only  be  made  if  there  be  present  such 
things  as  a  measure  of  political  security,  stability  of  conditions 
enabling  us  to  know  that  crops  can  be  gathered,  transported  and 
sold  for  money  of  stable  value ;  if  there  be  in  other  words  the 
indispensable  element  of  contract,  confidence,  rendering  possible 
the  indispensable  device  of  credit.  And  as  the  self-sufficing 
economic  unit — quite  obviously  in  the  case  of  England,  less 
obviously  but  hardly  less  certainly  in  other  notable  cases — 
cannot  be  the  national  unit,  the  field  of  the  contract — ^the 
necessary  stability  of  credit,  that  is — must  be,  if  not  inter- 
national, then  trans-national.  All  of  which  is  extremely 
elementary;  and  almost  entirely  overlooked  by  our  statesman- 
ship, as  reflected  in  the  Settlement  and  in  the  conduct  of  policy 
since  the  Armistice. 


Britain's  dependence  on  the  production  by  foreigners  of  a 
surplus  of  food  and  raw  materials  beyond  their  own 
needs 

The  matter  may  be  clarified  if  we  summarise  what  precedes, 
and  much  of  what  follows,  in  this  proposition : — 

The  present  conditions  in  Europe  show  that  much  of  its 
dense  population  (notably  the  population  of  these  islands)  can 


10  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

only  live  at  a  standard  necessary  for  civilisation  (leisure,  social 
peace,  individual  freedom)  by  means  of  certain  co-operative 
processes,  which  must  be  carried  on  largely  across  frontiers. 
The  mere  physical  existence  of  much  of  the  population  of 
Britain  is  dependent  upon  the  production  by  foreigners  of  a 
surplus  of  food  and  raw  materials  beyond  their  own  needs. 

The  processes  of  production  have  become  of  the  complex 
kind  which  cannot  be  compelled  by  preponderant  power,  exacted 
by  physical  coercion. 

But  the  attempt  at  such  coercion,  the  inevitable  results  of 
a  policy  aimed  at  securing  predominant  power,  provoking  resis- 
tance and  friction,  can  and  does  paralyse  the  necessary 
processes,  and  by  so  doing  is  undermining  the  economic 
foundations  of  British  life. 

What  are  the  facts  supporting  the  foregoing  proposition  ? 

Many  whose  instincts  of  national  protection  would  become 
immediately  alert  at  the  possibility  of  a  naval  blockade  of  these 
islands,  remain  indifferent  to  the  possibility  of  a  blockade 
arising  in  another  but  every  bit  as  effective  a  fashion. 

That  is  through  the  failure  of  the  food  and  raw  material, 
upon  which  our  populations  and  our  industries  depend,  to  be 
produced  at  all  owing  to  the  progressive  social  disintegration 
which  seems  to  be  going  on  over  the  greater  part  of  the  world. 
To  the  degree  to  which  it  is  true  to  say  that  Britain's  life  is 
dependent  upon  her  fleet,  it  is  true  to  say  that  it  is  dependent 
upon  the  production  by  foreigners  of  a  surplus  above  their  own 
needs  of  food  and  raw  material.  This  is  the  most  fundamental 
fact  in  the  economic  situation  of  Britain :  a  large  portion  of  her 
population  are  fed  by  the  exchange  of  coal,  or  services  and 
manufactures  based  on  coal,  for  the  surplus  production,  mainly 
food  and  raw  material,  of  peoples  living  overseas.^    Whether 

*Out  of  a  population  of  45,000,000  our  home-grown  wheat  suffices 
for  only  about  12,500,000,  on  the  basis  of  the  1919-20  crop.  Sir  Henry 
Rew,  Food  Supplies  in  Peace  and  War,  says:    'On  the  basis  of  our 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  11 

the  failure  of  food  to  reach  us  were  due  to  the  sinking  of  our 
ships  at  sea  or  the  failure  of  those  ships  to  obtain  cargoes  at 
the  port  of  embarkation  the  result  in  the  end  would  be  the  same. 
Indeed,  the  latter  method,  if  complete,  would  be  the  more 
serious  as  an  armistice  or  surrender  would  not  bring  relief. 

The  hypothesis  has  been  put  in  an  extreme  form  in  order  to 
depict  the  situation  as  vividly  as  possible.  But  such  a  condition 
as  the  complete  failure  of  the  foreigner's  surplus  does  not  seem 
to-day  so  preposterous  as  it  might  have  done  five  years  ago. 
For  that  surplus  has  shrunk  enormously  and  great  areas  that 
once  contributed  to  feeding  us  can  do  so  no  longer.  Those 
areas  already  include  Russia,  Siberia,  the  Balkans,  and  a  large 
part  of  the  Near  and  Far  East.  What  we  are  practically  con- 
cerned with,  of  course,  is  not  the  immediate  disappearance  of 
that  surplus  on  which  our  industries  depend,  but  the  degree 
to  which  its  reduction  increases  for  us  the  cost  of  food,  and  so 
intensifies  all  the  social  problems  that  arise  out  of  an  increasing 
cost  of  living.  Let  the  standard  alike  of  consumption  and 
production  of  our  overseas  white  customers  decline  to  the 
standard  of  India  and  China,  and  our  foreign  trade  would 
correspondingly  decrease ;  the  decline  in  the  world's  production 
of  food  would  mean  that  much  less  for  us;  it  would  reduce  the 
volume  of  our  trade,  or  in  terms  of  our  own  products,  cost 
that  much  more;  this  in  turn  would  increase  the  cost  of  our 
manufactures,  create  an  economic  situation  which  one  could 
describe  with  infinite  technical  complexity,  but  which,  howerer 
technical  and  complex  that  description  were  made,  would  finally 
come  to  this — ^that  our  own  toil  would  become  less  productive. 

That  is  a  relatively  new  situation.  In  the  youth  of  men 
now  living,  these  islands  with  their  twenty-five  or  thirty  million 


present  population  ...  we  should  still  need  to  import  78  per  cent. 
of  our  requirements.'  (p.  165).  Before  the  War,  according  to  the  same 
authority,  home  produce  supplied  48  per  cent,  in  food  value  of  the 
total  consumption,  but  the  table  on  which  this  figure  is  based  does  not 
include  sugar,  tea,  coffee,  or  cocoa. 


12  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

population  were,  so  far  as  vital  needs  are  concerned,  self- 
sufficing.  What  will  be  the  situation  when  the  children  now 
gfrowing  up  in  our  homes  become  members  of  a  British  popu- 
lation which  may  number  fifty,  sixty,  or  seventy  millions? 
(Germany's  population,  which,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  was 
nearly  seventy  millions,  was  in  1870  a  good  deal  less  than  the 
present  population  of  Great  Britain.) 

Moreover,  the  problem  is  affected  by  what  is  perhaps  the  most 
important  economic  change  in  the  world  since  the  industrial 
revolution,  namely  the  alteration  in  the  ratio  of  the  exchange 
value  of  manufactures  and  food — the  shift  over  of  advantage 
in  exchange  from  the  side  of  the  industrialist  and  manufacturer 
to  the  side  of  the  producer  of  food. 

Until  the  last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  world  was 
a  place  in  which  it  was  relatively  easy  to  produce  food,  and 
nearly  the  whole  of  its  population  was  doing  it.  In  North  and 
South  America,  in  Russia,  Siberia,  China,  India,  the  universal 
occupation  was  agriculture,  carried  on  largely  (save  in  the  case 
of  China  and  India)  upon  new  soil,  its  first  fertility  as  yet 
unexhausted.  A  tiny  minority  of  the  world's  population  only 
was  engaged  in  industry  in  the  modem  sense:  in  producing 
things  in  factories  by  machinery,  in  making  iron  and  steel. 
Only  in  Great  Britain,  in  Northern  Germany,  in  a  few  districts 
in  the  United  States,  had  large-scale  industry  been  system- 
atically developed.  It  is  easy  to  see,  therefore,  what  immense 
advantage  in  exchange  the  industrialist  had.  What  he  had  for 
sale  was  relatively  scarce;  what  the  agriculturist  had  for  sale 
was  produced  the  world  over  and  was,  in  terms  of  manufac- 
tures, extremely  cheap.  It  was  the  economic  paradox  of  the 
time  that  in  countries  like  America,  South  and  North,  the 
farmer — ^the  producer  of  food — was  naturally  visualised  as  a 
poverty-stricken  individual — a  'hayseed'  dressed  in  cotton  jeans, 
without  the  conveniences  and  amenities  of  civilisation,  while  it 
was  in  the  few  industrial  centres  that  the  vast  wealth  was 
being  piled  up.    But  as  the  new  land  in  North  America  and 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  13 

Argentina  and  Siberia  became  occupied  and  its  first  fertility 
exhausted,  as  the  migration  from  the  land  to  the  towns  set  in, 
it  became  possible  with  the  spread  of  technical  training  through- 
out the  world,  with  the  wider  distribution  of  mechanical  power 
and  the  development  of  transport,  for  every  country  in  some 
measure  to  engage  in  manufacture,  and  the  older  industrial 
centres  lost  some  of  their  monopoly  advantage  in  dealing  with 
the  food  producer.  In  Cobden's  day  it  was  almost  true  to  say 
that  England  spun  cotton  for  the  world.  To-day  cotton  is 
spun  where  cotton  is  grown;  in  India,  in  the  Southern  States 
of  America,  in  China. 

This  is  a  condition  which  (as  the  pages  which  follow  reveal 
in  greater  detail)  the  intensification  of  nationalism  and  its 
hostility  to  international  arrangement  will  render  very  much 
more  acute.  The  patriotism  of  the  future  China  or  Argentina 
—or  India  and  Australia,  for  that  matter — may  demand  the 
home  production  of  goods  now  bought  in  (say)  England.  It 
may  not  in  economic  terms  benefit  the  populations  who  thus 
insist  upon  a  complete  national  economy.  But  'defence  is 
more  than  opulence.'  The  very  insecurity  which  the  absence 
of  a  definitely  organised  international  order  involves  will  be 
invoked  as  justifying  the  attempt  at  economic  self-sufficiency. 
Nationalism  creates  the  situation  to  which  it  points  as  justi- 
fication for  its  policy:  it  makes  the  very  real  dangers  that  it 
fears.  And  as  Nationalism  thus  breaks  up  the  efficient  trans- 
national division  of  labour  and  diminishes  total  productivity, 
the  resultant  pressure  of  population  or  diminished  means  of 
subsistence  will  push  to  keener  rivalry  for  the  conquest  of 
territory.  The  circle  can  become  exceedingly  vicious — so 
vicious,  indeed,  that  we  may  finally  go  back  to  the  self-sufficing 
village  community;  a  Europe  sparsely  populated  if  the  resul- 
tant clerical  influence  is  unable  to  check  prudence  in  the  matter 
of  the  birth-rate,  densely  populated  to  a  Chinese  or  Indian 
degree  if  the  birth-rate  is  uncontrolled. 

The  economic  chaos  and  social  disintegration  which  have 


14  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

stricken  so  much  of  the  world  have  brought  a  sharp  reminder 
of  the  primary,  the  elemental  place  of  food  in  the  catalogue  of 
man's  needs,  and  the  relative  ease  and  rapidity  with  which  most 
else  can  be  jettisoned  in  our  cMnplex  civilisation,  provided  only 
that  the  stomach  can  be  filled. 

Before  the  War  the  towns  of  Europe  were  the  luxurious 
and  opulent  centres;  the  rural  districts  were  comparatively 
poor.  To-day  it  is  the  cities  of  the  Continent  that  are  half- 
starved  or  famine-stricken,  while  the  farms  are  well-fed  and 
relatively  opulent.  In  Russia,  Poland,  Hungary,  Germany,  Aus- 
tria, the  cities  perish,  but  the  peasants  for  the  most  part  have 
a  sufficiency.  The  cities  are  finding  that  with  the  breakdown 
of  the  old  stability — of  the  transport  and  credit  systems  par- 
ticularly— they  cannot  obtain  food  from  the  farmers.  This 
process  which  we  now  see  at  work  on  the  Continent  is  in  fact 
the  reversal  of  our  historical  development. 

As  money  acquired  a  stable  value  and  transport  and  com- 
munication became  easy  and  cheap,  the  manor  ceased  to  be  self- 
contained,  to  weave  its  own  clothes  and  make  its  own  imple- 
ments. But  the  Russian  peasants  are  proving  to-day  that  if  the 
railroads  break  down,  and  the  paper  money  loses  its  value,  the 
farm  can  become  once  more  self-sufficing.  Better  to  thresh 
the  wheat  with  a  flail,  to  weave  clothes  from  the  wool,  than  to 
exchange  wheat  and  wool  for  a  money  that  will  buy  neither 
cloth  nor  threshing  machinery.  But  a  country-side  that  weaves 
its  own  cloth  and  threshes  its  grain  by  hand  is  one  that  has 
little  surplus  of  food  for  great  cities — as  Vienna,  Buda-Pest, 
Moscow,  and  Petrograd  have  already  discovered. 

If  England  is  destined  in  truth  to  remain  the  workshop 
of  that  world  which  produces  the  food  and  raw  material,  then 
she  has  indeed  a  very  direct  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  all 
those  processes  upon  which  the  pre-war  exchange  between 
farm  and  factory,  city  and  country,  depended.  * 

*The  growing  power  of  the  food-producing  area  and  its  determina- 
tion to  be  independent  as  far  as  possible  of  the  industrial  centre,  is  a 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  1$ 

The  *farm'  upon  which  the  'factory'  of  Great  Britain  de- 
pends is  the  food-producing  world  as  a  whole.  It  does  not 
suffice  that  the  overseas  world  should  merely  support  itself  as 
it  did,  say,  in  the  tenth  century,  but  it  must  be  induced  by  hope 
of  advantage  to  exchange  a  surplus  for  those  things  which  we 
can  deliver  to  it  more  economically  than  it  can  make  them  for 
itself.  Because  the  necessary  social  and  political  stability,  with 
its  material  super-structure  of  transport  and  credit,  operating 
trans-nationally,  has  broken  down,  much  of  Europe  is  returning 
to  its  earlier  simple  life  of  unco-ordinated  production,  and  its 
total  fertility  is  being  very  greatly  reduced.  The  consequent 
reaction  of  a  diminished  food  supply  for  ourselves  is  already 
being  felt. 


The  'Prosperity'  of  Paper  Money 

It  will  be  said :  Does  not  the  unquestioned  rise  in  the  stand- 
ard of  wages,  despite  all  the  talk  of  debt,  expenditure,  un- 
balanced budgets,  public  bankruptcy,  disprove  any  theory  of  a 
vital  connection  between  a  stable  Europe  and  our  own  pros- 
perity ?  Indeed,  has  not  the  experience  of  the  War  discredited 
much  of  the  theory  of  the  interdependence  of  nations? 

The  first  few  years  of  the  War  did,  indeed,  seem  to  discredit 
it,  to  show  that  this  interdependence  was  not  so  vital  as  had 
been  supposed.  Germany  seemed  for  a  long  time  really  to  be 
self-supporting,  to  manage  without  contact  with  other  peoples. 
It  seemed  possible  to  re-direct  the  channels  of  trade  with  rela- 
tive ease.    It  really  appeared  for  a  time  that  the  powers  of  the 


fact  too  often  neglected  in  considering  the  revolutionary  movements  of 
Europe.  The  war  of  the  classes  almost  everywhere  is  crossed  by  an- 
other war,  that  between  cities  and  country.  The  land-owning  country- 
man, whether  peasant  or  noble,  tends  to  become  conservative,  clerical, 
anti-socialist  (and  anti-social)  in  his  politics  and  outlook. 


16  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Governments  could  modify  fundamentally  the  normal  process 
of  credit  almost  at  will,  which  would  have  been  about  equivalent 
to  the  discovery  of  perpetual  motion!  Not  only  was  private 
credit  maintained  by  governmental  assistance,  but  exchanges 
were  successfully  'pegged*;  collapse  could  be  prevented  ap- 
parently with  ease.  Industry  itself  showed  a  similar  elasticity. 
In  this  country  it  seemed  possible  to  withdraw  five  or  six 
million  men  from  actual  production,  and  so  organise  the  re- 
mainder as  to  enable  them  to  produce  enough  not  only  to 
maintain  themselves,  but  the  country  at  large  and  the  army, 
in  food,  clothing  and  other  necessaries.  And  this  was  accom- 
plished at  a  standard  of  living  above  rather  than  below  that 
which  obtained  when  the  country  was  at  peace,  and  when  the 
six  or  seven  or  eight  millions  engaged  in  war  or  its  maintenance 
were  engaged  in  the  production  of  consumable  wealth.  It 
seemed  an  economic  miracle  that  with  these  millions  withdrawn 
from  production,  though  remaining  consumers,  the  total  in- 
dustrial output  should  be  very  little  less  than  it  was  before  the 
War. 

But  we  are  beginning  to  see  how  this  miracle  was  performed, 
and  also  what  is  the  truth  as  to  the  self-sufficiency  of  the  great 
nations.  As  late  as  the  early  summer  of  1918,  when,  even 
after  four  years  of  the  exhausting  drain  of  war,  well-fed 
German  armies  were  still  advancing  and  gaining  victories,  and 
German  guns  were  bombarding  Paris  ( for  the  first  time  in  the 
War),  the  edifice  of  German  self-sufficiency  seemed  to  be  sound. 
But  this  apparently  stalwart  economic  structure  crumbled  in 
la  few  months  into  utter  ruins  and  the  German  population  was 
jstarving  and  freezing,  without  adequate  food,  fuel,  clothing. 
(England  has  in  large  measure  escaped  this  result  just  because 

her  contacts  with  the  rest  of^the  world  have  been  maintained 

^^ — ._ _^ 

while  Gepnany's  have  not.    These  latter  \vere  not  even  re-es- 
tablished aT-^he^  Armistice ;    in  many   respects   her  economic  V 
isolation  was  more  complete  after  the  War  than  during  it.  I 
Moreover,  because  our  contacts  with  the  rest  of  the  world  arc  ) 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  17 

maintained  by  shipping,  a  very  great  flexibility  is  given  to  our 
extra-national  economic  relationships.  Our  lines  of  communi- 
cation can  be  switched  from  one  side  of  the  world  to  the  other 
instantly,  whereas  a  country  whose  approaches  are  by  railroads 
may  find  its  communications  embarrassed  for  a  generation  if 
new  frontiers  render  the  old  lines  inapplicable  to  the  new  poli- 
tical conditions. 

In  the  first  year  or  so  following  the  Armistice  there  was  a 
curious  contradiction  in  the  prevailing  attitude  towards  the 
economic  situation  at  home.  The  newspapers  were  full  of  head- 
lines about  the  Road  to  Ruin  and  National  Bankruptcy;  the 
Government  plainly  was  unable  to  make  both  ends  meet;  the 
financial  world  was  immensely  relieved  when  America  postponed 
the  payments  of  debts  to  her;  we  were  pathetically  appealing 
to  her  to  come  and  save  us;  the  British  sovereign,  which  for 
generations  has  been  a  standard  of  value  for  the  world  and 
the  symbol  of  security,  dropped  to  a  discount  of  20  per  cent, 
in  terms  of  the  dollar;  our  Continental  creditors  were  even 
worse  oflf ;  the  French  could  only  pay  us  in  a  depreciated  paper 
currency,  the  value  of  which  in  terms  of  the  dollar  varied  be- 
tween a  third  and  a  fourth  of  what  it  was  before  the  War; 
the  lira  was  cheaper  still.  Yet  side  by  side  with  this  we  had 
stories  of  a  trade  boom  (especially  in  textiles  and  cotton),  so 
great  that  merchants  and  manufacturers  refused  to  go  to  their 
offices,  in  order  to  dodge  the  flood  of  orders  so  vastly  in  ex-  { 
cess  of  what  they  could  fulfil.  Side  by  side  with  depreciated  | 
paper  currency,  with  public  debts  so  crippling  that  the  Govern- 
ment could  only  balance  its  budget  by  loans  which  were  not 
successful  when  floated,  the  amusement  trades  flourished  as 
never  before.  Theatre,  music  hall,  and  cinematograph  receipts 
beat  all  records.  There  was  a  greater  demand  for  motor-cars 
than  the  trade  could  supply.  The  Riviera  was  fuller  than  it 
had  ever  been  before.  The  working  class  itself  was  competing 
with  others  for  the  purchase  of  luxuries  which  in  the  past 
that  class  never  knew.    And  while  the  financial  situation  made 


18  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

it  impossible,  apparently,  to  find  capital  for  building  houses  to 
live  in,  ample  capital  was  forthcoming  wherewith  to  build 
cineipa  -palaces.  We  heard  and  read  of  famine  almost  at  our 
"3oors,  and  saw  great  prosperity  aroimd  us;  read  daily  of  im- 
pending bankruptcy — and  of  high  profits  and  lavish  spending; 
of  world-wide  unrest  and  revolution — ^and  higher  wages  than 
the  workers  had  ever  known. 

Complex  and  contradictory  as  the  facts  seemed,  the  difficulty 
of  a  true  estimate  was  rendered  greater  by  the  position  in  which 
European  Governments  found  themselves  placed.  These  Gov- 
ernments were  faced  by  the  necessity  of  maintaining  credit  and 
confidence  at  almost  any  cost.  They  must  not,  therefore,  throw 
too  great  an  emphasis  upon  the  dark  features.  Yet  the  need 
for  economy  and  production  was  declared  to  be  as  great  as  it 
was  during  the  war.  To  create  a  mood  of  seriousness  and 
sober  resolution  adequate  to  the  situation  would  involve  stressing 
facts  which,  in  their  efforts  to  obtain  loans,  internal  or  external, 
and  to  maintain  credit,  governments  were  compelled  to  mini- 
mise. 

Then,  of  course,  the  facts  were  obscured  mainly  by  the  pur- 
chasing power  created  by  the  manufacture  of  credit  and  paper 
money.  Some  light  is  thrown  upon  this  ambiguous  situation 
by  a  fact  which  is  now  so  manifest — ^that  this  juxtaposition  of 
growing  indebtedness  and  lavish  spending,  high  wages,  high 
profits,  active  trade,  and  a  rising  standard  of  living,  were  all 
things  that  marked  the  condition  of  Germany  in  the  first  few 
years  of  the  War.  Industrial  concerns  showed  profits  such 
as  they  had  never  shown  before;  wages  steadily  rose;  and 
money  was  plentiful.  But  the  profits  were  made  and  the  wages 
were  paid  in  a  money  that  continually  declined  in  value — as  ours 
is  declining.  The  higher  consumption  drew  upon  sources  that 
were  steadily  being  depleted — as  ours  are  being  depleted.  The 
production  was  in  certain  cases  maintained  by  very  imeco- 
nomic  methods :  as  by  working  only  the  best  seams  in  the  coal 
mines,  by  devoting  no  effort  to  the  proper  upkeep  of  plant 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  19 

(locomotives  on  the  railway  which  ordinarily  would  go  into 
the  repair  shop  every  six  weeks  were  kept  running  somehow 
during  the  whole  course  of  the  War).  In  this  sense  the  people 
were  'living  upon  capital' — devoting,  that  is,  to  the  needs  ol 
current  consumption  energy  which  should  have  been  devoted 
to  ensuring  future  production.  In  another  way,  they  were 
converting  into  income  what  is  normally  a  source  of  capital. 
An  increase  in  profits  or  wages,  which  ordinarily  would  have 
provided  a  margin,  over  and  above  current  expenditure,  out 
of  which  capital  for  new  plant,  etc.,  could  have  been  drawn, 
was  rapidly  nullified  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  prices. 
Loans  for  the  purpose  even  of  capital  expenditure  involved  an 
inflation  of  currency  which  still  further  increased  prices,  thus 
diminishing  the  value  of  the  capital  so  provided,  necessitating 
the  issue  of  further  loans  which  had  the  same  effect.  And  so 
the  vicious  circle  was  narrowed.  Even  after  four  years  of  this 
kind  of  thing  the  edifice  had  in  many  respects  the  outward  ap- 
pearances of  prosperity.  As  late  as  April,  1918,  the  German 
organisation,  as  we  have  noted,  was  still  capable  of  maintaining 
a  military  machine  which  could  not  only  hold  its  own  but  com- 
pel the  retirement  of  the  combined  forces  of  France,  Britain, 
America,  and  minor  Allies.  But  once  the  underlying  process 
of  disintegration  became  apparent,  the  whole  structure  went 
to  pieces. 

It  is  that  unnoticed  process  of  disintegration,  preceding  the 
final  collapse,  which  should  interest  us.  For  the  general 
method  employed  by  Germany  for  meeting  the  consumption  of 
war  and  disguising  the  growing  scarcity  is  in  many  respects  the 
method  her  neighbours  adopted  for  meeting  the  consumption 
of  a  new  standard  of  life  on  the  basis  of  less  total  wealth  — 
a  standard  which,  on  the  part  of  the  workers,  means  both 
shorter  hours  and  a  larger  share  of  their  produce,  and  on  the 
part  of  other  classes  a  larger  share  of  the  more  expensive 
luxuries.  Like  the  Germans  of  1914-18,  we  are  drawing 
for  current  consumption  upon  the  fund  which,   in  a  more 


20  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

healthy  situation,  would  go  to  provide  for  renewal  of  plant^ 
and  provision  of  new  capital.  To  'eat  the  seed  corn'  may  give 
an  appearance  of  present  plenty  at  therosfSTHarvation  later. 
It  is  extremely  unlikely  that  there  will  ever  be  in  England 
the  sudden  catastrophic  economic  collapse  which  we  have  wit- 
nessed in  Russia,  Germany,  Austria,  and  Central  Europe  gener- 
ally. But  we  shall  none  the  less  be  concerned.  As  the  increased 
wages  gained  by  strikes  lose  with  increasing  rapidity  their  value 
in  purchasing  power,  thus  wiping  out  the  effect  of  the  industrial 
'victory,'  irritation  among  the  workers  will  grow.  On  minds 
so  prepared  the  Continental  experiments  in  social  reconstruc- 
tion— prompted  by  conditions  immeasurably  more  acute — will 
act  with  the  force  of  hypnotic  suggestion.  Our  Government 
may  attempt  to  cope  with  these  movements  by  repression  or 
political  devices.  Tempers  will  be  too  bad  and  patience  too 
short  to  give  the  sound  solutions  a  real  chance.  And  an  eco- 
nomic situation,  not  in  itself  inherently  desperate,  may  get 
steadily  worse  because  of  the  loss  of  social  discipline  and  of 
political  insight,  the  failure  to  realise  past  expectations,  the 
continuance  of  military  burdens  created  by  external  political 
chaos. 


The  European  disintegration:   Britain's  concern. 

What  has  actually  happened  in  so  much  of  Europe  around 
us  ought  certainly  to  prevent  any  too  complacent  sense  of 
security.  In  the  midst  of  this  old  civilisation  are  (in  Mr. 
Hoover's  calculation)  some  hundred  million  folk,  who  before 
the  War  managed  to  support  themselves  in  fair  comfort  but 
are  now  unable  to  be  truly  self-supporting.  Yet  they  live  upon  \ 
the  same  soil  and  in  the  presence  of  the  same  natural  resources  j 
as  before  the  War.  Their  inability  to  use  that  soil  and  those 
materials  is  not  due  to  the  mere  physical  destruction  of  war, 
for  the  famine  is  worst  where  there  has  been  no  physical  de- 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  21 

struction  at  all.  It  is  not  a  lack  of  labour,  for  millions  are 
unemployed,  seeking  work.  Nor  is  it  lack  of  technical  or 
scientific  knowledge,  upon  which  (very  erroneously)  we  are 
apt  to  look  as  the  one  sufficient  factor  of  civilisation ;  for  our 
technical  knowledge  in  the  management  of  matter  is  greater 
even  than  before  the  War. 

What  then  is  the  reason  why  these  millions  starve  in  the 
midst  of  potential  plenty?  It  is  that  they  have  lost,  from 
certain  moral  causes  examined  later  in  these  pages,  the  capacity 
to  co-ordinate  their  labour  sufficiently  to  carry  on  the  processes 
by  which  alone  labour  and  knowledge  can  be  applied  to  an 
exploitation  of  nature  sufficiently  complete  to  support  our 
dense  modern  populations. 

The  fact  that  wealth  is  not  to-day  a  material  which  can  be 
taken,  but  a  process  which  can  only  be  maintained  by  virtue 
of  certain  moral  factors,  marks  a  change  in  human  relationship, 
the  significance  of  which  still  seems  to  escape  us. 

The  manor,  or  even  the  eighteenth  century  village,  was 
roughly  a  self-sufficing  unit.  It  mattered  little  to  that  unit  what 
became  of  the  outside  world.  The  manor  or  village  was  inde- 
pendent; its  people  could  be  cut  off  from  the  outside  world, 
could  ravage  the  near  parts  of  it  and  remain  unaffected.  But 
when  the  development  of  communication  and  the  discovery  of 
steam  turns  the  agricultural  community  into  coal  miners,  these 
are  no  longer  indiiferent  to  the  condition  of  the  outside  world. 
Cut  them  off  from  the  agriculturalists  who  take  their  coal  or 
manufactures,  or  let  these  latter  be  unable  to  carry  on  their 
calling,  and  the  miner  starves.  He  cannot  eat  his  coal.  He  is 
no  longea  independent.  His  life  hangs  upon  certain  activities 
of  others.  Where  his  forebears  could  have  raided  and  ravaged 
with  no  particular  hurt  to  themselves,  the  miner  cannot.  He 
is  dependent  upon  those  others  and  has  given  them  hostages. 
He  is  no  longer  'independent,'  however  clamorously  in  his 
Nationalist  oratory  he  may  use  that  word.  He  has  been  forced 
into  a  relation  of  partnership.    And  how  very  small  is  the  effect- 


22  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

iveness  of  any  physical  coercion  he  can  apply,  in  order  to  exact 
the  services  by  which  he  lives,  we  shall  see  presently. 

This  situation  of  interdependence  is  of  course  felt  much  more 
acutely  by  some  countries  than  others — much  more  by  England, 
for  instance,  than  by  France.  France  in  the  matter  of  essential 
foodstuffs  can  be  nearly  self-supporting,  England  cannot.  For 
England,  an  outside  world  of  fairly  high  production  is  a  matter 
of  life  and  death ;  the  economic  consideration  must  in  this  sense 
take  precedence  of  others.  In  the  case  of  France  considerations 
of  political  security  are  apt  to  take  precedence  of  economic  con- 
siderations. France  can  weaken  her  neighbours  vitally  without 
being  brought  to  starvation.  She  can  purchase  security  at  the 
cost  of  mere  loss  of  profits  on  foreign  trade  by  the  economic 
destruction  of,  say.  Central  Europe.  The  same  policy  would 
for  Britain  in  the  long  run  spell  starvation.  And  it  is  this 
fundamental  difference  of  economic  situation  which  is  at  the 
bottom  of  much  of  the  divergence  of  policy  between  Britain 
and  France  which  has  recently  become  so  acute. 

This  is  the  more  evident  when  we  examine  recent  changes 
of  detail  in  this  general  situation  special  to  England.  Before 
the  War  a  very  large  proportion  of  our  food  and  raw  material 
was  supplied  by  the  United  States.  But  our  economic  relation- 
ship with  tliat  country  has  been  changed  as  the  result  of  the 
War.  Previous  to  1914  we  were  the  creditor  and  America 
the  debtor  nation.  She  was  obliged  to  transmit  to  us  large 
sums  in  interest  on  investments  of  British  capital.  These 
annual  payments  were  in  fact  made  in  the  form  of  food  and 
raw  materials,  for  which,  in  a  national  sense,  we  did  not  have 
to  give  goods  or  services  in  return.  We  are  now  less  in  the 
position  of  creditor,  more  in  that  of  debtor.  America  does 
not  have  to  transmit  to  us.  Whereas,  originally,  we  did  an 
immense  proportion  of  America's  carrying  trade,  because  she 
had  no  ocean-going  mercantile  marine,  she  has  begun  to  do 
her  own  carrying.  Further,  the  pressure  of  her  population  upon 
her  food  resources  is  rapidly  growing.    The  law  diminishing 


OUR  DAILY  BREAa  23 

returns  is  in  some  instances  beginning  to  apply  to  the  production 
of  food,  which  in  the  past  has  been  plentiful  without  fertilisers 
and  under  a  vfery  wasteful  and  simple  system.  And  in  America, 
as  elsewhere,  the  standard  of  consumption,  owing  to  a  great 
increase  of  the  wage  standard,  has  grown,  while  the  standard 
of  production  has  not  always  correspondingly  increased. 

The  practical  effect  of  this  is  to  throw  England  into  greater 
dependence  upon  certain  new  sources  of  food — or  trade,  which 
in  the  end  is  the  same  thing.  The  position  becomes  clearer  if 
we  reflect  that  our  dependence  becomes  more  acute  with  every 
increase  of  our  population.  Our  children  now  at  school  may 
be  faced  by  the  problem  of  finding  food  for  a  population  of 
sixty  or  seventy  millions  on  these  islands.  A  high  agricultural 
productivity  on  the  part  of  countries  like  Russia  and  Siberia 
and  the  Balkans  might  well  be  then  a  life  and  death  matter. 

Now  the  European  famine  has  taught  us  a  good  deal  about 
the  necessary  conditions  of  high  agricultural  productivity. 
The  co-operation  of  manufactures — of  railways  for  taking 
crops  out  and  fertilisers  in,  of  machinery,  tools,  wagons,  clothing 
— is  one  of  them.  That  manufacturing  itself  must  be  done  by 
division  of  labour  is  another :  the  country  or  area  that  is  fitted 
to  supply  textiles  or  cream  separators  is  not  necessarily  fitted 
to  supply  steel  rails :  yet  until  the  latter  are  supplied  the  former 
cannot  be  obtained.  Often  productivity  is  paralysed  simply 
because  transport  has  broken  down  owing  to  lack  of  rolling 
stock,  or  coal,  or  lubricants,  or  spare  parts  for  locomotives ;  or 
because  a  debased  currency  makes  it  impossible  to  secure  food 
from  peasants,  who  will  not  surrender  it  in  return  for  paper 
that  has  no  value — ^the  manufactures  which  might  ultimately 
give  it  value  being  paralysed.  The  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  value  of  paper  money,  for'  instance,  is 
rapidly  diminishing  the  food  productivity  of  the  soil;  peasants 
will  not  toil  to  produce  food  which  they  cannot  exchange, 
through  the  medium  of  money,  for  the  things  which  they  need 
^-clothing,  implements,  and  so  on.    This  diminishing  produc- 


24  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

tivity  is  further  aggravated  by  the  impossibiHty  of  obtaining 
fertilisers  (some  of  which  are  industrial  products,  and  all  of 
which  require  transport),  machines,  tools,  etc.  The  food  pro- 
ducing capacity  of  Europe  cannot  be  maintained  without  the 
full  co-operation  of  the  non-agricultural  industries — ^transport, 
manufactures,  coal  mining,  sound  banking — and  the  mainte- 
nance of  political  order.  Nothing  but  the  restoration  of  all  the 
economic  processes  of  Europe  as  a  whole  can  prevent  a  declining 
productivity  that  must  intensify  social  and  political  disorder, 
of  which  we  may  merely  have  seen  the  beginning. 

But  if  this  interdependence  of  factory  and  farm  in  the  pro- 
duction of  food  is  indisputable,  though  generally  ignored,  it 
involves  a  further  fact  just  as  indisputable,  and  even  more 
completely  ignored.  And  the  further  fact  is  that  the  manufac- 
turing and  the  farming,  neither  of  which  can  go  on  without  the 
other,  may  well  be  situated  in  different  States.  Vienna  starves 
largely  because  the  coal  needed  for  its  factories  is  now  situ- 
ated in  a  foreign  State — Czecho-Slovakia — which,  partly  from 
political  motives  perhaps,  fails  to  deliver  it.  Great  food  pro- 
ducing areas  in  the  Balkans  and  Russia  are  dependent  for 
their  tools  and  machinery,  for  the  stability  of  the  money  with- 
out which  the  food  will  not  be  produced,  upon  the  industries 
of  Germany.  Those  industries  are  destroyed,  the  markets 
have  disappeared,  and  with  them  the  incentive  to  production. 
The  railroads  of  what  ought  to  be  food  producing  States 
are  disorganized  from  lack  of  rolling  stock,  due  to  the  same 
paralysis  of  German  industry;  and  so  the  food  production  is 
diminished.  Tens  of  millions  of  acres  outside  Germany,  whose 
food  the  world  sorely  needs,  have  been  rendered  barren  by 
the  industrial  paralysis  of  the  Central  Empires  which  the 
economic  terms  of  the  Treaty  render  inevitable. 

Speaking  of  the  need  of  Russian  agriculture  for  German 
industry,  Mr.  Maynard  Keynes,  who  has  worked  out  the 
statistics  revealing  the  relative  position  of  Germany  to  the 
rest  of  Europe,  writes: — 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  25 

*It  is  impossible  geographically  and  for  many  other  rea- 
sons for  Englishmen,  Frenchmen,  or  Americans  to  under- 
take it — ^we  have  neither  the  incentive  nor  the  means  for 
doing  the  work  on  a  sufficient  scale.  Germany,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  the  experience,  the  incentive,  and  to  a  large  extent, 
the  materials  for  furnishing  the  Russian  peasant  with  the 
goods  of  which  he  has  been  starved  for  the  past  five  years, 
for  reorganising  the  business  of  transport  and  collection,  and 
30  for  bringing  into  the  world's  pool,  for  the  common  advan- 
tage, the  supplies  from  which  we  are  now  disastrously  cut 
off.  ...  If  we  oppose  in  detail  every  means  by  which  Ger- 
many or  Russia  can  recover  their  material  well-being,  because 
we  feel  a  national,  racial,  or  political  hatred  for  their  popula- 
tions or  their  governments,  we  must  be  prepared  to  face  the 
consequences  of  such  feelings.  Even  if  there  is  no  moral 
solidarity  between  the  newly-related  races  of  Europe,  there 
is  an  economic  solidarity  which  we  cannot  disregard.  Even 
now,  the  world  markets  are  one.  If  we  do  not  allow  Ger- 
many to  exchange  products  with  Russia  and  so  feed  herself, 
she  must  inevitably  compete  with  us  for  the  produce  of  the 
New  World.  The  more  successful  we  are  in  snapping  eco- 
nomic relations  between  Germany  and  Russia,  the  more  we  shall 
depress  the  level  of  our  own  economic  standards  and  increase 
the  gravity  of  our  own  domestic  problems.'  ^ 

It  is  not  merely  the  productivity  of  Russia  which  is  involved. 
Round  Germany  as  a  central  support  the  rest  of  the  European 
economic  system  grouped  itself,  and  upon  the  prosperity  and 
enterprise  of  Germany  the  prosperity  of  the  rest  of  the  Con- 
tinent mainly  depended.  Germany  was  the  best  customer 
of  Russia,  Norway,  Poland,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  Italy,  and 
Austria-Hungary;  she  was  the  second  best  customer  of  Great 
Britain,  Sweden,  and  Denmark;  and  the  third  best  customer 
of  France.  She  was  the  largest  source  of  supply  to  Russia, 
Norway,     Sweden,     Denmark,     Poland,     Switzerland,     Italy, 

*  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace/  pp.  275-277. 


26         '  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Austria-Hungary,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria;  and  the  second 
largest  source  of  supply  to  Great  Britain,  Belgium,  and  France. 
Britain  sent  more  experts  to  Germany  than  to  any  other  coun- 
try in  the  world  except  India,  and  bought  more  from  her 
than  any  other  country  in  the  world  except  the  United  States. 
There  was  no  European  country  except  those  west  of  Ger- 
many which  did  not  do  more  than  a  quarter  of  their  total 
trade  with  her;  and  in  the  case  of  Russia,  Austria-Hungary, 
and  Poland,  the  proportion  was  far  greater.  To  retard  or 
prevent  the  economic  restoration  of  Germany  means  retarding 
the  economic  reconstruction  of  Europe. 

This  gives  us  a  hint  of  the  deep  causes  underlying  the 
present  divergence  of  French  and  British  policy  with  refer- 
ence to  the  economic  reconstruction  of  Russia  and  Central 
Europe.  A  Britain  of  sixty  or  seventy  millions  faced  by  the 
situation  with  reference  to  America  that  has  just  been  touched 
upon,  might  well  find  that  the  development  of  the  resources 
of  Russia,  Siberia,  and  the  Near  East— even  at  the  cost  of 
dividing  the  profits  thereof  in  terms  of  industrial  development 
with  Germ.any,  each  supplying  that  for  which  it  was  best 
suited — was  the  essential  condition  of  food  and  social  peace. 
France  has  no  such  pre-occupation.  Her  concern  is  political: 
the  maintenance  of  a  military  predominance  on  which  she  be- 
lieves her  political  security  to  depend,  an  object  that  might  well 
be  facilitated  by  the  political  disintegration  of  Europe  even 
though  it  involved  its  economic  disintegration. 

That  brings  us  to  the  political  factor  in  the  decline  in  produc- 
tivity. From  itVe  may  learn  something  of  the  moral  factor, 
which  is  the  ultimate  condition  of  any  co-operation  whatso- 
ever. 

The  relationship  of  the  political  to  the  economic  situation 
is  illustrated  most  vividly,  perhaps,  in  the  case  of  Austria. 
Mr.  Hoover,  in  testimony  given  to  a  United  States  Senate 
Committee,  has  declared  bluntly  that  it  is  no  use  talking  of 
loans  to  Austria  which  imply  future  security,  if  the  present 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  27 

political  status  is  to  be  maintained,  because  that  status  has 
rendered  the  old  economic  activities  impossible.  Speaking 
before  the  Committee,  he  said : — 

'The  political  situation  in  Austria  I  hesitate  to  discuss,  but 
it  is  the  cause  of  the  trouble.  Austria  has  now  no  hope  of 
being  anything  more  than  a  perpetual  poorhouse,  because  all 
her  lands  that  produce  food  have  been  taken  from  her.  This, 
I  will  say,  was  done  wi^out  American  inspiration.  If  this 
political  situation  continues,  and^Aiistrra  is  made  a  perpetual 
mendicant,  the  United  States  should  not  provide  the  charity. 
We  should  make  the  loan  suggested  with  full  notice  that  those 
who  undertake  to  continue  Austria's  present  status  must  pay 
the  bill.  Present  Austria  faces  three  alternatives — death,  mi- 
gration, or  a  complete  industrial  diversion  and  re-organization. 
Her  economic  rehabilitation  seems  impossible  after  the  way 
she  was  broken  up  at  the  Peace  Conference.  Her  present 
territory  will  produce  only  enoughTbbd  for  three  months,  and 
she  has  now  no  factories  which  might  produce  products  to  be 
exchanged  for  food.'  ^ 

To  realise  what  can  really  be  accomplished  by  statesman- 
ship that  has  a  soul  above  such  trifles  as  food  and  fuel,  when 
it  sets  its  hand  to  map-drawing,  one  should  attempt  to  visualise 
the  state  of  Vienna  to-day.  Mr  A.  G.  Gardiner,  the  English 
journalist,  has  sketched  it  thus : — 

*To  conceive  its  situation  one  must  imagine  London  suddenly 
cut  off  from  all  the  sources  of  its  life,  no  access  to  the  sea, 
frontiers  of  hostile  Powers  all  round  it,  every  coalfield  of 
Yorkshire  or  South  Wales  or  Scotland  in  foreign  hands,  no 
citizen  able  to  travel  to  Birmingham  or  Manchester  without  a 
passport,  the  mills  it  had  financed  in  Lancashire  taken  from 
it,  no  coal  to  burn,  no  food  to  eat,  and — with  its  shilling  down 

*  Manchester  Guardian,  Weekly  Edition,  February  6th.,  1920. 


28  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

in  value  to  a  farthing — ^no  money  to  buy  raw  materials  for  its 
labour,  industry  at  a  standstill,  hundreds  of  thousands  living 
(or  dying)  on  charity,  nothing  prospering  except  the  vile  ex- 
ploiters of  misery,  the  traffickers  in  food,  the  traffickers  in  vice. 
That  is  the  Vienna  which  the  peace  criminals  have  made, 

'Vienna  was  the  financial  and  administrative  centre  of  fifty 
million  of  people.  It  financed  textile  factories,  paper  manu- 
facturing, machine  works,  beet  growing,  and  scores  of  other 
industries  in  German  Bohemia.  It  owned  coal  mines  at 
Teschen.  It  drew  its  food  from  Hungary.  From  every  quar- 
ter of  the  Empire  there  came  to  Vienna  the  half-manufac- 
tured products  of  the  provinces  for  the  finishing  processes, 
tailoring,  dyeing,  glass-working,  in  which  a  vast  population 
found  employment. 

'Suddenly  all  this  elaborate  structure  of  economic  life  was 
swept  away,  Vienna,  instead  of  being  the  vital  centre  of  fifty 
millions  of  people,  finds  itself  a  derelict  city  with  a  province 
of  six  millions.  It  is  cut  off  from  its  coal  supplies,  from  its 
food  supplies,  from  its  factories,  from  everything  that  means 
existence.    It  is  enveloped  by  tariff  walls,' 

The  writer  goes  on  to  explain  that  the  evils  are  not  limited 
to  Austria.  In  this  unhappy  Balkanised  Society  that  the  peace 
has  created  at  the  heart  of  Europe,  every  State  is  at  issue  with 
its  neighbours :  the  Czechs  with  the  Poles,  the  Hungarians  with 
the  Czechs,  the  Rumanians  with  the  Hungarians,  and  all  with 
Austria.  The  whole  Empire  is  parcelled  out  into  quarrelling 
factions,  with  their  rival  tariffs,  their  passports  and  their  ani- 
mosities. All  free  intercourse  has  stopped,  all  free  interchange 
of  commodities  has  ceased.  E^ch  starves  the  other  and  is 
starved  by  the  other.  T  met  a  banker  travelling  from  Buda- 
pest to  Berlin  by  Vienna  and  Bavaria.  I  asked  him  why  he 
went  so  far  out  of  his  way  to  get  to  his  goal,  and  he  replied 
that  it  was  easier  to  do  that  than  to  get  through  the  barbed- 
wire  entanglements  of  Czecho-Slovakia.  There  is  great  hunger 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  29 

in  Bohemia,  and  it  is  due  largely  to  the  same  all-embracing 
cause.  Formerly  the  Czech  peasants  used  to  go  to  Hungary 
to  gather  the  harvest  and  returned  with  corn  as  part  payment. 
Now  intercourse  has  stopped,  the  Hungarian  cornfields  are 
without  the  necessary  labour,  and  the  Czech  peasant  starves 
at  home,  or  is  fed  by  the  American  Relief  Fund.  "One  year 
of  peace,"  said  Herr  Renner,  the  Chancellor,  to  me,  "has 
wrought  more  ruin  than  five  years  of  war." ' 

Mr  Gardiner's  final  verdict  *  does  not  in  essence  differ  from 
that  of  Mr  Hoover: — 

'It  is  the  levity  of  mind  which  has  plunged  this  great  city 
into  ruin  that  is  inexplicable.  The  political  dismemberment  of 
Austria  might  be  forgiven.  That  was  repeatedly  declared  by 
the  Allies  not  to  be  an  object  of  the  War;  but  the  policy  of  the 
French,  backed  by  the  industrious  propaganda  of  a  mischievous 
newspaper  group  in  this  country,  triumphed  and  the  promise 
"was  dishonoured.  Austria-Hungary  was  broken  into  political 
fragments.  That  might  be  defended  as  a  political  necessity. 
But  the  economic  dismemberment  was  as  gratuitous  as  it  was 
deadly.  It  could  have  been  provided  against  if  ordinary  fore- 
sight had  been  employed.  Austria-Hungary  was  an  economic 
unit,  a  single  texture  of  the  commercial,  industrial,  and  financial 
interests.*  ^ 

*  Daily  News,  June  28th.,  1920. 

'Sir  William  Goode,  British  Director  of  Relief,  has  said,  (Times 
Dec.  6th.,  1919)  :— 

'I  have  myself  recently  returned  from  Vienna.  I  feel  as  if  I  had 
spent  ten  days  in  the  cell  of  a  condemned  murderer  who  has  given 
up  all  hope  of  reprieve.  I  stayed  at  the  best  hotel,  but  I  saw  no  milk 
and  no  eggs  the  whole  time  I  was  there.  In  the  bitter,  cold  hall  of 
the  hotel,  once  the  gayest  rendezvous  in  Europe,  the  visitors  huddled 
together  in  the  gloom  of  one  light  where  there  used  to  be  forty.  They 
were  more  like  shadows  of  the  Embankment  than  representatives  of 
the  rich.  Vienna's  world-famous  Opera  House  is  packed  every  after- 
noon. Why?  Women  and  men  go  there  in  order  to  keep  themselves 
warm,  and  because  they  have  no  work  to  do.* 

He  went  on  : — 

'First  aid  was  to  hasten  peace.     Political  difficulties  combined  with 


30  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

We  have  talked  readily  enough  in  the  past  of  this  or  that 
being  a  'menace  to  civilisation.'  The  phrase  has  been  applied 
indifferently  to  a  host  of  things  from  Prussian  Militarism  to 
the  tango.  No  particular  meaning  was  attached  to  the  phrase, 
and  we  did  not  believe  that  the  material  security  of  our  civilisa- 
tion— ^the  delivery  of  the  letters  and  the  milk  in  the  morning, 
and  the  regular  running  of  the  'Tubes' — would  ever  be  endan- 
gered in  our  times. 

But  this  is  what  has  happened  in  a  few  months.  We  have 
seen  one  of  the  greatest  and  most  brilliant  capitals  of  Europe, 
a  city  completely  untouched  by  the  physical  devastation  of  war, 
endowed  beyond  most  with  the  equipment  of  modern  technical 
learning  and  industry,  with  some  of  the  greatest  factories, 
medical  schools  and  hospitals  of  our  times,  unable  to  save  its 
children  from  death  by  simple  starvation — unable,  with  all  that 
equipment,  to  provide  them  each  with  a  little  milk  and  a  few 
ounces  of  flour  every  day. 


The  Limits  of  Political  Control 

It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  as  political  factors  (partic- 
ularly the  drawing  of  frontiers)  entered  to  some  extent  at  least 
into  the  present  distribution  of  population,  political  forces  can 
re-distribute  that  population.  But  re-distribution  would  mean 
in  fact  killing. 

So  to  re-direct  the  vast  currents  of  European  industry  as  to 
involve  a  great  re-distribution  of  the  population  would  demand 


decreased  production,  demoralisation  of  railway  traffic,  to  say  nothing 
of  actual  shortages  of  coal,  food,  and  finance,  had  practically  paralysed 
industrial  and  commercial  activity.  The  bold  liberation  or  creation  of 
areas,  without  simultaneous  steps  to  reorganise  economic  life,  had  so  far 
proved  to  be  a  dangerous  experiment.  Professor  Masaryk,  the  able 
President  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  put  the  case  in  a  nutshell  when  he  said: 
"It  is  a  question  of  the  export  of  merchandise  or  of  population.'" 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  31 

a  period  of  time  so  great  that  during  the  necessary  stoppage  of 
the  economic  process  most  of  the  population  concerned  would 
be  dead — even  if  we  could  imagine  sufficient  stability  to  permit 
of  these  vast  changes  taking  place  according  to  the  naive  and 
what  we  now  know  to  be  fantastic,  programme  of  our  Treaties. 
And  since  the  political  forces — as  we  shall  see — ^are  extremely 
unstable,  the  new  distribution  would  presumably  again  one  day 
undergo  a  similarly  murderous  modification. 

That  brings  us  to  the  question  suggested  in  the  proposition 
set  out  some  pages  back,  how  far  preponderant  political  power 
can  ensure  or  compel  those  processes  by  which  a  population  in 
the  position  of  that  of  these  islands  lives. 

For,  as  against  much  of  the  foregoing,  it  is  sometimes  urged 
that  Britain's  concern  in  the  Continental  chaos  is  not  really 
vital,  because  while  the  British  Isles  cannot  be  self-sufficing,  the 
British  Empire  can  be. 

During  the  War  a  very  bold  attempt  was  made  to  devise  a 
scheme  by  which  political  power  should  be  used  to  force  the 
economic  development  of  the  world  into  certain  national  chan- 
nels, a  scheme  whereby  the  military  power  of  the  dominant 
group  should  be  so  used  as  to  ensure  it  a  permanent  preponder- 
ance of  economic  resources.  The  plan  is  supposed  to  have 
emanated  from  Mr  Hughes,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Australia, 
and  the  Allies  (during  Mr  Asquith's  Premiership  incidentally) 
met  in  Paris  for  its  consideration.  Mr  Hughes's  idea  seems 
to  have  been  to  organise  the  world  into  economic  categories: 
the  British  Empire  first  in  order  of  mutual  preference,  the  Allies 
next,  the  neutrals  next,  and  the  enemy  States  last  of  all.  Russia 
was,  of  course,  included  among  the  Allies,  America  among  the 
neutrals,  the  States  then  Austria-Hungary  among  the  enemies. 

One  has  only  to  imagine  some  such  scheme  having  been 
voted  and  put  into  operation,  and  the  modifications  which 
political  changes  would  to-day  compel,  to  get  an  idea  of  merely 
the  first  of  the  difficulties  of  using  political  and  military  power, 
with  a  basis   of   separate   and   competing   nationalisms,    for 


^2  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

economic  purposes.  The  very  nature  of  military  nationalism 
makes  surrender  of  competition  in  favour  of  long  continued 
co-operation  for  common  purposes,  a  moral  impossibility.  The 
foundations  of  the  power  are  unstable,  the  wills  which  determine 
its  use  contradictory. 

Yet  military  power  must  rest  upon  Alliance.  Even  the 
British  Empire  found  that  its  defence  needed  Allies.  And  if  the 
British  Empire  is  to  be  self-sufficing,  its  trade  canalised  into 
channels  drawn  along  certain  political  lines,  the  preferences  and 
prohibitions  will  create  many  animosities.  Are  we  to  sacrifice 
our  self-sufficiency  for  the  sake  of  American  and  French 
friendship,  or  risk  losing  the  friendship  by  preferences  designed 
to  ensure  self-sufficiency?  Yet  to  the  extent  that  our  trade 
is  with  countries  like  North  and  South  America  we  cannot 
exercise  on  its  behalf  even  the  shadow  of  military  coercion. 

But  that  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  difficulty. 

A  suggestive  fact  is  that  ever  since  the  population  of  these 
islands  became  dependent  upon  overseas  trade,  that  trade  has 
been  not  mainly  with  the  Empire  but  with  foreigners.  It  is 
to-day.^  And  if  one  reflects  for  a  moment  upon  the  present 
political  relationship  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  Ireland, 
Egypt,  India,  South  Africa,  and  the  tariff  and  immigration 
legislation  that  has  marked  the  economic  history  of  Australia 
and  Canada  during  the  last  twenty  years,  one  will  get  some 
idea  of  the  difficulty  which  surrounds  the  employment  of 
political  power  for  the  shaping  of  an  economic  policy  to  sub- 
serve any  large  and  long-continued  political  end. 

The  difficulties  of  an  imperial  policy  in  this  respect  do  not 
differ  much  in  character  from  the  difficulties  encountered  in 
Paris.    The  British  Empire,  too,  has  its  problems  of  'Balkanis- 

^The  figures  for  1913  are: — 

Imports.  From  British  Possessions £192,000,000 


From   Foreign   Countries 
Elxports.  To  British  Possessions 

To  Foreign  Countries 
Re-exports.  To  British  Possessions 

To  Foreign  Countries 


£577,000,000. 
£195,000,000. 
£330,000,000. 

£14,000,000. 

£96,000.000. 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  33 

ation,'  problems  that  have  arisen  also  from  the  anti-social 
element  of  'absolute'  nationalism.  The  present  Nationalist 
fermentation  within  the  Empire  reveals  very  practical  limits  to 
the  use  of  political  power.  We  cannot  compel  the  purchase  of 
British  goods  by  Egyptian,  Indian,  or  Irish  Nationalists. 
Moreover,  an  Indian  or  Egyptian  boycott  or  Irish  agitation, 
may  well  deprive  political  domination  of  any  possibility  of 
economic  advantage.  The  readiness  with  which  British  opinion 
has  accepted  very  large  steps  towards  the  independence  and 
evacuation  of  Egypt  after  having  fiercely  resisted  such  a  policy 
for  a  generation,  would  seem  to  suggest  that  some  part  of  the 
truth  in  this  matter  is  receiving  general  recognition.  It  is  hardly 
less  noteworthy  that  popular  newspapers — that  one  could  not 
have  imagined  taking  such  a  view  at  the  time,  say,  of  the  Boer 
war — now  strenuously  oppose  further  commitments  in  Mesopo- 
tamia and  Persia — and  do  so  on  financial  grounds.  And  even 
where  the  relations  of  the  Imperial  Government  with  States 
like  Canada  or  Australia  are  of  the  most  cordial  kind,  the 
impotence  of  political  power  for  exacting  economic  advantage 
has  become  an  axiom  of  imperial  statecraft.  The  day  that 
the  Government  in  London  proposed  to  set  in  motion  its  army 
or  navy  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  Canada  or  Australia 
to  cease  the  manufacture  of  cotton  or  steel  in  order  to  give 
England  a  market,  would  be  the  day,  as  we  are  all  aware,  of 
another  Declaration  of  Independence.  Any  preference  would 
be  the  result  of  consent,  agreement,  debate,  contract:  not  of 
coercion. 

But  the  most  striking  demonstration  yet  afforded  in  history 
of  the  limits  placed  by  modern  industrial  conditions  upon  the 
economic  effectiveness  of  political  power  is  afforded  by  the 
story  of  the  attempt  to  secure  reparations,  indemnity,  and  even 
coal  from  Germany,  and  the  attempt  of  the  victors,  like  France, 
to  repair  the  disastrous  financial  situation  which  has  followed 
war  by  the  military  seizure  of  the  wealth  of  a  beaten  enemy. 
That  story  is  instructive  both  by  reason  of  the  light  which  it 


34  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

throws  upon  the  facts  as  to  the  economic  value  of  military 
power,  and  upon  the  attitude  of  pubHc  and  statesmen  towards 
these  facts. 

When,  some  hfteen  years  ago,  it  was  suggested  that,  given 
the  conditions  of  modern  trade  and  industry,  a  victor  would 
not  in  practice  be  able  to  turn  his  military  preponderance  to 
economic  account  even  in  such  a  relatively  simple  matter  as 
the  payment  of  an  indemnity,  the  suggestion  was  met  with  all 
but  universal  derision.  European  economists  of  international 
reputation  implied  that  an  author  who  could  make  a  suggestion 
of  that  kind  was  just  playing  with  paradox  for  the  purpose 
of  notoriety.  And  as  for  newspaper  criticism — it  revealed  the 
fact  that  in  the  minds  of  the  critics  it  was  as  simple  a  matter 
for  an  army  to  'take'  a  nation's  wealth  once  military  victory 
had  been  achieved,  as  it  would  be  for  a  big  schoolboy  to  take 
an  apple  from  a  little  one. 

Incidentally,  the  history  of  the  indemnity  negotiations  illum- 
inates extraordinarily  the  truth  upon  which  the  present  writer 
happens  so  often  to  have  insisted,  namely,  that  in  dealing  with 
the  economics  of  nationalism,  one  cannot  dissociate  from  the 
problem  the  moral  facts  which  make  the  nationalism — without 
which  there  would  be  no  nationalisms,  and  therefore  no  'inter- 
national' economics. 

A  book  by  the  present  author  published  some  fifteen  years 
ago  has  a  chapter  entitled  'The  Indemnity  Futility.'  In  the 
first  edition  the  main  emphasis  of  the  chapter  was  thrown  on 
this  suggestion :  on  the  morrow  of  a  great  war  the  victor  would 
be  in  no  temper  to  see  the  foreign  trade  of  his  beaten  enemy 
expand  by  leaps  and  bounds,  yet  by  no  other  means  than  by  an 
immense  foreign  trade  could  a  nation  pay  an  indemnity  commen- 
surate with  the  vast  expenditure  of  modern  war.  The  idea 
that  it  would  be  paid  in  'money,'  which  by  some  economic 
witchcraft  should  not  involve  the  export  of  goods,  was  declared 
to  be  a  gross  and  ignorant  fallacy.  The  traders  of  the  victorious 
nation  would  have  to  face  a  greatly  sharpened  competitioi) 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  35 

from  the  beaten  nation ;  or  the  victor  would  have  to  go  without 
any  very  considerable  indemnity.  The  chapter  takes  the  ground 
that  an  indemnity  is  not  in  terms  of  theoretical  economics  an 
impossibility :  it  merely  indicates  the  indispensable  condition  of 
securing  it — the  revival  of  the  enemy's  economic  strength — 
and  suggests  that  this  would  present  for  the  victorious  nation, 
not  only  a  practical  difficulty  of  internal  politics  (the  pressure 
of  Protectionist  groups)  but  a  grave  political  difficulty  arising 
out  of  the  theory  upon  which  defence  by  preponderant  isolated 
national  power  is  based.  A  country  possessing  the  economic 
strength  to  pay  a  vast  indemnity  is  of  potential  military  strength. 
And  this  is  a  risk  your  nationalists  will  not  accept. 

Even  friendly  Free  Trade  critics  shook  their  heads  at  this 
and  implied  that  the  argument  was  a  reversion  to  Protectionist 
illusions  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  case.  That  misunder- 
standing (for  the  argument  does  not  involve  acceptance  of 
Protectionist  premises)  seemed  so  general  that  in  subsequent 
editions  of  the  book  this  particular  passage  was  deleted.^ 


*The  question  is  dealt  with  more  fully  in  the  last  chapter  of  the 
'Addendum'  to  this  book.  The  chapter  of  'The  Great  Illusion'  dealing 
with  the  indemnity  says:  The  difficulty  in  the  case  of  a  large  in- 
demnity is  not  so  much  the  payment  by  the  vanquished  as  the  receiving 
by  the  victor.'  (p.  76,  1910  Edition.)  Mr  Lloyd  George  (Jan.  28th., 
1921)  says:  'The  real  difficulty  is  in  securing  payment  outside  the 
limits  of  Germany.  .  .  .The  only  way  Germany  can  pay  is  by  exports — 
the  difference  between  German  imports  and  exports  ...  If  she  ex- 
ports too  much  for  the  Allies  it  means  the  ruin  of  their  industry.' 

Thus  the  main  problem  of  an  indemnity  is  to  secure  wealth  in  ex- 
portable form  which  will  not  disorganise  the  victor's  trade.  Yet  so 
obscured  does  the  plainest  fact  become  in  the  murky  atmosphere  of 
war  time  that  in  many  of  the  elaborate  studies  emanating  from  West- 
minster and  Paris,  as  to  'What  Germany  can  pay'  this  phase  of  the 
problem  is  not  even  touched  upon.  We  get  calculations  as  to  Ger- 
many's total  wealth  in  railroads,  public  buildings,  houses,  as  though 
these  things  could  be  picked  up  and  transported  to  France  or  Belgium. 
We  are  told  that  the  Allies  should  collect  the  revenues  of  the  railroads ; 
the  Daily  Mail  wants  us  to  'take'  the  income  of  Herr  Stinnes,  all  with- 
out a  word  as  to  the  form  in  which  this  wealth  is  to  leave  Germany. 
Are  we  prepared  to  take  the  things  made  in  the  factories  of  Herr 
Stinnes  or  other  Germans?  If  not,  what  do  we  propose  that  Germany 
shall  give?    Paper  marks  increased  in  quantity  until  they  reach  just  the 


36  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

It  is  not  necessary  now  to  labour  the  point,  in  view  of  all 
that  has  happened  in  Paris.  The  dilemma  suggested  fifteen 
years  ago  is  precisely  the  dilemma  which  confronted  the 
makers  of  the  Peace  Treaty;  it  is,  indeed,  precisely  the  dilemma 
which  confronts  us  to-day. 

It  applies  not  only  to  the  Indemnity,  Reparations,  but  to 
our  entire  policy,  to  larger  aspects  of  our  relations  with  the 
enemy.  Hence  the  paralysis  which  results  from  the  two  mutu- 
ally exclusive  aims  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles:  the  desire 
on  the  one  hand  to  reduce  the  enemy's  strength  by  checking 
his  economic  vitality — and  on  the  other  to  restore  the  general 
productivity  of  Europe,  to  which  the  economic  life  of  the 
enemy  is  indispensable. 

France  found  herself,  at  the  end  of  the  War,  in  a  desperate 
financial  position  and  in  dire  need  of  all  the  help  which  could 
come  from  the  enemy  towards  the  restoration  of  her  devas- 
tated districts.  She  presented  demands  for  reparation  run- 
ning to  vast,  unprecedented  sums.  So  be  it.  Germany  then 
was  to  be  permitted  to  return  to  active  and  productive  work, 
to  be  permitted  to  have  the  iron  and  the  other  raw  materials 
necessary  for  the  production  of  the  agricultural  machinery, 
the  building  material  and  other  sorts  of  goods  France  needed. 
Not  the  least  in  the  world!     Germany  was  to  produce  this 


value  of  the  paper  they  are  printed  on  ?  Even  to  secure  coal,  we  must, 
as  we  have  seen,  give  in  return  food. 

If  the  crux  of  the  situation  were  really  understood  by  the  memorialists 
who  want  Germany's  pockets  searched,  their  studies  would  be  devoted 
not  to  showing  what  Germany  might  produce  under  favourable  cir- 
cumstances, which  her  past  has  shown  to  be  very  great  indeed,  but 
what  degree  of  competitive  German  production  Allied  industrialists 
will  themselves  be  ready  to  face. 

"Big  business"  in  England  is  already  strongly  averse  to  the  pay- 
ment of  an  indemnity,  as  any  conversation  in  the  City  or  with  indus- 
trialists readily  reveals.  Yet  it  was  the  suggestion  of  what  has  actually 
taken  place  which  excited  the  derision  of  critics  a  few  years  ago. 
Obviously  the  feasibility  of  an  indemnity  is  much  more  a  matter  of  our 
will  than  of  Germany's,  for  it  depends  on  what  shall  be  the  size  of 
Germany's  foreign  trade.  Clearly  we  can  expand  that  if  we  want  to. 
We  might  give  her  a  preference! 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  37 

great  mass  of  wealth,  but  her  factories  were  to  remain  closed, 
her  rolling  stock  was  to  be  taken  from  her,  she  was  to  have 
neither  food  nor  raw  materials.  This  is  not  some  malicious 
travesty  of  the  attitude  which  prevailed  at  the  time  that  the 
Treaty  was  made.  It  was,  and  to  a  large  extent  still  is,  the 
position  taken  by  many  French  publicists  as  well  as  by  some 
in  England.  Mr.  Vanderlip,  the  American  banker,  describes 
in  his  book  ^  the  attitude  which  he  found  in  Paris  during  the 
Conference  in  these  words :  'The  French  burn  to  milk  the  cow 
but  insist  first  that  its  throat  must  be  cut.' 

Despite  the  lessons  of  the  year  which  followed  the  signing 
of  the  Treaty,  one  may  doubt  whether  even  now  the  nature 
of  wealth  and  'money'  has  come  home  to  the  Chauvinists  of 
the  Entente  countries.  The  demand  that  we  should  at  one 
and  the  same  time  forbid  Germany  to  sell  so  much  as  a  pen- 
knife in  the  markets  of  the  world  and  yet  compel  her  to  pay 
us  a  tribute  which  could  only  be  paid  by  virtue  of  a  foreign 
trade  greater  than  any  which  she  has  been  able  to  maintain 
in  the  past — these  mutually  exclusive  demands  are  still  made 
in  our  own  Parliament  and  Press. 

How  powerfully  the  Nationalist  fears  operate  to  obscure 
the  plain  alternatives  is  revealed  in  a  letter  of  M.  Andre 
Tardieu,  written  more  than  eighteen  months  after  the  Armis- 
tice. 

M.  Tardieu,  who  was  M.  Clemenceau's  political  lieutenant 
in  the  framing  of  the  Treaty,  and  one  of  the  principal  inspirers 
of  the  French  policy,  writing  in  July,  1920,  long  after  the 
condition  of  Europe  and  the  Continent's  economic  dependence 
on  Germany  had  become  visible,  'warns'  us  of  the  'danger'  that 
Germany  may  recover  unless  the  Treaty  is  applied  in  all  its 
rigour !    He  says : — 

'Remember  your  own  history  and  remember  what  the  rat 
de  terre  de  cousin  which  Great  Britain  regarded  with  such 
*  'What  Happened  to  Europe.' 


38  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

disdain  after  the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt  became  in  less  than 
forty  years.  We  shall  see  Germany  recover  economically, 
profiting  by  the  ruins  she  has  made  in  other  countries,  with  a 
rapidity  which  will  astonish  the  world.  When  that  day  arrives, 
if  we  have  given  way  at  Spa  to  the  madness  of  letting  her 
off  part  of  the  debt  that  was  born  of  her  crime,  no  courses 
will  be  too  strong  for  the  Governments  which  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  duped.  M.  Clemenceau  always  said  to  British  and 
American  statesmen:  "We  of  France  understand  Germany 
better  than  you."  M.  Clemenceau  was  right,  and  in  bringing 
his  colleages  round  to  his  point  of  view  he  did  good  work  for 
the  welfare  of  humanity.  If  the  work  of  last  year  is  to  be 
undone,  the  world  will  be  delivered  up  to  the  economic  hege- 
mony of  Germany  before  twenty-five  years  have  passed.  There 
could  be  no  better  proof  than  the  recent  despatches  of  The 
Times  correspondent  in  Germany,  which  bear  witness  to  the 
fever  of  production  which  consumes  Herr  Stinnes  and  his 
like.  Such  evidence  is  stronger  than  the  biased  statistics  of 
Mr  Keynes.  Those  who  refuse  to  take  it  into  account  will 
be  the  criminals  in  the  eyes  of  their  respective  countries.'  ^ 

Note  M.  Tardieu's  argument.  He  fears  the  restoration  of 
Germany  industry,  unless  we  make  her  pay  the  whole  indem- 
nity. That  is  to  say,  in  other  words,  if  we  compel  Germany 
to  produce  during  the  next  twenty-five  years  something  like 
ten  thousand  millions  worth  of  wealth  over  and  above  her  own 
needs,  involving  as  it  must  a  far  greater  output  from  her  fac- 
tories, mines,  shipyards,  laboratories,  a  far  greater  develop- 
ment of  her  railways,  ports,  canals,  a  far  greater  efficiency 
and  capacity  in  her  workers  than  has  ever  been  known  in  the 
past,  if  that  takes  place  as  it  must  if  we  are  to  get  an  indem- 
nity on  the  French  scale,  why,  in  that  case,  there  will  be  no 
risk  of  Germany's  making  too  great  an  economic  recovery! 

The  English  Press  is  not  much  better.     It  was  in  Decem- 

*  Times,  July  3rd.,  1920. 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  39 

ber,  1918,  that  Professor  Starling  presented  to  the  British 
Government  his  report  showing  that  unless  Germany  had  more 
food  she  would  be  utterly  unable  to  pay  any  large  indemnity 
to  aid  in  reparations  to  France.  Fully  eighteen  months  later  we 
find  the  Daily  Mail  (June  18,  1920)  rampaging  and  shouting 
itself  hoarse  at  the  monstrous  discovery  that  the  Government 
have  permitted  Germans  to  purchase  wheat!  Yet  the  Mail 
has  been  foremost  in  insisting  upon  France's  dire  need  for  a 
German  indemnity  in  order  to  retore  devastated  districts.  If 
the  Mail  is  really  representative  of  John  Bull,  then  that  per- 
son is  at  present  in  the  position  of  a  farmer  who  at  seed-time 
is  made  violently  angry  at  the  suggestion  that  grain  should 
be  taken  for  the  purpose  of  sowing  the  land,  and  shouts  that  it 
is  a  wicked  proposal  to  take  food  from  the  mouths  of  his 
children.  Although  the  Northcliffe  Press  has  itself  published 
page  advertisements  (from  the  Save  the  Children  Fund)  de- 
scribing the  incredible  and  appalling  conditions  in  Europe, 
the  Daily  Mail  shouts  in  its  leading  article:  'Is  British  Food 
to  go  to  the  Boches?'  The  thing  is  in  the  best  war  style.  'Is 
there  any  reason  why  the  Briton  should  be  starved  to  feed  the 
German?'  asks  the  Mail.  And  there  follows,  of  course,  the 
usual  invective  about  the  submarines,  war  criminals,  the  sink- 
ing of  hospital  ships,  and  the  approval  by  the  whole  German 
people  of  all  these  crimes. 

We  get  here,  as  at  every  turn  and  twist  of  our  policy,  not 
any  recognition  of  interdependence,  but  a  complete  repudiation 
of  that  idea,  and  an  assumption,  instead,  of  a  conflict  of  inter- 
est. If  the  children  of  Vienna  or  Berlin  are  to  be  fed,  then  it 
is  assumed  that  it  must  be  at  the  expense  of  the  children  of 
Paris  and  London.  The  wealth  of  the  world  is  conceived  as 
a  fixed  quantity,  unaffected  by  any  process  of  co-operation 
between  the  peoples  sharing  the  world.  The  idea  is,  of  course, 
an  utter  fallacy.  French  or  Belgian  children  will  have  more, 
not  less,  if  we  take  measures  to  avoid  European  conditions 
in  which  the  children  of  Vienna  are  left  to  die.     If,  during 


40  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  winter  of  1919-1920,  French  children  died  from  sickness 
due  to  lack  of  fuel,  it  was  because  the  German  coal  was  not 
delivered,  and  the  German  coal  was  not  delivered  because, 
among  other  things,  of  general  disorganization  of  transport,  of 
lack  of  rolling  stock,  of  underfeeding  of  the  miners,  of  collapse 
of  the  currency,  political  unrest,  uncertainty  of  the  future. 

It  is  one  of  the  contradictions  of  the  whole  situation  that 
France  herself  gives  intermittent  recognition  to  the  fact  of 
this  interdependence.  When,  at  Spa,  it  became  evident  that 
coal  simply  could  not  be  delivered  in  the  quantities  demanded 
unless  Germany  had  some  means  of  buying  imported  food, 
France  consented  to  what  was  in  fact  a  loan  to  Germany  (to 
the  immense  mystification  of  certain  journalistic  critics  in 
Paris).  One  is  prompted  to  ask  what  those  who,  before  the 
War  so  scornfully  treated  the  present  writer  for  throwing 
doubts  upon  the  feasibility  of  a  post-war  indemnity,  would 
have  said  had  he  predicted  that  on  the  morrow  of  victory,  the 
victor,  instead  of  collecting  a  vast  indemnity  would  from  the 
simplest  motives  of  self -protection,  out  of  his  own  direly 
depleted  store  of  capital,  be  advancing  money  to  the  van- 
quished.^ 

The  same  inconsistency  runs  through  much  of  our  post-war 
behaviour.  The  famine  in  Central  Europe  has  become  so  ap- 
palling that  very  great  sums  are  collected  in  Britain  and  Amer- 
ica for  its  relief.  Yet  the  reduced  productivity  out  of  which 
the  famine  has  arisen  was  quite  obviously  deliberately  de- 
signed, and  most  elaborately  planned  by  the  economic  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty  and  by  the  blockades  prolonged  after  the 
Armistice,  for  months  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  years  in  the 
case  of  Russia.  And  at  the  very  time  that  advertisements  were 
appearing  in  the  Daily  Mail  for  'Help  to  Starving  Europe,' 
and  only  a  few  weeks  before  France  consented  to  advance 
money  for  the  purpose  of  feeding  Germany,  that  paper  was 

*  The  proposal  respecting  Aiistria  was  a  loan  of  50  millions  in 
instalments  of  five  years. 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  41 

working  up  *anti-Hun  stunts'  for  the  purpose  of  using  our 
power  to  prevent  any  food  whatsoever  going  to  Boches.  It  is 
also  a  duplication  of  the  American  phenomenon  already  touched 
upon :  One  Bill  before  Congress  for  the  loaning  of  American 
money  to  Europe  in  order  that  cotton  and  wheat  may  find  a 
market:  another  Bill  before  the  same  Congress  designed,  by 
a  stiffly  increased  tariff,  to  keep  out  European  goods  so  that 
the  loans  can  never  be  repaid.^ 

The  experience  of  France  in  the  attempt  to  exact  coal  by 
the  use  of  military  pressure  throws  a  good  deal  of  light  upon 
what  is  really  annexed  when  a  victor  takes  over  territory  con- 
taining, say,  coal;  as  also  upon  the  question  of  getting  the 
coal  when  it  has  been  annexed.  *If  we  need  coal,'  wrote  a 
Paris  journalist  plaintively  during  the  Spa  Conference,  'why 
in  heaven's  name  don't  we  go  and  take  it.'  The  implication 
being  that  it  could  be  'taken'  without  payment,  for  nothing. 
But  even  if  France  were  to  occupy  the  Ruhr  and  to  administer 
the  mines,  the  plant  would  have  to  be  put  in  order,  rolling 
stock  provided,  railroads  restored,  and,  as  France  has  already 

*  Mr  Hoover  seems  to  suggest  that  their  repayment  should  never  take 
place.    To  a  meeting  of  Bankers  he  says : — 

'Even  if  we  extend  these  credits  and  if  upon  Europe's  recovery  we 
then  attempt  to  exact  the  payment  of  these  sums  by  import  of  com- 
modities, we  shall  have  introduced  a  competition  with  our  own  indus- 
tries that  cannot  be  turned  back  by  any  tariff  wall  ...  I  believe  that 
we  have  to-day  an  equipment  and  a  skill  in  production  that  yield  us 
a  surplus  of  commodities  for  export  beyond  any  compensation  we  can 
usefully  take  by  way  of  imported  commodities  .  .  .  Gold  and  remit- 
tances and  services  cannot  cover  this  gulf  in  our  trade  balance  .  .  . 
To  me  there  is  only  one  remedy,  and  that  is  by  the  systematic  permanent 
investment  of  our  surplus  production  in  reproductive  works  abroad. 
We  thus  reduce  the  return  we  must  receive  to  a  return  of  interest 
and  profit.' 

A  writer  in  the  New  Republic  (Dec.  29th.,  1920.)  who  quotes  this 
says  pertinently  enough : — 

'Mr  Hoover  disposes  of  the  principal  of  our  foreign  loans.  The 
debtors  cannot  return  it  and  we  cannot  afford  to  receive  it  back.  But 
the  interest  and  profit  which  he  says  we  may  receive — that  will  have  to 
be  paid  in  commodities,  as  the  principal  would  be  if  it  were  paid  at  ail. 
What  shall  we  do  when  the  volume  of  foreign  commodities  received  in 
payment  of  interest  and  profit  becomes  very  large  and  our  industries 
cry  for  protection  ?  ' 


42  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

learned,  miners  fed  and  clothed  and  housed.  But  that  costs 
money — to  be  paid  as  part  of  the  cost  of  the  coal.  If  Germany 
is  compelled  to  provide  those  things — mining  machinery,  roll- 
ing stock,  rails,  miners'  houses  and  clothing  and  food — we  are 
confronted  with  pretty  much  the  same  dilemma  as  we  encounter 
in  compelling  the  payment  of  an  indemnity.  A  Germany  that 
can  buy  foreign  food  is  a'  Germany  of  restored  credit ;  a  Ger- 
many that  can  furnish  rolling  stock,  rails,  mining  machinery, 
clothing  and  housing  for  miners,  is  a  Germany  restored  to  ' 
general  economic  health — and  potentially  powerful.  That  Ger- 
many France  fears  to  create.  And  even  though  we  resort  to  a 
military  occupation,  using  forced  labour  militarily  controlled,  we 
are  faced  by  the  need  of  all  the  things  that  must  still  enter 
in  the  getting  of  the  coal,  from  miners*  food  and  houses  to 
plant  and  steel  rails.  Their  cost  must  be  charged  against  the 
coal  obtained.  And  the  amount  of  coal  obtained  in  return 
for  a  given  outlay  will  depend  very  largely,  as  we  know  in 
England  to  our  cost,  upon  the  willingness  of  the  miner  him- 
self. Even  the  measure  of  resistance  provoked  in  British 
miners  by  disputes  about  workers'  control  and  Nationalisation, 
has  meant  a  great  falling  off  in  output.  But  at  least  they  are 
working  for  their  own  countrymen.  What  would  be  their  out- 
put if  they  felt  they  were  working  for  an  enemy,  and  that 
every  ton  they  mined  might  merely  result  in  increasing  the 
ultimate  demands  which  that  enemy  would  make  upon  their 
country?  Should  we  get  even  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  pre-war 
output   or   anything  like   it  ?  ^     Yet   that   diminished   output 

*  The  present  writer  declines  to  join  in  the  condemnation  of  British 
miners  for  reduced  output.  In  an  ultimate  sense  (which  is  no  part  of 
the  present  discussion)  the  decline  in  effort  of  the  miner  is  perhaps 
justified.  But  the  facts  are  none  the  less  striking  as  showing  how  great 
the  difference  of  output  can  be.  Figures  given  by  Sir  John  Cadman, 
President  of  the  Institute  of  Mining  Engineers  a  short  time  ago  (and 
quoted  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  for  Oct.  1920.),  show  that  in  1916 
the  coal  production  per  person  employed  in  the  United  Kingdom  was 
263  tons,  as  against  731  tons  in  the  United  States.  In  1918  the  former 
amounted  to  236  tons,  and  during  1919  it  sank  to  19714  tons.  In  1915 
the  coal  produced  per  man  per  day  in  this  country  was  0.98  tons,  and 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  43 

would  have  to  stand  the  cost  of  all  the  permanent  charges 
aforesaid.  Would  the  cost  of  the  coal  to  France,  under  some 
scheme  of  forced  labour,  be  in  the  end  less  than  if  she 
were  to  buy  it  in  the  ordinary  commercial  way  from  German 
mines,  as  she  did  before  the  War?  This  latter  method  would 
almost  certainly  be  in  economic  terms  more  advantageous. 
Where  is  the  economic  advantage  of  the  military  method? 
This,  of  course,  is  only  the  re-discovery  of  the  old  truth  that 
forced  or  slave  labour  is  more  costly  than  paid  labour. 

The  ultimate  explanation  of  the  higher  cost  of  slave  labour 
is  the  ultimate  explanation  of  the  difficulty  of  using  political 
power  for  economic  ends,  of  basing  our  economic  security 
upon  military  predominance.  Here  is  France,  with  her  old 
enemy  helpless  and  prostrate.  She  needs  his  work  for  repara- 
tions, for  indemnities,  for  coal.  To  perform  that  work  the 
prostrate  enemy  must  get  upon  his  feet.  If  he  does,  France 
fears  that  he  will  knock  her  down.  From  that  fear  arise  con> 
tradictory  policies,  self -stultifying  courses.  If  she  overcomes 
her  fear  sufficiently  to  allow  the  enemy  to  produce  a  certain 
amount  of  wealth  for  her,  it  is  extremely  likely  that  more 
than  the  amount  of  that  wealth  will  have  to  be  spent  in  pro- 
tecting herself  against  the  danger  of  the  enemy's  recovered 
vitality.    Even  when  wars  were  less  expensive  than  they  are, 


in  America  it  was  3.91  tons  for  bituminous  coal  and  2.19  tons  for 
anthracite.  In  1918  the  British  output  figure  was  0.80  tons,  and  the 
American  Z^l  tons  for  bitvuninous  coal  and  227  for  anthracite.  Meas- 
ured by  their  daily  output,  a  single  American  miner  does  just  as  much 
work  as  do  five  Englishmen. 

The  inferiority  in  production  is,  of  course,  'to  some  considerable  ex- 
tent' due  to  the  fact  that  the  most  easily  workable  deposits  in  England 
are  becoming  exhausted,  while  the  United  States  can  most  easily  draw 
on  their  most  prolific  and  most  easily  workable  sites.  .  .  . 

It  is  the  fact  that  in  our  new  and  favourable  coalfields,  such  as  the 
South  Yorkshire  area,  the  men  working  under  the  most  favourable 
modern  conditions  and  in  new  mines  where  the  face  is  near  the  shaft, 
do  not  obtain  as  much  coal  per  man  employed,  as  that  got  by  the 
miners  in  the  country  generally  under  the  conditions  appertaining  forty 
and  fifty  years  ago. 


44  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

indemnities  were  soon  absorbed  in  the  increase  of  armament 
necessitated  by  the  Treaties  which  exacted  the  indemnities. 

Again,  this  is  a  very  ancient  story.  The  victor  on  the 
Egyptian  vase  has  his  captured  enemy  on  the  end  of  a  rope. 
We  say  that  one  is  free,  the  other  bond.  But  as  Spencer  has 
shown  us,  both  are  bond.  The  victor  is  tied  to  the  vanquished : 
if  he  should  let  go  the  prisoner  would  escape.  The  victor  spends 
his  time  seeing  that  the  prisoner  does  not  escape;  the  prisoner 
his  time  and  energy  trying  to  escape.  The  combined  efforts 
in  consequence  are  not  turned  to  the  production  of  wealth;  they 
are  'cancelled  out'  by  being  turned  one  against  another.  Both 
may  come  near  to  starvation  in  that  condition  if  much  labour 
is  needed  to  produce  food.  Only  if  they  strike  a  bargain  and 
co-operate  will  they  be  in  the  position  each  to  turn  his  energy 
to  the  best  economic  account. 

But  though  the  story  is  ancient,  men  have  not  yet  read  it. 
These  pages  are  an  attempt  to  show  why  it  has  not  been  read. 

Let  us  summarise  the  conclusions  so  far  reached,  namely : — 

That  predominant  political  and  military  power  is  important 
to  exact  wealth  is  shown  by  the  inability  of  the  Allies  to  turn 
their  power  to  really  profitable  account ;  notably  by  the  failure 
of  France  to  alleviate  her  financial  distress  by  adequate  repa- 
rations— even  adequate  quantities  of  coal — from  Germany; 
and  by  the  failure  of  the  Allied  statesmen  as  a  whole,  wielding 
a  concentration  of  power  greater  perhaps  than  any  known  in 
history  to  arrest  an  economic  disintegration,  which  is  not  only 
the  cause  of  famine  and  vast  suffering,  but  is  a  menace  to 
Allied  interest,  particularly  to  the  economic  security  of  Britain. 

The  causes  of  this  impotence  are  both  mechanical  and  moral. 
If  another  is  to  render  active  service  in  the  production  of  wealth 
for  us — ^particularly  services  of  any  technical  complexity  in 
industry,  finance,  commerce — he  must  have  strength  for  that 
activity,  knowledge,  and  the  instruments.  But  all  those  things 
can  be  turned  against  us  as  means  of  resistance  to  our  coercion. 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  45 

To  the  degree  to  which  we  make  him  strong  for  our  service 
we  make  him  strong  for  resistance  to  our  will.  As  resistance 
increases  we  are  compelled  to  use  an  increasing  proportion  of 
what  we  obtain  from  him  in  protecting  ourselves  against  him. 
Energies  cancel  each  other,  indemnities  must  be  used  in  prepa- 
ration for  the  next  war.  Only  voluntary  co-operation  can  save 
this  waste  and  create  an  effective  combination  for  the  produc- 
tion of  wealth  that  can  be  utilised  for  the  preservation  of  life. 


The  Ultimate  Moral  Factor 

The  problem  is  not  merely  one  of  foreign  politics  or  inter- 
national relationship.  The  passions  which  obscure  the  real 
nature  of  the  process  by  which  men  live  are  present  in  the 
industrial  struggle  also,  and — especially  in  the  case  of  com- 
munities situated  as  is  the  British — ^make  of  the  national  and 
international  order  one  problem. 

It  is  here  suggested  that : — 

Into  the  processes  which  maintain  life  within  the  nation 
an  increasing  measure  of  consent  and  aquiescence  by  all  parties 
must  enter:  physical  coercion  becomes  increasingly  impotent 
to  ensure  them.  The  problem  of  declining  production  by  {inter 
alios)  miners,  cannot  be  solved  by  increasing  the  army  or 
police.  The  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  fails  before  the  prob- 
lem of  exacting  big  crops  by  the  coercion  of  the  peasant  or 
countryman.  It  would  fail  still  more  disastrously  before  the 
problem  of  obtaining  food  or  raw  materials  from  foreigners 
(without  which  the  British  could  not  live)  in  the  absence  of  a 
money  of  stable  value. 

One  of  the  most  suggestive  facts  of  the  post-war  situation 
is  that  European  civilization  almost  breaks  down  before  one 
of  the  simplest  of  its  mechanical  problems :  that  of  'moving 


46  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

some  stones  from  where  they  are  not  needed  to  the  places 
where  they  are  needed,'  in  other  words  before  the  problem  of 
mining  and  distributing  coal.  Millions  of  children  have  died 
in  agony  in  France  during  this  last  year  or  two  because  there 
was  no  coal  to  transport  the  food,  to  warm  the  buildings.  Coal 
is  the  first  need  of  our  massed  populations.  Its  absence  means 
collapse  of  everything — of  transport,  of  the  getting  of  food 
to  the  towns,  of  furnishing  the  machinery  and  fertilisers  by 
which  food  can  be  produced  in  sufficient  quantity.  It  is  warmth, 
it  is  clothing,  it  is  light,  it  is  the  daily  newspaper,  it  is  water, 
it  is  communication.  All  our  elaboration  of  knowledge  and 
science  fails  in  the  presence  of  this  problem  of  'taking  some 
stones  from  one  heap  and  putting  them  on  another.*  The  coal 
famine  is  a  microcosm  of  the  world's  present  failure. 

But  if  all  those  things — and  spiritual  things  also  are  in- 
volved because  the  absence  of  material  well-being  means  wide- 
spread moral  evils — depend  upon  coal,  the  getting  of  the  coal 
itself  is  dependent  upon  them.  We  have  touched  upon  the 
importance  of  the  one  element  of  sheer  goodwill  on  the  part 
of  the  miners  as  a  factor  in  the  production  of  coal ;  upon  the 
hopelessness  of  making  good  its  absence  by  physical  coercion. 
But  we  have  also  seen  that  just  as  the  attempted  use  of  coer- 
cion in  the  international  field,  though  ineffective  to  exact 
necessary  service  or  exchange,  can  and  does  produce  paralysis 
of  the  indispensible  processes,  so  the  'power'  which  the  posi- 
tion of  the  miner  gives  him  is  a  power  of  paralysis  only. 

A  later  chapter  shows  that  the  instinct  of  industrial  groups 
to  solve  their  difficulties  by  simple  coercion,  the  sheer  asser- 
tion of  power,  is  very  closely  related  to  the  psychology  of 
nationalism,  so  disruptive  in  the  international  field.  Bolshe- 
vism, in  the  sense  of  belief  in  the  effectiveness  of  coercion, 
represents  the  transfer  of  jingoism  to  the  industrial  struggle. 
It  involves  the  same  fallacies.  A  mining  strike  can  bring  the 
industrial  machine  to  a  full  stop;  to  set  that  machine  to  work 
for  the   feeding  of   the  population — which  involves  the  co- 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  47 

ordination  of  a  vast  number  of  industries,  the  purchase  of 
food  and  raw  material  from  foreigners,  who  will  only  sur- 
render it  in  return  for  promises  to  pay  which  they  believe  will 
be  fulfilled — means  not  only  technical  knowledge,  it  means  also 
the  presence  of  a  certain  predisposition  to  co-operation.  This 
Balkanised  Europe  which  cannot  feed  itself  has  all  the  techni- 
cal knowledge  that  it  ever  had.  But  its  natural  units  are  domin- 
ated by  a  certain  temper  which  make  impossible  the  co-opera- 
tions by  which  alone  the  knowledge  can  be  applied  to  the  avail- 
able natural  resources. 

It  is  also  suggestive  that  the  virtual  abandonment  of  the 
gold  standard  is  playing  much  the  same  role  (rendering  visible 
the  inefficiency  of  coercion)  in  the  struggle  between  the  indus- 
trial that  it  is  between  the  national  groups.  A  union  strikes 
for  higher  wages  and  is  successful.  The  increase  is  granted — 
and  is  paid  in  paper  money. 

When  wages  were  paid  in  gold  an  advance  in  wages,  gained 
as  the  result  of  strike  or  agitation,  represented,  temporarily 
at  least,  a  real  victory  for  the  workers.  Prices  might  ultimately 
rise  and  wipe  out  the  advantage,  but  with  a  gold  currency 
price  movements  have  nothing  like  the  rapidity  and  range 
which  is  the  case  when  unlimited  paper  money  can  be  printed. 
An  advance  in  wages  paid  in  paper  may  mean  nothing  more 
than  a  mere  readjustment  of  symbols.  The  advance,  in  other 
words,  can  be  cancelled  by  *a  morning's  work  of  the  inflation- 
ist' as  a  currency  expert  has  put  it.  The  workers  in  these  con- 
ditions can  never  know  whether  that  which  they  are  granted 
with  the  right  hand  of  increased  wages  will  not  be  taken  away 
by  the  left  hand  of  inflation. 

In  order  to  be  certain  that  they  are  not  simply  tricked,  the 
workers  must  be  in  a  position  to  control  the  conditions  which 
determine  the  value  of  currency.  But  again,  that  means  the 
co-ordination  of  the  most  complex  economic  processes, 
processes  which  can  only  be  ensured  by  bargaining  with  other 
groups  and  with  foreign  countries. 


48  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

This  problem  would  still  present  itself  as  acutely  on  the 
morrow  of  the  establishment  of  a  British  Soviet  Republic  as 
it  presents  itself  to-day.  If  the  British  Soviets  could  not  buy 
food  and  raw  materials  in  twenty  different  centres  through- 
out the  world  they  could  not  feed  the  people.  We  should  be 
blockaded,  not  by  ships,  but  by  the  worthlessness  of  our  money. 
Russia,  which  needs  only  an  infinitesimal  proportion  relatively 
of  foreign  imports  has  gold  and  the  thing  of  absolutely  uni- 
versal need,  food.  We  have  no  gold — only  things  which  a 
world  fast  disintegrating  into  isolated  peasantries  is  learning 
somehow  to  do  without. 

Before  blaming  the  lack  of  'social  sense'  on  the  part  of 
striking  miners  or  railwaymen  let  us  recall  the  fact  that  the 
temper  and  attitude  to  life  and  the  social  difficulties  which  lie 
at  the  bottom  of  the  Syndicalist  philosophy  have  been  deliber- 
ately cultivated  by  Government,  Press,  and  Church,  during  five 
years  for  the  purposes  of  war;  and  that  the  selected  ruling 
order  have  shown  the  same  limitation  of  vision  in  not  one 
whit  less  degree. 

Think  what  Versailles  actually  did  and  what  it  might  have 
done. 

.Here  when  the  Conference  met,  was  a  Europe  on  the  edge 
of  famine — some  of  it  over  the  edge.  Every  country  in  the 
world,  including  the  wealthiest  and  most  powerful,  like  Amer- 
ica, was  faced  with  social  maladjustment  in  one  form  or 
another.  In  America  it  was  an  inconvenience,  but  in  the  cities 
of  a  whole  continent — in  Russia,  Poland,  Germany,  Austria — 
it  was  shortly  to  mean  ill-health,  hunger,  misery,  and  agony 
to  millions  of  children  and  their  mothers.  Terms  of  the  study 
like  'the  interruption  of  economic  processes'  were  to  be  trans- 
lated into  such  human  terms  as  infantile  cholera,  tuberculosis, 
typhus,  hunger-oedema.  These,  as  events  proved,  were  to 
undermine  the  social  sanity  of  half  a  world. 

The  acutest  statesmen  that  Europe  can  produce,  endowed 
with  the  most  autocratic  power,  proceed  to  grapple  with  the 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  49 

situation.  In  what  way  do  they  apply  that  power  to  the 
problem  of  production  and  distribution,  of  adding  to  the 
world's  total  stock  of  goods,  which  nearly  every  government 
in  the  world  was  in  a  few  weeks  to  be  proclaiming  as  human- 
ity's first  need,  the  first  condition  of  reconstruction  and  re- 
generation ? 

The  Treaty  and  the  policy  pursued  since  the  Armistice  to- 
wards Russia  tell  us  plainly  enough.  Not  only  do  the  politi- 
cal arrangements  of  the  Treaty,  as  we  have  seen,  ignore  the 
needs  of  maintaining  the  machinery  of  production  in  Europe  ^ 
but  they  positively  discourage  and  in  many  cases  are  obviously 
framed  to  prevent,  production  over  very  large  areas. 

The  Treaty,  as  some  one  has  said,  deprived  Germany  of 
both  the  means  and  the  motive  of  production.  No  adequate 
provision  was  made  for  enabling  the  import  of  food  and  raw 
materials,  without  which  Germany  could  not  get  to  work  on  the 
scale  demanded  by  the  indemnity  claims;  and  the  motive  for 
industry  was  undermined  by  leaving  the  indemnity  claims  in- 
determinate. 

The  victor's  passion,  as  we  have  seen,  blinded  him  to  the 
indispensable  condition  of  the  very  demands  which  he  was 
making.  Europe  was  unable  temperamentally  to  reconcile  it- 
self to  the  conditions  of  that  increased  productivity,  by  which 
alone  it  was  to  be  saved.  It  is  this  element  in  the  situation — 
its  domination,  that  is,  by  an  uncalculating  popular  passion 
poured  out  lavishly  in  support  of  self -destructive  policies — 
which  prompts  one  to  doubt  whether  these  disruptive  forces 
find  their  roots  merely  in  the  capitalist  organization  of  society: 
still  less  whether  they  are  due  to  the  conscious  machinations 
of  a  small  group  of  capitalists.  No  considerable  section  of 
capitalism  any  where  has  any  interest  in  the  degree  of  paralysis 

*  Mr  J.  M.  Keynes,  'The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,* 
p.  211,  says: — 'It  is  an  extraordinary  fact  that  the  fundamental  economic 
problem  of  a  Europe  starving  and  disintegrating  before  their  eyes, 
was  the  one  question  m  which  it  wa?  impossibje  to  arouse  the  interest 
of  the  Fow.' 

4 


50  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

that  has  been  produced.  Capitahsm  may  have  overreached 
itself  by  stimulating  nationalist  hostilities  until  they  have  got 
beyond  control.  Even  so,  it  is  the  unseeing  popalar  passion 
that  furnishes  the  capitalist  with  his  arm,  and  is  the  factor  of 
greatest  danger. 

Examine  for  a  moment  the  economic  manifestation  of  inter- 
national hostilities.  There  has  just  begun  in  the  United 
States  a  clamorous  campaign  for  the  denunciation  of  the 
Panama  Treaty  which  places  British  ships  on  an  equality 
with  American.  American  ships  must  be  exempt  from  the  tolls. 
'Don't  we  own  the  Canal?'  ask  the  leaders  of  this  campaign. 
There  is  widespread  response  to  it.  But  of  the  millions  of 
Americans  who  will  become  perhaps  passionately  angry  over 
that  matter  and  extremely  anti-British,  how  many  have  any 
shares  in  any  ships  that  can  possibly  benefit  by  the  denuncia- 
tion of  the  Treaty?  Not  one  in  a  thousand.  It  is  not  an 
economic  motive  operating  at  all. 

Capitalism — ^the  management  of  modern  industry  by  a  small 
economic  autocracy  of  owners  of  private  capital — has  certainly  a 
part  in  the  conflicts  that  produce  war.  But  that  part  does  not 
arise  from  the  direct  interest  that  the  capitalists  of  one  nation 
as  a  whole  have  in  the  destruction  of  the  trade  or  industry 
of  another.  Such  a  conclusion  ignores  the  most  elementary 
facts  in  the  modern  organisation  of  industr>\  And  it  is  cer- 
tainly not  true  to  say  that  British  capitalists,  as  a  distinct 
group,  were  more  disposed  than  the  public  as  a  whole  to  insist 
upon  the  Carthaginian  features  of  the  Treaty.  Everything 
points  rather  to  the  exact  contrary.  Public  opinion  as  reflected, 
for  instance,  by  the  December,  1918,  election,  was  more  fero- 
ciously anti-German  than  capitalists  are  likely  to  have  been. 
It  is  certainly  not  too  much  to  say  that  if  the  Treaty  had  been 
made  by  a  group  of  British — or  French — ^bankers,  merchants, 
shipowners,  insurance  men,  and  industrialists,  liberated  from 
all  fear  of  popular  resentment,  the  economic  life  of  Central 
Europe  would  not  have  been  crushed  as  it  has  been. 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  51 

Assuredly,  such  a  gathering  of  capitalists  would  have  in- 
cluded groups  having  direct  interest  in  the  destruction  of 
German  competition.  But  it  would  also  have  included  others 
having  an  interest  in  the  restoration  of  the  German  market 
and  German  credit,  and  one  influence  would  in  some  measure 
have  cancelled  the  other. 

As  a  simple  fact  we  know  that  not  all  British  capitalists, 
still  less  British  financiers,  are  interested  in  the  destruction  of 
German  prosperity.  Central  Europe  was  one  of  the  very 
greatest  markets  available  for  British  industry,  and  the  recov- 
ery of  that  market  may  constitute  for  a  very  large  number 
of  manufacturers,  merchants,  shippers,  insurance  companies, 
and  bankers,  a  source  of  immense  potential  profit.  It  is  a 
perfectly  arguable  proposition,  to  put  it  at  the  very  lowest,  that 
British  'capitalism'  has,  as  a  whole,  more  to  gain  from  a  pro- 
ductive and  stable  Europe  than  from  a  starving  and  unstable 
one.  There  is  no  reason  whatever  to  doubt  the  genuineness 
of  the  internationalism  that  we  associate  with  the  Manches- 
ter School  of  Capitalist  Economics. 

But  in  political  nationalism  as  a  force  there  are  no  such  cross 
currents  cancelling  out  the  hostility  of  one  nation  to  another. 
Economically,  Britain  is  not  one  entity  and  Germany  another. 
But  as  a  sentimental  concept,  each  may  perfectly  well  be  an 
entity ;  and  in  the  imagination  of  John  Citizen,  in  his  political 
capacity,  voting  on  the  eve  of  the  Peace  Conference,  Britain 
is  a  triumphant  and  heroic  'person,'  while  Germany  is  an  evil 
and  cruel  'person,'  who  must  be  punished,  and  whose  pockets 
must  be  searched.  John  has  neither  the  time  nor  has  he 
felt  the  need,  for  a  scientific  attitude  in  politics.  But  when 
it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  giving  his  vote,  but  of  earn- 
ing his  income,  of  succeeding  as  a  merchant  or  shipowner 
in  an  uncertain  future,  he  will  be  thoroughly  scientific. 
When  it  comes  to  carrying  cargoes  or  selling  cotton  goods, 
he  can  face  facts.  And,  in  the  past  at  least,  he  knows  that 
he  has  not  sold  those  materials  to  a  wicked  person  called 


52  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

'Germany,*  but  to  a  quite  decent  and  human  trader  called 
Schmidt. 

What  I  am  suggesting  here  is  that  for  an  explanation  of 
the  passions  which  have  given  us  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  we 
must  look  much  more  to  rival  nationalisms  than  to  rival  capi- 
talisms ;  not  to  hatreds  that  are  the  outgrowth  of  a  real  conflict 
of  interests,  but  to  certain  nationalist  conceptions,  'myths,'  as 
Sorel  has  it.  To  these  conceptions  economic  hostilities  may 
assuredly  attach  themselves.  At  the  height  of  the  war-hatred 
of  things  German,  a  shopkeeper  who  had  the  temerity  to  ex- 
pose German  post  cards  or  prints  for  sale  would  have  risked 
the  sacking  of  his  shop.  The  sackers  would  not  have  been 
persons  engaged  in  the  post  card  producing  trade.  Their 
motive  would  have  been  patriotic.  If  their  feelings  lasted  over 
the  war,  they  would  vote  against  the  admission  of  German 
post  cards.  They  would  not  be  moved  by  economic,  still  less 
by  capitalistic  motives.  These  motives  do  enter,  as  we  shall 
see  presently,  into  the  problems  raised  by  the  present  condi- 
tion of  Europe.  But  it  is  important  to  see  at  what  point  and 
in  what  way.  The  point  for  the  moment — and  it  has  im- 
mense practical  importance — is  that  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
and  its  economic  consequences  should  be  attributed  less  to 
capitalism  (bad  as  that  has  come  to  be  in  its  total  results)  than 
to  the  pressure  of  a  public  opinion  that  had  crystallised  round 
nationalist  conceptions.^ 

*  Incidentally  we  see  nations  not  yet  brought  under  capitalist  organi- 
sation (e.g.  the  peasant  nations  of  the  Balkans)  equally  subject  to  the 
hostilities  we  are  discussing. 
Bertrand  Russell  writes  {New  Republic,  September  15th.,  1920)  : — 
'No  doubt  commercial  rivalry  between  England  and  Germany  had  a 
great  deal  to  do  with  causing  the  war,  but  rivalry  is  a  different  thing 
from  profit-seeking.  Probably  by  combination,  English  and  German 
capitalists  could  have  made  more  than  they  did  out  of  rivalry,  but  the 
rivalry  was  instinctive,  and  its  economic  form  was  accidental.  The 
capitalists  were  in  the  grip  of  nationalist  instinct  as  much  as  their 
proletarian  'dupes.'  In  both  classes  some  have  gained  by  the  war,  but 
the  universal  will  to  war  was  not  produced  by  the  hope  of  gain.  It 
was  produced  by  a  different  set  of  instincts,  one  which  Marxian 
psychology  fails  to  recognise  adequately.  .  .  . 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  53 

Here,  at  the  end  of  1920,  is  the  British  Press  still  clamour- 
ing for  the  exclusion  of  German  toys.  Such  an  agitation 
presumably  pleases  the  millions  of  readers.  They  are  certainly 
not  toymakers  or  sellers;  they  have  no  commercial  interest 
in  the  matter  save  that  'their  toys  will  cost  them  more'  if  the 
agitation  succeeds.    They  are  actuated  by  nationalist  hostility. 

If  Germany  is  not  to  be  allowed  to  sell  even  toys,  there  will  be 
very  few  things  indeed  that  she  can  sell.  We  are  to  go  on  with 
the  policy  of  throttling  Europe  in  order  that  a  nation  whose  in- 
dustrial activity  is  indispensable  to  Europe  shall  not  become 
strong.  We  do  not  see,  it  is  true,  the  relation  between  the 
economic  revival  of  Europe  and  the  industrial  recuperation 
of  Germany ;  we  do  not  see  it  because  we  can  be  made  to  feel 
anger  at  the  idea  of  German  toys  for  British  children  so  much, 
more  readily  than  we  can  be  made  to  see  the  causes  which 
deprive  French  children  of  warmth  in  their  schoolrooms. 
European  society  seems  to  be  in  the  position  of  an  ill-disci- 
plined child  that  cannot  bring  itself  to  swallow  the  medicine 
that  would  relieve  it  of  its  pain.  The  passions  which  have 
been  cultivated  in  five  years  of  war  must  be  indulged,  what- 
ever the  ultimate  cost  to  ourselves.  The  judgment  of  such 
a  society  is  swamped  in  those  passions. 

The  restoration  of  much  of  Europe  will  involve  many  vast 


Men  desire  power,  they  desire  satisfaction  for  their  pride  and  their 
self-respect.  They  desire  victory  over  their  rivals  so  profoundly  that 
they  will  invent  a  rivalry  for  the  unconscious  purpose  of  making  a 
victory  possible.  All  these  motives  cut  across  the  pure  economic  motive 
in  ways  that  are  practically  important. 

There  is  need  of  a  treatment  of  political  motives  by  the  methods  of 
psycho-analysis.  In  politics,  as  in  private  life,  men  invent  myths  to 
rationalise  their  conduct.  If  a  man  thinks  that  the  only  reasonable 
motive  in  politics  is  economic  self -advancement,  he  will  persuade  him- 
self that  the  things  he  wishes  to  do  will  make  him  rich.  When  he 
wants  to  fight  the  Germans,  he  tells  himself  that  their  competition  is 
ruining  his  trade.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  an  'idealist,'  who  holds 
that  his  politics  should  aim  at  the  advancement  of  the  human  race,  he 
will  tell  himself  that  the  crimes  of  the  Germans  demand  their  humilia- 
tion. The  Marxian  sees  through  this  latter  camouflage,  but  not  through 
the  former. 


54  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

and  complex  problems  of  reconstruction.  But  here,  in  the 
alternatives  presented  by  the  payment  of  a  German  indemnity, 
for  instance,  is  a  very  simple  issue :  if  Germany  is  to  pay,  she 
must  produce  goods,  that  is,  she  must  be  economically  restored ; 
if  we  fear  her  economic  restoration,  then  we  cannot  obtain 
the  execution  of  the  reparation  clauses  of  the  Treaty.  But  that 
simple  issue  one  of  the  greatest  figures  of  the  Conference  can- 
not face.  He  has  not,  eighteen  months  after  the  Treaty, 
emerged  from  the  most  elementary  confusion  concerning  it. 
If  the  psychology  of  Nationalism  renders  so  simple  a  problem 
insoluble,  what  will  be  its  effect  upon  the  problem  of  Europe 
as  a  whole? 

Again,  it  may  be  that  shipowners  are  behind  the  American 
agitation  and  toy  manufacturers  behind  the  British.  A  Coffin 
Trust  might  intrigue  against  measures  to  prevent  a  repetition 
of  the  influenza  epidemic.  But  what  should  we  say  of  the 
fitness  for  self-government  of  a  people  that  should  lend  itself 
by  millions  to  such  an  intrigue  of  Coffin-makers,  showing  as 
the  result  of  its  propaganda  a  fierce  hostility  to  sanitation? 
We  should  conclude  that  it  deserved  to  die.  If  Europe  went 
to  war  as  the  result  of  the  intrigues  of  a  dozen  capitalists,  its 
civilisation  is  not  worth  saving;  it  cannot  be  saved,  for  as 
soon  as  the  capitalists  were  removed,  its  inherent  helplessness 
would  place  it  at  the  mercy  of  some  other  form  of  exploita- 
tion. 

Its  only  hope  lies  in  a  capacity  for  self-management,  self- 
rule,  which  means  self-control.  But  a  few  financial  intriguers, 
we  are  told,  have  only  to  pronounce  certain  words,  'fatherland 
above  all,'  'national  honour,'  put  about  a  few  stories  of  atroci- 
ties, clamour  for  revenge,  for  the  millions  to  lose  all  self-con- 
trol, to  become  completely  blind  as  to  where  they  are  going, 
what  they  are  doing,  to  lose  all  sense  of  the  ultimate  conse- 
quences of  their  acts. 

The  gravest  fact  in  the  history  of  the  last  ten  years  is  not 
the  fact  of  war ;  it  is  the  temper  of  mind,  the  blindness  of  con- 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  55 

duct  on  the  part  of  the  milhons,  which  alone,  ultimately, 
explains  our  policies.  The  suffering  and  cost  of  war  may  well 
be  the  best  choice  of  evils,  like  the  suffering  and  cost  of  surgery, 
or  the  burdens  we  assume  for  a  clearly  conceived  moral  end. 
But  what  we  have  seen  in  recent  history  is  not  a  deliberate 
choice  of  ends  with  a  consciousness  of  moral  and  material 
cost.  We  see  a  whole  nation  demanding  fiercely  in  one  breath 
certain  things,  and  in  the  next  just  as  angrily  demanding 
other  things  which  make  compliance  with  the  first  impossible; 
a  whole  nation  or  a  whole  continent  given  over  to  an  orgy 
of  hate,  retaliation,  the  indulgence  of  self -destructive  pas- 
sions. And  this  collapse  of  the  human  mind  does  but  become 
the  more  appalling  if  we  accept  the  explanation  that  'wars 
are  caused  by  capitalism'  or  'Junkerthum' ;  if  we  believe  that 
six  Jew  financiers  sitting  in  a  room  can  thus  turn  millions 
into  something  resembling  madmen.  No  indictment  of  human 
reason  could  be  more  severe. 

To  assume  that  millions  will,  without  any  real  knowledge 
of  why  they  do  it  or  of  the  purpose  behind  the  behests  they 
obey,  not  only  take  the  lives  of  others  and  give  their  own, 
but  turn  first  in  one  direction  and  then  in  another  the  flood 
of  their  deepest  passions  of  hate  and  vengeance,  just  as  a  little 
group  of  mean  little  men,  manipulating  mean  little  interests, 
may  direct,  is  to  argue  a  moral  helplessness  and  shameful 
docility  on  the  part  of  those  millions  which  would  deprive  the 
future  of  all  hope  of  self-government.  And  to  assume  that 
they  are  not  unknowing  as  to  the  alleged  cause — ^that  would 
bring  us  to  moral  phantasmagoria. 

We  shall  get  nearer  to  the  heart  of  our  problem  if,  instead 
of  asking  perpetually  'Who  caused  the  War?'  and  indicting 
'Capitalists'  or  'Junkers,*  we  ask  the  question:  'What  is  the 
cause  of  that  state  of  mind  and  temper  in  the  millions  which 
made  them  on  the  one  side  welcome  war  (as  we  allege  of  the 
German  millions),  or  on  the  other  side  makes  them  acclaim, 
or  impose,  blockades,  famines,'  'punitive'  'Treaties  of  Peace  ?' 


56  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Obviously  'selfishness'  is  not  operating  so  far  as  the  mas? 
is  concerned,  except  of  course  in  the  sense  that  a  yielding  to 
the  passion  of  hate  is  self-indulgence.  Selfishness,  in  the 
sense  of  care  for  social  security  and  well-being,  might  save 
the  structure  of  European  society.  It  would  bring  the  famine 
to  an  end.  But  we  have  what  a  French  writer  has  called  a 
'holy  and  unselfish  hate.'  Balkan  peasants  prefer  to  burn 
their  wheat  rather  than  send  it  to  the  famished  city  across 
the  river.  Popular  English  newspapers  agitate  against  a  Ger- 
man trade  which  is  the  only  hope  of  necessitous  Allies  ob- 
taining any  considerable  reparation  from  Germany.  A  society 
in  which  each  member  is  more  desirous  of  hurting  his  neigh- 
bour than  of  promoting  his  own  welfare,  is  one  in  which  the 
aggregate  will  to  destruction  is  more  powerful  than  the  will 
to  preservation. 

The  history  of  these  last  years  shows  with  painful  clarity 
that  as  between  groups  of  men  hostilities  and  hates  are  aroused 
very  much  more  easily  than  any  emotion  of  comradeship.  And 
the  hate  is  a  hungrier  and  more  persistent  emotion  than  the 
comradeship.  The  much  proclaimed  fellowship  of  the  Allies, 
'cemented  by  the  blood  shed  on  the  field,'  vanished  rapidly. 
But  hate  remained  and  found  expression  in  the  social  struggle, 
in  fierce  repressions,  in  bickerings,  fears,  and  rancours  be- 
tween those  who  yesterday  fought  side  by  side.  Yet  the 
price  of  survival  is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  ever  closer  cohesion 
and  social  co-operation. 

And  while  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  'hunger  of  hate* — 
the  actual  desire  to  have  something  to  hate — ^may  so  warp 
our  judgment  as  to  make  us  see  a  conflict  of  interest  where 
none  exists,  it  is  also  true  that  a  sense  of  conflict  of  vital  inter- 
est is  a  great  feeder  of  hate.  And  that  sense  of  conflict  may 
well  become  keener  as  the  problem  of  man's  struggle  for 
sustenance  on  the  earth  becomes  more  acute,  as  his  numbers 
increase  and  the  pressure  upon  that  sustenance  becomes  greater. 

Once  more,  as  millions  of  children  are  born  at  our  very 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  57 

doors  into  a  world  that  cannot  feed  them,  condemned,  if  they 
Hve  at  all,  to  form  a  race  that  will  be  defective,  stunted,  un- 
healthy, abnormal,  this  question  which  Malthus  very  rightly 
taught  our  grandfathers  to  regard  as  the  final  and  ultimate 
question  of  their  Political  Economy,  comes  dramatically  into 
the  foreground.  How  can  the  earth,  which  is  limited,  find 
food  for  an  increase  of  population  which  is  unlimited? 

The  haunting  anxieties  which  lie  behind  the  failure  to  find 
a  conclusive  answer  to  that  question,  probably  affect  political 
decisions  and  deepen  hostilities  and  animosities  even  where 
the  reason  is  ill-formulated  or  unconscious.  Some  of  us,  per- 
haps, fear  to  face  the  question  lest  we  be  confronted  with 
morally  terrifying  alternatives.  Let  posterity  decide  its  own 
problems.  But  such  fears,  and  the  motives  prompted  by  them, 
do  not  disappear  by  our  refusal  to  face  them.  Though  hidden, 
they  still  live,  and  under  various  moral  disguises  influence 
our  conduct. 

Certainly  the  fears  inspired  by  the  Malthusian  theory  and 
the  facts  upon  which  it  is  based,  have  affected  our  attitude  to 
war;  affected  the  feeling  of  very  many  for  whom  war  is  not 
avowedly,  as  it  is  openly  and  avowedly  to  some  of  its  students, 
'the  Struggle  for  Bread.'  ^ 

The  Great  Illusion  was  an  attempt  frankly  to  face  this  ulti- 
mate question  of  the  bearing  of  war  upon  man's  struggle  for 
survival.     It  took  the  ground  that  the  victory  of  one  nation 

^  *If  the  Englishman  sells  goods  in  Turkey  or  Argentina,  he  is  taking 
trade  from  the  German,  and  if  the  German  sells  goods  in  either  of 
these  countries — or  any  other  country,  come  to  that — he  is  taking  trade 
from  the  Englishman;  and  the  well-being  of  every  inhabitant  of  the 
great  manufacturing  towns,  such  as  London,  Paris,  or  Berlin,  is  bound 
up  in  the  power  of  the  capitalist  to  sell  his  wares ;  and  the  production 
of  manufactured  articles  has  outstripped  the  natural  increase  of  de- 
mand by  67  per  cent.,  therefore  new  markets  must  be  fotmd  for  these 
wares  or  the  existing  ones  be  "forced";  hence  the  rush  for  colonies 
and  feverish  trade  competition  between  the  great  manufacturing  coim- 
tries.  And  the  production  of  manufactured  goods  is  still  increasing, 
and  the  great  cities  must  sell  their  wares  or  starve.  Now  we  imder- 
stand  what  trade  rivalry  really  is.  It  resolves  itself,  in  fact,  into  the 
struggle  for  bread.'    (A  Rifleman :  'Struggle  for  Bread.'  p.  54.) 


58  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

over  another,  however  complete,  does  not  solve  the  problem; 
it  makes  it  worse  in  that  the  conditions  and  instincts  which  war 
accentuates  express  themselves  in  nationalist  and  racial  rivalries, 
create  divisions  that  embarrass  and  sometimes  make  impossible 
the  widespread  co-operation  by  which  alone  man  can  effectively 
exploit  nature. 

That  demonstration  as  a  whole  belongs  to  the  pages  that 
follow.  But  bearing  upon  the  narrower  question  of  war  in 
relation  to  the  world's  good,  this  much  is  certain : — 

If  the  object  of  the  combatants  in  the  War  was  to  make 
sure  of  their  food,  then  indeed  is  the  result  in  striking  contrast 
with  that  intention,  for  food  is  assuredly  more  insecure  than 
ever  alike  for  victor  and  vanquished.  They  differ  only  in  the 
degree  of  insecurity.  The  War,  the  passions  which  it  has 
nurtured,  the  political  arrangements  which  those  passions  have 
dictated,  have  given  us  a  Europe  immeasurably  less  able  to 
meet  its  sustenance  problem  than  it  was  before.  So  much  less 
able  that  millions,  who  before  the  War  could  well  support  them- 
selves by  their  own  labour,  are  now  unable  so  to  do  and  have 
to  be  fed  by  drawing  upon  the  slender  stocks  of  their  con- 
querors— stocks  very  much  less  than  when  some  at  least  of  those 
conquerors  were  in  the  position  of  defeated  peoples. 

This  i&  not  the  effect  of  the  material  destruction  of  war,  of 
the  mere  battering  down  of  houses  and  bridges  and  factories 
by  the  soldier. 

The  physical  devastation,  heart-breaking  as  the  spectacle  of 
it  is,  is  not  the  difificult  part  of  the  problem,  nor  quantitatively 
the  most  important.^    It  is  not  the  devastated  districts  that  are 

*Mr  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  says: 
'I  do  not  put  the  money  value  of  the  actual  physical  loss  to  Belgian 
property  by  destruction  and  loot  above  £150,000,000  as  a  maximum,  and 
while  I  hesitate  to  put  yet  lower  an  estimate  which  diflfers  so  widely 
from  those  generally  current,  I  shall  be  surprised  if  it  proves  possible 
to  substantiate  claims  even  to  this  amount.  .  .  .  While  the  French 
claims  are  immensely  greater,  here  too,  there  has  been  excessive  exag- 
geration, as  responsible  French  statisticians  have  themselves  pointed  out. 
Not  above  10  per  cent,  of  the  area  of  France  was  effectively  occupied 
by  the  enemy,  and  not  above  4  per  cent,  lay  within  the  area  of  sub- 


OUR  DAILY  BREAD  59 

suffering  from  famine,  nor  their  losses  which  appreciably  dimin- 
ish the  world  supply  of  food.  It  is  in  cities  in  which  not  a  house 
has  been  destroyed,  in  which,  indeed,  every  wheel  in  every 
factory  is  still  intact,  that  the  population  dies  of  hunger,  and 
the  children  have  to  be  fed  by  our  charity.  It  is  the  fields  over 
which  not  a  single  soldier  has  tramped  that  are  condemned  to 
sterility  because  those  factories  are  idle,  while  the  factories 
are  condemned  to  idleness  because  the  fields  are  sterile. 

The  real  'economic  argument'  against  war  does  not  consist 
in  the  presentation  of  a  balance  sheet  showing  so  much  cost  and 
destruction  and  so  much  gain.  The  real  argument  consists  in 
the  fact  that  war,  and  still  more  the  ideas  out  of  which  it  arises, 
produce  ultimately  an  unworkable  society.  The  physical  des* 
truction  and  perhaps  the  cost  are  greatly  exaggerated.  It  is 
perhaps  true  that  in  the  material  foundations  of  wealth  Britain 
is  as  well  off  to-day  as  before  the  War.  It  is  not  from  lack 
of  technical  knowledge  that  the  economic  machine  works  with 
such  friction :  that  has  been  considerably  increased  by  the  War, 
It  is  not  from  lack  of  idealism  and  imselfishness.  There  has 
been  during  the  last  five  years  such  an  outpouring  of  devotecj 
unselfishness — the  very  hates  have  been  unselfish — as  history 
cannot  equal.  Millions  have  given  their  lives  for  the  contrary 
ideals  in  which  they  believed.  It  is  sometimes  the  ideals  fof 
which  men  die  that  make  impossible  their  life  and  work 
together. 

The  real  'economic  argument,'  supported  by  the  experience 
of  our  victory,  is  that  the  ideas  which  produce  war — the  fears 
out  of  which  it  grows  and  the  passions  which  it  feeds — produce 
a  state  of  mind  that  ultimately  renders  impossible  the  co-opera- 
tion by  which  alone  wealth  can  be  produced  and  life  maintained. 
The  use  of  our  power  or  our  knowledge  for  the  purpose  o{ 
subduing  Nature  to  our  service  depends  upon  the  prevalence 

stantial  devastation.  ...  In  short,  it  will  be  difficult  to  establish  a  bill 
exceeding  £500,000,000  for  physical  and  material  damage  in  the  occu- 
pied and  devastated  areas  of  Northern  France.'  (pp.  114-117.) 


60  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  certain  ideas,  ideas  which  underlie  the  'art  of  living  together.* 
They  are  something  apart  from  mere  technical  knowledge 
which  war,  as  in  Germany,  may  increase,  but  which  can  never 
be  a  substitute  for  this  'art  of  living  together.'  (The  arms, 
indeed,  may  be  the  instruments  of  anarchy,  as  in  so  much  of 
Europe  to-day). 

The  War  has  left  us  a  defective  or  perverted  social  sense, 
with  a  group  of  instincts  and  moralities  that  are  disintegrating 
Western  society,  and  will,  unless  checked,  destroy  it. 

These  forces,  like  the  'ultimate  art'  which  they  have  so  nearly 
destroyed,  are  part  of  the  problem  of  economics.  For  they 
render  a  production  of  wealth  adequate  to  welfare  impossible. 
How  have  they  arisen?  How  can  they  be  corrected?  These 
questions  will  form  an  integral  part  of  the  problems  here  dealt 
with. 


CHAPTER  11 

THE  OLD  ECONOMY  AND  THE  POST-WAR  STATE 

This  chapter  suggests  the  following: — 

The  trans-national  processes  which  enabled  Europe  to  sup- 
port itself  before  the  War,  were  based  mainly  on  private 
exchanges  prompted  by  the  expectation  of  individual  advantage. 
They  were  not  dependent  upon  political  power.  (The  fifteen 
millions  for  whom  German  soil  could  not  provide,  lived  by  trade 
with  countries  over  which  Germany  had  no  political  control,  as 
a  similar  number  of  British  live  by  similar  non-political  means.) 

The  old  individualist  economy  has  been  largely  destroyed  by 
the  State  Socialism  introduced  for  war  purposes;  the  Nation, 
taking  over  individual  enterprise,  became  trader  and  manufac- 
turer in  increasing  degree.  The  economic  clauses  of  the 
Treaty,  if  enforced,  must  prolong  this  tendency,  rendering  a 
large  measure  of  such  Socialism  permanent. 

The  change  may  be  desirable.  But  if  co-operation  must  in 
future  be  less  as  between  individuals  for  private  advantage, 
and  much  more  as  between  nations.  Governments  acting  in  an 
economic  capacity,  the  political  emotions  of  nationalism  will 
play  a  much  larger  role  in  the  economic  processes  of  Europe. 
If  to  Nationalist  hostilities  as  we  have  known  them  in  the  past, 
is  to  be  added  the  commercial  rivalry  of  nations  now  converted 
into  traders  and  capitalists,  we  are  likely  to  have  not  a  less  but 
more  quarrelsome  world,  unless  the  fact  of  interdependence  is 
much  more  vividly  realised  than  in  the  past. 

61 


62  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

The  facts  of  the  preceding  chapter  touching  the  economic 
chaos  in  Europe,  the  famine,  the  debauchery  of  the  currencies, 
the  collapse  of  credit,  the  failure  to  secure  indemnities,  and 
particularly  the  remedies  of  an  international  kind  to  which  we 
are  now  being  forced,  all  confirm  what  had  indeed  become 
pretty  evident  before  the  War,  namely,  that  much  of  Europe 
lives  by  virtue  of  an  international,  or,  more  correctly,  a  trans- 
national economy.  That  is  to  say,  there  are  large  populations 
that  cannot  live  at  much  above  a  coolie  standard  unless  there 
is  a  considerable  measure  of  economic  co-operation  across  fron- 
tiers. The  industrial  countries,  like  Britain  and  Germany,  can 
support  their  populations  only  by  exchanging  their  special  prod- 
ucts and  services — ^particularly  coal,  iron,  manufactures,  ocean 
carriage — for  food  and  raw  materials ;  while  more  agricultural 
countries  like  Italy  and  even  Russia,  can  maintain  their  full 
food-producing  capacity  only  by  an  apparatus  of  railways, 
agricultural  machinery,  imported  coal  and  fertilisers,  to  which 
the  industry  of  the  manufacturing  area  is  indispensable. 

That  necessary  international  co-operation  had,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  been  largely  developed  before  the  War.  The  cheapen- 
ing of  transport,  the  improvement  of  communication,  had 
pushed  the  international  division  of  labour  very  far  indeed. 
The  material  in  a  single  bale  of  clothes  would  travel  half  round 
the  world  several  times,  and  receive  the  labour  of  half  a  dozen 
nationalities,  before  finally  reaching  its  consumer.  But  there 
was  this  very  significant  fact  about  the  whole  process; 
Governments  had  very  little  to  do  with  it,  and  the  process  did 
not  rest  upon  any  clearly  defined  body  of  commercial  right, 
defined  in  a  regular  code  or  law.  One  of  the  greatest  of  all 
British  industries,  cotton  spinning,  depended  upon  access  to  raw 
material  under  the  complete  control  of  a  foreign  State,  America. 
(The  blockade  of  the  South  in  the  War  of  Secession  proved 
how  absolute  was  the  dependence  of  a  main  British  industry 
upon  the  political  decisions  of  a  foreign  Government).  The 
mass  of  contradictory  uncertainties  relating  to  rights  of  neutral 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       63 

trade  in  war-time,  known  as  International  Law,  furnished  no 
basis  of  security  at  all.  It  did  not  even  pretend  to  touch  the 
source — the  right  of  access  to  the  material  itself. 

That  right,  and  the  international  economy  that  had  become 
so  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  so  much  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Western  Europe,  rested  upon  the  expectation  that  the 
private  owner  of  raw  materials — the  grower  of  wheat  or  cotton, 
or  the  owner  of  iron  ore  or  coal-mines — would  continue  to 
desire  to  sell  those  things,  would  always,  indeed,  be  compelled 
so  to  do,  in  order  to  turn  them  to  account.  The  main  aim  of 
the  Industrial  Era  was  markets — to  sell  things.  One  heard  of 
'economic  invasions'  before  the  War.  This  did  not  mean  that 
the  invader  took  things,  but  that  he  brought  them — for  sale. 
The  modern  industrial  nation  did  not  fear  the  loss  of  commodi- 
ties. What  it  feared  was  their  receipt.  And  the  aid  of  Govern- 
ments was  mainly  invoked,  not  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
things  leaving  the  country,  but  for  the  purpose  of  putting 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  foreigners  bringing  commodities  into 
the  country.  Nearly  every  country  had  'Protection'  against 
foreign  goods.  Very  rarely  did  we  find  countries  fearing  to 
lose  their  goods  and  putting  on  export  duties.  Incidentally 
such  duties  are  forbidden  by  the  American  Constitution. 

Before  the  War  it  would  have  seemed  a  work  of  supereroga- 
tion to  frame  international  regulations  to  protect  the  right  to 
buy:  all  were  searching  for  buyers.  In  an  economic  world 
which  revolved  on  the  expectation  of  individual  profit,  the 
competition  for  profit  kept  open  the  resources  of  the  world. 

Under  that  system  it  did  not  matter  much,  economically, 
what  political  administration — provided  always  that  it  was  an 
orderly  one — covered  the  area  in  which  raw  materials  were 
found,  or  even  controlled  ports  and  access  to  the  sea.  It  was 
in  no  way  indispensable  to  British  industry  that  its  most 
necessary  raw  material — cotton,  say — should  be  under  its  own 
control.  That  industry  had  developed  while  the  sources  of  the 
material  were  in  a  foreign  State.    Lancashire  did  not  need  to 


64  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

*own'  Louisiana.  If  England  had  'owned'  Louisiana,  British 
cotton-spinners  would  still  have  had  to  pay  for  the  cotton  as 
before.  When  a  writer  declared  before  the  War  that  Germany 
dreamed  of  the  conquest  of  Canada  because  she  needed  its 
wheat  wherewith  to  feed  her  people,  he  certainly  overlooked 
the  fact  that  Germany  could  have  had  the  wheat  of  Canada 
on  the  same  conditions  as  the  British  who  'owned'  the  country — 
and  who  certainly  could  not  get  it  without  paying  for  it. 
It  was  true  before  the  War  to  write : — 

'Co-operation  between  nations  has  become  essential  for  the 
very  life  of  their  peoples.  But  that  co-operation  does  not  take 
place  as  between  States  at  all.  A  trading  corporation  called 
"Britain"  does  not  buy  cotton  from  another  corporation  called 
"America."  A  manufacturer  in  Manchester  strikes  a  bargain 
with  a  merchant  in  Louisiana  in  order  to  keep  a  bargain  with 
a  dyer  in  Germany,  and  three,  or  a  m.uch  larger  number  of 
parties,  enter  into  virtual,  or  perhaps  actual,  contract,  and  form 
a  mutually  dependent  economic  community  (numbering,  it  may 
be,  with  the  work-people  in  the  group  of  industries  involved, 
some  millions  of  individuals) — an  economic  entity  so  far  as 
one  can  exist  which  does  not  include  all  organised  society. 
The  special  interests  of  such  a  community  may  become  hostile 
to  those  of  another  community,  but  it  will  almost  certainly  not 
be  a  "national"  one,  but  one  of  a  like  nature,  say  a  shipping 
ring  or  groups  of  international  bankers  or  Stock  Exchange 
speculators.  The  frontiers  of  such  communities  do  not  coincide 
with  the  areas  in  which  operate  the  functions  of  the  State. 
How  could  a  State,  say  Britain,  act  on  behalf  of  an  economic 
entity  such  as  that  just  indicated  ?  By  pressure  against  America 
or  Germany?  But  the  community  against  which  the  British 
manufacturer  in  this  case  wants  pressure  exercised  is  not 
"America"  or  "Germany" — both  want  it  exercised  against  the 
shipping  ring  or  the  speculators  or  the  bankers  who  in  part 
are  British.    If  Britain  injures  America  or  Germany  as  a  whole, 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       65 

she  injures  necessarily  the  economic  entity  which  it  was  her 
object  to  protect.*^ 

This  line  of  reasoning  is  no  longer  valid,  for  it  was  based 
upon  a  system  of  economic  individualism,  upon  a  distinction 
between  the  functions  proper  to  the  State  and  those  proper  to 
the  citizen.  This  individualist  system  has  been  profoundly 
transformed  in  the  direction  of  national  control  by  the  measures 
adopted  everywhere  for  the  purposes  of  war;  a  transformation 
that  the  confiscatory  clauses  of  the  Treaty  and  the  arrange- 
ments for  the  payment  of  the  indemnity  help  to  render  per- 
manent. While  the  old  understanding  or  convention  has  been 
destroyed — or  its  disappearance  very  greatly  accelerated — by 
the  Allies,  no  new  one  has  so  far  been  established  to  take  its 
place.  To  that  fact  we  must  ascribe  much  of  the  economic 
paralysis  that  has  come  upon  the  world. 

I  am  aware,  of  course,  that  the  passage  I  have  quoted  did  not 
tell  the  whole  story;  that  already  before  the  War  the  power 
of  the  political  State  was  being  more  and  more  used  by  'big 
business';  that  in  China,  Mexico,  Central  America,  the  Near 
East,  Morocco,  Persia,  Mesopotamia,  wherever  there  was  un- 
developed and  disorderly  territory,  private  enterprise  was  exer- 
cising pressure  upon  the  State  to  use  its  power  to  ensure  sources 
of  raw  material  or  areas  for  the  investment  of  capital.  That 
phase  of  the  question  is  dealt  with  at  greater  length  elsewhere.^ 
But  the  actual  (whatever  the  potential)  economic  importance 
of  the  territory  about  which  the  nations  quarrelled  was  as  yet, 
in  1914,  small;  the  part  taken  by  Governments  in  the  control 
and  direction  of  international  trade  was  negligible.     Europe 

*  The  Foundations  of  International  Policy  pp.  xxiii-xxiv. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  Governments  were  for  their  armies  and 
navies  and  public  departments  considerable  purchasers  in  the  inter- 
national market.  But  the  general  truth  of  the  distinction  here  made 
is  unaffected.  The  difference  in  degree,  in  this  respect,  between  the 
pre-war  and  post-war  state  in  so  great  as  to  make  a  difference  of  kind. 
The  dominant  motive  for  State  action  has  been  changed. 

*  See  Addendum  and  also  the  authors*  War  and  the  Workers. 
(National  Labour  Press),  pp.  29-50. 

e 


66  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

lived  by  processes  that  went  on  without  serious  obstacle  across 
frontiers.  Little  States,  for  instance,  without  Colonies  ( Scandi- 
navia, Switzerland)  not  only  maintained  a  standard  of  living 
for  their  people  quite  as  high  as  that  in  the  great  States,  but 
maintained  it  moreover  by  virtue  of  a  foreign  trade  relatively 
as  considerable.  And  the  forces  which  preserved  the  inter- 
national understanding  by  which  that  trade  was  carried  on  were 
obviously  great. 

It  was  not  true,  before  the  War,  to  say  that  Germany  had  to 
expand  her  frontiers  to  feed  her  population.  It  is  true  that 
with  her,  as  with  us,  her  soil  did  not  produce  the  food  needed 
for  the  populations  living  on  it;  as  with  us,  about  fifteen 
millions  were  being  fed  by  means  of  trade  with  territories  which 
politically  she  did  not  'own,'  and  did  not  need  to  'own' — with 
Russia,  with  South  America,  with  Asia,  with  our  own  Colonies. 
Like  us  Germany  was  turning  her  coal  and  iron  into  bread. 
The  process  could  have  gone  on  almost  indefinitely,  so  long  as 
the  coal  and  iron  lasted,  as  the  tendency  to  territorial  division 
of  labour  was  being  intensified  by  the  development  of  transport 
and  invention.  (The  pressure  of  the  population  on  the  food 
resources  of  these  islands  was  possibly  greater  under  the 
Heptarchy  than  at  present,  when  they  support  forty-five  mil- 
lions.) Under  the  old  economic  order  conquest  meant,  not  a 
transfer  of  wealth  from  one  set  of  persons  to  another — for 
the  soil  of  Alsace,  for  instance,  remained  in  the  hands  of  those 
who  had  owned  it  under  France — ^but  a  change  of  administra- 
tion. The  change  may  have  been  as  unwarrantable  and  oppress- 
ive as  you  will,  but  it  did  not  involve  economic  strangulation 
of  the  conquered  peoples  or  any  very  fundamental  economic 
change  at  all.  French  economic  life  did  not  wither  as  the 
result  of  the  changes  of  frontier  in  1872,  and  French  factories 
were  not  shut  off  from  raw  material,  French  cities  were  not 
stricken  with  starvation  as  the  result  of  France's  defeat.  Her 
economic  and  financial  recovery  was  extraordinarily  rapid ;  her 
financial  position  a  year  or  two  after  the  War  was  sound<y 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       67 

than  that  of  Germany.  It  seemed,  therefore,  that  if  Germany, 
of  all  nations,  and  Bismarck,  of  all  statesmen,  could  thus  respect 
the  convention  which  after  war  secured  the  immunity  of  private 
trade  and  property,  it  must  indeed  be  deeply  rooted  in  inter- 
national comity. 

Indeed,  the  'trans-national'  economic  activities  of  individuals, 
which  had  ensued  so  widespread  an  international  economy,  and 
the  principle  of  the  immunity  of  private  property  from  seizure 
after  conquest,  had  become  so  firmly  rooted  in  international 
relationship  as  to  survive  all  the  changes  of  war  and  conquest. 
They  were  based  on  a  principle  that  had  received  recognition 
in  English  Treaties  dating  back  to  the  time  of  Magna  Carta, 
and  that  had  gradually  become  a  convention  of  international 
relationship. 

At  Versailles  the  Germans  pointed  out  that  their  country 
was  certainly  not  left  with  resources  to  feed  its  population. 
The  Allies  replied  to  that,  not  by  denying  the  fact — to  which 
their  own  advisers,  like  Mr  Hoover,  have  indeed  pointedly 
called  attention — ^but  as  follows: —  , 

*It  would  appear  to  be  a  fundamental  fallacy  that  the  political 
control  of  a  country  is  essential  in  order  to  procure  a  reasonable 
share  of  its  products.  Such  a  proposal  finds  no  foundation  in 
economic  law  or  history.'  * 

In  making  their  reply  the  Allies  seemed  momentarily  to  have 
overlooked  one  fact — ^their  own  handiwork  in  the  Treaty. 

Before  the  War  it  would  have  been  a  true  reply.  But  the 
Allies  have  transformed  what  were,  before  the  War,  dangerous 
fallacies  into  monstrous  truths. 

President  Wilson  has  described  the  position  of  Germany 
under  the  Treaty  in  these  terms  : — 

'The  Treaty  of  Peace  sets  up  a  great  Commission,  known  as 
the  Reparations  Commission.  .  .  .  That  Reparation  Commission 

» Note  of  May  22,  1919. 


68  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

can  determine  the  currents  of  trade,  the  conditions  of  credit, 
of  international  credit;  it  can  determine  how  much  Germany 
is  going  to  buy,  where  it  is  going  to  buy,  and  how  it  is  going 
to  pay  for  it'  ^ 

In  other  words,  it  is  no  longer  open  to  Germany,  as  the 
result  of  guarantees  of  free  movement  accorded  to  individual 
traders,  to  carry  on  that  process  by  which  before  the  War  she 
supported  herself.  Individual  Germans  cannot  now,  as  hereto- 
fore, get  raw  materials  by  dealing  with  foreign  individuals, 
without  reference  to  their  nationality.  Germans  are  now,  in 
fact,  placed  in  the  position  of  having  to  deal  through  their 
State,  which  in  turn  deals  with  other  States.  To  buy  wheat  or 
iron,  they  cannot  as  heretofore  go  to  individuals,  to  the  grower 
or  min^owner,  and  offer  a  price;  the  thing  has  to  be  done 
through  Governments.  We  have  come  much  nearer  to  a  con- 
dition in  which  the  States  do  indeed  'own'  (they  certainly  con- 
trol) their  raw  material. 

The  most  striking  instance  is  that  of  access  to  the  Lorraine 
iron,  which  before  the  War  furnished  three- fourths  of  the  raw 
material  of  Germany's  basic  industr2^  Under  the  individualist 
system,  in  which  'the  buyer  is  king'  in  which  efforts  were  mainly 
directed  to  finding  markets,  no  obstacle  was  placed  on  the  export 
of  iron  (except,  indeed,  the  obstacle  to  the  acquisition  by  French 
citizens  of  Lorraine  iron  set  up  by  the  French  Government  in 
the  imposition  of  tariffs).  But  under  the  new  order,  with  the 
French  State  assuming  such  enormously  increased  economic 
functions,  the  destination  of  the  iron  will  be  determined  by 
political  considerations.  And  'political  considerations,'  in  an 
order  of  international  society  in  which  the  security  of  the  nation 
depends,  not  upon  the  collective  strength  of  the  whole  society, 
but  upon  its  relative  strength  as  against  rival  units,  mean  the 
deliberate  weakening  of  rivals.    Thus,  no  longer  will  the  desire 

*  Speech  of  September  5,  1919.  From  report  in  Philadelphia  Public 
Ledger,  Sept  6. 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       69 

of  private  owners  to  find  a  market  for  their  wares  be  a  guaran- 
tee of  the  free  access  of  citizens  in  other  States  to  those  mate- 
rials. In  place  of  a  play  of  factors  which  did,  however  clumsily, 
ensure  in  practice  general  access  to  raw  materials,  we  have  a 
new  order  of  motives;  the  deliberate  desire  of  States,  com- 
peting in  power,  owning  great  sources  of  raw  material,  to 
deprive  rival  States  of  the  use  of  them. 

That  the  refusal  of  access  will  not  add  to  the  welfare  of  the 
people  of  the  State  that  so  owns  these  materials,  that,  indeed, 
it  will  inevitably  lower  the  standard  of  living  in  all  States  alike, 
is  certainly  true.  But  so  long  as  there  is  no  real  international 
society  organised  on  the  basis  of  collective  strength  and  co- 
operation, the  motive  of  security  will  override  considerations 
of  welfare.  The  condition  of  international  anarchy  makes  true 
what  otherwise  need  not  be  true,  that  the  vital  interests  of 
nations  are  conflicting. 

Parenthetically,  it  is  necessary  to  say  this :  the  time  may  have 
come  for  the  destruction  of  the  older  order.  If  the  individ- 
ualist order  was  that  which  gave  us  Armageddon,  and  still 
more,  the  type  of  mind  which  Armageddon  and  the  succeeding 
'peace'  revealed,  then  the  present  writer,  for  one,  sheds  no  tears 
over  its  destruction.  In  any  case,  a  discussion  of  the  intrinsic 
merits,  social  and  moral,  of  socialism  and  individualism  re- 
spectively, would  to-day  be  quite  academic.  For  those  who  pro- 
fess to  stand  for  individualism  are  the  most  active  agents  of 
its  destruction.  The  Conservative  Nationalists,  who  oppose 
the  socialisation  of  wealth  and  yet  advocate  the  conscription 
of  life ;  oppose  Nationalisation,  yet  demand  the  utmost  military 
preparedness  in  an  age  when  effective  preparation  for  war 
means  the  mobilisation  particularly  of  the  nation's  industrial 
resources ;  resent  the  growing  authority  of  the  State,  yet  insist 
that  the  power  of  the  National  State  shall  be  such  as  to  give 
it  everywhere  domination ;  do,  indeed,  demand  omelets  without 
eggs,  and  bricks  not  only  without  straw  but  without  clay. 

A   Europe   of    competing   military    nationalisms    means   a 


70  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Europe  in  which  the  individual  and  all  his  activities  must  more 
and  more  be  merged  in  his  State  for  the  purpose  of  that  com- 
petition. The  process  is  necessarily  one  of  progressively  intense 
socialisation;  and  the  war  measures  carried  it  to  very  great 
lengths  indeed.  Moreover,  the  point  to  which  our  attention 
just  now  should  be  directed,  is  the  difference  which  distin- 
guishes the  process  of  change  within  the  State  from  that  which 
marks  the  change  in  the  international  field.  Within  the  State 
the  old  method  is  automatically  replaced  by  the  new  (indeed 
nationalisation  is  mostly  the  means  by  which  the  old  individual- 
ism is  brought  to  an  end)  ;  between  nations,  on  the  other  hand, 
no  organised  socialistic  internationalism  replaces  the  old  method 
which  is  destroyed.  The  world  is  left  without  any  settled  inter- 
national economy. 

Let  us  note  the  process  of  destruction  of  the  old  economy. 

In  July,  1914,  the  advocacy  of  economic  nationalisation  or 
Socialism  would  have  been  met  with  elaborate  arguments  from 
perhaps  nine  average  Englishmen  out  of  ten,  to  the  effect  that 
control  or  management  of  industries  and  services  by  the  Govern- 
ment was  impossible,  by  reason  of  the  sheer  inefficiency  which 
marks  Governmental  work.  Then  comes  the  War,  and  an 
efficient  railway  service  and  the  co-ordination  of  industry  and 
finance  to  national  ends  becomes  a  matter  of  life  and  death.  In 
this  grave  emergency,  what  policy  does  this  same  average 
Englishman,  who  has  argued  so  elaborately  against  State  con- 
trol, and  the  possibility  of  governments  ever  administering 
public  services,  pursue?  Almost  as  a  matter  of  course,  as  the 
one  thing  to  be  done,  he  clamours  for  the  railways  and  other 
public  services  to  be  taken  over  by  the  Government,  and  for  the 
State  to  control  the  industry,  trade,  and  finance  of  the  country. 

Now  it  may  well  be  that  the  Socialist  would  deny  that  the 
system  which  obtained  during  the  War  was  Socialism,  and 
would  say  that  it  came  nearer  to  being  State  Capitalism  than 
State  Socialism;  the  individualist  may  argue  that  the  methods 
would  never  be  tolerated  as  a  normal  method  of  national  life. 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       71 

But  when  all  allowances  are  made  the  fact  remains  that  when 
our  need  was  greatest  we  resorted  to  the  very  system  which 
we  had  always  declared  to  be  the  worst  from  the  point  of  view 
of  efficiency.  As  Sir  Leo  Chiozza  Money,  in  sketching  the 
history  of  this  change,  which  he  has  called  'The  Triumph  of 
Nationalisation,'  says:  'The  nation  won  through  the  unprece- 
dented economic  difficulties  of  the  greatest  War  in  history  by 
methods  which  it  had  despised.  National  organisation  tri- 
umphed in  a  land  where  it  had  been  denied.'  In  this  sense  the 
England  of  1914-1920  was  a  Socialist  England;  and  it  was  a 
Socialist  England  by  common  consent. 

This  fact  has  an  effect  on  the  moral  outlook  not  generally 
realised. 

For  very  many,  as  the  War  went  on  and  increasing  sacri- 
fices of  life  and  youth  were  demanded,  new  light  was  thrown 
upon  the  relations  of  the  individual  to  the  State.  A  whole 
generation  of  young  Englishmen  were  suddenly  confronted 
with  the  fact  that  their  lives  did  not  belong  to  themselves,  that 
each  owed  his  life  to  the  State.  But  if  each  must  give,  or  at 
least  risk,  everything  that  he  possessed,  even  life  itself,  were 
others  giving  or  risking  what  they  possessed?  Here  was 
new  light  on  the  institution  of  private  property.  If  the  life 
of  each  belongs  to  the  community,  then  assuredly  does  his  prop- 
erty. The  Communist  State  which  says  to  the  citizen,  'You 
must  work  and  surrender  your  private  property  or  you  will 
have  no  vote,'  asks,  after  all,  somewhat  less  than  the  bourgeois 
Military  State  which  says  to  the  conscript,  'Fight  and  give 
your  person  to  the  State  or  we  will  kill  you.'  For  great  masses 
of  the  British  working-classes  conscription  has  answered  the 
ethical  problem  involved  in  the  confiscation  of  capital.  The 
Eighth  Commandment  no  longer  stands  in  the  way,  as  it  stood 
so  long  in  the  case  of  a  people  still  religiously  minded  and 
still  feeling  the  weight  of  Puritan  tradition. 

Moreover,  the  War  showed  that  the  communal  organisation 
of  industry  could  be  made  to  work.    It  could  'deliver  the  goods' 


72  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

if  those  goods  were,  say,  munitions.  And  if  it  could  work 
for  the  purposes  of  war,  why  not  for  those  of  peace?  The 
War  showed  that  by  co-ordinated  and  centrahsed  action  the 
whole  economic  structure  can  without  disaster  be  altered  to 
a  degree  that  before  the  War  no  economist  would  have  sup- 
posed possible.  We  witnessed  the  economic  miracle  men- 
tioned in  the  last  chapter,  but  worth  recalling  here.  Suppose 
before  the  War  you  had  collected  into  one  room  all  the  great 
capitalist  economists  in  England,  and  had  said  to  them :  'Dur- 
ing the  next  few  years  you  will  withdraw  from  normal  pro- 
duction five  or  six  millions  of  the  best  workers.  The  mere 
residue  of  the  workers  will  be  able  to  feed,  clothe,  and  generally 
maintain  those  five  or  six  millions,  themselves,  and  the  country 
at  large,  at  a  standard  of  living  on  the  whole  as  high,  if  not 
higher,  than  that  to  which  the  people  were  accustomed  before 
those  five  or  six  million  workers  were  withdrawn.'  If  you 
had  said  that  to  those  capitalist  economists,  there  would  not 
have  been  one  who  would  have  admitted  the  possibility  of 
the  thing,  or  regarded  the  forecast  as  anything  but  rubbish. 

Yet  that  economic  miracle  has  been  performed,  and  it  has 
been  performed  thanks  to  Nationalisation  and  Socialism,  and 
could  not  have  been  performed  otherwise. 

However,  one  may  qualify  in  certain  points  this  summary 
of  the  outstanding  economic  facts  of  the  War,  it  is  impossible 
to  exaggerate  the  extent  to  which  the  revelation  of  economic 
possibilities  has  influenced  working-class  opinion. 

To  the  effect  of  this  on  the  minds  of  the  more  intelligent 
workers,  we  have  to  add  another  psychological  effect,  a  certain 
recklessness,  inseparable  from  the  conditions  of  war,  reflected 
in  the  workers'  attitude  towards  social  reform. 

Perhaps  a  further  factor  in  the  tendency  towards  Com- 
munism is  the  habituation  to  confiscation  which  currency  in- 
flation involves.  Under  the  influence  of  war  contrivances 
States  have  learned  to  pay  their  debts  in  paper  not  equivalent 
in  value  to  the  gold  in  which  the  loan  was  made :  whole  classes 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       73 

of  bondholders  have  thus  been  deprived  of  anything  from 
one-half  to  two-thirds  of  the  value  of  their  property.  It  is 
confiscation  in  its  most  indiscriminate  and  sometimes  most 
cruel  form.  Bourgeois  society  has  accepted  it.  A  socialistic 
society  of  to-morrow  may  be  tempted  to  find  funds  for  its 
social  experiments  in  somewhat  the  same  way. 

Whatever  weight  we  may  attach  to  some  of  these  factors, 
this  much  is  certain:  not  only  war,  but  preparation  for  war, 
means,  to  a  much  greater  degree  than  it  has  ever  meant  before, 
mobilisation  of  the  whole  resources  of  the  country — men, 
women,  industry.  This  form  of  'nationalisation'  cannot  go 
on  for  years  and  not  affect  the  permanent  form  of  the  society 
subjected  to  it.  It  has  affected  it  very  deeply.  It  has  involved 
a  change  in  the  position  of  private  property  and  individual 
enterprise  that  since  the  War  has  created  a  new  cleavage  in 
the  West.  The  future  of  private  property  which  was  before 
the  War  a  theoretical  speculation,  has  become  within  a  year  or 
two,  and  especially,  perhaps,  since  the  Bolshevist  Revolution  in 
Russia,  a  dominating  issue  in  European  social  and  political 
development.  It  has  subjected  European  society  to  a  new  strain. 
The  wearing  down  of  the  distinction  between  the  citizen  and 
the  State,  and  the  inroads  upon  the  sacro-sanctity  of  private 
property  and  individual  enterprise,  make  each  citizen  much 
more  dependent  upon  his  State,  much  more  a  part  of  it.  Con- 
trol of  foreign  trade  so  largely  by  the  State  has  made  inter- 
national trade  less  a  matter  of  processes  maintained  by  indi- 
viduals who  disregarded  their  nationality,  and  more  a  matter  of 
arrangement  between  States,  in  which  the  non-political  indi- 
vidual activity  tends  to  disappear.  We  have  here  a  group 
of  forces  which  has  achieved  a  revolution,  a  revolution  in  the 
relationship  of  the  individual  European  to  the  European  State, 
and  of  the  States  to  one  another. 

The  socialising  and  communist  tendencies  set  up  by  measures 
of  industrial  mobilisation  for  the  purposes  of  the  War,  have 
been   carried    forward   in   another   sphere   by   the   economic 


74  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  These  latter,  if  even  partly 
carried  into  effect,  will  mean  in  very  large  degree  the  com- 
pulsory socialisation,  even  communisation,  of  the  enemy 
States.  Not  only  the  country's  foreign  trade,  but  much  of  its 
internal  industry  must  be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  private 
traders  or  manufacturers.  The  provisions  of  the  Treaty  as- 
suredly help  to  destroy  the  process  upon  v/hich  the  old  eco- 
nomic order  in  Europe  rested. 

Let  the  reader  ask  himself  what  is  likely  to  be  the  influence 
upon  the  institution  of  private  property  and  private  commerce 
of  a  Treaty  world-wide  in  its  operation,  which  will  take  a 
generation  to  carry  out,  which  may  well  be  used  as  a  precedent 
for  future  settlements  between  States  (settlements  which  may 
include  very  great  politico-economic  changes  in  the  position 
of  Egypt,  Ireland,  and  India),  and  of  which  the  chief  eco- 
nomic provisions  are  as  follows: — 

*It  deprives  Germany  of  nearly  the  whole  of  her  overseas 
marine.  It  banishes  German  sovereignty  and  economic  in- 
fluence from  all  her  overseas  possessions,  and  sequestrates  the 
private  property  of  Germans  in  those  places,  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, and  in  all  countries  within  Allied  jurisdiction.  It  puts  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Allies  all  German  financial  rights  and  in- 
terests, both  in  the  countries  of  her  former  Allies  and  in  the 
States  and  territories  which  have  been  formed  out  of  them. 
It  gives  the  Reparations  Commission  power  to  put  its  finger 
on  any  great  business  or  property  in  Germany  and  to  demand 
its  surrender.  Outside  her  own  frontiers  Germany  can  be 
stripped  of  everything  she  possesses,  and  inside  them,  until  an 
impossible  indemnity  has  been  paid  to  the  last  farthing,  she 
can  truly  call  nothing  her  own. 

'The  Treaty  inflicts  on  an  Empire  built  up  on  coal  and  iron 
the  loss  of  about  one-third  of  her  coal  supplies,  with  such  a 
heavy  drain  on  the  scanty  remainder  as  to  leave  her  with  an 
annual  supply  of  only  60  million  tons,  as  against  the  pre-war 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE      75 

production  of  over  190  million  tons,  and  the  loss  of  over  three- 
quarters  of  her  iron  ore.  It  deprives  her  of  all  effective  control 
over  her  own  system  of  transport;  it  takes  the  river  system 
of  Germany  out  of  German  hands,  so  that  on  every  Inter- 
national Committee  dealing  with  German  waters,  Germans 
are  placed  in  a  clear  minority.  It  is  as  though  the  Powers  of 
Central  Europe  were  placed  in  a  majority  on  the  Thames 
Conservancy  or  the  Port  of  London  Authority,  Finally,  it 
forces  Germany  for  a  period  of  years  to  concede  "most 
favoured  nation"  treatment  to  the  Allies,  while  she  receives  no 
such  reciprocal  favour  in  return.' 

This  wholesale  confiscation  of  private  property^  is  to  take 
place  without  the  Allies  affording  any  compensation  to  the 
individuals  expropriated,  and  the  proceeds  will  be  employed, 
first,  to  meet  private  debts  due  to  Allied  nationals  from  any 
German  nationals,  and,  second,  to  meet  claims  due  from  Aus- 
trian, Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  or  Turkish  nationals.  Any  bal- 
ance may  either  be  returned  by  the  liquidating  power  direct  to 
Germany,  or  retained  by  them.  If  retained,  the  proceeds  must 
be  transferred  to  the  Reparations  Commission  for  Germany's 

*  In  German  East  Africa  we  have  a  case  in  which  practically  the 
whole  of  the  property  in  land  was  confiscated.  The  whole  European 
population  were  evicted  from  the  farms  and  plantations — many,  of  course, 
representing  the  labour  of  a  lifetime — ^and  deported.  A  visitor  to  the 
colony  describes  it  as  an  empty  shell,  its  productivity  enormously  re- 
duced. In  contradistinction,  however,  one  welcomes  General  Smuts's 
statement  in  the  Union  House  of  Assembly  in  regard  to  the  Govern- 
ment's intentions  as  to  German  property.  He  declared  that  the  balance 
of  nine  millions  in  the  hands  of  the  Custodian  after  claims  for  damages 
had  been  recovered,  would  not  be  paid  to  the  Reparations  Commission, 
as  this  would  practically  mean  confiscation.  The  Government  would 
take  the  nine  millions,  plus  interest,  as  a  loan  to  South  Africa  for  thirty 
years  at  four  per  cent.  While  under  the  Peace  Treaty  they  had  the  right 
to  confiscate  all  private  property  in  South-West  Africa,  they  did  not  in- 
tend to  avail  themselves  of  those  rights.  They  would  leave  private 
property  alone.  As  to  the  concessions,  if  the  titles  to  these  were  proved, 
they  would  also  be  left  untouched.  The  statement  of  the  South 
African  Government's  intentions,  which  are  the  most  generous  of  any 
country  in  the  world,  was  received  with  repeated  cheers  from  all  sec- 
tions of  the  House. 


76  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

credit  in  the  Reparations  account.  Note,  moreover,  how  the 
identification  of  a  citizen  with  his  State  is  carried  forward 
by  the  discrimination  made  against  Germans  in  overseas  trade. 
Heretofore  there  were  whole  spheres  of  international  trade 
and  industrial  activity  in  which  the  individual's  nationality 
mattered  very  little.  It  was  a  point  in  favour  of  individual 
effort,  and,  incidentally,  of  international  peace.  Under  the 
Treaty,  whereas  the  property  of  Allied  nationals  within  Ger- 
man jurisdiction  reverts  to  Allied  ownership  on  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  the  property  of  Germans  within  Allied  jurisdiction  is 
to  be  retained  and  liquidated  as  described  above,  with  the 
result  that  the  whole  of  German  property  over  a  large  part  of 
the  world  can  be  expropriated,  and  the  large  properties  now 
within  the  custody  of  Public  Trustees  and  similar  officials 
in  the  Allied  countries  may  be  retained  permanently.  In  the 
second  place,  such  German  assets  are  chargeable,  not  only 
with  the  liabilities  of  Germans,  but  also,  if  they  run  to  it,  with 
'payment  of  the  amounts  due  in  respect  of  claims  by  the 
nationals  of  such  Allied  or  Associated  Power  with  regard 
to  their  property,  rights,  and  interests  in  the  territory  of  other 
Enemy  Powers,*  as,  for  example,  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and  Aus- 
tria. This  is  a  remarkable  provision,  which  is  naturally  non- 
reciprocal.  In  the  third  place,  any  final  balance  due  to  Ger- 
many on  private  account  need  not  be  paid  over,  but  can  be 
held  against  the  various  liabilities  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment.^ The  eflfective  operation  of  these  articles  is  guaranteed 
by  the  delivery  of  deeds,  titles,  and  information. 

*  Since  the  above  lines  were  written  the  following  important  an- 
nouncement has  appeared  (according  to  The  Times  of  October  26th., 
1920.)   in  the  Board  of  Trade  Journal  of  October  21st.  :— 

'  H.  M.  Government  have  informed  the  German  Government  that  they 
do  not  intend  to  exercise  their  rights  under  paragraph  18  of  Annex 
II  to  Part  VIII  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  to  seize  the  property  of 
German  nationals  in  this  country  in  case  of  voluntary  default  by 
Germany.  This  applies  to  German  property  in  the  United  Kingdom 
or  under  United  Kingdom  control,  whether  in  the  form  of  bank  bal- 
ances, or  in  liiat  of  goods  in  British  bottoms,  or  of  goods  sent  to  this 
country  for  sale. 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       77 

It  will  be  noted  how  completely  the  Treaty  returns  to  the 
Tribal  conception  of  a  collective  responsibility,  and  how  it 
wipes  away  the  distinction  heretofore  made  in  International 
Law,  between  the  civilian  citizen  and  the  belligerent  Govern- 
ment. An  Austrian  who  has  lived  and  worked  in  England  or 
China  or  Egypt  all  his  life,  and  is  married  to  an  English  woman 
and  has  children  who  do  not  speak  a  word  of  German,  who  is 
no  more  responsible  for  the  invasion  of  Belgium  than  an  Ice- 
lander or  a  Chinaman,  finds  that  the  savings  of  his  lifetime 
left  here  in  the  faith  of  British  security,  are  confiscated  under 
the  Treaty  in  order  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  France  or  Japan. 
And,  be  it  noted,  whenever  attention  is  directed  to  what  the 
defenders  of  the  Treaty  like  to  call  its  'sternness*  (as  when 
it  deprives  Englishborn  women  and  their  children  of  their 
property)  we  are  invited  to  repress  our  misgiving  on  that  score 
in  order  to  contemplate  the  beauty  of  its  'justice,'  and  to  ad- 
mire the  inexorable  accuracy  with  which  reward  and  punish- 
ment are  distributed.  It  is  the  standing  retort  to  critics  of 
the  Treaty :  they  forget  its  'justice.'  ^ 

'  It  has  already  been  announced  that  German  property,  rights,  and 
interests  acquired  since  the  publication  of  the  General  Licence  permit- 
ting the  resumption  of  trade  with  Germany  (i.e.  since  July  12th.,  1919), 
are  not  liable  to  retention  tmder  Art.  297  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  which 
gives  the  AlUed  and  Associated  Powers  the  right  to  liquidate  all  Ger- 
man property,  rights,  and  interests  within  their  territories  at  the  date 
of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Treaty.' 

This  announcement  has  called  forth  strong  protests  from  France 
and  from  some  quarters  in  this  country,  to  which  the  British  Govern- 
ment has  rejoined  by  a  semi-official  statement  that  the  concession  has 
been  made  solely  on  account  of  British  commercial  interests.  The  in- 
cident illustrates  the  difficulty  of  waiving  even  permissive  powers  under 
the  Treaty,  although  the  exercise  of  those  powers  would  obviously  in- 
jure British  traders.  Moreover,  the  Reparations  (Recovery)  Act, 
passed  in  March  1921,  appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  above  an- 
nouncement. 

*A  point  that  seems  to  have  been  overlooked  is  the  effect  of  this 
Treaty  on  the  arrangements  which  may  follow  changes  in  the  political 
status  of,  say,  Egypt  or  India  or  Ireland.  If  some  George  Washington 
of  the  future  were  to  apply  the  principles  of  the  Treaty  to  British 
property,  the  effects  might  be  far-reaching. 

A  Quarterly  Review  critic  (April  1920)  says  of  these  dauses  of  the 
Treaty  (particularly  Article  297b.)  :— 


78  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

How  far  this  new  tendency  is  likely  to  go  towards  a  reasser- 
tion  of  the  false  doctrine  of  the  complete  submergence  of  the 
individual  in  the  State,  the  erection  of  the  'God-State'  which  at 
the  beginning  we  declared  to  be  the  main  moral  cause  of  the 
War  and  set  out  to  destroy,  will  be  discussed  later.  The  point 
for  the  moment  is  that  the  enforcement  of  this  part  of  the 
Treaty,  like  other  parts,  will  go  to  swell  communistic  tendencies. 
It  will  be  the  business  of  the  German  State  to  maintain  the 
miners  who  are  to  deliver  the  coal  under  the  Treaty,  the  work- 
ers in  the  shipyards  who  are  to  deliver  the  yearly  toll  of 
ships.  The  intricate  and  elaborate  arrangements  for  'search- 
ing Germany's  pockets'  for  the  purpose  of  the  indemnity 
mean  the  very  strictest  Governmental  control  of  private  trade 
in  Germany,  in  many  spheres  its  virtual  abolition.  All  must 
be  done  through  the  Government  in  order  that  the  conditions 
of  the  Treaty  may  be  fulfilled.  Foreign  trade  will  be  no 
longer  the  individual  enterprise  of  private  citizens.  It  will, 
by  the  order  of  the  Allies,  be  a  rigidly  controlled  Govern- 
mental function,  as  President  Wilson  reminded  us  in  the  pas- 
sage quoted  above. 

To  a  lesser  degree  the  same  will  be  true  of  the  countries 
receiving  the  indemnity.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  promises  that 
it  will  not  be  paid  in  cheap  goods,  or  in  such  a  way  as  to 
damage  home  industries.  But  it  must  be  paid  in  some  goods : 
ships,  dyes,  or  (as  some  suggest)  raw  materials.  Their  dis- 
tribution to  private  industry,  the  price  that  these  industries 

'We  are  justified  in  regarding  this  policy  with  the  utmost  appre- 
hension, not  only  because  of  its  injustice,  but  also  because  it  is  likely 
to  form  precedents  of  a  most  mischievous  character  in  the  future.  If,  it 
will  be  said,  the  Allied  Governments  ended  their  great  war  for  justice 
and  right  by  confiscating  private  property  and  ruining  those  unfortunate 
individuals  who  happened  to  have  investments  outside  their  own 
country,  how  can  private  wealth  at  home  complain  if  a  Labour  Govern- 
ment proposes  to  confiscate  private  property  in  any  business  which  it 
thinks  suitable  for  "nationalisation"?  Under  another  provision  the 
Reparations  Commission  is  actually  allowed  to  demand  the  surrender 
of  German  properties  and  German  enterprises  in  neutral  countries. 
This  will  be  found  in  Article  235,  which  "introduces  a  quite  novel  prin- 
ciple in  the  collection  of  indemnities." ' 


OLD  ECONOMY  AND  POST-WAR  STATE       79 

shall  pay,  must  be  arranged  by  the  receiving  Government. 
This  inevitably  means  a  prolongation  of  the  State's  interven- 
tion in  the  processes  of  private  trade  and  industry.  Nor  is  it 
merely  the  disposal  of  the  indemnity  in  kind  which  will  com- 
pel each  Allied  Government  to  continue  to  intervene  in  the 
trade  and  industry  of  its  citizens.  The  fact  that  the  Repara- 
tions Commission  is,  in  effect,  to  allocate  the  amount  of  ore, 
cotton,  shipping,  Germany  is  to  get,  to  distribute  the  ships 
and  coal  which  she  may  deliver,  means  the  establishment  of 
something  resembling  international  rationing.  The  Govern- 
ments will,  in  increasing  degree,  determine  the  amount  and 
direction  of  trade. 

The  more  thoroughly  we  'make  Germany  pay,'  the  more 
State-controlled  do  we  compel  her  (and  only  to  a  lesser  ex- 
tent ourselves)  to  become.  We  should  probably  regard  a 
standard  of  life  in  Germany  very  definitely  below  that  of  the 
rest  of  Western  Europe,  as  poetic  justice.  But  it  would  in- 
evitably set  up  forces,  both  psychological  and  economic,  that 
make  not  only  for  State-control — either  State  Socialism  or 
State  Capitalism — but  for  Communism. 

Suppose  we  did  our  work  so  thoroughly  that  we  took  abso- 
lutely all  Germany  could  produce  over  and  above  what  was 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  physical  efficiency  of  her 
population.  That  would  compel  her  to  organise  herself  in- 
creasingly on  the  basis  of  equality  of  income :  no  one,  that  is, 
going  above  the  line  of  physical  efficiency  and  no  one  falling 
below  it. 

Thus,  while  British,  French,  and  American  anti-socialists  are 
declaring  that  the  principle  enunciated  by  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, that  all  trade  must  be  through  the  Soviet,  is  one  which 
will  prove  most  mischievous  in  its  example,  it  is  precisely 
that  principle  which  increasingly,  if  the  Treaty  is  enforced, 
they  will  in  fact  impose  upon  a  great  country,  highly  organ- 
ised, of  great  bureaucratic  efficiency,  far  more  likely  by  its 
training  and  character  to  make  the  principle  a  success. 


80  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

This  tendency  may  be  in  the  right  direction  or  the  wrong 
one.  The  point  is  that  no  provision  has  been  made  to  meet 
the  condition  which  the  change  creates.  The  old  system  per- 
mitted the  world  to  work  under  well-defined  principles.  The 
new  regimen,  because  it  has  not  provided  for  the  consequences 
of  the  changes  it  has  provoked,  condemns  a  great  part  of 
Europe  to  economic  paralysis  which  must  end  in  bitter  anarchic 
struggles  unless  the  crisis  is  anticipated  by  constructive  states- 
manship. 

Meantime  the  continued  coercion  of  Germany  will  demand 
on  the  part  of  the  Western  democracies  a  permanent  mainte- 
nance of  the  machine  of  war,  and  so  a  perpetuation  of  the 
tendency,  in  the  way  already  described,  towards  a  militarised 
Nationalisation. 

The  resultant  'Socialism'  will  assuredly  not  be  of  the  type 
that  most  Socialists  (among  whom,  incidentally,  the  present 
writer  counts  himself)  would  welcome.  But  it  will  not  neces- 
sarily be  for  that  reason  any  less  fatal  to  the  workable  trans- 
national individualism. 

Moreover,  military  nationalisation  presupposes  international 
conflict,  if  not  perpetually  recurrent  war;  presupposes,  that 
is,  first,  an  inability  to  organise  a  stable  international  economy 
indispensable  to  a  full  life  for  Europe's  population;  and, 
secondly,  an  increasing  destructiveness  in  warfare — self-de- 
struction in  terms  of  European  Society  as  a  whole.  'Efficiency* 
in  such  a  society  would  be  efficiency  in  suicide. 


CHAPTER  III 

NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  THE  ASSERTION  OF  RIGHT 

The  change  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter  raises  certain  pro- 
found questions  of  Right.  These  may  be  indicated  as  fol- 
lows : — 

By  our  political  power  we  can  create  a  Europe  which,  while 
not  assuring  advantage  to  the  victor,  deprives  the  vanquished 
of  means  of  existence.  The  loss  of  both  ore  and  coal  by  the 
Central  Powers  might  well  make  it  impossible  for  their  future 
populations  to  find  food.  What  are  they  to  do?  Starve?  To 
disclaim  responsibility  is  to  claim  that  we  are  entitled  to  use 
our  power  to  deny  them  life. 

This  'right*  to  starve  foreigners  can  only  be  invoked  by 
invoking  the  concept  of  nationalism.  'Our  nation  first.'  But 
the  policy  of  placing  life  itself  upon  a  foundation  of  pre- 
ponderant force  instead  of  mutually  advantageous  co-opera- 
tion, compels  statesmen  perpetually  to  betray  the  principle  of 
nationality;  not  only  directly  (as  in  the  case  of  the  annexation 
of  territory,  economically  necessary,  but  containing  peoples 
of  alien  nationality),  but  indirectly;  for  the  resistance  which 
our  policy  (of  denying  means  of  subsistence  to  others)  pro- 
vokes, makes  preponderance  of  power  the  condition  of  sur- 
vival.   All  else  must  give  way  to  that  need. 

Might  cannot  be  pledged  to  Right  in  these  conditions.  If 
our  power  is  pledged  to  Allies  for  the  purposes  of  the  Balance 
(which  means,  in  fact,  preponderance),  it  cannot  be  used 
•  81 


82  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

against  them  to  enforce  respect  for  (say)  nationality.  To  turn 
against  Allies  would  break  the  Balance.  To  maintain  the 
Balance  of  Power  we  are  compelled  to  disregard  the  moral 
merits  of  an  Ally's  policy  (as  in  the  case  of  the  promise  to 
the  Czar's  Government  not  to  demand  the  independence  of 
Poland).  The  maintenance  of  a  Balance  (i.e.  preponderance) 
is  incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  Right.  There  is  a 
conflict  of  obligation. 

Before  the  War,  a  writer  in  the  National  Review,  desiring 
to  show  the  impossibility  of  obviating  war  by  any  international 
agreement,  took  the  example  of  the  conflict  with  Germany 
and  put  the  case  as  follows : — 

'Germany  must  go  to  war.  Every  year  an  extra  million 
babies  are  crying  out  for  more  room,  and  as  the  expansion 
of  Germany  by  peaceful  means  seems  impossible,  Germany 
can  only  provide  for  those  babies  at  the  cost  of  potential  foes. 

'This  ...  it  cannot  be  too  often  repeated,  is  not  mere 
envious  greed,  but  stern  necessity.  The  same  struggle  for  life 
and  space  which  more  than  a  thousand  years  ago  drove  one 
Teutonic  wave  after  another  across  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps, 
is  now  once  more  a  great  compelling  force.  .  .  .  This  aspect 
of  the  case  may  be  all  very  sad  and  very  wicked,  but  it  is 
true.  .  .  .  Herein  lies  the  ceaseless  and  ruinous  struggle  for 
armaments,  and  herein  for  France  lies  the  dire  necessity  of 
linking  her  foreign  policy  with  that  of  powerful  allies.' 

'And  so,*  adds  the  writer,  'it  is  impossible  and  absurd  to 
accept  the  theory  of  Mr.  Norman  Angell.* 

Now  that  theory  was,  not  that  Germany  and  others  would 
not  fight — I  was  very  insistent  indeed  that  ^  unless  there  was 
a  change  in  European  policy  they  would — ^but  that  war,  how- 
ever it  might  end,  would  not  solve  the  question.    And  that  con- 

*See  quotations  in  Addendum. 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      83 

elusion  at  least,  whatever  may  be  the  case  with  others,  is 
proved  true. 

For  we  have  had  war;  we  have  beaten  Germany;  and  those 
million  babies  still  confront  us.  The  German  population  and 
its  tendency  to  increase  is  still  there.  What  are  we  going  to 
do  about  it?  The  War  has  killed  two  million  out  of  about 
seventy  million  Germans;  it  killed  very  few  of  the  women. 
The  subsequent  privations  of  the  blockade  certainly  disposed 
of  some  of  the  weaker  among  both  women  and  children.  The 
rate  of  increase  may  in  the  immediate  future  be  less.  It  was 
declining  before  the  War  as  the  country  became  more  pros- 
perous, following  in  this  what  seems  to  be  a  well-established 
rule :  the  higher  the  standard  of  civilisation  the  more  does  the 
birth-rate  decline.  But  if  the  country  is  to  become  extremely 
frugal  and  more  agricultural,  this  tendency  to  decline  is  likely 
to  be  checked.  In  any  case  the  number  of  mouths  to  be  fed 
will  not  have  been  decreased  by  war  to  the  same  extent  that 
the  resources  by  which  they  might  have  been  fed  have  been 
decreased. 

What  do  we  propose  to  Germany,  now  that  we  have  beaten 
her,  as  the  means  of  dealing  with  those  million  babies?  Pro- 
fessor Starling,  in  a  report  to  the  British  Government,^  sug- 
gests emigration: — 

'Before  the  War  Germany  produced  85  per  cent,  of  the 
total  food  consumed  by  her  inhabitants.  This  large  produc- 
tion was  only  possible  by  high  cultivation,  and  by  the  plentiful 
use  of  manure  and  imported  feeding  stuffs,  means  for  the 
purchase  of  these  being  furnished  by  the  profits  of  industry. 
.  .  .  The  loss  to  Germany  of  40  per  cent,  of  its  former  coal 
output  must  diminish  the  number  of  workers  who  can  be 
maintained.  The  great  increase  in  German  population  during 
the  last  twenty-five  years  was  rendered  possible  only  by  ex- 
ploiting the  agricultural  possibilities  of  the  soil  to  the  greatest 

» Cmd.  280  (1919),  p.  15. 


84  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

possible  extent,  and  this  in  its  turn  depended  on  the  industrial 
development  of  the  country.  The  reduction  by  20  per  cent, 
in  the  productive  area  of  the  country,  and  the  40  per  cent, 
diminution  in  the  chief  raw  material  for  the  creation  of  wealth, 
renders  the  country  at  present  over-populated,  and  it  seems 
probable  that  within  the  next  few  years  many  million  (ac- 
cording to  some  estimates  as  many  as  fifteen  million)  workers 
and  their  families  v/ill  be  obliged  to  emigrate,  since  there 
will  be  neither  work  nor  food  for  them  to  be  obtained  from  the 
reduced  industries  of  the  country.' 

But  emigration  where?  Into  Russia?  The  influence  of 
Germans  in  Russia  was  very  great  even  before  the  War.  Cer- 
tain French  writers  warn  us  frantically  against  the  vast  dan- 
ger of  Russia's  becoming  a  German  colony  unless  a  cordon 
of  border  States,  militarily  strong,  is  created  for  the  purpose 
of  keeping  the  two  countries  apart.  But  we  should  certainly 
get  a  Germanisation  of  Russia  from  the  inside  if  five  or  ten 
or  fifteen  million  Germans  were  dispersed  therein  and  the 
country  became  a  permanent  reservoir  for  those  annual  million 
babies. 

And  if  not  Russia,  where?  Imagine  a  migration  of  ten 
or  fifteen  million  Huns  throughout  the  world — a  dispersion 
before  which  that  of  the  Jews  and  of  the  Irish  would  pale. 
We  know  how  the  migration  from  an  Ireland  of  eight  millions 
that  could  not  feed  itself  has  reacted  upon  our  politics  and 
our  relations  with  America.  What  sort  of  foreign  problems 
are  we  going  to  bequeath  to  our  children  if  our  policy  forces 
a  great  German  migration  into  Russia,  or  the  Balkans,  or 
Turkey  ? 

This  insistent  fact  of  a  million  more  or  less  of  little  Huns 
being  born  into  the  world  every  year  remains.  Shall  we  sug- 
gest to  Germany  that  she  must  deal  with  this  problem  as  the 
thrifty  householder  deals  with  the  too  frequent  progeny  of 
the  family  cat? 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      85 

Or  shall  we  do  just  nothing,  and  say  that  it  is  not  our 
affair;  that  as  we  have  the  power  over  the  iron  of  Lorraine 
and  Morocco,  over  the  resources  of  Africa  and  Asia,  over 
the  ocean  highways  of  the  world,  we  are  going  to  see  that  that 
power,  naval  and  military,  is  used  to  ensure  abundance  for 
ourselves  and  our  friends;  that  as  for  others,  since  they  have 
not  the  power,  they  may  starve  ?    Vae  victis  indeed !  ^ 

Just  note  what  is  involved.  This  war  was  fought  to  destroy 
the  doctrine  that  might  is  right.  Our  power,  we  say,  gives  us 
access  to  the  wealth  of  the  world;  others  shall  be  excluded. 
Then  we  are  using  our  power  to  deny  to  some  millions  the 
most  elemental  of  all  rights,  the  right  to  existence.  By  the 
economic  use  of  our  military  power  (assuming  that  military 
power  is  as  effective  as  we  claim)  we  compel  some  millions  to 
choose  between  war  and  penury  or  starvation;  we  give  to 
war,  in  their  case,  the  justification  that  it  is  on  behalf  of  the 
bread  of  their  children,  their  livelihood. 

Let  us  compare  France's  position.  Unlike  the  German,  the 
French  population  has  hardly  increased  at  all  in  recent  genera- 
tions. In  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  War,  indeed, 
it  showed  a  definite  decline,  a  tendency  naturally  more  marked 
since  the  War.  This  low  birth-rate  has  greatly  concerned 
French  statesmen,  and  remedies  have  been  endlessly  discussed, 
with  no  result.  The  causes  are  evidently  very  deep-rooted  in- 
deed. The  soil  which  has  been  inherited  by  this  declining 
population  is  among  the  richest  and  most  varied  in  the  world, 

*  The  dilemma  is  not,  of  course,  as  absolute,  as  this  query  woidd 
suggest.  What  I  am  trying  to  make  perfectly  clear  here  is  the  kind 
of  problem  that  faces  us  rather  than  the  precise  degree  of  its  difficulty. 
My  own  view  is  that  after  much  suffering  especially  to  the  children, 
and  the  reduction  during  a  generation  or  two,  perhaps,  of  the  physical 
standard  of  the  race,  the  German  population  will  find  a  way  round  the 
sustenance  difficulty.  For  one  thing,  France  needs  German  coke  quite  as 
badly  as  Germany  needs  French  ore,  and  this  common  need  may  be 
made  the  basis  of  a  bargain.  But  though  Germany  may  be  able  to 
surmount  the  difficulties  created  for  her  by  her  victors,  it  is  those  difficul- 
ties which  will  constitute  her  grievance,  and  will  present  precisely  the 
kind,  if  not  the  degree,  of  injustice  hwe  indicated. 


86  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

producing  in  the  form  of  wines,  brandies,  and  certain  other 
luxuries,  results  which  can  be  duplicated  nowhere  else.  It 
stretches  almost  into  the  sub-tropics.  In  addition,  the  nation 
possesses  a  vast  colonial  empire — in  Algeria,  Tunis,  Morocco 
(which  include  some  of  the  greatest  food-growing  areas  in 
the  world),  Madagascar,  Equatorial  Africa,  Cochin-China ; 
an  empire  managed,  by  the  way,  on  strongly  protectionist 
principles. 

We  have  thus  on  the  one  side  a  people  of  forty  millions 
with  no  tendency  to  increase,  mainly  not  industrial  (because 
not  needing  to  be),  possessing  undeveloped  areas  capable,  in 
their  food  and  mineral  resources  (home  and  colonial),  of  sup- 
porting a  population  very  many  times  its  size.  On  the  other 
hand  is  a  neighbouring  group,  very  much  larger,  and  rapidly 
increasing,  occupying  a  poorer  and  smaller  territory.  It  is 
unable  to  subsist  at  modern  standards  on  that  territory  without 
a  highly-developed  industry.  The  essential  raw  materials  have 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  smaller  group.  The  latter  on 
grounds  of  self-defence,  fearing  to  be  outnumbered,  may  with- 
hold those  materials  from  the  larger  group ;  and  its  right  so  to 
do  is  to  be  unquestioned. 

Does  any  one  really  believe  that  Western  Society  could 
remain  stable,  resting  on  moral  foundations  of  this  kind?  Can 
one  disregard  primary  economic  need  in  considering  the  problem 
of  preserving  the  Europe  of  'free  and  independent  national 
states'  of  Mr.  Asquith's  phrase  ?  ^ 

*  One  very  commonly  sees  the  statement  that  France  had  no  adequate 
resources  in  iron  ore  before  tlie  War.  This  is  an  entire  mistake,  as 
the  Report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  Munitions 
to  visit  Lorraine  (issued  July,  1919),  points  out  (p.  11.)  : — 'Before  the 
War  the  resources  of  Germany  of  iron  ore  were  3,600,000,000  tons  and 
those  of  France  3,300,000,000.'  What  gave  Germany  the  advantage  was 
the  possession  not  of  greater  ore  resources  than  France,  but  of  coal 
suitable  for  furnace  coke,  and  this  superiority  in  coal  will  still  remain 
even  after  the  Treaty,  although  the  paralysis  of  transport  and  other  in- 
dispensable factors  may  render  the  superiority  valueless.  The  report 
just  quoted  says: — 'It  is  true  that  Germany  will  want  iron  ore  from 
Lorraine  (in  1913  she  took  14,000,000  tons  from  Briey  and  18,500,000 
tons  from  Lorraine),  but  she  will  not  be  so  entirely  dependent  upon 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      87 

If  things  are  left  where  this  Treaty  leaves  them,  then  the 
militarist  theories  which  before  were  fallacies  will  have  be- 
come true.  We  can  no  longer  say  that  peoples  as  distinct  from 
imperialist  parties  have  no  interest  in  conquest.  In  this  new 
world  of  to-morrow — this  'better  and  more  stable  world' — 
the  interests  of  peoples  themselves  will  be  in  deadly  conflict. 
For  an  expanding  people  it  will  be  a  choice  between  robbery 
of  neighbours'  territory  and  starvation.  Re-conquest  of  Lor- 
raine will  become  for  the  Germans  not  a  matter  of  hurt 
pride  or  sentiment,  but  a  matter  of  actual  food  need,  a  need 
which  will  not,  like  hurt  pride,  diminish  with  the  lapse  of 
time,  but  increase  with  the  growth  of  the  population.  On 
the  side  of  war,  then,  truly  we  shall  find  'the  human  stomach 
and  the  human  womb.' 

The  change  is  a  deeper  reversion  than  we  seem  to  realise. 
Even  under  feudalism  the  means  of  subsistence  of  the  people, 
the  land  they  cultivated,  remained  as  before.  Only  the  lords 
were  changed — and  one  lord  was  very  like  another.  But 
where,  under  modern  industrial  economy,  titles  to  property  in 
indispensable  raw  materials  can  be  cancelled  by  a  conqueror  and 
become  the  State  property  of  the  conquering  nation,  which 
enforces  the  right  to  distribute  them  as  it  pleases,  whole  popu- 
lations may  find  themselves  deprived  of  the  actual  means  of 
supporting  themselves  on  the  territory  that  they  occupy. 

this  one  source  of  supply  as  the  Lorrarine  works  will  be  upon  Ger- 
many for  coke,  unless  some  means  are  provided  to  enable  Lorraine  to 
obtain  coke  from  elsewhere,  or  to  produce  her  own  needs  from  Saar 
coal  and  imported  coking  coal.'  The  whole  report  seems  to  indicate 
that  the  mise  en  valeur  of  France's  new  'property'  depends  upon  sup- 
plies of  German  coal — to  say  nothing  of  the  needs  of  a  German  market 
and  the  markets  depending  on  that  market.  As  it  is,  the  Lorraine  steel 
works  are  producing  nothing  like  their  full  output  because  of  the  ina- 
bility of  Germany  to  supply  furnace  coke,  owing  largely  to  the  West- 
phalian  labour  troubles  and  transport  disorganisation.  Whether  poli- 
tical passion  will  so  far  subside  as  to  enable  the  two  countries  to  come 
to  a  bargain  in  the  matter  of  exchange  of  ore  or  basic  pig-iron  for 
furnace  coke,  remains  to  be  seen.  In  any  case  one  may  say  that  the 
ore-fields  of  Lorraine  will  only  be  of  value  to  France  provided  that 
much  of  their  product  is  returned  to  Germany  and  used  for  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  value  to  German  coal. 


88  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

We  shall  have  set  up  a  disruptive  ferment  working  with  all 
the  force  of  the  economic  needs  of  50  or  100  million  virile  folk 
to  bring  about  once  more  some  vast  explosion.  Europe  will 
once  more  be  living  on  a  volcano,  knowing  no  remedy  save 
futile  efforts  to  'sit  on  the  lid.' 

The  beginnings  of  the  attempt  are  already  visible.  Colonel 
Repington  points  out  that  owing  to  the  break  up  of  Russia 
and  Austria,  and  the  substitution  for  these  two  powerful  States 
of  a  large  number  of  small,  independent  ones  likely  to  quarrel 
among  themselves,  Germany  will  be  the  largest  and  most 
cohesive  of  all  the  European  Continental  nations,  relatively 
stronger  than  she  was  before  the  War.  He  demands  in  conse- 
quence, that  not  only  France,  but  Holland  and  Belgium,  be 
extended  to  the  Rhine,  which  must  become  the  strategic  frontier 
of  civilisation  against  barbarism.  He  says  there  can  be  no 
sort  of  security  otherwise.  He  even  reminds  us  that  it  was 
Rome's  plan.  (He  does  not  remind  us  that  if  it  had  notably 
succeeded  then  we  should  hardly  be  trying  it  again  two  thou- 
sand years  later.)  The  plan  gives  us,  in  fact,  this  prospect: 
the  largest  and  most  unified  racial  block  in  Europe  will  find 
itself  surrounded  by  a  number  of  lesser  States,  containing 
German  minorities,  and  possessing  materials  indispensable  to 
Germany's  economic  life,  to  which  she  is  refused  peaceful 
access  in  order  that  she  may  not  become  strong  enough  to 
obtain  access  by  force;  an  attempt  which  she  will  be  com- 
pelled to  make  because  peaceful  access  is  denied  to  her.  Our 
measures  create  resistance;  that  resistance  calls  forth  more 
extreme  measures;  those  measures  further  resistance,  and  so 
on.  We  are  in  the  thick  once  more  of  Balance  of  Power, 
strategic  frontiers,  every  element  of  the  old  stultifying  state- 
craft against  which  all  the  Allies — ^before  the  Armistice — 
made  flaming  protest. 

And  when  this  conflict  of  rights — each  fighting  as  he  be- 
lieves for  the  right  to  life — has  blazed  up  into  passions  that 
transcend  all  thought  of  gain  or  advantage,  we  shall  be  asked 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      89 

somewhat  contemptuously  what  purpose  it  serves  to  discuss 
so  cold  a  thing  as  'economics'  in  the  midst  of  this  welter. 

It  won't  serve  any  purpose.  But  the  discussion  of  economics 
before  it  had  become  a  matter  for  passion  might  have  pre- 
vented the  conflict. 

The  situation  has  this  complication — and  irony:  Increas- 
ing prosperity,  a  higher  standard  of  living,  sets  up  a  tendency 
prudentially  to  check  increase  of  population.  France,  and 
in  hardly  less  degree  even  new  and  sparsely  populated  coun- 
tries like  Australia,  have  for  long  shown  a  tendency  to  a  de- 
cline of  the  rate  of  increase.  In  France,  indeed,  as  has  al- 
ready been  mentioned,  an  absolute  decrease  had  set  in  before 
the  War.  But  as  soon  as  this  tendency  becomes  apparent, 
the  same  nationalist  who  invokes  the  menace  of  over-popula- 
tion as  the  justification  for  war,  also  invokes  nationalism  to 
reverse  the  tendency  which  would  solve  the  over-population 
problem.  This  is  part  of  the  mystic  nature  of  the  nationalist 
impulse.  Colonel  Roosevelt  is  not  the  only  warlike  nationalist 
who  has  exhausted  the  resources  of  invective  to  condemn  'race 
suicide'  and  to  enjoin  the  patriotic  duty  of  large  families. 

We  may  gather  some  idea  of  the  morasses  into  which  the 
conception  of  nationalism  and  its  'mystic  impulses*  may  lead 
us  when  applied  to  the  population  problem  by  examining  some 
current  discussions  of  it.  Dr  Raymond  Pearl,  of  John  Hop- 
kins University,  summarises  certain  of  his  conclusions  thus : — 

'There  are  two  ways  which  have  been  thought  of  and  prac- 
tised, by  which  a  nation  may  attempt  to  solve  its  problem  of 
population  after  it  has  become  very  pressing  and  after  the 
eifects  of  internal  industrial  development  and  its  creation  of 
wealth  have  been  exhausted.  These  are  respectively  the  methods 
of  France  and  Germany.  By  consciously  controlled  methods, 
France  endeavoured,  and  on  the  whole  succeeded,  in  keeping  her 
birth-rate  at  just  such  a  delicate  balance  with  the  death-rate  as 
to  make  the  population  nearly  stationary.    Then  any  industrial 


90  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

developments  simply  operated  to  raise  the  standard  of  living 
of  those  fortunate  enough  to  be  born.  France's  condition, 
social  economy,  and  political,  in  1914  represented,  I  think,  the 
results  of  about  the  maximum  efficiency  of  what  may  be  called 
the  birth-control  method  of  meeting  the  problem  of  population. 
'Germany  deliberately  chose  the  other  plan  of  meeting  the 
problem  of  population.  In  fewest  words  the  scheme  was, 
when  your  population  pressed  too  hard  upon  subsistence,  and 
you  had  fully  liquidated  the  industrial  development  asset,  to  go 
out  and  conquer  some  one,  preferably  a  people  operating  under 
the  birth-control  population  plan,  and  forcibly  take  his  land 
for  your  people.  To  facilitate  this  operation  a  high  birth- 
rate is  made  a  matter  of  sustained  propaganda,  and  in  every 
other  possible  way  encouraged.  An  abundance  of  cannon 
fodder  is  essential  to  the  success  of  the  scheme.*  ^ 

A  word  or  two  as  to  the  facts  alleged  in  the  foregoing.  We 
are  told  that  the  two  nations  not  only  followed  respectively 
two  different  methods,  but  that  it  was  in  each  case  a  deliberate 
national  choice,  supported  by  organised  propaganda.  'By  con- 
sciously controlled  methods,  France,*  we  are  told,  'en- 
deavoured' to  keep  her  birth-rate  down.  The  fact  is,  of  course, 
that  all  the  conscious  endeavours  of  'France,*  if  by  France  is 
meant  the  Government,  the  Church,  the  learned  bodies,  were 
in  the  exactly  contrary  direction.  Not  only  organised  propa- 
ganda, but  most  elaborate  legislation,  aiming  through  taxation 
at  giving  a  preference  to  large  families,  has  for  a  generation 
been  industriously  urging  an  increase  in  the  French  popula- 
tion. It  has  notoriously  been  a  standing  dish  in  the  menu 
of  the  reformers  and  uplifters  of  nearly  every  political  party. 
What  we  obviously  have  in  the  case  of  France  is  not  a  deci- 
sion made  by  the  nation  as  a  corporate  body  and  the  Govern- 
ment representing  it,  but  a  tendency  which  their  deliberate 

'  From  the  summary  of  a  series  of  lectures  on  the  Biology  of  Death, 
as  reported  in  the  Boston  Herald  of  December  19th.,  1920. 


NATIONALITY.  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      91 

decision,  as  represented  by  propaganda  and  legislation,  has 
been  unable  to  check.^ 

In  discussing  the  merits  of  the  two  plans,  Dr  Pearl  goes  on : — 

'Now  the  morals  of  the  two  plans  are  not  at  issue  here. 
Both  are  regarded,  on  different  grounds  to  be  sure,  as  highly 
immoral  by  many  people.  Here  we  are  concerned  only  with 
actualities.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  general  and  in  the 
long  run  the  German  plan  is  bound  to  win  over  the  birth- 
control  plan,  if  the  issue  is  joined  between  the  two  and  only 
the  two,  and  its  resolution  is  military  in  character.  ...  So 
long  as  there  are  on  the  earth  aggressively-minded  peoples  who 
from  choice  deliberately  maintain  a  high  birth-rate,  no  people 
can  afford  to  put  the  French  solution  of  the  population  prob- 
lem into  operation  unless  they  are  prepared  to  give  up,  prac- 
tically at  the  asking,  both  their  national  integrity  and  their  land.' 

Let  us  assume,  therefore,  that  France  adopts  the  high  birth- 
rate plan.  She,  too,  will  then  be  compelled,  if  the  plan  has 
worked  out  successfully,  *to  get  out  and  conquer  some  one.*  But 
that  some  one  will  also,  for  the  same  reasons,  have  been  fol- 
lowing the  plan  of  high  birth-rate.  What  is  then  to  happen? 
A  competition  in  fecundity  as  a  solution  of  the  excess  popu- 
lation problem  seems  inadequate.  Yet  it  is  inevitably  prompted 
by  the  nationalist  impulse. 

Happily  the  general  rise  in  the  standard  of  life  itself  fur- 
nishes a  solution.  As  we  have  seen,  the  birth-rate  is,  within 
certain  limits,  in  inverse  ratio  to  a  people's  prosperity.     But 

'  A  recent  book  on  the  subject,  summing  up  the  various  recommenda- 
tions made  in  France  up  to  1918  for  increasing  the  birth-rate  is  La 
Natalite:   ses  Lois  Economiqucs  et  Psychologiques,  by  Gaston  Rageot. 

The  present  writer  remembers  being  present  ten  years  before  the  War 
at  a  Conference  at  the  Sorbonne  on  this  subject.  One  of  the  lecturers 
simimarised  all  the  various  plans  that  had  been  tried  to  increase  the 
birth-rate.  'They  have  all  failed,'  he  concluded,  'and  I  doubt  if  any- 
thing remains  to  be  done.'  And  one  of  the  savants  present  added :  'Ex- 
cept to  applaud.' 


92  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

again,  nationalism,  by  preventing  the  economic  unification  of 
Europe,  may  well  stand  in  the  way  of  that  solution  also.  It 
checks  the  tendencies  which  would  solve  the  problem. 

A  fall  in  the  birth-rate,  as  a  concomitant  of  a  rising  stand- 
ard of  living,  was  beginning  to  be  revealed  in  Germany  also 
before  the  War.*  If  now,  under  the  new  order,  German  in- 
dustrialism is  checked  and  we  get  an  agricultural  population 
compelled  by  circumstances  to  a  standard  of  life  not  higher 
than  that  of  the  Russian  moujik,  we  may  perhaps  also  be 
faced  by  a  revival  of  high  fertility  in  mystic  disregard  of 
the  material  means  available  for  the  support  of  the  popula- 
tion. 

There  is  a  further  point. 

Those  who  have  dealt  with  the  world's  food  resources  point 
out  that  there  are  great  sources  of  food  still  undeveloped.  But 
the  difficulties  do  not  arise  from  a  total  shortage.  They  arise 
from  a  mal-distribution  of  population,  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
as  between  nations  the  Ten  Commandments — particularly  the 
eighth— do  not  run.  By  the  code  of  nationalism  we  have  no  obli- 
gation towards  starving  foreigners.  A  nation  may  seize  terri- 
tory which  it  does  not  need,  and  exclude  from  it  those  who 
direly  need  its  resources.  While  we  insist  that  internationalism 
is  political  atheism,  and  that  the  only  doctrine  fit  for  red-blood- 
ed people  is  what  Colonel  Roosevelt  called  'intense  Nationalism,* 
intense  nationalism  means,  in  economic  practice,  the  attempt, 


*  Mr  William  Harbutt  Dawson  gives  the  figures  as  follows  :— 
'  The  decline  in  the  birth-rate  was  found  to  have  become  a  settled 
factor  in  the  population  question.  .  .  .  The  birth-rate  for  the  whole 
Empire  reached  the  maximum  figure  in  1876,  when  it  stood  at  41.0  per 
1000  of  the  population.  .  .  .  Since  1876  the  movement  has  been 
steadily  downward,  with  the  slightest  possible  break  at  the  beginning 
of  the  'nineties Since  1900  the  rate  has  decreased  as  fol- 
lows : — 

1900  ....    35.6  per  1000,  1904    ....    34.1  per  1000. 

1901  ...    .    35.7  per      "  1905    ...    .    33.0  per      " 

1902  ....    35.1  per      "  1906    ...    .    33.1  per      " 

1903  ....    33.9  per      " 

{The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany,  p.  309) 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS  AND  RIGHT       93 

even  at  some  cost,  to  render  the  political  unit  also  the  economic 
unit,  and  as  far  as  possible  self-sufficing. 

It  serves  little  purpose,  therefore,  to  point  out  that  one  or 
two  States  in  South  America  can  produce  food  for  half  the 
world,  if  we  also  create  a  political  tradition  which  leads  the 
patriotic  South  American  to  insist  upon  having  his  own  manu- 
factures, even  at  cost  to  himself,  so  that  he  will  not  need  ours. 
He  will  achieve  that  result  at  the  cost  of  diminishing  his  pro- 
duction of  food.  Both  he  and  the  Englishman  will  be  poorer, 
but  according  to  the  standard  of  the  intense  nationalist,  the 
result  should  be  a  good  one,  though  it  may  confront  many 
of  us  with  starvation,  just  as  the  intense  nationalism  of  the 
various  nations  of  Eastern  and  South-Eastern  Europe  actu- 
ally results  in  famine  on  soil  fully  capable,  before  the  War,  of 
supporting  the  population,  and  capable  of  supporting  still 
greater  populations  if  natural  resources  are  used  to  the  best 
advantage.  It  is  political  passions,  anti-social  doctrines,  and  the 
muddle,  confusion,  and  hostility  that  go  therewith  which  are 
the  real  cause  of  the  scarcity. 

And  that  may  forecast  the  position  of  Europe  as  a  whole 
to-morrow:  we  may  suffer  starvation  for  the  patriotic  joy 
of  seeing  foreigners  —  Boche  or  Bolshevist  —  suffer  in  still 
greater  degree. 

Given  the  nationalist  conception  of  a  world  divided  into 
completely  distinct  groups  of  separate  corporate  bodies,  enti- 
ties so  different  that  the  binding  social  ties  between  them 
(laws,  in  fact)  are  impossible  of  maintenance,  there  must 
inevitably  grow  up  pugnacities  and  rivalries,  creating  a  general 
sense  of  conflict  that  will  render  immeasurably  difficult  the 
necessary  co-operation  between  the  peoples,  the  kind  of  co- 
operation which  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  has,  in  so  large  de- 
gree, deliberately  destroyed.  Whether  the  hostility  comes,  ii] 
the  first  instance,  from  the  'herd/  or  tribal,  instinct,  and 
develops  into  a  sense  of  economic  hostility,  or  whether  the 
hostility  arises  from  the  conviction  that  there  exists  a  conflict 


94  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  interest,  the  result  is  pretty  much  the  same.  I  happen  to  have 
put  the  case  elsewhere  in  these  terms : — 

If  it  be  true  that  since  the  world  is  of  limited  space,  we  must 
fight  one  another  for  it,  that  if  our  children  are  to  be  fed  others 
must  starve,  then  agreement  between  peoples  will  be  for  ever 
impossible.  Nations  will  certainly  not  commit  suicide  for 
the  sake  of  peace.  If  this  is  really  the  relationship  of  two 
great  nations,  they  are,  of  course,  in  the  position  of  two 
cannibals,  one  of  whom  says  to  the  other:  'Either  I  have  got 
to  eat  you,  or  you  have  got  to  eat  me.  Let's  come  to  a  friendly 
agreement  about  it.'  They  won't  come  to  a  friendly  agreement 
about  it.  They  will  fight.  And  my  point  is  that  not  only 
would  they  fight  if  it  really  were  true  that  the  one  had  to  kill 
and  eat  the  other,  but  they  would  fight  as  long  as  they  be- 
lieved it  to  be  true.  It  might  be  that  there  was  ample  food 
within  their  reach — out  of  their  reach,  say,  so  long  as  each 
acted  alone,  but  within  their  reach  if  one  would  stand  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  other  ('this  is  an  allegory'),  and  so  get  the 
fat  cocoa-nuts  on  the  higher  branches.  But  they  would,  never- 
theless, be  cannibals  so  long  as  each  believed  that  the  flesh  of 
the  other  was  the  only  source  of  food.  It  would  be  that  mis- 
take, not  the  necessary  fact,  which  would  provoke  them  to 
fight. 

When  we  learn  that  one  Balkan  State  refuses  to  another  a 
necessary  raw  material,  or  access  over  a  railroad,  because  it 
prefers  the  suffering  of  that  neighbour  to  its  own  welfare,  we 
are  shocked  and  talk  about  primitive  and  barbarous  passions. 
But  are  we  ourselves — Britain  or  France — in  better  state? 
The  whole  story  of  the  negotiations  about  the  indemnity  and 
the  restoration  of  Europe  shows  that  we  are  not.  Quite  soon 
after  the  Armistice  the  expert  advisers  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment urged  the  necessity,  for  the  economic  safety  of  the  Allies 
themselves,  of  helping  in  the  restoration  of  Germany.  But 
they  also  admitted  that  it  was  quite  hopeless  to  go  to  Parlia- 
ment with  any  proposal  to  help  Germany.    And  even  when  one 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      95 

gets  a  stage  further  and  there  is  general  admission  'in  the 
abstract*  that  if  France  is  to  secure  reparations,  Germany 
must  be  fed  and  permitted  to  work,  the  sentiment  of  hostility 
stands  in  the  way  of  any  specific  measure. 

We  are  faced  with  certain  traditions  and  moralities,  involving 
a  psychology  which,  gathering  round  words  like  'patriotism,* 
deprives  us  of  the  emotional  restraint  and  moral  disci- 
pline necessary  to  carry  through  the  measures  which  intellec- 
tually we  recognise  to  be  indispensable  to  our  country's 
welfare. 

We  thus  see  why  it  is  impossible  to  speak  of  international 
economics  without  predicating  the  nation  as  a  concept.  In  the 
economic  problems  of  nations  or  States,  one  is  necessarily  deal- 
ing not  only  with  economic  facts,  but  with  political  facts:  a 
political  entity  in  its  economic  relations  (before  the  War  in- 
considerable, but  since  the  War  very  great)  ;  group  conscious- 
ness; the  interests,  or  what  is  sometimes  as  important,  the 
supposed  interests  of  this  group  or  area  as  distinct  from  that; 
the  moral  phenomena  of  nationalism — group  preferences  or 
prejudices,  herd  instinct,  tribal  hostility.  All  this  is  part  of 
the  economic  problem  in  international  politics.  Protection,  for 
instance,  is  only  in  part  a  problem  of  economics;  it  is  also  a 
problem  of  political  preferences :  the  manufacturer  who  is  con- 
tent to  face  the  competition  of  his  own  countrymen,  objects  to 
facing  that  of  foreigners.  Political  conceptions  are  part  of  the 
economic  problem  when  dealing  with  nations,  just  as  primary 
economic  need  must  be  taken  into  account  as  part  of  the  cause  of 
the  conflict  of  nationalisms. 

One  very  commonly  hears  the  argument :  'What  is  the  good 
of  discussing  economic  forces  in  relation  to  the  conflict  of 
Europe  when  our  participation,  for  instance,  in  the  War,  was 
in  no  way  prompted  by  economic  considerations  ?' 

Our  motive  may  not  have  been  economic,  yet  the  cause  of  the 
War  may  very  well  have  been  mainly  economic.  The  sentiment 
of  nationality  may  be  a  stronger  motive  in  European  politics 


96  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

than  any  other.  The  chief  menace  to  nationahty  may  none  the 
less  be  economic  need. 

While  it  may  be  perfectly  true  that  Belgians,  Serbs,  Poles, 
Bohemians,  fought  from  motives  of  nationality,  it  may  also 
be  true  that  the  wars  which  they  were  compelled  to  fight  had 
an  economic  cause. 

If  the  desire  of  Germany  or  Austria  for  undeveloped  ter- 
ritory had  anything  to  do  with  that  thrust  towards  the  Near 
East  in  the  way  of  which  stood  Serbian  nationality,  then  eco- 
nomic causes  had  something  to  do  with  compelling  Serbia  and 
Belgiimi  to  fight  for  their  nationality.  Owing  to  the  pressure 
of  the  economic  need  or  greed  of  others,  we  are  still  concerned 
with  economic  forces,  though  we  may  be  actuated  only  by  the 
purest  nationalism :  the  economic  pressure  of  others  is  obviously 
part  of  the  problem  of  our  national  defence.  And  if  one  ex- 
amines in  turn  the  chief  problems  of  nationality,  one  finds  in 
almost  every  case  that  any  aggression  by  which  it  may  be 
menaced  is  prompted  by  the  need,  or  assumed  need,  of  other 
nations  for  mines,  ports,  access  to  the  sea  (warm  water  or 
other) ,  or  for  strategic  frontiers  to  defend  those  things. 

Why  should  the  desire  of  one  people  to  rule  itself,  to  be 
free,  be  thwarted  by  another  making  exactly  the  same  demands  ? 
In  the  case  of  the  Germans  we  ascribe  it  to  some  special  and 
evil  lust  peculiar  to  their  race  and  training.  But  the  Peace 
has  revealed  to  us  that  it  exists  in  every  people,  every  one. 

A  glance  at  the  map  enables  us  to  realise  readily  enough  why 
a  given  State  may  resist  the  'complete  independence'  of  a 
neighbouring  territory. 

Here,  on  the  borders  of  Russia,  for  instance,  are  a  number 
of  small  States  in  a  position  to  block  the  access  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Russia  lo  the  sea ;  in  a  position,  indeed,  by  their  control 
of  certain  essential  raw  materials,  to  hold  up  the  development 
of  a  hundred  million  people,  very  much  as  the  robber  barons 
of  the  Rhine  held  up  the  commerce  of  that  waterway.  No 
powerful  Russia,  Bolshevik  or  Czarist,  will  permanently  recog- 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT       97 

nise  the  absolute  right  of  a  little  State,  at  will  (at  the  bidding, 
perhaps,  of  some  military  dictator,  who  in  South  American 
fashion  may  have  seized  its  Government),  to  block  her  access 
to  the  'highways  of  the  world.*  'Sovereignty  and  independence* 
— ^absolute  sovereignty  over  its  own  territory,  that  is — may  well 
include  the  'right'  to  make  the  existence  of  others  intolerable. 
Ought  any  nation  to  have  such  a  right?  Like  questions  are 
raised  in  the  case  of  the  States  that  once  were  Austria.  They 
have  achieved  their  complete  freedom  and  independence.  Some 
of  the  results  are  dealt  with  in  the  first  chapter.  In  some  cases 
the  new  States  are  using  their  'freedom,  sovereignty,  and  inde- 
pendence' for  the  purpose  of  worsening  a  condition  of  famine 
and  economic  paralysis  that  spells  indescribable  suffering  for 
millions  of  completely  innocent  folk.^ 

So  far,  the  new  Europe  is  economically  less  competent  than 
the  old.  The  old  Austrian  grouping,  for  instance,  made  pos- 
sible a  stable  and  orderly  life  for  fifty  million  people.  A 
Mittel  Europa,  with  its  Berlin-Bagdad  designs,  would,  what- 
ever its  dangers  otherwise,  have  given  us  a  vastly  greater  area 
of  co-ordinated  production,  an  area  approaching  that  of  the 
United  States ;  it  would  have  ensured  the  effective  co-operation 
of  populations  greatly  in  excess  of  those  of  the  United  States. 
Whatever  else  might  have  happened,  there  would  have  been  no 
destruction  by  famine  of  the  populations  concerned  if  some 
such  plan  of  organised  production  had  materialised.  The  old 
Austria  at  least  ensured  for  the  children  physical  health  and 
education,  for  the  peasants  work  in  their  fields,  in  security ;  and 

*  Conversely  it  may  be  said  that  the  economic  position  of  the  border 
States  becomes  impossible  unless  the  greater  States  are  orderly.  In  re- 
gard to  Poland,  Mr  Keynes  remarks:  'Unless  her  great  neighbours  are 
prosperous  and  orderly,  Poland  is  an  economic  impossibility,  with  no 
industry  but  Jew-baiting.' 

Sir  William  Goode  (the  British  Director  of  Relief)  states  that  he 
found  'everywhere  never-ending  vicious  circles  of  political  paradox 
and  economic  complication,  with  consequent  paralysis  of  national  life 
and  industry.  The  new  States  of  repartitioned  Europe  seem  not  only 
incapable  of  maintaining  their  own  economic  life^  but  also  either  unable 
or  unwilling  to  help  their  neighbours.'    (Cmd.  521  C1920),  p.  6.) 

T 


98  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

although  denial  of  full  national  rights  was  doubtless  an  evil 
thing,  it  still  left  free  a  vast  field  of  human  activities — ^those 
of  the  family,  of  productive  labour,  of  religion,  music,  art, 
love,  laughter. 

A  Europe  of  small  'absolute*  nationalisms  threatens  to  make 
these  things  impossible.  We  have  no  standard,  unhappily,  by 
which  we  can  appraise  the  moral  loss  and  gain  in  the  exchange 
of  the  European  life  of  July,  1914,  for  that  which  Europe  now 
faces  and  is  likely  to  face  in  the  coming  years.  But  if  we  can- 
not measure  or  weigh  the  moral  value  of  absolute  nationalism, 
the  present  situation  does  enable  us  to  judge  in  some  measure 
the  degree  of  security  achieved  for  the  principle  of  nationality, 
and  to  what  extent  it  may  be  menaced  by  the  economic  needs 
of  the  millions  of  Europe.  And  one  is  impelled  to  ask  whether 
nationality  is  not  threatened  by  a  danger  far  greater  than  any 
it  had  to  meet  in  the  old  Europe,  in  the  anarchy  and  chaos  that 
nationalism  itself  is  at  present  producing. 

The  greater  States,  like  Germany,  may  conceivably  manage 
somehow  to  find  a  modus  vivendi.  A  self-sufficing  State  may 
perhaps  be  developed  (a  fact  which  will  enable  Germany  at  one 
and  the  same  time  to  escape  the  payment  of  reparations  and  to 
defy  future  blockades).  But  that  will  mean  embittered  nation- 
alism.   The  sense  of  exclusion  and  resentment  will  remain. 

The  need  of  Germany  for  outside  raw  materials  and  food 
may,  as  the  result  of  this  effort  to  become  self-sufficing,  prove 
less  than  the  above  considerations  might  suggest.  But  unhap- 
pily, assumed  need  can  be  as  patent  a  motive  in  international 
politics  as  real  need.  Our  recent  acquiescence  in  the  independ- 
ence of  Egypt  would  imply  that  our  need  for  persistent  occupa- 
tion was  not  as  great  as  we  supposed.  Yet  the  desire  to  re- 
main in  Egypt  helped  to  shape  our  foreign  policy  during  a 
whole  generation,  and  played  no  small  part  in  the  bargaining 
with  France  over  Morocco  which  widened  the  gulf  between  our- 
selves and  Germany. 

The  preservation  of  the  principle  of  nationality  depends  upon 


NATIONALITY.  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT      99 

making  it  subject  at  least  to  some  form  of  internationalism.  If 
'self-determination'  means  the  right  to  condemn  other  peoples 
to  death  by  starvation,  then  that  principle  cannot  survive.  The 
Balkanisation  of  Europe,  turning  it  into  a  cauldron  of  rival 
'absolute'  nationalisms,  does  not  mean  safety  for  the  principle 
of  nationality,  it  means  its  ultimate  destruction  either  by 
anarchy  or  by  the  autocratic  domination  of  the  great  Powers. 
The  problem  is  to  reconcile  national  right  and  international 
obligation.  That  will  mean  a  discipline  of  the  national  impulse, 
and  of  the  instincts  of  domination  which  so  readily  attach 
themselves  to  it.  The  recognition  of  economic  needs  will  cer- 
tainly help  towards  such  discipline.  However  'materialistic' 
it  may  be  to  recognise  the  right  of  others  to  life,  that  recogni- 
tion makes  a  sounder  foundation  for  human  society  than  do 
the  instinctive  impulses  of  mystic  nationalism. 

Until  we  have  managed  somehow  to  create  an  economic  code  or 
comity  which  makes  the  sovereignty  of  each  nationality  subject 
to  the  general  need  of  the  whole  body  of  organised  society,  this 
struggle,  in  which  nationality  is  for  ever  threatened,  will  go  on. 

The  alternatives  were  very  clearly  stated  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic : — 

'The  underlying  assumption  heretofore  has  been  that  a  na- 
tion's security  and  prosperity  rest  chiefly  upon  its  own  strength 
and  resources.  Such  an  assumption  has  been  used  to  justify 
statesmen  in  attempting,  on  the  ground  of  the  supreme  need 
for  national  security,  to  increase  their  own  nation's  power  and 
resources  by  insistence  upon  strategic  frontiers,  territory  with 
raw  material,  outlets  to  the  sea,  even  though  that  course  does 
violence  to  the  security  and  prosperity  of  others.  Under  any 
system  in  which  adequate  defence  rests  upon  individual  pre- 
ponderance of  power,  the  security  of  one  must  involve  the  in- 
security of  another,  and  must  inevitably  give  rise  to  covert  or 
overt  competitions  for  power  and  territory,  dangerous  to  peace 
and  destructive  to  justice. 

'Under  such  a  system  of  competitive  as  opposed  to  co- 


100  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

operative  nationalism,  the  smaller  nationalities  can  never  be 
really  secure.  International  commitments  of  some  kind  there 
must  be.  The  price  of  secure  nationality  is  some  degree  of 
internationalism. 

'The  problem  is  to  modify  the  conditions  that  lead  to  war. 
It  will  be  quite  inadequate  to  establish  courts  of  arbitration  or 
of  law  if  they  have  to  arbitrate  or  judge  on  the  basis  of  the  old 
laws  and  practices.    These  have  proved  insufficient. 

*It  is  obvious  that  any  plan  ensuring  national  security  and 
equality  of  opportunity  will  involve  a  limitation  of  national 
sovereignty.  State  ^,  possessing  ports  that  are  the  natural  out- 
let of  a  hinterland  occupied  by  another  people,  will  perhaps 
regard  it  as  an  intolerable  invasion  of  their  independence  if 
their  sovereignty  over  those  ports  is  not  absolute  but  limited 
by  the  obligation  to  permit  of  their  use  by  a  foreign  and  pos- 
sibly rival  people  on  equal  terms.  States  possessing  territories 
in  Africa  or  Asia  inhabited  by  populations  in  a  backward  state 
of  development,  have  generally  heretofore  looked  for  privileged 
and  preferential  treatment  of  their  own  industry  and  commerce 
in  those  territories.  Great  interests  will  be  challenged,  some 
sacrifice  of  national  pride  demanded,  and  the  hostility  of  poli- 
tical factions  in  some  countries  will  be  aroused. 

'Yet  if,  after  the  War,  States  are  to  be  shut  out  from  the 
sea;  if  rapidly  expanding  populations  find  themselves  excluded 
from  raw  materials  indispensable  to  their  prosperity;  if  the 
privileges  and  preferences  enjoyed  by  States  with  overseas 
territories  place  the  less  powerful  States  at  a  disadvantage,  we 
shall  have  re-established  potent  motives  for  that  competition  for 
political  power  which,  in  the  past,  has  been  so  large  an  element 
in  the  causation  of  war  and  the  subjugation  of  weaker  peoples. 
The  ideal  of  the  security  of  all  nations  and  "equality  of  oppor- 
tunity" will  have  failed  of  realisation.'  * 

*  From  a  manifesto  signed  by  a  large  number  of  American  intellectuals, 
business  men,  and  Labour  L^dcrs  ('League  of  Free  Nations  Associa* 
tion'  on  the  eve  of  President  Wilson's  departure  for  Paris.    . 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT     101 

The  Balance  of  Power  and  Defence  of  Law  and  Nationality. 

'Why  were  you  so  whole-soully  for  this  war?'  asked  the  in- 
terviewer of  Mr  Lloyd  George. 
'Belgium/  was  the  reply. 
The  Prime  Minister  of  the  morrow  continued : — 

'The  Saturday  after  war  had  actually  been  declared  on  the 
Continent  (Saturday,  1st  August),  a  poll  of  the  electors  of 
Great  Britain  would  have  shown  ninety-five  per  cent,  against 
embroiling  this  country  in  hostilities.  Powerful  city  financiers 
whom  it  was  my  duty  to  interview  this  Saturday  on  the  finan- 
cial situation,  ended  the  conference  with  an  earnest  hope  that 
Britain  would  keep  out  of  it.  A  poll  on  the  following  Tuesday 
would  have  resulted  in  a  vote  of  ninety-nine  per  cent,  in  favour 
of  war. 

'What  had  happened  in  the  meantime?  The  revolution  in 
public  sentiment  was  attributable  entirely  to  an  attack  made  by 
Germany  on  a  small  and  unprotected  country,  which  had  done 
her  no  wrong,  and  what  Britain  was  not  prepared  to  do  for 
interests  political  and  commercial,  she  readily  risked  to  help 
the  weak  and  helpless.  Our  honour  as  a  nation  is  involved  in 
this  war,  because  we  are  bound  in  an  honourable  obligation  to 
defend  the  independence,  the  liberty,  the  integrity  of  a  small 
neighbour  that  has  lived  peaceably;  but  she  could  not  have 
compelled  us,  being  weak.  The  man  who  declined  to  discharge 
his  debt  because  his  creditor  is  too  poor  to  enforce  it,  is  a 
blackguard.* 

A  little  later,  in  the  same  interview,  Mr  Lloyd  George,  after 
allusion  to  German  misrepresentations,  said : — 

'But  this  I  know  is  true — after  the  guarantee  give-n  that  the 
German  fleet  would  not  attack  the  coast  of  France  or  annex  any 
French  territory,  /  would  not  have  been  party  to  a  declaration 
of  war,  had  Belgium  not  been  invaded,  and  I  think  I  can  say 


102  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  same  thing  for  most,  if  not  all,  of  my  colleagues.  If  Ger- 
many had  been  wise,  she  would  not  have  set  foot  on  Belgian 
soil.  The  Liberal  Government  then  would  not  have  intervened. 
Germany  made  a  grave  mistake.'  * 

This  interview  compels  several  very  important  conclusions. 
One,  perhaps  the  most  important — and  the  most  hopeful — is 
profoundly  creditable  to  English  popular  instinct  and  not  so 
creditable  to  Mr  Lloyd  George. 

If  Mr  Lloyd  George  is  speaking  the  truth  (it  is  difficult  to 
find  just  the  phrase  which  shall  express  one's  meaning  and  be 
Parliamentary),  if  he  believes  it  would  have  been  entirely  safe 
for  Great  Britain  to  have  kept  out  of  the  War  provided  only 
that  the  invasion  of  Belgium  could  have  been  prevented,  then 
indeed  is  the  account  against  the  Cabinet,  of  which  he  was 
then  a  member  and  (after  modifications  in  it)  was  shortly  to 
become  the  head,  a  heavy  one.  I  shall  not  pursue  here  the 
inquiry  whether  in  point  of  simple  political  fact,  Belgium  was 
the  sole  cause  of  our  entrance  into  the  War,  because  I  don't 
suppose  anybody  believes  it.  But — and  here  Mr  Lloyd  George 
almost  certainly  does  speak  the  truth — the  English  people  gave 
their  whole-souled  support  to  the  war  because  they  believed 
it  to  be  for  a  cause  of  which  Belgium  was  the  shining  example 
and  symbol :  the  right  of  the  small  nation  to  the  same  considera- 
tion as  the  great.  That  objective  may  not  have  been  the  main 
inspiration  of  the  Governments :  it  was  the  main  moral  inspira- 
tion of  the  British  people,  the  sentiment  which  the  Government 
exploited,  and  to  which  it  mainly  appealed. 

'The  purpose  of  the  Allies  in  this  War,'  said  Mr  Asquith, 
'is  to  pave  the  way  for  an  international  system  which  will  secure 
the  principle  of  equal  rights  for  all  civilised  States  ...  to 
render  secure  the  principle  that  international  problems  must  be 
handled  by  free  people  and  that  their  settlement  shall  no  longer 
be  hampered  and  swayed  by  the  overmastering  dictation  of 

*  Interview  published  by  Pearson's  Magazine,  March,   1915. 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT     103 

a  Government  controlled  by  a  military  caste.'  We  should  not 
sheathe  the  sword  'until  the  rights  of  the  smaller  nationalities 
of  Europe  are  placed  upon  an  unassailable  foundation.  Pro- 
fessor Headlam  (an  ardent  upholder  of  the  Balance  of  Power, 
by  the  way),  in  a  book  that  is  characteristic  of  the  early  war 
literature,  says  the  cardinal  principles  for  which  the  War  wa.s 
fought  were  two:  first,  that  Europe  is,  and  should  remain, 
divided  between  independent  national  States,  and,  second,  that 
subject  to  the  condition  that  it  did  not  threaten  or  interfere 
with  the  security  of  other  States,  each  country  should  have 
full  and  complete  control  over  its  own  affairs. 

How  far  has  our  victory  achieved  that  object?  Is  the 
policy  which  our  power  supported  before  the  War — and  still 
supports — compatible  with  it?  Does  it  help  to  strengthen  the 
national  security  of  Belgium,  and  other  weak  States  like 
Yugo-Slavia,  Poland,  Albania,  Finland,  the  Russian  Border 
States,  China? 

It  is  here  suggested,  first,  that  our  commitments  under  the 
Balance  of  Power  policy  which  we  had  espoused  ^  deprived 
our  national  force  of  any  preventive  effectiveness  whatever 
in  so  far  as  the  invasion  of  Belgium  was  concerned,  and 
secondly,  that  our  post-war  policy,  which  is  also  in  fact  a 
Balance  of  Power  policy  is  betraying  in  like  fashion  the  cause 
of  the  small  State. 

It  is  further  suggested  that  the  very  nature  of  the  operation 

*  Times,  March  8,  1915.  'Our  honour  and  interest  must  have  com- 
pelled us  to  join  France  and  Russia  even  if  Germany  had  scrupulously 
respected  the  rights  of  her  small  neighbours  and  had  sought  to  hack 
her  way  through  the  Eastern  fortresses.  The  German  Chancellor  has 
insisted  more  than  once  upon  this  truth.  He  has  fancied  apparently 
that  he  was  making  an  argumentative  point  against  us  by  establishing  it. 
That,  like  so  much  more,  only  shows  his  complete  misunderstanding  of 
our  attitude  and  our  character.  .  .  .  We  reverted  to  our  historical  policy 
of  the  Balance  of  Power.' 

The  Times  maintains  the  same  position  five  years  later  (July  31st, 
1920)  :  'It  needed  more  than  two  years  of  actual  warfare  to  render  the 
British  people  wholly  conscious  that  they  were  fighting  not  a  quixotic 
fight  for  Belgium  and  France,  but  a  desperate  battle  for  their  own 
existence.* 


104  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  the  Balance  of  Power  policy  sets  up  in  practice  a  conflict 
of  obligation:  if  our  power  is  pledged  to  the  support  of  one 
particular  group,  like  the  Franco-Russian  group  of  1914,  it 
cannot  also  be  pledged  to  the  support,  honestly  and  impartially, 
of  a  general  principle  of  European  law. 

We  were  drawn  into  the  War,  Mr  Lloyd  George  tells  us, 
to  vindicate  the  integrity  of  Belgium.  Very  good.  We  know 
what  happened  in  the  negotiations.  Germany  wanted  very 
much  to  know  what  would  induce  us  to  keep  out  of  the  War. 
Would  we  keep  out  of  the  War  if  Germany  refrained  from 
crossing  the  Belgian  frontier?  Such  an  assurance,  giving 
Germany  the  strongest  material  reasons  for  not  invading  Bel- 
gium, converting  a  military  reason  (the  only  reason,  we  are 
told,  that  Germany  would  listen  to)  for  that  offence  into  an 
immensely  powerful  military  reason  against  it,  could  not  be 
given.  In  order  to  be  able  to  maintain  the  Balance  of  Power 
against  Germany  we  must  'keep  our  hands  free.' 

It  is  not  a  question  here  of  Germany's  trustworthiness,  but 
of  using  her  sense  of  self-interest  to  secure  our  object  of  the 
protection  of  Belgium.  The  party  in  the  German  councils 
opposed  to  the  invasion  would  say:  'If  you  invade  Belgium 
you  will  have  to  meet  the  hostility  of  Great  Britain.  If  you 
don't,  you  will  escape  that  hostility.'  To  which  the  general 
.staff  was  able  to  reply:  'Britain's  Balance  of  Power  policy 
means  that  you  will  have  to  meet  the  enmity  of  Britain  in  any 
case.  In  terms  of  expediency,  it  does  not  matter  whether  you 
go  through  Belgium  or  not.' 

The  fact  that  the  principle  of  the  'Balance'  compelled  us  to 
support  France,  whether  Germany  respected  the  Treaty  of 
1839  or  not,  deprived  our  power  of  any  value  as  a  restraint 
upon  German  military  designs  against  Belgium.  There  was, 
in  fact,  a  conflict  of  obligations:  the  obligations  to  the 
Balance  of  Power  rendered  that  to  the  support  of  the  Treaty 
of  no  avail  in  terms  of  protection.  If  the  object  of  force  is 
to  compel  observance  of  law  on  the  part  of  those  who  will  not 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT     105 

observe  it  otherwise,  that  object  is  defeated  by  the  entangle- 
ments of  the  Balance  of  Power. 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  account  of  that  stage  of  the  negotiations 
at  which  the  question  of  Belgium  was  raised,  is  quite  clear 
and  simple.  The  German  Ambassador  asked  him  'whether, 
if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality, 
we  would  engage  to  remain  neutral.'  'I  replied,*  writes  Sir 
Edward,  'that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands  were  still  free, 
and  we  were  considering  what  our  attitude  should  be.  I  did 
not  think  that  we  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that 
condition  alone.  The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether 
I  could  not  formulate  conditions  on  which  we  would  remain 
neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of  France  and 
her  Colonies  might  be  guaranteed.  I  said  that  I  felt  obliged 
to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain  neutral  on  similar 
terms,  and  I  could  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands 
free.' 

'If  language  means  anything,'  comments  Lord  Loreburn,^ 
'this  means  that  whereas  Mr  Gladstone  bound  this  country 
to  war  in  order  to  safeguard  Belgian  neutrality,  Sir  Edward 
would  not  even  bind  this  country  to  neutrality  to  save  Bel- 
gium. He  may  have  been  right,  but  it  was  not  for  the  sake 
of  Belgian  interests  that  he  refused.' 

Compare  our  experience,  and  the  attitude  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  in  1914,  when  we  were  concerned  to  maintain  the 
Balance  of  Power,  with  our  experience  and  Mr  Gladstone's 
behaviour  when  precisely  the  same  problem  of  protecting 
Belgium  was  raised  in  1870.  In  these  circumstances  Mr 
Gladstone  proposed  both  to  France  and  to  Prussia  a  treaty 
by  which  Great  Britain  undertook  that,  if  either  of  the  bellig- 
erents should  in  the  course  of  that  war  violate  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  Great  Britain  would  co-operate  with  the  other 
belligerent  in  defence  of  the  same,  'employing  for  that  purpose 
her  naval  and  military  forces  to  ensure  its  observance.'     In 

^  How  the  War  Came,  p.  238. 


106  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

this  way  both  France  and  Germany  knew  and  the  whole  world 
knew,  that  invasion  of  Belgium  meant  war  with  Great  Britain. 
Whichever  belligerent  violated  the  neutrality  must  reckon  with 
the  consequences.  Both  France  and  Prussia  signed  that 
Treaty.    Belgium  was  saved. 

Lord  Loreborn  {How  the  War  Came)  says  of  the 
incident : — 

*This  policy,  which  proved  a  complete  success  in  1870,  indi- 
cated the  way  in  which  British  power  could  effectively  protect 
Belgium  against  an  unscrupulous  neighbour.  But  then  it  is  a 
policy  which  cannot  be  adopted  unless  this  country  is  itself 
prepared  to  make  war  against  either  of  the  belligerents  which 
shall  molest  Belgium.  For  the  inducement  to  each  of  such 
belligerents  is  the  knowledge  that  he  will  have  Great  Britain 
as  an  enemy  if  he  invades  Belgium,  and  as  an  Ally  if  his 
enemy  attacks  him  through  Belgian  territory.  And  that  can- 
not be  a  security  unless  Great  Britain  keeps  herself  free  to  give 
armed  assistance  to  either  should  the  other  violate  the  Treaty. 
The  whole  leverage  would  obviously  disappear  if  we  took  sides 
in  the  war  on  other  grounds.'  ^ 

This,  then,  is  an  illustration  of  the  truth  above  insisted  upon : 
to  employ  our  force  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Balance  of 
Power  is  to  deprive  it  of  the  necessary  impartiality  for  the 
maintenance  of  Right. 

Much  more  clear  even  than  in  the  case  of  Belgium  was  the 
conflict  in  certain  other  cases  between  the  claims  of  the  Bal- 

*  Lord  Loreburn  adds : — 

'But  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  1914  did  not  and  could  not  offer  similar 
Treaties  to  France  and  Germany  because  our  relations  with  France 
and  the  conduct  of  Germany  were  such,  that  for  us  to  join  Germany  in 
any  event  was  unthinkable.  And  he  did  not  proclaim  our  neutrality  be- 
cause our  relations  with  France,  as  described  in  his  own  speech,  were 
such  that  he  could  not  in  honour  refuse  to  join  France  in  the  war. 
Therefore  the  example  of  1870  could  not  be  followed  in  1914,  and  Bel- 
gium was  not  saved  but  destroyed.' 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT     107 

ance  of  Power  and  our  obligation  to  place  'the  rights  of  the 
smaller  nationalities  of  Europe  upon  an  unassailable  founda- 
tion' which  Mr  Asquith  proclaimed  as  the  object  of  the  War. 
The  archetype  of  suppressed  nationality  was  Poland;  a 
nation  with  an  ancient  culture,  a  passionate  and  romantic 
attachment  to  its  ancient  traditions,  which  had  simply  been 
wiped  off  the  map.  If  ever  there  was  a  case  of  nation-murder 
it  was  this.  And  one  of  the  culprits — perhaps  the  chief 
culprit — was  Russia.  To-day  the  Allies,  notably  France,  stand 
as  the  champions  of  Polish  nationality.  But  as  late  as  1917, 
as  part  of  that  kind  of  bargain  which  inevitably  marks  the 
old  type  of  diplomatic  Alliance,  France  was  agreeing  to  hand 
over  Poland,  helpless,  to  her  old  jailer,  the  Czarist  Govern- 
ment. In  March,  1916,  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris  was 
instructed  that,  at  the  then  impending  diplomatic  conference^ 

'It  is  above  all  necessary  to  demand  that  the  Polish  question 
should  be  excluded  from  the  subjects  of  international  nego- 
tiation, and  that  all  attempts  to  place  Poland's  future  under 
the  guarantee  and  control  of  the  Powers  should  be  prevented.' 

On  February  12th,  1917,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister 
informed  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  M.  Doumergue 
(French  Ambassador  in  Petrograd)  had  told  the  Czar  of 
France's  wish  to  get  Alsace-Lorraine  at  the  end  of  the  War, 
and  also  *a  special  position  in  the  Saar  Valley,  and  to  bring 
about  the  detachment  from  Germany  of  the  territories  west 
of  the  Rhine  and  their  reorganisation  in  such  a  way  that  in 
future  the  Rhine  may  form  a  permanent  strategic  obstacle  to 
any  German  advance.'  The  Czar  was  pleased  to  express  his 
approval  in  principle  of  this  proposal.  Accordingly  the 
Russian  Foreign  Minister  expressed  his  wish  that  an  Agree- 
ment by  exchange  of  Notes  should  take  place  on  this  subject, 

^  See  the  Documents  published  by  the  Russian  Government  in  No- 
vember, 1917. 


108  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

and  desired  that  if  Russia  agreed  to  the  unrestricted  right  of 
France  and  Britain  to  fix  Germany's  western  frontiers,  so 
Russia  was  to  have  an  assurance  of  freedom  of  action  in  fixing 
Germany's  future  frontier  on  the  east.  (This  means  the 
Russian  western  frontier.)  ^ 

Or  take  the  case  of  Serbia,  the  oppressed  nationality  whose 
struggle  for  freedom  against  Austria  was  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  War.  It  was  because  Russia  would  not  permit 
Austria  to  do  with  reference  to  Serbia,  what  Russia  claimed 
the  right  to  do  with  reference  to  Poland,  that  the  latter  made 
of  the  Austrian  policy  a  casus  belli. 

Very  well.  We  stood  at  least  for  the  vindication  of  Serbian 
nationality.  But  the  'Balance'  demanded  that  we  should  win 
Italy  to  our  side  of  the  scale.  She  had  to  be  paid.  So  on 
April  20th,  1915,  without  informing  Serbia,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
signed  a  Treaty  (the  last  article  of  which  stipulated  that  it 
should  be  kept  secret)  giving  to  Italy  the  whole  of  Dalmatia, 
in  its  present  extent,  together  with  the  islands  north  and  west 
of  the  Dalmatian  coast  and  I  stria  as  far  as  the  Quarnero  and 
the  Istrian  Islands.  That  Treaty  placed  under  Italian  rule 
whole  populations  of  Southern  Slavs,  creating  inevitably  a 
Southern  Slav  irredentism,  and  put  the  Yugo-Slavia,  that  we 
professed  to  be  creating,  under  the  same  kind  of  economic 
disability  which  it  had  suffered  from  the  Austrian  Empire. 
One  is  not  astonished  to  find  Signor  Salandra  describing  the 
principles  which  should  guide  his  policy  as  *a  freedom  from 
all  preoccupations  and  prejudices,  and  from  every  sentiment 
except  that  of  "Sacred  egoism"  (sacro  egoismo)  for  Italy.' 

To-day,  it  need  hardly  be  said,  there  is  bitter  hatred  between 
our  Serbian  Ally  and  our  Italian  Ally,  and  most  patriotic 

*  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  undertaking  to  Russia  was  actually  given. 
Lord  R.  Cecil  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  July  24th,  1917,  said :  'It 
will  be  for  this  country  to  back  up  the  French  in  what  they  desire.  I 
will  not  go  through  all  the  others  of  our  Allies — there  are  a  good 
many  of  them — but  the  principle  (to  stand  by  our  Allies)  will  be 
equally  there  in  the  case  of  all  and  particularly  in  the  case  of  Serbia. 


NATIONALITY.  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT     109 

Vugo- Slavs  regard  war  with  Italy  one  day  as  inevitable.* 
Yet,  assuredly,  Sir  Edward  Grey  is  not  to  be  blamed.  If 
allegiance  to  the  Balance  of  Power  was  to  come  first,  allegiance 
to  any  principle,  of  nationality  or  of  anything  else,  must  come 
second. 

The  moral  implications  of  this  political  method  received 
another  illustration  in  the  case  of  the  Rumanian  Treaty.  Its 
nature  is  indicated  in  the  Report  of  General  Polivanov,  amongst 
the  papers  published  at  Petrograd  and  dated  7th-20th  Novem- 
ber, 1916.  It  explains  how  Rumania  was  at  first  a  neutral, 
but  shifting  between  different  inclinations — a  wish  not  to  come 
in  too  late  for  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  a  wish  to 
earn  as  much  as  possible  at  the  expense  of  the  belligerents. 
At  first,  according  to  this  Report,  she  favoured  our  enemies 
and  had  obtained  very  favourable  commercial  agreements  with 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Then  in  1916,  on  the  Russ- 
ian successes  under  Brusilov,  she  inclined  to  the  Entente 
Powers.  The  Russian  Chief  of  the  Staff  thought  Rumanian 
neutrality  preferable  to  her  intervention,  but  later  on  General 
Alexeiev  adopted  the  view  of  the  Allies,  'who  looked  upon 
Rumania's  entry  as  a  decisive  blow  for  Austria-Hungary  and 
as  the  nearing  of  the  War's  end.'  So  in  August,  1916,  an 
agreement  was  signed  with  Rumania  (by  whom  it  was  signed 
is  not  stated,  assigning  to  her  Bukovina  and  all  Transylvania. 
'The  events  which  followed,'  says  the  report,  'showed  how 
greatly  our  Allies  were  mistaken  and  how  they  overvalued 
Rumania's  entry.*  In  fact,  Rumania  was  in  a  brief  time 
utterly  overthrown.  And  then  Polivanov  points  out  that  the 
collapse  of  Rumania's  plans  as  a  Great  Power  'is  not  particu- 
larly opposed  to  Russia's  interests.' 

One  might  follow  up  this  record  and  see  how  far  the  method 

of  the  Balance  has  protected  the  small  and  weak  nation  in  the 

*  Since  these  lines  were  written,  there  has  been  a  change  of  govern- 
ment and  of  policy  in  Italy.  An  agreement  has  been  reached  with 
Yugo-Slavia,  which  appears  to  satisfy  the  moderate  elements  in  both 
countries. 


110  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

case  of  Albania,  whose  partition  was  arranged  for  in  April, 
1915,  under  the  Treaty  of  London;  in  the  case  of  Macedonia 
and  the  Bulgarian  Macedonians;  in  the  case  of  Western 
Thrace,  of  the  Serbian  Banat,  of  the  Bulgar  Dobrudja,  of  the 
Southern  Tyrol,  of  German  Bohemia,  of  Shantung — of  still 
further  cases  in  which  we  were  compelled  to  change  or  modify 
or  betray  the  cause  for  which  we  entered  the  War  in  order 
to  maintain  the  preponderance  of  power  by  which  we  could 
achieve  military  success. 

The  moral  paralysis  exemplified  in  this  story  is  already  in- 
fecting our  nascent  efforts  at  creating  a  society  of  nations — 
witness  the  relation  of  the  League  with  Poland.  No  one  in 
1920  justified  the  Polish  claims  made  against  Russia.  Our  own 
communications  to  Russia  described  them  as  'imperialistic'  The 
Prime  Minister  condemned  them  in  unmeasured  terms.  Poland 
was  a  member  of  the  League.  Her  supplies  of  arms  and 
ammunition,  military  stores,  credit,  were  obtained  by  the  grace 
of  the  chief  members  of  the  League.  The  only  port  by  which 
arms  could  enter  Poland  was  a  city  under  the  special  control 
of  the  League.  An  appeal  was  made  to  the  League  to  take 
steps  to  present  th^  Polish  adventure.  Lord  Robert  Cecil 
advocated  the  course  with  particular  urgency.  The  Soviet 
Government  itself,  while  Poland  was  preparing,  appealed  to 
the  chief  constitutional  governments  of  the  League  for  some 
preventive  action.  Why  was  none  taken?  Because  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power  demanded  that  we  should  'stand  by  France,* 
and  Polish  Imperialism  was  part  of  the  policy  quite  overtly 
and  deliberately  laid  down  by  M.  Clemenceau,  who,  with  a 
candour  entirely  admirable,  expressed  his  preference  for  the 
old  system  of  alliances  as  against  the  newfangled  Society  of 
Nations.  We  could  not  restrain  Poland  and  at  the  same  time 
fulfil  our  Alliance  obligations  to  France,  who  was  supporting 
the  Polish  policy.^ 

*Lord  Curzon  (May  17th,  1920)  wrote  that  he  did  not  see  how  we 
could  invoke  the  League  to  restrain  Poland.     The  Poles,  he  added, 


NATIONALITY,  ECONOMICS,  AND  RIGHT     HI 

By  reason  of  the  grip  of  this  system  we  supported  (while 
proclaiming  the  sacredness  of  the  cause  of  oppressed  nationali- 
ties) or  acquiesced  in  the  policy  of  Czarist  Russia  against 
Poland,  and  incidentally  Finland ;  we  supported  Poland  against 
republican  Russia;  we  encouraged  the  creation  of  small  border 
States  as  means  of  fighting  Soviet  Russia,  while  we  aided  Kolt- 
chak  and  Denikin,  who  would  undoubtedly  if  successful  have 
suppressed  the  border  States.  We  supported  the  Southern 
Slavs  against  Austria  when  we  desired  to  destroy  the  latter; 
we  supported  Italy  (in  secret  treaties)  against  the  Southern 
Slavs  when  we  des-ired  the  help  of  the  former.  Violations  and 
repressions  of  nationality  which,  when  committed  by  the  enemy 
States,  we  declared  should  excite  the  deathless  resistance  of 
all  free  men  and  call  down  the  punishment  of  Heaven,  we 
acquiesce  in  and  are  silent  about  when  committed  by  our  Allies. 

This  was  the  Fight  for  Right,  the  war  to  vindicate  the  moral 
law  in  the  relations  of  States. 

The  political  necessities  of  the  Balance  of  Power  have  pre- 
vented the  country  from  pledging  its  power,  untrammelled,  to 
the  maintenance  of  Right.  The  two  objects  are  in  theory  and 
practice  incompatible.  The  Balance  of  Power  is  in  fact  an 
assertion  of  the  principle  of  Macht-PoUHk,  of  the  principle  that 
Might  makes  Right. 

must  choose  war  or  peace  on  their  own  responsibility.  Mr  Lloyd 
George  (June  19th,  1920)  declared  that  'the  League  of  Nations  could  not 
intervene  in  Poland.' 


CHAPTER  IV 

MILITARY   PREDOMINANCE — ^AND   INSECURITY 

The  War  revealed  this :  However  great  the  military  power  of 
a  State,  as  in  the  case  of  France ;  however  great  its  territorial 
extent,  as  in  the  case  of  the  British  Empire;  or  its  economic 
resources  and  geographical  isolation  as  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  the  conditions  of  the  present  international  order 
compel  that  State  to  resort  to  Alliance  as  an  indispensable  part 
of  its  military  defence.  And  the  peace  reveals  this:  that  no 
Alliance  can  long  resist  the  disruptive  forces  of  nationalist 
psychology.  So  rapid  indeed  has  been  the  disintegration  of  the 
Alliance  that  fought  this  War,  that,  from  this  one  cause,  the 
power  indispensable  for  carrying  out  the  Treaty  imposed  upon 
the  enemy  has  on  the  morrow  of  victory  already  disappeared. 

So  much  became  patent  in  the  year  that  followed  the  signing 
of  the  Treaty.  The  fact  bears  of  course  fundamentally  upon 
the  question  of  the  use  of  political  power  for  those  economic 
ends  discussed  in  the  preceding  pages.  If  the  economic  policy 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  to  be  carried  out,  it  will  in  any 
case  demand  a  preponderance  of  power  so  immense  and  secure 
that  the  complete  political  solidarity  of  the  Alliance  which 
fought  the  War  must  be  assumed.  It  cannot  be  assumed. 
That  Alliance  has  in  fact  already  gone  to  pieces;  and  with  it 
the  unquestioned  preponderance  of  power. 

The  fact  bears  not  only  upon  the  use  of  power  for  the  pur- 
pose of  carrying  an  economic  policy — or  some  moral  end, 
like  the  defence  of  Nationality — into  effect.     The  disruptive 

112 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  113 

influence  of  the  Nationalisms  of  which  alliances  are  composed 
raises  the  question  of  how  far  a  military  preponderance  resting 
on  a  National  foundation  can  even  give  us  political  security. 

If  the  moral  factors  of  nationality  are,  as  we  have  seen,  an 
indispensable  part  of  the  study  of  international  economics, 
so  must  those  same  factors  be  considered  as  an  indispensable 
part  of  the  problem  of  the  power  to  be  exercised  by  an  al- 
liance. 

During  the  War  there  was  an  extraordinary  neglect  of  this 
simple  truth.  It  seemed  to  occur  to  no  one  that  the  intensifica- 
tion of  the  psychology  of  narionalism — not  only  among  the 
lesser  States  but  in  France  and  America  and  England — ran  the 
risk  of  rendering  the  Alliance  powerless  after  its  victory.  Yet 
that  is  what  has  happened. 

The  power  of  an  Alliance  (again  we  are  dealing  with  things 
that  are  obvious  but  neglected)  does  not  depend  upon  the  sum 
of  its  material  forces — navies,  armies,  artillery.  It  depends 
upon  being  able  to  assemble  those  things  to  a  common  purpose ; 
in  other  words,  upon  policy  fit  to  direct  the  instrument.  If  the 
policy,  or  certain  moral  elements  within  it,  are  such  that  one 
member  of  the  Alliance  is  likely  to  turn  his  arms  against  the 
others,  the  extent  of  his  armament  does  not  add  to  the  strength 
of  the  Alliance.  It  was  with  ammunition  furnished  by  Britain 
and  France  that  Russia  in  1919  and  1920  destroyed  British 
and  French  troops.  The  present  building  of  an  enormous  navy 
by  America  is  not  accepted  in  Britain  as  necessarily  adding  to 
the  security  of  the  British  Empire. 

It  is  worth  while  to  note  how  utterly  fallacious  are  certain 
almost  universal  assumptions  concerning  the  relation  of  war  psy- 
chology to  the  problem  of  alliance  solidarity.  An  English  visi- 
tor to  the  United  States  (or  an  American  visitor  to  England) 
during  the  years  1917-1918  was  apt  to  be  deluged  by  a  flood 
of  rhetoric  to  this  effect :  The  blood  shed  on  the  same  battle- 
fields, the  suffering  shared  in  common  in  the  same  common 
cause,  would  unite  and  cement  as  nothing  had  ever  yet  united 


114  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  two  great  branches  of  the  English-speaking  race,  destined 
by  Providence.  .  .  . 

But  the  same  visitor  moving  in  the  same  circle  less  than  two 
years  later  found  that  this  eternal  cement  of  friendship  had 
already  lost  its  potency.  Never,  perhaps,  for  generations  were 
Anglo-American  relations  so  bad  as  they  had  become  within 
a  score  or  so  of  months  of  the  time  that  Englishmen  and  Ameri- 
cans were  dying  side  by  side  on  the  battle-field.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  1921,  in  the  United  States,  it  was  easier,  on  a  public 
platform,  to  defend  Germany  than  to  present  a  defence  of 
English  policy  in  Ireland  or  in  India.  And  at  that  period  one 
might  hear  commonly  enough  in  England,  in  trams  and  rail- 
way carriages,  a  repetition  of  the  catch  phrase,  'America  next.' 
If  certain  popular  assumptions  as  to  war  psychology  were 
right,  these  things  would  be  impossible. 

Yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  psychological  phenomenon  is 
true  to  type.  It  was  not  an  accident  that  the  internationalist 
America  of  1915,  of  'Peace  without  Victory,'  should  by  1918 
have  become  more  fiercely  insistent  upon  absolute  victory  and 
unconditional  surrender  than  any  other  of  the  belligerents, 
whose  emotions  had  found  some  outlet  during  three  years  of 
war  before  America  had  begun.  The  complete  reversal  of  the 
'Peace  without  Victory'  attitude  was  demanded — cultivated,  de- 
liberately produced — as  a  necessary  part  of  war  morale.  But 
these  emotions  of  coercion  and  domination  cannot  be  intensively 
cultivated  and  then  turned  off  as  by  a  tap.  They  made  America 
fiercely  nationalist,  with  necessarily  a  temperamental  distaste 
for  the  internationalism  of  Mr  Wilson.  And  when  a  mere 
year  of  war  left  the  emotional  hungers  unsatisfied,  they  turned 
unconsciously  to  other  satisfactions.  Twenty  million  Ameri- 
cans of  Irish  descent  or  association,  among  others,  utilised  the 
opportimity. 

One  feature — ^perhaps  the  very  largest  feature  of  all—of 
war  morale,  had  been  the  exploitation  of  the  German  atrocities. 
The  burning  of  Louvain,  and  other  reprisals  upon  the  Belgian 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  115 

civilian  population,  meant  necessarily  a  special  wickedness  on 
the  part  of  a  definite  entity,  known  as  'Germany,'  that  had  to  be 
crushed,  punished,  beaten,  wiped  out.  There  were  no  distinc- 
tions. The  plea  that  all  were  not  equally  guilty  excited  the  fierce 
anger  reserved  for  all  such  'pacifist'  and  pro-German  pleas.  A 
German  woman  had  laughed  at  a  wounded  American :  all  Ger- 
man women  were  monsters.  'No  good  German  but  a  dead  Ger- 
man.' It  was  in  the  German  blood  and  grey  matter.  The  elab- 
orate stories — illustrated — of  Germans  sticking  bayonets  into 
Belgian  children  produced  a  thesis  which  was  beyond  and  above 
reason  or  explanation:  for  that  atrocity,  'Germany' — seventy 
million  people,  ignorant  peasants,  driven  workmen,  the  babies, 
the  invalids,  the  old  women  gathering  sti(yics  in  the  forest,  the 
children  trooping  to  school — all  were  guilty.  To  state  the 
thing  in  black  and  white  sounds  like  a  monstrous  travesty. 
But  it  is  not  a  travesty.  It  is  the  thesis  we,  too,  maintained ; 
but  in  America  it  had,  in  the  American  way,  an  over  simplifi- 
cation and  an  extra  emphasis. 

And  then  after  the  War  an  historical  enemy  of  America's 
does  precisely  the  same  thing.  In  the  story  of  Amritsar  and 
the  Irish  reprisals  it  is  the  Indian  and  Sinn  Fein  version  only 
which  is  told ;  just  as  during  the  War  we  got  nothing  but  the 
anti-German  version  of  the  burning  of  Louvain,  or  reprisals 
upon  civilians.  Why  should  we  expect  that  the  result  should 
be  greatly  different  upon  American  opinion?  Four  hundred 
unarmed  and  hopeless  people,  women  and  children  as  well  as 
men,  are  mown  down  by  machine-guns.  Or,  in  the  Irish  re- 
prisals, a  farmer  is  shot  in  the  presence  of  his  wife  and  children. 
The  Government  defends  the  soldiers.  'Britain'  has  done  this 
thing:  forty-five  millions  of  people,  of  infinitely  varying  de- 
grees of  responsibility,  many  opposing  it,  many  ignorant  of  it, 
almost  all  entirely  helpless.  To  represent  them  as  inhuman 
monsters  because  of  these  atrocities  is  an  infinitely  mischievous 
falsehood.  But  it  is  made  possible  by  a  theory,  which  in  the 
case  of  Germaiiy  we  maintained  for  years  as  essentially  true. 


116  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

And  now  it  is  doing  as  between  Britain  and  America  what  a 
similar  falsehood  did  as  between  Germany  and  England,  and 
will  go  on  doing  so  long  as  Nationalism  includes  conceptions  of 
collective  responsibility  which  fly  in  the  face  of  common  sense 
and  truth.  If  the  resultant  hostilities  can  operate  as  between 
two  national  groups  like  the  British  and  the  American,  what 
groups  can  be  free  of  them? 

It  is  a  little  difficult  now,  two  years  after  the  end  of  the 
War,  with  the  world  in  its  present  turmoil,  to  realise  that  we 
really  did  expect  the  defeat  of  Germany  to  inaugurate  an  era 
of  peace  and  security,  of  reduction  of  armaments,  the  virtual 
end  of  war;  and  believed  that  it  was  German  militarism,  'that 
trampling,  drilling  foolery  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  that  has 
arrested  civilisation  and  darkened  the  hopes  of  mankind  for 
forty  years,'  ^  as  Mr  Wells  wrote  in  The  War  that  wUl  End 
War,  which  accounted  for  nearly  all  the  other  militarisms,  and 
that  after  its  destruction  we  could  anticipate  'the  end  of  the 
armament  phase  of  European  history.'  For,  explained  Mr 
Wells.  'France,  Italy,  England,  and  all  the  smaller  Powers  of 
Europe  are  now  pacific  countries ;  Russia,  after  this  huge  War, 
will  be  too  exhausted  for  further  adventure.'^ 

'When  will  peace  come?'  asked  Professor  Headlam,  and 
answered  that 

'It  will  come  when  Germany  has  learnt  the  lesson  of  the  War, 
when  it  has  learnt,  as  every  other  nation  has  had  to  learn,  that 
the  voice  of  Europe  cannot  be  defied  with  impunity.  .  .  . 
Men  talk  about  the  terms  of  peace.  They  matter  little.  With 
a  Germany  victorious  no  terms  could  secure  the  future  of  Eu- 
rope, with  a  Germany  defeated,  no  artificial  securities  will  be 
wanted,  for  there  will  be  a  stronger  security  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  defeat.' ' 


*  The  War  that  will  End  War,  p.  14. 

*Ibid.  p.  19.  •  The  Issue,  p.  37-39. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  117 

There  were  to  be  no  limits  to  the  poHtical  or  economic  re- 
arrangements which  victory  would  enable  us  to  effect.  Very  au- 
thoritative military  critics  like  Mr  Hilaire  Belloc  became  quite 
angry  and  contemptuous  at  the  suggestion  that  the  defeat  of  the 
enemy  would  not  enable  us  to  rearrange  Europe  at  our  will. 
The  doctrine  that  unlimited  power  was  inherent  in  victory  was 
thus  stated  by  Mr  Belloc : — 

'It  has  been  well  said  that  the  most  straightforward  and 
obvious  conclusions  on  the  largest  lines  of  military  policy  are 
those  of  which  it  is  most  difficult  to  convince  a  general  audience ; 
and  we  find  in  this  matter  a  singular  miscalculation  running 
through  the  attitude  of  many  Western  publicists.  They  speak 
as  though,  whatever  might  happen  in  the  West,  the  Alliance, 
which  is  fighting  for  European  civilisation,  the  Western  Allies 
and  the  United  States,  could  not  now  affect  the  destinies  of 
Eastern  Europe.  .  .  . 

Such  an  attitude  is,  upon  the  simplest  principles  of  military 
science,  a  grotesque  error.  .  .  .  If  we  are  victorious  .  .  .  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  military  power  gives  us  as  full  an 
opportunity  for  deciding  the  fate  of  Eastern  Europe  as  it 
does  for  deciding  the  fate  of  Western  Europe.  Victory  gained 
by  the  Allies  will  decide  the  fate  of  all  Europe,  and,  for  that 
matter,  of  the  whole  world.  It  will  open  the  Baltic  and  the 
Black  Sea.  It  will  leave  us  masters  with  the  power  to  dictate 
in  what  fashion  the  new  boundaries  shall  be  arranged,  how  the 
entries  to  the  Eastern  markets  shall  be  kept  open,  garrisoned 
and  guaranteed.  .  .  . 

Wherever  they  are  defeated,  whether  upon  the  line  they 
now  hold  or  upon  other  lines,  their  defeat  and  our  victory 
will  leave  us  with  complete  power.  If  that  task  be  beyond  our 
strength,  then  civilisation  has  suffered  defeat,  and  there  is  the 
end  of  it.* 

German  power  was  to  be  destroyed  as  the  condition  of  saving 
civilisation.    Mr  Belloc  wrote: — 


118  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

'If  by  some  negotiation  (involving  of  course  the  evacuation 
of  the  occupied  districts  in  the  West)  the  enemy  remains  un- 
defeated, civilised  Europe  has  lost  the  war  and  Prussia  has 
won  it.'^ 

Such  was  the  simple  and  popular  thesis.  Germany,  criminal 
and  barbarian,  challenged  Europe,  civilised  and  law-abiding. 
Civilisation  can  only  assert  itself  by  the  punishment  of  Germany 
and  save  itself  by  the  destruction  of  German  power.  Once  the 
German  military  power  is  destroyed,  Europe  can  do  with 
Germany  what  it  will. 

I  suggest  that  the  experience  of  the  last  two  years,  and  our 
own  present  policy,  constitute  an  admission  or  demonstration, 
first,  that  the  moral  assumption  of  this  thesis — that  the  menace 
of  German  power  was  due  to  some  special  wickedness  on  the 
part  of  the  German  nation  not  shared  by  other  peoples  in  any 
degree — is  false;  and,  secondly,  that  the  destruction  of  Ger- 
many's military  force  gives  to  Europe  no  such  power  to  control 
Germany. 

Our  power  over  Germany  becomes  every  day  less : 

First,  by  the  break-up  of  the  Alliance.  The  'sacred  egoisms' 
which  produced  the  War  are  now  disrupting  the  Allies.  The 
most  potentially  powerful  European  member  of  the  Alliance 
or  Association — Russia — has  become  an  enemy;  the  most 
powerful  member  of  all,  America,  has  withdrawn  from 
co-operation;  Italy  is  in  conflict  with  one  Ally,  Japan  with 
another. 

Secondly,  by  the  more  extended  Balkanisation  of  Europe. 
The  States  utilised  by  (for  instance)  France  as  the  instruments 
of  Allied  policy  (Poland,  Hungary,  Ukrainia,  Rumania, 
Czecho-Slovakia)  are  liable  to  quarrel  among  themselves. 
The  groups  rendered  hostile  to  Allied  policy — Germany, 
Russia,  China — ^are  much  larger,  and  might  well  once  more 
become  cohesive  units.    The  Nationalism  which  is  a  factor  of 

*Land  and  Water,  February  21st,  1918. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  119 

Allied  disintegration  may  nevertheless  work  for  the  consoli- 
dation of  the  groups  opposed  to  us. 

Thirdly,  by  the  economic  disorganisation  of  Europe  (result- 
ing mainly  from  the  desire  to  weaken  the  enemy),  which  de- 
prives the  Alliance  of  economic  resources  sufficient  for  a 
military  task  like  that  of  the  conquest  of  Russia  or  the  occu- 
pation of  Germany. 

Fourthly,  by  the  social  unrest  within  each  country  (itself 
due  in  part  to  the  economic  disorganisation,  in  part  to  the 
introduction  of  the  psychology  of  jingoism  into  the  domain 
of  industrial  strife)  :  Bolshevism.  A  long  war  of  intervention 
in  Russia  by  the  Alliance  would  have  broken  down  under  the 
strain  of  internal  unrest  in  Allied  countries. 

The  Alliance  thus  succumbs  to  the  clash  of  Nationalisms 
and  the  clash  of  classes. 

These  moral  factors  render  the  purpose  which  will  be  given 
to  accumulated  military  force — 'the  direction  in  which  the  guns 
will  shoot' — so  uncertain  that  the  amount  of  material  power 
available  is  no  indication  of  the  degree  of  security  attained. 

If  it  were  true,  as  we  argued  so  universally  before  and 
during  the  War,  that  German  power  was  the  final  cause  of 
the  armament  rivalry  in  Europe,  then  the  disappearance  of 
that  power  should  mark,  as  so  many  prophesied  it  would 
mark,  the  end  of  the  'armament  era.' ^    Has  it  done  so?    Or 

*  Even  as  late  as  January  13th,  1920,  Mr  H.  W.  Wilson  of  the  Daily 
Mail  writes  that  if  the  disarmament  of  Germany  is  carried  out  'the  real 
cause  of  swollen  armaments  in  Europe  will  vanish.' 

On  May  18th,  1920,  Field-Marshal  Sir  Henry  Wilson  (Morning  Post, 
May  19th)  declares  himself  thus : — 

'We  were  told  that  after  this  last  war  we  were  to  have  peace.  We 
have  not;  there  are  something  between  twenty  and  thirty  bloody  wars 
going  on  at  the  present  moment.  We  were  told  that  the  great  war 
was  to  end  war.  It  did  not;  it  could  not.  We  have  a  very  difficult 
time  ahead,  whether  on  the  sea,  in  the  air,  or  on  the  land.'  He  wanted 
them  to  take  away  the  warning  from  a  fellow  soldier  that  their  country 
and  their  Empire  both  wanted  them  to-day  as  much  as  ever  they  had, 
and  if  they  were  as  proud  of  belonging  to  the  British  Empire  as  he  was 
they  would  do  their  best,  in  whatever  capacity  they  served,  to  qualify 
themselves  for  the  times  that  were  coining. 


120  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

does  any  one  to-day  seriously  argue  that  the  increase  of  arma- 
ment expenditure  over  the  pre-war  period  is  in  some  mystic 
way  due  to  Prussian  militarism? 
Let  us  turn  to  a  Times  leader  in  the  summer  of  1920: — 

*To-day  the  condition  of  Europe  and  of  a  large  portion  of 
the  world  is  scarcely  less  critical  than  it  was  six  years  ago. 
Within  a  few  days,  or  at  most  a  few  weeks,  we  may  know 
whether  the  Peace  Treaty  signed  at  Versailles  will  possess 
effective  validity.  The  independent  existence  of  Poland,  which 
is  a  keystone  of  the  reorganisation  of  Europe  contemplated  by 
the  Treaty,  is  in  grave  peril;  and  with  it,  though  perhaps  not 
in  the  manner  currently  imagined  in  Germany,  is  jeopardised 
the  present  situation  of  Germany  herself. 

,  .  .  There  is  undoubtedly  a  widespread  plot  against  West- 
ern civilisation  as  we  know  it,  and  probably  against  British 
liberal  institutions  as  a  principal  mainstay  of  that  civilisation. 
Yet  if  our  institutions,  and  Western  civilisation  with  them, 
are  to  withstand  the  present  onslaught,  they  must  be  defended. 
....  We  never  doubted  the  staunchness  and  vigour  of  Eng- 
land six  years  ago,  and  we  doubt  them  as  little  to-day.'  ^ 

And  so  we  must  have  even  larger  armaments  than  ever. 
Field-Marshal  Earl  Haig  and  Field-Marshal  Sir  Henry 
Wilson  in  England,  Marshal  Foch  in  France,  General  Leonard 
Wood  in  America,  all  urge  that  it  will  be  indispensable  to 
maintain  our  armaments  at  more  than  the  pre-war  scale.  The 
ink  of  the  Armistice  was  barely  dry  before  the  Daily  Mail 
published  a  long  interview  with  Marshal  Foch  ^  in  the  course 
of  which  the  Generalissimo  enlarged  on  the  'inevitability'  of 
war  in  the  future  and  the  need  of  being  'prepared  for  it.' 
Lord  Haig.  in  his  Rectorial  Address  at  St  Andrews  (May 
14th,  1919)  followed  with  the  plea  that  as  'the  seeds  of  future 
conflict  are  to  be  found  in  every  quarter,  only  waiting  the  right 
condition,  moral,  economic,  political,  to  burst  once  more  into 

» July  31st,  1920.  'April  19th,  1919. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  121 

activity,*  every  man  in  the  country  must  immediately  be  trained 
for  war.    The  MaU,  supporting  his  plea,  said: — 

'We  all  desire  peace,  but  we  cannot,  even  in  the  hour  of  com- 
plete victory,  disregard  the  injunction  uttered  by  our  first 
soldier,  that  "only  by  adequate  preparation  for  war  can  peace 
in  every  way  be  guaranteed." 

*  "A  strong  citizen  army  on  strong  territorial  lines,"  is  the 
advice  Sir  Douglas  Haig  urges  on  the  country.  A  system 
providing  twelve  months'  military  training  for  every  man  in 
the  country  should  be  seriously  thought  of  .  .  .  Morally  and 
physically  the  War  has  shown  us  that  the  effect  of  discipline 
upon  the  youths  of  the  country  is  an  asset  beyond  calculation.* 

So  that  the  victory  which  was  to  end  the  'trampling  and  drill- 
ing foolery*  is  made  a  plea  for  the  institution  of  permanent  con- 
scription in  England,  where,  before  the  victory,  it  did  not  exist. 

The  admission  involved  in  this  recommendation,  the  admis- 
sion that  destruction  of  German  power  has  failed  to  give  us 
security,  is  as  complete  as  it  well  could  be. 

If  this  was  merely  the  exuberant  zeal  of  professional  soldiers, 
we  might  perhaps  disregard  these  declarations.  But  the  con- 
viction of  the  soldiers  is  reflected  in  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment. At  a  time  when  the  financial  difficulties  of  all  the  Allied 
countries  are  admittedly  enormous,  when  the  bankruptcy  of 
some  is  a  contingency  freely  discussed,  and  when  the  need  of 
economy  is  the  refrain  everywhere,  there  is  not  an  Allied  State 
which  is  not  to-day  spending  more  upon  military  and  naval 
preparations  than  it  was  spending  before  the  destruction  of  the 
German  power  began.  America  is  preparing  to  build  a  bigger 
fleet  than  she  has  ever  had  in  her  history  ^ — a  larger  fleet  than 

*A  Reuter  Despatch  dated  August  31st,  1920,  says: — 
*  Speaking  to-day  at  Charleston  (West  Virginia)  Mr  Daniels,  U.  S. 
Naval  Secretary,  said :  "We  arc  building  enormous  docks  and  are  con- 
structing 18  dreadnoughts  and  battle  cruisers,  with  a  dozen  other  power- 
ful ships  which  in  effective  fighting  power  will  give  our  navy  world 
primacy." ' 


122  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  German  armada,  which  was  for  most  Englishmen  perhaps 
the  decisive  demonstration  of  Germany's  hostile  intent.  Britain 
on  her  side  has  at  present  a  larger  naval  budget  than  that  of 
the  year  which  preceded  the  War ;  while  for  the  new  war  instru- 
ment of  aviation  she  has  a  building  programme  more  costly 
than  the  shipbuilding  programmes  of  pre-war  time.  France 
is  to-day  spending  more  on  her  army  than  before  the  War; 
spending,  indeed,  upon  it  now  a  sum  larger  than  that  which 
she  spent  upon  the  whole  of  her  Government  when  German 
militarism  was  undestroyed. 

Despite  all  this  power  possessed  by  the  members  of  the 
Alliance,  the  predominant  note  in  current  political  criticism  is 
that  Germany  is  evading  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, that  in  the  payment  of  the  indemnity,  the  punishment 
of  military  criminals,  and  disarmament,  the  Treaty  is  a  dead 
letter,  and  the  Allies  are  powerless.  As  the  Times  reminds  us, 
the  very  keystone  of  the  Treaty,  in  the  independence  of  Poland, 
trembles. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  recall  the  fashion  in  which  we  thought 
and  wrote  of  the  German  menace  before  and  during  the  War. 
The  following  from  The  New  Europe  (which  had  taken  as 
its  device  *La  Victoire  Integrale')  will  be  recognised  as 
typical : — 

'It  is  of  vital  importance  to  us  to  understand,  not  only  Ger- 
many's aims,  but  the  process  by  which  she  hopes  to  carry 
them  through.  If  Germany  wins,  she  will  not  rest  content 
with  this  victory.  Her  next  object  will  be  to  prepare  for 
further  victories  both  in  Asia  and  in  Central  and  Western 
Europe. 

'Those  who  still  cherish  the  belief  that  Prussia  is  pacifist 
show  a  profound  misunderstanding  of  her  psychology.  .  .  . 
On  this  point  the  Junkers  have  been  frank:  those  who  h^ve 
not  been  frank  are  the  wiseacres  who  try  to  persuade  us  that 
we  can  moderate  their  attitude  by  making  peace  with  them. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  123 

If  they  would  only  pay  a  little  more  attention  to  the  Junkers' 
avowed  objects,  and  a  little  less  attention  to  their  own  theories 
about  those  objects,  they  would  be  more  useful  guides  to 
public  opinion  in  this  country,  which  finds  itself  hopelessly 
at  sea  on  the  subject  of  Prussianism.. 

'What  then  are  Germany's  objects?  What  is  likely  to  be 
her  view  of  the  general  situation  in  Europe  at  the  present 
moment?  .  .  .  Whatever  modifications  she  may  have  intro- 
duced into  her  immediate  programme,  she  still  clings  to  her 
desire  to  overthrow  our  present  civilisation  in  Europe,  and  to 
introduce  her  own  on  the  ruins  of  the  old  order.  .  .  . 

'Buoyed  up  by  recent  successes  .  .  .  her  offers  of  peace  will 
become  more  insistent  and  more  difficult  to  refuse.  Influ- 
ences will  clamour  for  the  resumption  of  peace  on  economic 
and  financial  grounds.  .  .  .  We  venture  to  say  that  it  will  be 
very  difficult  for  any  Government  to  resist  this  pressure,  and, 
unless  the  danger  of  coming  to  terms  with  Germany  is  very 
clearly  and  strongly  put  before  the  public,  we  may  find  our- 
selves  caught  in  the  snares  that  Germany  has  for  a  long  time 
past  been  laying  for  us. 

.  .  .  'We  shall  be  told  that  once  peace  is  concluded  the 
Junkers  will  become  moderate,  and  all  those  who  wish  to  be- 
lieve this  will  readily  accept  it  without  further  question. 

'But,  while  we  in  our  innocence  may  be  priding  ourselves 
on  the  conclusion  of  peace  to  Germany  it  will  not  be  a  peace, 
but  a  "respite."  .  .  .  This  "respite"  will  be  exceedingly 
useful  to  Germany  not  only  for  propaganda  purposes,  but  in 
order  to  replenish  her  exhausted  resources  necessary  for 
future  aggression.  Meanwhile  German  activities  in  Asia  and 
Ireland  are  likely  to  continue  unabated  until  the  maximum 
inconvenience  to  England  has  been  produced.* 

If  the  reader  will  carry  his  mind  back  a  couple  of  years,  he 
will  recall  having  read  numberless  articles  similar  to  the  above, 
concerning  the  duty  of  annihilating    the  power  of  Germany. 


124  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Well,  will  the  reader  note  that  the  above  does  not  refer  to 
Germany  at  all,  but  to  Russia?  I  have  perpetrated  a  little 
forgery  for  his  enlightenment.  In  order  to  bring  home  the 
rapidity  with  which  a  change  of  roles  can  be  accomplished, 
an  article  warning  us  against  any  peace  with  Russia,  appearing 
in  the  New  Europe  of  January  8th,  1920,  has  been  reproduced 
word  for  word,  except  that  'Russia'  or  'Lenin'  has  been  changed 
to  'Germany'  or  'the  Junkers,'  as  the  case  may  be. 

Now  let  us  see  what  this  writer  has  to  say  as  to  the  German 
power  to-day? 

Well,  he  says  that  the  security  of  civilisation  now  depends 
upon  the  restoration,  in  part  at  least,  of  that  German  power, 
for  the  destruction  of  which  the  world  gave  twenty  million 
lives.  The  danger  to  civilisation  now  is  mainly  'the  breach 
between  Germany  and  the  West,  and  the  rivalries  of  national- 
ism.'   Lenin,  plotting  our  destruction,  relies  mainly  on  that : — 

*Above  all  we  may  be  sure  that  his  attention  is  concentrated 
on  England  and  Germany.  So  long  as  Germany  remains  aloof 
and  feelings  of  bitterness  against  the  Allies  are  allowed  to 
grow  still  more  acute,  Lenin  can  rub  his  hands  with  glee ;  what 
he  fears  more  than  anything  is  the  first  sign  that  the  sores 
caused  by  five  years  of  war  are  being  healed,  and  that  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Germany  are  preparing  to  treat  one  another 
as  neighbours,  who  have  each  their  several  parts  to  play  in 
the  restoration  of    normal  economic  conditions  in  Europe.' 

As  to  the  policy  of  preventing  Germany's  economic  restora- 
tion for  fear  that  she  should  once  more  possess  the  raw  material 
of  military  power,  this  writer  declares  that  it  is  precisely  that 
Carthaginian  policy  (embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles) 
which  Lenin  would  most  of  all  desire : — 

'As  a  trained  economist  we  may  be  sure  that  he  looks  first 
and   foremost  at  the  widespread  economic  chaos.     We   can 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  125 

imagine  his  chuckle  of  satisfaction  when  he  sees  the  European 
exchanges  getting  steadily  worse  and  national  antagonisms 
growing  more  acute.  Disputes  about  territorial  questions  are 
to  him  so  much  grist  to  the  Bolshevik  mill,  as  they  all  tend  to 
obscure  the  fundamental  question  of  the  economic  reconstruc- 
tion of  Europe,  without  which  no  country  in  Europe  can  con- 
sider itself  safe  from  Bolshevism. 

'He  must  realise  to  the  full  the  lamentable  condition  of  the 
finances  of  the  new  States  in  Central  and  South-east  Europe.' 

In  putting  forward  these  views,  The  New  Europe  is  by  no 
means  alone.  Already  in  January,  1920,  Mr  J.  L.  Garvin  had 
declared  what  indeed  was  obvious,  that  it  was  out  of  the 
question  to  expect  to  build  a  new  Europe  on  the  simultaneous 
hostility  of  Germany  and  Russia. 

'Let  us  face  the  main  fact.  If  there  is  to  be  no  peace  with 
the  Bolshevists  there  must  be  an  altogether  different  under- 
standing with  Germany.  .  .  .  For  any  sure  and  solid  harrier 
against  the  external  consequences  of  Bolshevism  Germany  is 
essential' 

Barely  six  months  later  Mr  Winston  Churchill,  Secretary 
of  State  for  War  in  the  British  Cabinet,  chooses  the  Evening 
News,  probably  the  arch-Hun-Hater  of  all  the  English  Press, 
to  open  out  the  new  policy  of  Alliance  with  Germany  against 
Russia.    He  says: — 

'It  will  be  open  to  the  Germans  ...  by  a  supreme  effort 
of  sobriety,  of  firmness,  of  self-restraint,  and  of  courage — 
undertaken,  as  most  great  exploits  have  to  be,  under  conditions 
of  peculiar  difficulty  and  discouragement — ^to  build  a  dyke  of 
peaceful,  lawful,  patient  strength  and  virtue  against  the  flood 
of  red  barbarism  flowing  from  the  East,  and  thus  safeguard 
their  own  interests  and  the  interests  of  their  principle  antag- 
onists in  the  West. 


126  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

*If  the  Germans  were  able  to  render  such  a  service,  not  by 
vainglorious  military  adventure  or  with  ulterior  motives,  they 
would  unquestionably  have  taken  a  giant  step  upon  that  path 
of  self -redemption  which  would  lead  them  surely  and  swiftly 
as  the  years  pass  by  to  their  own  great  place  in  the  councils 
of  Christendom,  and  would  have  rendered  easier  the  sincere 
coHDperation  between  Britain,  France,  and  Germany,  on  which 
the  very  salvation  of  Europe  depends.* 

So  the  salvation  of  Europe  depends  upon  our  co-operation 
with  Germany,  upon  a  German  dyke  of  'patient  strength.'  ^ 

One  wonders  why  we  devoted  quite  so  many  lives  and  so 
much  agony  to  knocking  Germany  out ;  and  why  we  furnished 
quite  so  much  treasure  to  the  military  equipment  of  the  very 
Muscovite  'barbarians'  who  now  threaten  to  overflow  it. 

One  wonders  also,  why,  if  'the  very  salvation  of  Europe'  in 
July,  1920,  depends  upon  sincere  co-operation  of  the  Entente 
with  Germany,  those  Allies  were  a  year  earlier  exacting  by  force 
her  signature  to  a  Treaty  which  not  even  its  authors  pretended 
was  compatible  with  German  reconciliation. 

If  the  Germans  are  to  fulfil  the  role  Mr  Churchill  assigns 
to  them,  then  obviously  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  must  be  torn 
up.  If  they  are  to  be  the  'dyke'  protecting  Western  civilisation 
against  the  Red  military  flood,  it  must,  according  to  the 
Churchillian  philosophy,  be  a  military  dyke:  the  disarmament 
clauses  must  be  abolished,  as  must  the  other  clauses — ^particu- 
larly the  economic  ones — ^which  would  make  of  any  people 
suffering  from  them  the  bitter  enemy  of  the  people  that  imposed 
them.  Our  Press  is  just  now  full  of  stories  of  secret  Treaties 
between  Germany  and  Russia  against  France  and  England. 
Whether  the  stories  are  true  or  not,  it  is  certain  that  the  effect 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  Allied  policy  to  Russia  will 
be    to    create    a    Russo-German    understanding.      And    Mr 

*We  are  once  more  back  to  the  Car  ly lean  'deep,  patient  .  .  .  vir- 
tuous   .    .    .    Germany.' 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  127 

Churchill  (phase  1920)  has  undoubtedly  indicated  the  alter- 
natives. If  you  are  going  to  nght  Russia  to  the  death,  then  you 
must  make  friends  with  Germany;  if  you  are  going  to  main- 
tain the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  then  you  must  make  friends  with 
Russia.    You  must  'trust*  either  the  Boche  or  the  Bolshevist. 

Popular  feeling  at  this  moment  (or  rather  the  type  of  feeling 
envisaged  by  the  Northcliffe  Press)  won't  do  either.  Boche 
and  Bolshevist  alike  are  'vermin'  to  be  utterly  crushed,  and  any 
policy  implying  co-operation  with  either  is  ruled  out.  'Force 
.  .  .  force  to  the  uttermost'  against  both  is  demanded  by  the 
Times,  the  Daily  Mail,  and  the  various  evening,  weekly,  or 
monthly  editions  thereof. 

Very  well.  Let  us  examine  the  proposal  to  'hold  down'  by 
force  both  Russia  and  Germany.  Beyond  Russia  there  is  Asia, 
particularly  India.    The  New  Europe  writer  reminds  us : — 

'  ...  If  England  cannot  be  subdued  by  a  direct  attack,  she 
is,  at  any  rate,  vulnerable  in  Asia,  and  it  is  here  that  Lenin  is 
preparing  to  deliver  his  real  propaganda  offensive.  During 
the  last  few  months  more  and  more  attention  has  been  paid  to 
Asiatic  propaganda,  and  this  will  not  be  abandoned,  no  matter 
what  temporary  arrangements  the  Soviet  Government  may  at- 
tempt to  make  with  Western  Europe.  It  is  here,  and  here  only, 
that  England  can  be  wounded,  so  that  she  may  be  counted  out 
of  the  forth-coming  revolutionary  struggle  in  Europe  that  Lenin 
is  preparing  to  engage  in  at  a  later  date.  .  .  . 

'We  should  find  ourselves  so  much  occupied  in  maintaining 
order  in  Asia  that  we  should  have  little  time  or  energy  left  for 
interfering  in  Europe.* 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  know  how  great  are  the  forces  that 

can  be  absorbed^  when  the  territory  for  subjection  stretches 

*  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  in  a  memo- 
randum dated  December  1st,  1919,  which  appears  in  a  Blue  Book  on  'the 
Evacuation  of  North  Russia,  1919,'  says: — 'There  is  one  great  lesson  to 
be  learned  from  the  history  of  the  campaign.  •  ,•  .•  It  is  that  once  a 
military  force  is  involved  in  operations  on  land  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  limit  the  magnitude  of  its  commitments.' 


128  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

from  Archangel  to  the  Deccan — ^through  Syria,  Arabia, 
Mesopotamia,  Egypt,  Persia,  Afghanistan.  Our  experience 
in  Archangel,  Murmansk,  Vladivostock,  and  with  Koltchak, 
Denikin,  and  Wrangel  shows  that  the  military  method  must 
be  thorough  or  it  will  fail.  It  is  no  good  hoping  that  a  supply 
of  surplus  ammunition  to  a  counter-revolutionary  general  will 
subdue  a  country  like  Russia.  The  only  safe  and  thorough- 
going plan  is  complete  occupation — or  a  very  extended  occu- 
pation— of  both  countries.  M.  Qemenceau  definitely  favoured 
this  course,  as  did  nearly  all  the  military-minded  groups  in 
England  and  America,  when  the  Russian  policy  was  dis- 
cussed at  the  end  of  1918  and  early  in  1919. 

Why  was  that  policy  not  carried  out? 

The  history  of  the  thing  is  clear  enough.  That  policy 
would  have  called  upon  the  resources  in  men  and  material 
of  the  whole  of  the  Alliance,  not  merely  those  of  the  Big 
Four,  but  of  Poland,  Czecho- Slovakia,  Yugo-Slavia,  Italy, 
Greece,  and  Japan  as  well.  The  'March  to  Berlin  and  Mos- 
cow' which  so  many,  even  in  England  and  America,  were 
demanding  at  the  time  of  the  Armistice  would  not  have  been  the 
march  of  British  Grenadiers ;  nor  the  succeeding  occupation  one 
like  that  of  Egypt  or  India.  Operations  on  that  scale  would 
have  brought  in  sooner  or  later  (indeed,  much  smaller  opera- 
tions have  already  brought  in)  the  forces  of  nations  in  bitter 
conflict  the  one  with  the  other.  We  know  what  the  occupa- 
tion of  Ireland  by  British  troops  has  meant.  Imagine  an 
Ireland  multiplied  many  times,  occupied  not  only  by  British 
but  by  'Allied'  troops — British  side  by  side  with  Senegalese 
negroes,  Italians  with  Yugo-Slavs,  Poles  with  Czecho- Slovaks 
and  White  Russians,  Americans  with  Japanese.  Remember, 
moreover,  how  far  the  disintegration  of  the  Alliance  had  al- 
ready advanced.  The  European  member  of  the  Alliance  great- 
est in  its  potential  resources,  human  and  material,  was  of  course 
the  very  country  against  which  it  was  now  proposed  to  act; 
the  'steamroller'  had  now  to  be  destroyed  ...  by  the  Allies. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  129 

America,  the  member  of  the  Alliance,  which,  at  the  time  of 
the  Armistice,  represented  the  greatest  unit  of  actual  material 
force,  had  withdrawn  into  a  nationalist  isolation  from,  and 
even  hostility  to,  the  European  Allies.  Japan  was  pursuing 
a  line  of  policy  which  rendered  increasingly  difficult  the  active 
co-operation  of  certain  of  the  Western  democracies  with  her; 
her  policy  had  already  involved  her  in  declared  and  open  hos- 
tility to  the  other  Asiatic  clement  of  the  Alliance,  China.  Italy 
was  in  a  state  of  bitter  hostility  to  the  nationality — Greater 
Serbia — whose  defence  was  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  War, 
and  was  soon  to  mark  her  feeling  towards  the  peace  by  re- 
turning to  power  the  Minister  who  had  opposed  Italy's  en- 
trance into  the  War;  a  situation  which  we  shall  best  under- 
stand if  we  imagine  a  'pro-German*  (say,  for  instance,  Lord 
Morley,  or  Mr  Ramsay  MacDonald,  or  Mr  Philip  Snowden) 
being  made  Prime  Minister  of  England.  What  may  be  termed 
the  minor  Allies,  Yugo-Slavia,  Czecho-SIovakia,  Rumania, 
Greece,  Poland,  the  lesser  Border  States,  the  Arab  kingdom 
that  we  erected,  were  drifting  towards  the  entangling  conflicts 
which  have  since  broken  out.  Already,  at  a  time  when  the  Quai 
d'Orsay  and  Carmelite  House  were  both  clamouring  for  what 
must  have  meant  in  practice  the  occupation  of  both  Germany 
and  Russia,  the  Alliance  had  in  fact  disintegrated,  and  some 
of  its  main  elements  were  in  bitter  conflict.  The  picture  of 
a  solid  alliance  of  pacific  and  liberal  democracies  standing  for 
the  maintenance  of  an  orderly  European  freedom  against 
German  attacks  had  completely  faded  away.  Of  the  Grand 
Alliance  of  twenty-four  States  as  a  combination  of  power 
pledged  to  a  common  purpose,  there  remained  just  France  and 
England — and  their  relations,  too,  were  becoming  daily  worse ; 
in  fundamental  disagreement  over  Poland,  Turkey,  Syria,  the 
Balkan  States,  Austria,  and  Germany  itself,  its  indemnities, 
and  its  economic  treatment  generally.  Was  this  the  instru- 
ment for  the  conquest  of  half  a  world? 

But  the  political  disintegration  of  the  Alliance  was  not  the 


130  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

only  obstacle  to  a  thorough-going  application  of  military 
force  to  the  problem  of  Germany  and  Russia. 

By  the  very  terms  of  the  theory  of  security  by  prepon- 
derant power,  Germany  had  to  be  weakened  economically,  for 
her  subjugation  could  never  be  secure  if  she  were  permitted 
to  maintain  an  elaborate,  nationally  organised  economic  ma- 
chinery, which  not  only  gives  immense  powers  of  production, 
capable  without  great  difficulty  of  being  transformed  to  the 
production  of  military  material,  but  which,  through  the  or- 
ganisation of  foreign  trade,  gives  influence  in  countries  like 
Russia,  the  Balkans,  the  Near  and  Far  East. 

So  part  of  the  policy  of  Versailles,  reflected  in  the  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  already  dealt  with,  was  to  check  the  economic 
recovery  of  Germany  and  more  particularly  to  prevent  econo- 
mic co-operation  between  that  country  and  Russia.  That 
Russia  should  become  a  'German  Colony'  was  a  nightmare 
that  haunted  the  minds  of  the  French  peace-makers.^ 

But,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to  prevent  the  economic  co- 
operation of  Germany  and  Russia  meant  the  perpetuation  of 
the  economic  paralysis  of  Europe.     Combined  with  the  main- 


*  And  Russo-German  co-operation  is  of  course  precisely  what  French 
policy  must  create.    Says  an  American  critic : — 

'France  certainly  carries  a  big  stick,  but  she  does  not  speak  softly; 
she  takes  her  own  part,  but  she  seems  to  fear  neither  God  nor  the  revul- 
sion of  man.  Yet  she  has  reason  to  fear.  Suppose  she  succeeds  for 
a  while  in  reducing  Germany  to  servitude  and  Russia  to  a  dictatorship 
of  the  Right,  in  securing  her  own  dominion  on  the  Continent  as  over- 
lord by  the  petty  States  of  Europe.  What  then?  What  can  be  the 
consequence  of  a  common  hostility  of  the  Teutonic  and  Slavonic  peo- 
ples, except  in  the  end  common  action  on  their  part  to  throw  off  an 
intolerable  yoke?  The  nightmare  of  a  militant  Russo-German  alliance 
becomes  daily  a  more  sinister  prophecy,  as  France  teaches  the  people  of 
Europe  that  force  alone  is  the  solvent  France  has  only  to  convince 
all  of  Germany  that  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  will  be  enforced  in  all  its 
rigour,  which  means  occupation  of  the  Ruhr  and  the  loss  of  Silesia,  to 
destroy  the  final  resistance  of  those  Germans  who  look  to  the  West 
rather  than  to  the  East  for  salvation.  Let  it  be  known  that  the  barrier 
of  the  Rhine  is  all  bayonet  and  threat,  and  western-minded  Germany 
must  go  down  before  the  easterners,  Communist  or  Junker.  It  will  not 
matter  greatly  which.'    {New  Republic,  Sept  ISth,  1920). 


■  MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  131 

tenance  of  the  blockade  it  would  certainly  have  meant  utter 
and  perhaps  irretrievable  collapse. 

Perhaps  the  Allies  at  the  beginning  of  1919  were  in  no  mood 
to  be  greatly  disturbed  by  the  prospect.  But  they  soon  learned 
that  it  had  a  very  close  bearing  both  on  the  aims  which  they 
had  set  before  themselves  in  the  Treaty  and,  indeed,  on  the 
very  problem  of  maintaining  military  predominance. 

In  theory,  of  course,  an  army  of  occupation  should  live  on 
the  occupied  country.  But  it  soon  became  evident  that  it  was 
quite  out  of  the  question  to  collect  even  the  cost  of  the  armies 
for  the  limited  occupation  of  the  Rhine  territories  from  a 
country  whose  industrial  life  was  paralysed  by  blockade. 
Moreover,  the  costs  of  the  German  occupation  were  very  sen- 
sibly increased  by  the  fact  of  the  Russian  blockade.  Deprived 
of  Russian  wheat  and  other  products,  the  cost  of  living  in 
Western  Europe  was  steadily  rising,  the  social  unrest  was  in 
consequence  increasing,  and  it  was  vitally  necessary,  if  some- 
thing like  the  old  European  life  was  to  be  restored,  that  pro- 
duction should  be  restarted  as  rapidly  as  possible.  We  found 
that  a  blockade  of  Russia  which  cut  off  Russian  foodstuffs 
from  Western  Europe,  was  also  a  blockade  of  ourselves.  But 
the  blockade,  as  we  have  seen,  was  not  the  only  economic 
device  used  as  a  part  of  military  pressure:  the  old  economic 
nerves  between  Germany  and  her  neighbours  had  been  cut 
out  and  the  creeping  paralysis  of  Europe  was  spreading  in 
every  direction.  There  was  not  a  belligerent  State  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe  that  was  solvent  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term — able,  that  is,  to  discharge  its  obligations  in  the  gold 
money  in  which  it  had  contracted  them.  All  had  resorted  to 
the  shifts  of  paper — fictitious — money,  and  the  debacle  of  the 
exchanges  was  already  setting  in.  Whence  were  to  come  the 
costs  of  the  forces  and  armies  of  occupation  necessitated  by 
the  policy  of  complete  conquest  of  Russia  and  Germany  at  the 
same  time? 

When,  therefore  (according  to  a  story  current  at  the  time), 


132  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

President  Wilson,  following  the  announcement  that  France 
stood  for  the  military  coercion  of  Russia,  asked  each  Ally  in 
turn  how  many  troops  and  how  much  of  the  cost  it  would 
provide,  each  replied :  'None.*  It  was  patent,  indeed,  that  the 
resources  of  an  economically  paralysed  Western  Europe  were 
not  adequate  to  this  enterprise.  A  half-way  course  was 
adopted.  Britain  supplied  certain  counter-revolutionary  gen- 
erals with  a  very  considerable  quantity  of  surplus  stores,  and 
a  few  military  missions;  France  adopted  the  policy  of  using 
satellite  States — Poland,  Rumania,  and  even  Hungary — as  her 
tools.    The  result  we  know. 

Meantime,  the  economic  and  financial  situation  at  home  (in 
France  and  Italy)  was  becoming  desperate.  France  needed 
coal,  building  material,  money.  None  of  these  things  could 
be  obtained  from  a  blockaded,  starving,  and  restless  Germany. 
One  day,  doubtless,  Germany  will  be  able  to  pay  for  the  armies 
of  occupation;  but  it  will  be  a  Germany  whose  workers  are 
fed  and  clothed  and  warmed,  whose  railways  have  adequate 
rolling  stock,  whose  fields  are  not  destitute  of  machines,  and 
factories  of  coal  and  the  raw  materials  of  production.  In 
other  words,  it  will  be  a  strong  and  organised  Germany,  and, 
if  occupied  by  alien  troops,  most  certainly  a  nationalist  and 
hostile  Germany,  dangerous  and  difficult  to  watch,  however 
much  disarmed. 

But  there  was  a  further  force  which  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments found  themselves  compelled  to  take  into  consideration 
in  settling  their  military  policy  at  the  time  of  the  Armistice. 
In  addition  to  the  economic  and  financial  difficulties  which 
compelled  them  to  refrain  from  large  scale  operations  in 
Russia  and  perhaps  in  Germany;  in  addition  to  the  clash  of 
rival  nationalisms  among  the  Allies,  which  was  already  intro- 
ducing such  serious  rifts  into  the  Alliance,  there  was  a  further 
element  of  weakness — revolutionary  unrest,  the  'Bolshevik' 
fever. 

In  December,  1918,  the  British  Government  was  confronted 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  133 

by  the  refusal  of  soldiers  at  Dover,  who  believed  that  they  were 
being  sent  to  Russia,  to  embark.  A  month  or  two  later  the 
French  Government  was  faced  by  a  naval  mutiny  at  Odessa. 
American  soldiers  in  Siberia  refused  to  go  into  action  against 
the  Russians.  Still  later,  in  Italy,  the  workers  enforced  their 
decision  not  to  handle  munitions  for  Russia,  by  widespread 
strikes.  Whether  the  attempt  to  obtain  troops  in  very  large 
quantities  for  a  Russian  war,  involving  casualties  and  sacri- 
fices on  a  considerable  scale,  would  have  meant  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1919  military  revolts,  or  Commimist,  Spartacist,  or 
Bolshevik  revolutionary  movements,  or  not,  the  Governments 
were  evidently  not  prepared  to  face  the  issue. 

We  have  seen,  therefore,  that  the  blockade  and  the  econo- 
mic weakening  of  our  enemy  are  two-edged  weapons,  only 
of  effective  use  within  very  definite  limits;  that  these  limits 
in  turn  condition  in  some  degree  the  employment  of  more 
purely  military  instruments  like  the  occupation  of  hostile  ter- 
ritory; and  indeed  condition  the  provision  of  the  instruments. 

The  power  basis  of  the  Alliance,  such  as  it  is,  has  been,  since 
the  Armistice,  the  naval  power  of  England,  exercised  through 
the  blockades,  and  the  military  force  of  France  exercised 
mainly  through  the  management  of  satellite  armies.  The 
British  method  has  involved  the  greater  immediate  cruelty  (per- 
haps a  greater  extent  and  degree  of  suffering  imposed  upon 
the  weak  and  helpless  than  any  coercive  device  yet  discovered 
by  man)  though  the  French  has  involved  a  more  direct  nega- 
tion of  the  aims  for  which  the  War  was  fought.  French  policy 
aims  quite  frankly  at  the  re-imposition  of  France's  military 
hegemony  of  the  Continent.  That  aim  will  not  be  readily 
surrendered. 

Owing  to  the  division  in  Socialist  and  Labour  ranks,  to 
the  growing  fear  and  dislike  of  'confiscatory'  legislation,  by 
a  peasant  population  and  a  large  petit  rentier  class,  conserva- 
tive elements  are  bound  to  be  predominant  in  France  for  a 
long  time.    Those  elements  are  frankly  sceptical  of  any  League 


134  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  Nations  device.  A  League  of  Nations  would  rob  them 
of  what  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  a  NationaHst  called  'the 
Right  of  Victory/  But  the  alternative  to  a  League  as  a 
means  of  security  is  military  predominance,  and  France  has 
bent  her  energies  since  the  Armistice  to  securing  it.  To-day, 
the  military  predominance  of  France  on  the  Continent  is 
vastly  greater  than  that  of  Germany  ever  was.  Her  chief 
antagonist  is  not  only  disarmed — forbidden  to  manufacture 
heavy  artillery,  tanks  or  fighting  aircraft — ^but  as  we  have 
seen,  is  crippled  in  economic  life  by  the  loss  of  nearly  all  his 
iron  and  much  of  his  coal.  France  not  only  retains  her  arma- 
ment, but  is  to-day  spending  more  upon  it  than  before  the 
War.  The  expenditure  for  the  army  in  1920  amounted  to 
5000  millions  of  francs,  whereas  in  1914  it  was  only  1200 
millions.  Translate  this  expenditure  even  with  due  regard  to 
the  changed  price  level  into  terms  of  policy,  and  it  means, 
inter  alia,  that  the  Russo-Polish  war  and  Feisal's  deposition 
in  Syria  are  burdens  beyond  her  capacity.  And  this  is  only  the 
beginning.  Within  a  few  months  France  has  revived  the  full 
flower  of  the  Napoleonic  tradition  so  far  as  the  use  of  satellite 
military  States  is  concerned.  Poland  is  only  one  of  many  in- 
stnmients  now  being  industriously  fashioned  by  the  artisans 
of  the  French  military  renaissance.  In  the  Ukraine,  in  Hun- 
gary, in  Czecho-Slovakia,  in  Rumania,  in  Yugo-Slavia;  in 
Syria,  Greece,  Turkey,  and  Africa,  French  military  and  finan- 
cial organisers  are  at  work. 

M.  Clemenceau,  in  one  of  his  statements  to  the  Chamber  ^  on 
France's  future  policy,  outlined  the  method : — 

*We  have  said  that  we  would  create  a  system  of  barbed 
wire.  There  are  places  where  it  will  have  to  be  guarded  to  pre- 
vent Germany  from  passing.  There  txre  peoples  like  the  Poles, 
of  whom  I  spoke  just  now,  who  are  fighting  against  the 
Soviets,  who  are  resisting,  who  are  in  the  van  of  civilisation. 
*  December  23rd,  1919. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  135 

Well,  we  have  decided  ...  to  be  the  Allies  of  any  people 
attacked  by  the  Bolsheviks.  I  have  spoken  of  the  Poles,  of  the 
help  that  we  shall  certainly  get  from  them  in  case  of  necessity. 
Well,  they  are  fighting  at  this  moment  against  the  Bolsheviks, 
and  if  they  are  not  equal  to  the  task — but  they  will  be  equal  to 
it — the  help  which  we  shall  be  able  to  give  them  in  different 
ways,  and  which  we  are  actually  giving  them,  particularly 
in  the  form  of  military  supplies  and  uniforms — that  help  will 
be  continued.  There  is  a  Polish  army,  of  which  the  greater 
part  has  been  organised  and  instructed  by  French  officers. 
.  .  .  The  Polish  army  must  now  be  composed  of  from  450,000 
to  500,000  men.  If  you  look  on  the  map  at  the  geographical 
situation  of  this  military  force,  you  will  think  that  it  is  inter- 
esting from  every  point  of  view.  There  is  a  Czecho-Slovak 
army,  which  already  numbers  nearly  150,000  men,  well 
equipped,  well  armed,  and  capable  of  sustaining  all  the  tasks  of 
war.  Here  is  another  factor  on  which  we  can  count.  But 
I  count  on  many  other  elements.    I  count  on  Rumania.' 

Since  then  Hungary  has  been  added,  part  of  the  Hungarian 
plan  being  the  domination  of  Austria  by  Hungary,  and,  later, 
possibly  the  restoration  of  an  Austrian  Monarchy,  which  might 
help  to  detach  monarchical  and  clerical  Bavaria  from  Republi- 
can Germany.^     This  is  the  revival  of  the  old  French  policy 

*  The  Times  of  September  4th,  1920  reproduces  an  article  from  the 
Matin,  on  M.  Millerand's  policy  with  regard  to  small  States.  M, 
Millerand's  aim  was  that  economic  aid  should  ^o  hand  in  hand  with 
French  military  protection.  With  this  policy  in  view,  a  number  of  large 
businesses  rcently  passed  luider  French  control,  including  the  Skoda 
factory  in  Czecho-Slovakia,  big  works  at  Kattowitz  in  Upper  Silesia, 
the  firm  of  Huta-Bankowa  in  Poland,  railway  factories  in  Rumania, 
and  certain  river  systems  and  ports  in  Yugo-Slavia.  In  return  for 
assistance  to  Admiral  Horthy,  an  agreement  was  signed  whereby 
France  obtained  control  of  the  Hungarian  State  Railways,  of  the 
Credit  Bank,  the  Hungarian  river  system  and  the  port  of  Buda-pest. 
Other  reports  state  that  France  has  secured  85  per  cent,  of  the  oil-fields 
of  Poland,  in  return  for  her  help  at  the  time  of  the  threat  to  Warsaw. 
As  the  majority  of  shares  in  the  Polish  Oil  Company  'Galicia,'  which 
have  been  in  British  hands  until  recently,  have  been  bought  up  by  a 
French  Company,  the  'Franco-Polonaise,'  France  now  holds  an  im- 
portant weapon  of  international  policy. 


136  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  preventing  the  tmification  of  the  German  people.*  It  is  that 
aspiration  which  largely  explains  recent  French  sympathy  for 
Clericalism  and  Monarchism  and  the  reversal  of  the  policy 
heretofore  pursued  by  the  Third  Republic  towards  the  Vati- 
can. 

The  systematic  arming  of  African  negroes  reveals  some- 
thing of  Napoleon's  leaning  towards  the  military  exploitation  of 
servile  races.  We  are  probably  only  at  the  beginning  of  the 
arming  of  Africa's  black  millions.  They  are,  of  course,  an 
extremely  convenient  military  material.  French  or  British 
soldiers  might  have  scruples  against  service  in  a  war  upon  a 
Workers'  Republic.  Cannibals  from  the  African  forest  'con- 
scribed*  for  service  in  Europe  are  not  likely  to  have  political 
or  social  scruples  of  that  kind.  To  bring  some  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  these  Africans  to  Europe,  to  train  them  systemati- 
cally to  the  use  of  European  arms;  to  teach  them  that  the 
European  is  conquerable ;  to  put  them  in  the  position  of  victors 
over  a  vanquished  European  people — ^here  indeed  are  possibili- 
ties. With  Senegalese  negroes  having  their  quarters  in  Goethe's 
house,  and  placed,  if  not  in  authority,  at  least  as  the  instru- 
ments of  authority  over  the  population  of  a  European  university 
city;  and  with  the  Japanese  imposing  their  rule  upon  great 
stretches  of  what  was  yesterday  a  European  Empire  (and  our 
Ally)  a  new  page  may  well  have  opened  for  Europe. 

But  just  consider  the  chances  of  stability  for  power  based  on 


*  The  present  writer  would  like  to  enter  a  warning  here  that  nothing 
in  this  chapter  implies  that  we  should  disregard  France's  very  legiti- 
mate fears  of  a  revived  militarist  Germany.  The  implication  is  that 
she  is  going  the  right  way  about  to  create  the  very  dangers  that  terrify 
her.  If  this  were  the  place  to  discuss  alternative  policies,  I  should  cer- 
tainly go  on  to  urge  that  England — and  America — should  make  it  plain 
to  France  that  they  are  prepared  to  pledge  their  power  to  her  defence. 
More  than  that,  both  countries  should  offer  to  forgo  the  debts  owing 
to  them  by  France  on  condition  of  French  adhesion  to  more  workable 
European  arrangements.  The  last  thing  to  be  desired  is  a  rupture, 
or  a  mere  change  of  roles :  France  to  become  once  more  the  'enemy' 
and  Germany  once  more  the  'Ally.'  That  outcome  would  merely 
duplicate  the  weary  story  of  the  past 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  137 

the  assumption  of  continued  co-operation  of  a  number  of 
'intense'  nationalisms,  each  animated  by  its  sacred  egoisms. 
France  has  turned  to  this  policy  as  a  substitute  for  the  alliance 
of  two  or  three  great  States,  which  national  feeling  and  con- 
flicting interests  have  driven  apart.  Is  this  collection  of  mush- 
room republics  to  possess  a  stability  to  which  the  Entente 
could  not  attain? 

One  looks  over  the  list.  We  have,  it  is  true,  after  a  centurj', 
the  re-birth  of  Poland,  a  great  and  impressive  case  of  the  vin- 
dication of  national  right.  But  Poland,  yesterday  the  victim 
of  the  imperialist  oppressor,  has,  herself,  almost  in  a  few 
hours,  as  it  were,  acquired  an  imperialism  of  her  own.  The 
Pole  assures  us  that  his  nationality  can  only  be  secure  if  he 
is  given  dominion  over  territories  with  largely  non-Polish 
populations;  if,  that  is,  some  fifteen  millions  of  Ruthenes. 
Lithuanians,  Ukrainians,  Russians,  are  deprived  of  a  separate 
national  existence.  Italy,  it  is  true,  is  now  fully  redeemed; 
but  that  redemption  involves  the  'irredentism'  of  large  numbers 
of  German  Tyrolese,  Yugo-Slavs,  and  Greeks.  The  new  Aus- 
tria is  forbidden  to  federate  with  the  main  branch  of  the  race 
to  which  her  people  belong — ^though  federation  alone  can  save 
them  from  physical  extinction.  The  Czecho-Slovak  nation 
is  now  achieved,  but  only  at  the  expense  of  a  German  unre- 
deemed population  larger  numerically  than  that  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  And  Slovaks  and  Czechs  already  quarrel — ^many 
foresee  the  day  when  the  freed  State  will  face  its  own  rebels. 
The  Slovenes  and  Croats  and  the  Serbs  do  not  yet  make  a 
'nationality,'  and  threaten  to  fight  one  another  as  readily  as 
they  would  fight  the  Bulgarians  they  have  annexed  in  Bul- 
garian Macedonia.  Rumania  has  marked  her  redemption  by 
the  inclusion  of  considerable  Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  and  Ser- 
bian 'irredentisms'  within  her  new  borders.  Finland,  which 
with  Poland  typified  for  so  long  the  undying  struggle  for 
national  right,  is  to-day  determined  to  coerce  the  Swedes  on 
the  Aaland  Islands  and  the  Russians  on  the  Carelian  Territory. 


138  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Greek  rule  of  Turks  has  already  involved  retaliatory,  puni- 
tive, or  defensive  measures  which  have  needed  Blue  Book 
explanation.  Armenia,  Georgia,  and  Azerbaidjan  have  not  yet 
acquired  their  subject  nationalities. 

The  prospect  of  peace  and  security  for  these  nationalities 
may  be  gathered  in  some  measure  by  an  enumeration  of  the 
wars  which  have  actually  broken  out  since  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence met  in  Paris,  for  the  appeasement  of  Europe.  The  Poles 
have  fought  in  turn,  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  the  Ukrainians,  the 
Lithuanians,  and  the  Russians.  The  Ukrainians  have  fought 
the  Russians  and  the  Hungarians.  The  Finns  have  fought  the 
Russians,  as  have  also  the  Esthonians  and  the  Letts.  The 
Esthonians  and  Letts  have  also  fought  the  Baltic  Germans. 
The  Rumanians  have  fought  Hungary.  The  Greeks  have 
fought  the  Bulgarians  and  are  at  present  in  'full  dress'  war  with 
the  Turks.  The  Italians  have  fought  the  Albanians,  and  the 
Turks  in  Asia  Minor.  The  French  have  been  fighting  the 
Arabs  in  Syria  and  the  Turks  in  Cilicia.  The  various  British 
expeditions  or  missions,  naval  or  military,  in  Archangel,  Mur- 
mansk, the  Baltic,  the  Crimea,  Persia,  Siberia,  Turkestan, 
Mesopotamia,  Asia  Minor,  the  SOudan,  or  in  aid  of  Koltchak, 
Denikin,  Yudenitch,  or  Wrangel,  are  not  included  in  this  list 
as  not  arising  in  a  strict  sense  perhaps  out  of  nationality 
problems. 

Let  us  face  what  all  this  means  in  the  alignment  of  power 
in  the  world.  The  Europe  of  the  Grand  Alliance  is  a  Europe 
of  many  nationalities:  British,  French,  Italian,  Rumanian, 
Polish,  Czecho-Slovak,  Yugo-Slav,  Greek,  Belgian,  Magyar, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  others.  None  of  these  States  exceeds 
greatly  forty  millions  of  people,  and  the  populations  of  most 
are  very  much  less.  But  the  rival  group  of  Germany  and 
Russia,  making  between  them  over  two  hundred  millions, 
comprises  just  two  great  States.  And  contiguous  to  them, 
united  by  the  ties  of  common  hatreds,  lie  the  Mahomedan 
world  and   China.     Prusso- Slavdom    (combining   racial   ele- 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  139 

ments  having  common  qualities  of  amenity  to  autocratic  disci- 
pline) might  conceivably  give  a  lead  to  Chinese  and  other 
Asiatic  millions,  brought  to  hate  the  West.  The  opposing 
group  is  a  Balkanised  Europe  of  irreconcilable  national 
rivalries,  incapable,  because  of  those  rivalries,  of  any  prolonged 
common  action,  and  taking  a  religious  pride  in  the  fact  of  this 
incapacity  to  agree.  Its  moral  leaders,  or  many  of  them, 
certainly  its  powerful  and  popular  instrument  of  education, 
the  Press,  encourage  this  pugnacity,  regarding  any  effort 
towards  its  restraint  or  discipline  as  political  atheism;  deepen- 
ing the  tradition  which  would  make  'intense'  nationalism  a 
noble,  virile,  and  inspiring  attitude,  and  internationalism 
something  emasculate  and  despicable. 

We  talk  of  the  need  of  'protecting  European  civilisation' 
from  hostile  domination,  German  or  Russian.  It  is  a  danger. 
Other  great  civilisations  have  found  themselves  dominated 
by  alien  power.  Seeley  has  sketched  for  us  the  process  by 
which  a  vast  country  with  two  or  three  hundred  million  souls, 
not  savage  or  uncivilised  but  with  a  civilisation,  though  de- 
scending along  a  different  stream  of  tradition,  as  real  and 
ancient  as  our  own,  came  to  be  utterly  conquered  and  subdued 
by  a  people,  numbering  less  than  twelve  millions,  living  on 
the  other  side  of  the  world.  It  reversed  the  teaching  of  his- 
tory which  had  shown  again  and  again  that  it  was  impossible 
really  to  conquer  an  intelligent  people  alien  in  tradition  from 
its  invaders.  The  whole  power  of  Spain  could  not  in  eighty 
years  conquer  the  Dutch  provinces  with  their  petty  popula- 
tion. The  Swiss  could  not  be  conquered.  At  the  very  time 
when  the  conquest  of  India's  hundreds  of  millions  was  under 
way,  the  English  showed  themselves  wholly  unable  to  reduce 
to  obedience  three  millions  of  their  own  race  in  America. 
What  was  the  explanation?  The  Inherent  Superiority  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  Stock? 

For  long  we  were  content  to  draw  such  a  flattering  conclu- 
sion and  leave  it  at  that,  until  Seeley  pointed  out  the  uncom- 


140  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

fortable  fact  that  the  great  bulk  of  the  forces  used  in  the 
conquest  of  India  were  not  British  at  all.  They  were  Indian. 
India  was  conquered  for  Great  Britain  by  the  natives  of 
India. 

'The  nations  of  India  (says  Seeley)  have  been  conquered 
by  an  army  of  which,  on  the  average,  about  a  fifth  part  was 
English.  India  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  been  conquered  at 
all  by  foreigners;  she  was  rather  conquered  by  herself.  If 
we  were  justified,  which  we  are  not,  in  personifying  India 
as  we  personify  France  or  England,  we  could  not  describe  her 
as  overwhelmed  by  a  foreign  enemy;  we  should  rather  have 
to  say  that  she  elected  to  put  an  end  to  anarchy  by  submitting 
to  a  single  government,  even  though  that  government  were  in 
the  hands  of  foreigners.*  ^ 

In  other  words,  India  is  an  English  possession  because  the 
peoples  of  India  were  incapable  of  cohesion,  the  nations  of 
India  incapable  of  internationalism. 

The  peoples  of  India  include  some  of  the  best  fighting  stock 
in  the  world.  But  they  fought  one  another:  the  pugnacity 
and  material  power  they  personified  was  the  force  used  by 
their  conquerors  for  their  subjection. 

I  will  venture  to  quote  what  I  wrote  some  years  ago  touch- 
ing Seeley's  moral: — 

'Our  successful  defeat  of  tyranny  depends  upon  such  a 
development  of  the  sense  of  patriotism  among  the  democratic 
nations  that  it  will  attach  itself  rather  to  the  conception  of  the 
unity  of  all  free  co-operative  societies,  than  to  the  mere  geo- 
graphical and  racial  divisions;  a  development  that  will  enable 
it  to  organise  itself  as  a  cohesive  power  for  the  defence  of 
that  ideal,  by  the  use  of  all  the  forces,  moral  and  material, 
which  it  wields. 
*  The  Expansion  of  England,  p.  202. 


MILITARY  PREDOMINANCE  141 

'That  unity  is  impossible  on  the  basis  of  the  old  policies, 
the  European  statecraft  of  the  past.  For  that  assumes  a 
condition  of  the  world  in  which  each  State  must  look  for  its 
national  security  to  its  own  isolated  strength;  and  such  as- 
sumption compels  each  member,  as  a  measure  of  national  self- 
preservation,  and  so  justifiably,  to  take  precaution  against  drift- 
ing into  a  position  of  inferior  power,  compels  it,  that  is,  to  enter 
into  a  competition  for  the  sources  of  strength — ^territory  and 
strategic  position.  Such  a  condition  will  inevitably,  in  the  case 
of  any  considerable  alliance,  produce  a  situation  in  which 
some  of  its  members  will  be  brought  into  conflict  by  claims 
for  the  same  territory.  In  the  end,  that  will  inevitably  disrupt 
the  Alliance. 

'The  price  of  the  preservation  of  nationality  is  a  workable 
internationalism.  If  this  latter  is  not  possible  then  the  smaller 
nationalities  are  doomed.  Thus,  though  internationalism  may 
not  be  in  the  case  of  every  member  of  the  Alliance  the  object 
of  war,  it  is  the  condition  of  its  success.* 


CHAPTER  V 

PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  IN  WAR  AND  PEACE 

In  the  preceding  chapter  attention  has  been  called  to  a  phe- 
nomenon which  is  nothing  short  of  a  'moral  miracle'  if  our 
ordinary  reading  of  war  psychology  is  correct.  The  phenome- 
non in  question  is  the  very  definite  and  sudden  worsening  of 
Anglo-American  relations,  following  upon  common  suffering 
on  the  same  battle-fields,  our  soldiers  fighting  side  by  side; 
an  experience  which  we  commonly  assume  should  weld  friend- 
ship as  nothing  else  could.^ 

This  miracle  has  its  replica  within  the  nation  itself :  intense 
industrial  strife,  class  warfare,  revolution,  embittered  rivalries, 
following  upon  a  war  which  in  its  early  days  our  moralists 
almost  to  a  man  declared  at  least  to  have  this  great  consolation, 
that  it  achieved  the  moral  unity  of  the  nation.  Pastor  and 
poet,  statesman  and  professor  alike  rejoiced  in  this  spiritual 
consolidation  which  dangers  faced  in  common  had  brought 
about.  Never  again  was  the  nation  to  be  riven  by  the  old 
differences.  None  was  now  for  party  and  all  were  for  the 
State.    We  had  achieved  the  'union  sacree'  .  .  .  'duke's  son, 

*  The  assumption  marks  even  post-war  rhetoric.  M.  Millerand's  mes- 
sage to  the  Senate  and  Chamber  upon  his  election  as  President  of  the 
Republic  says :  'True  to  the  Alliances  for  ever  cemented  by  blood  shed 
in  common,'  France  will  strictly  enforce  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  'a 
new  charter  of  Europe  and  the  World.'  (Times,  Sept.  27th,  1920). 
The  passage  is  typical  of  the  moral  fact  dealt  with  in  this  chapter.  M. 
Millerand  knows,  his  hearers  know,  that  the  war  Alliance  'for  ever 
cemented  by  blood  shed  in  common,'  has  already  ceased  to  exist.  But 
the  admission  of  this  patent  fact  would  be  fatal  to  the  'blood'  heroics. 

142 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  143 

cook's  son.*  On  this  ground  alone  many  a  bishop  has  found 
(in  war  time)  the  moral  justification  of  war.^ 

Now  no  one  can  pretend  that  this  sacred  union  has  really 
survived  the  War.  The  extraordinary  contrast  between  the 
disunity  with  which  we  finish  war  and  the  unity  with  which 
we  begin  it,  is  a  disturbing  thought  when  we  recollect  that 
the  country  cannot  always  be  at  war,  if  only  because  peace 
is  necessary  as  a  preparation  for  war,  for  the  creation  of  things 
for  war  to  destroy.  It  becomes  still  more  disturbing  when  we 
add  to  this  post-war  change  another  even  more  remarkable, 
which  will  be  dealt  with  presently :  the  objects  for  which  at  the 
beginning  of  a  war  we  are  ready  to  die — ideals  like  de- 
mocracy, freedom  from  military  regimentation  and  the  sup- 
pression of  military  terrorism,  the  rights  of  small  nations — ^are 
things  about  which  at  the  end  of  the  War  we  are  utterly  in- 
different. It  would  seem  either  that  these  are  not  the  things 
that  really  stirred  us — ^that  our  feelings  had  some  other  unsus- 
pected origin — or  that  war  has  destroyed  our  feeling  for  them. 

Note  this  juxtaposition  of  events.  We  have  had  in  Europe 
millions  of  men  in  every  belligerent  country  showing  un- 
fathomable capacity  for  disinterested  service.  Millions  of 
youngsters — just  ordinary  folk — gave  the  final  and  greatest 
sacrifice  without  hesitation  and  without  question.  They  faced 
agony,  hardship,  death,  with  no  hope  or  promise  of  reward 
save  that  of  duty  discharged.  And,  very  rightly,  we  acclaim 
them  as  heroes.    They  have  shown  without  any  sort  of  doubt 

*  Dr  L.  P.  Jacks,  Editor  of  Tke  Hibbert  Journal,  tells  us  that  before 
the  War  the  English  nation,  regarded  from  the  moral  point  of  view, 
was  a  scene  of  'indescribable  confusion;  a  moral  chaos.'  But  there 
has  come  to  it  'the  peace  of  mind  that  comes  to  every  man  who,  after 
tossing  about  among  uncertainties,  finds  at  last  a  mission,  a  cause  to 
which  he  can  devote  himself.*  For  this  reason,  he  says,  the  War  has 
actually  made  the  English  people  happier  than  they  were  before: 
'brighter,  more  cheerful.  The  Englishman  worries  less  about  himself. 
.  .  .  The  tone  and  substance  of  conversation  are  better.  .  .  .  There 
is  more  health  in  our  souls  and  perhaps  in  our  bodies.'  And  he  tells 
how  the  War  cured  a  friend  of  insomnia.  (The  Peacefulness  of  Being 
at  War,  New  Republic,  September  11,  1915). 


144  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

that  they  are  ready  to  die  for  their  country's  cause  or  for  some 
even  greater  cause — human  freedom,  the  rights  of  a  small  na- 
tion, democracy,  or  the  principle  of  nationality,  or  to  resist 
a  barbarous  morality  which  can  tolerate  the  making  of  un- 
provoked war  for  a  monarchy's  ambition  or  the  greed  of  an 
autocratic  clique. 

And,  indeed,  whatever  our  final  conclusion,  the  spectacle  of 
vast  sacrifices  so  readily  made  is,  in  its  ultimate  meaning  one 
of  infinite  inspiration  and  hope.  But  the  War's  immediate 
sequel  puts  certain  questions  to  us  that  we  cannot  shirk.  For 
note  what  follows. 

After  some  years  the  men  who  could  thus  sacrifice  them- 
selves, return  home — to  Italy,  or  France,  or  Britain — and  ex- 
change khaki  for  the  miner's  overall  or  the  railway  worker's 
uniform.  And  it  would  then  seem  that  at  that  moment  their 
attitude  to  their  country  and  their  country's  attitude  to  them 
undergo  a  wonderful  change.  They  are  ready — so  at  least 
we  are  told  by  a  Press  which  for  five  years  had  spoken  of 
them  daily  as  heroes,  saints,  and  gentlemen — through  their 
miners'  or  railway  Unions  to  make  war  upon,  instead  of  for, 
that  community  which  yesterday  they  served  so  devotedly. 
Within  a  few  months  of  the  close  of  this  War  which  was  to 
unify  the  nation  as  it  had  never  been  unified  before  (the 
story  is  the  same  whichever  belligerent  you  may  choose)  there 
appear  divisions  and  fissures,  disruptions  and  revolutions,  more 
disturbing  than  have  been  revealed  for  generations. 

Our  extreme  nervousness  about  the  danger  of  Bolshevist 
propaganda  shows  that  we  believe  that  these  men,  yesterday 
ready  to  die  for  their  country,  are  now  capable  of  exposing 
it  to  every  sort  of  horror. 

Or  take  another  aspect  of  it.  During  the  War  fashionable 
ladies  by  thousands  willingly  got  up  at  six  in  the  morning  to 
scrub  canteen  floors  or  serve  coffee,  in  order  to  add  to  the 
comfort  of  their  working-class  countrymen — in  khaki.  They 
did  this,  one  assumes,  from  the  love  of  countrymen  who  risked 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  145 

their  lives  and  suffered  hardship  in  the  execution  of  duty. 
It  sounds  satisfactory  until  the  same  countryman  ceases  fight- 
ing and  turns  to  extremely  hard  and  hazardous  duties  like 
mining,  or  fishing  in  winter-time  in  the  North  Sea.  The  ladies 
will  no  longer  scrub  floors  or  knit  socks  for  him.  They  lose 
all  real  interest  in  him.  But  if  it  was  done  originally  from 
'love  of  fellow-countrymen/  why  this  cessation  of  interest? 
He  is  the  same  man.  Into  the  psychology  of  that  we  shall 
inquire  a  little  more  fully  later.  The  phenomenon  is  explained 
here  in  the  conviction  that  its  cause  throws  light  upon  the  other 
phenomenon  equally  remarkable,  namely,  that  victory  reveals 
a  most  astonishing  post-war  indifference  to  those  moral  and 
ideal  ends  for  which  we  believed  we  were  fighting.  Is  it  that 
they  never  were  our  real  aims  at  all,  or  that  war  has  wrought 
a  change  in  our  nature  with  reference  to  them? 

The  importance  of  knowing  what  really  moves  us  is  obvi- 
ous enough.  If  our  potential  power  is  to  stand  for  the  pro- 
tection of  any  principle — nationality  or  democracy — ^that  object 
must  represent  a  real  purpose,  not  a  convenient  clothing  for  a 
quite  different  purpose.  The  determination  to  defend  nation- 
ality can  only  be  permanent  if  our  feeling  for  it  is  sufficiently 
deep  and  sincere  to  survive  in  the  competition  of  other  moral 
'wishes.'  Where  has  the  War,  and  the  complex  of  desires 
it  developed,  left  our  moral  values?  And,  if  there  has  been 
a  re- valuation,  why? 

The  Allied  world  saw  clearly  that  the  German  doctrine — 
the  right  of  a  powerful  State  to  deny  national  independence 
to  a  smaller  State,  merely  because  its  own  self-preservation 
demanded  it — was  something  which  menaced  nationality  and 
right.  The  whole  system  by  which,  as  in  Prussia,  the  right  of 
the  people  to  challenge  the  political  doctrines  of  the  Govern- 
ment was  denied  (as  by  a  rigorous  control  of  press  and  educa- 
tion), was  seen  to  be  incompatible  with  the  principles  upon 
which  free  government  in  the  West  has  been  established.  All 
this  had  to  be  destroyed  in  order  that  the  world  might  be 


146  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

made  'safe  for  democracy.'  The  trenches  in  Flanders  became 
'the  frontiers  of  freedom.'  To  uphold  the  rights  of  small 
nations,  freedom  of  speech  and  press,  to  punish  military  terror, 
to  establish  an  international  order  based  on  right  as  against 
might — ^these  were  things  for  which  free  men  everywhere 
should  gladly  die.  They  did  die,  in  millions.  Nowhere  so 
much,  perhaps,  as  in  America  were  these  ideals  the  inspiration 
which  brought  that  country  into  the  War.  She  had  nothing  to 
gain  territorially  or  materially.  If  ever  the  motive  to  war 
was  an  ideal  motive,  America's  was. 

Then  comes  the  Peace.  And  the  America  which  had  dis- 
carded her  tradition  of  isolation  to  send  two  million  soldiers 
on  the  European  continent,  'at  the  call  of  the  small  nation,' 
was  asked  to  co-operate  with  others  in  assuring  the  future 
security  of  Belgium,  in  protecting  the  small  States  by  the 
creation  of  some  international  order  (the  only  way  in  which 
they  ever  can  be  effectively  protected)  ;  to  do  it  in  another 
form  for  a  small  nation  that  has  suffered  even  more  tragically 
than  Belgium,  Armenia;  definitely  to  organise  in  peace  that 
cause  for  which  she  went  to  war.  And  then  a  curious  discovery 
is  made.  A  cause  which  can  excite  immense  passion  when 
it  is  associated  with  war,  is  simply  a  subject  for  boredom 
when  it  becomes  a  problem  of  peace-time  organisation. 
America  will  give  lavishly  of  the  blood  of  her  sons  to  fight  for 
the  small  nations;  she  will  not  be  bothered  with  mandates  or 
treaties  in  order  to  make  it  unnecessary  to  fight  for  them. 
It  is  not  a  question  whether  the  particular  League  of  Nations 
established  at  Paris  was  a  good  one.  The  post-war  temper  of 
America  is  that  she  does  not  want  to  be  bothered  with  Europe 
at  all:  talk  about  its  security  makes  the  American  public  of 
1920  irritable  and  angry.  Yet  millions  were  ready  to  die 
for  freedom  in  Europe  two  years  ago !  A  thing  to  die  for  in 
1918  is  a  thing  to  yawn  over,  or  to  be  irritable  about,  when 
the  war  is  done. 

Is  America  alone  i^  this  change  of  feeling  about  the  small 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  147 

State?  Recall  all  that  we  wrote  and  talked  about  the  sacred- 
ness  of  the  rights  of  small  nations — and  still  in  certain  cases 
talk  and  write.  There  is  Poland.  It  is  one  of  the  nations  whose 
rights  are  sacred — to-day.  But  in  1915  we  acquiesced  in  an 
arrangement  by  which  Poland  was  to  be  delivered,  bound 
hand  and  foot,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  to  its  worst  and  bitterest 
enemy,  Czarist  Russia.  The  Alliance  (through  France,  to- 
day the  'protector  of  Poland')  undertook  not  to  raise  any 
objection  to  any  policy  that  the  Czar's  Government  might 
inaugurate  in  Poland.  It  was  to  have  a  free  hand.  A  secret 
treaty,  it  will  be  urged,  about  which  the  public  knew  nothing? 
We  were  fighting  to  liberate  the  world  from  diplomatic  au- 
tocracies using  their  peoples  for  unknown  and  unavowed  pur- 
poses. But  the  fact  that  we  were  delivering  over  Poland  to 
the  mercies  of  a  Czarist  Government  was  not  secret.  Ever>' 
educated  man  knew  what  Russian  policy  under  the  Czarist 
Government  would  be,  must  be,  in  Poland.  Was  the  Russian 
record  with  reference  to  Poland  such  that  the  unhampered  dis- 
cretion of  the  Czarist  Government  was  deemed  sufficient  guaran- 
tee of  Polish  independence?  Did  we  honestly  think  that 
Russia  had  proved  herself  more  liberal  in  the  treatment  of 
the  Poles  than  Austria,  whose  Government  we  were  destroy- 
ing? The  implication,  of  course,  flew  in  the  face  of  known 
facts:  Austrian  rule  over  the  Poles,  which  we  proposed  to 
destroy,  had  proved  itself  immeasurably  more  tolerant  than 
the  Russian  rule  which  we  proposed  to  re-enforce  and  render 
more  secure. 

And  there  were  Finland  and  the  Border  States.  If  Russia 
had  remained  in  the  War,  'loyal  to  the  cause  of  democracy 
and  the  rights  of  small  nations,'  there  would  have  been  no 
independent  Poland,  or  Finland,  or  Esthonia,  or  Georgia;  and 
the  refusal  of  our  Ally  to  recognise  their  independence  would 
not  have  disturbed  us  in  the  least. 

Again,  there  was  Serbia,  on  behalf  of  whose  'redemption' 
in  a  sense,  the  War  began.    An  integral  part  of  that  'redemp- 


148  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

tion'  was  the  inclusion  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  in  Serbia — 
the  means  of  access  of  the  new  Southern  Slav  State  to  the 
sea.  Italy,  for  naval  reasons,  desired  possession  of  that  coast, 
and,  without  informing  Serbia,  we  undertook  to  see  that  Italy 
should  get  it.  (Italy,  by  the  way,  also  entered  the  War  on 
behalf  of  the  principle  of  Nationality.)  ^ 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  small  State  it- 
self, however  it  may  declaim  about  'liberty  or  death,'  has, 
when  the  opportunity  to  assert  power  presents  itself,  any  greater 
regard  for  the  rights  of  nationality — in  other  people.  Take 
Poland.  For  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  Poland  has  called  upon 
Heaven  to  witness  the  monstrous  wickedness  of  denying  to  a 
people  its  right  to  self-determination ;  of  forcing  a  people  under 
alien  rule.  After  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  of  the  martyr- 
dom of  alien  rule,  Poland  acquires  its  freedom.  That  free- 
dom is  not  a  year  old  before  Poland  itself  becomes  in  temper 
as  imperialistic  as  any  State  in  Europe.  It  may  be  bank- 
rupt, racked  with  typhus  and  famine,  split  by  bitter  factional 
quarrels,  but  the  one  thing  upon  which  all  Poles  will  unite 
is  in  the  demand  for  dominion  over  some  fifteen  millions  of 
people,  not  merely  non-Polish,  but  bitterly  anti-Polish.  Al- 
though Poland  is  perhaps  the  worst  case,  all  the  new  small 
States  show  a  similar  disposition:  Czecho-Slovakia,  Yugo- 
slavia, Rumania,  Finland,  Greece,  have  all  now  their  own 
imperialism,  limited  only,  apparently,  by  the  extent  of  their 
power.  All  these  people  have  fought  for  the  right  to  na- 
tional independence;  there  is  not  one  that  is  not  denying  the 
right  to  national  independence.  If  every  Britain  has  its  Ire- 
land, every  Ireland  has  its  Ulster. 

But  is  this  belief  in  Nationality  at  all?  What  should  we 
have  thought  of  a  Southerner  of  the  old  Slave  States  ful- 
minating against  the  crime  of  slavery?  Should  we  have 
thought  his  position  any  more  logical  if  he  had  explained  that 

*The  facts  of  both  the  Russian  and  the  Italian  bargains  are  dealt 
with  in  more  detail  in  Chap.  III. 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  149 

he  was  opposed  to  slavery  because  he  did  not  want  to  become 
a  slave?  The  test  of  his  sincerity  would  have  been,  not  the 
conduct  he  exacted  of  others,  but  the  conduct  he  proposed 
to  follow  towards  others.  'One  is  a  Nationalist,'  says  Pro- 
fessor Corradini,  one  of  the  prophets  of  Italian  sacro  egoismo, 
'while  waiting  to  be  able  to  become  an  Imperialist.*  He 
prophesies  that  in  twenty  years  'all  Italy  will  be  Imperialist.'  ^ 

The  last  thing  intended  here  is  any  excuse  of  German  vio- 
lence by  a  futile  tu  quoque.  But  what  it  is  important  to  know, 
if  we  are  to  understand  the  real  motives  of  our  conduct — 
and  unless  we  do,  we  cannot  really  know  where  our  conduct 
is  leading  us,  where  we  are  going — is  whether  we  really  cared 
about  the  'moral  aims  of  war,'  the  things  for  which  we  thought 
we  were  willing  to  die.  Were  we  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  fight- 
ing— and  dying — for  something  else? 

Test  the  nature  of  our  feelings  by  what  was  after  all  per- 
haps the  most  dramatised  situation  in  the  whole  drama:  the 

^  Quoted  by  Mr  T.  L.  Stoddard  in  an  article  on  Italian  Nationalism,  in 
the  Forum,  Sept.  1915.  One  may  hope  that  the  outcome  of  the  War  has 
modified  the  tendencies  in  Italy  of  which  he  treats.  But  the  quotations 
he  makes  from  Italian  Nationalist  writers  put  Treitschke  and  Bern- 
hardi  in  the  shade.  Here  are  some.  Corradini  says :  'Italy  must  be- 
come once  more  the  first  nation  in  the  world.*  Rocco:  'It  is  said 
that  all  the  other  territories  are  occupied.  But  strong  nations,  or  nations 
on  the  path  of  progress,  conquer.  .  .  .  territories  occupied  by  nations 
in  decadence.'  Luigi  Villari  rejoices  that  the  cobwebs  of  mean- 
spirited  Pacifism  have  been  swept  away.  Italians  are  beginning  to  feel, 
in  whatever  part  of  the  world  they  may  happen  to  be,  something  of 
the  pride  of  Roman  citizens.'  Scipione  Sighele  writes:  'War  must  be 
loved  for  itself.  .  .  To  say  "War  is  the  most  horrible  of  evils,"  to  talk 
of  war  as  "an  unhappy  necessity,"  to  declare  that  we  should  "never 
attack  but  always  know  how  to  defend  ourselves,"  to  say  these  things 
is  as  dangerous  as  to  make  out-and-out  Pacifist  and  anti-militarist 
speeches.  It  is  creating  for  the  future  a  conflict  of  duties :  duties 
towards  humanity,  duties  towards  the  Fatherland.'  Corradini  explains 
the  programme  of  the  Nationalists :  'AH  our  efforts  will  tend  towards 
making  the  Italians  a  warlike  race.  We  will  give  it  a  new  will ;  we 
will  instil  into  it  the  appetite  for  power,  the  need  of  mighty  hopes. 
We  will  create  a  religion — the  religion  of  the  Fatherland  victorious 
over  the  other  nations.' 

I  am  indebted  to  Mr  Stoddard  for  the  translations;  but  they  read 
quite  'true  to  type.' 


150  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

fact  that  in  the  Western  world  a  single  man,  or  a  little  junta 
of  military  chiefs,  could  by  a  word  send  nations  into  war, 
millions  to  their  death;  and — worse  still  in  a  sense — that  those 
millions  would  accept  the  fact  of  thus  being  made  helpless 
pawns,  and  with  appalling  docility,  without  question,  kill 
and  be  killed  for  reasons  they  did  not  even  know.  It  must  be 
made  impossible  ever  again  for  half  a  dozen  Generals  or 
Cabinet  Ministers  thus  to  play  with  nations  and  men  and 
women  as  with  pawns. 

The  War  is  at  last  over.  And  in  Eastern  Europe,  the 
most  corrupt,  as  it  was  one  of  the  potentially  most  powerful 
of  all  the  military  autocracies — that  of  the  Czar — ^has  either 
gone  to  pieces  from  its  own  rottenness,  or  been  destroyed  by 
the  spontaneous  uprising  of  the  people.  Bold  experiments, 
in  entirely  new  social  and  economic  methods,  are  attempted  in 
this  great  community  which  may  have  so  much  to  teach  the 
Western  world,  experiments  which  challenge  not  only  old 
political  institutions,  but  old  economic  ones  as  well.  But  the 
men  who  were  the  Czar's  Ministers  are  still  in  Paris  and  Lon- 
don, in  close  but  secret  confabulation  with  Allied  Governments. 

And  one  morning  we  find  that  we  are  at  war  with  the  first 
Workers'  Republic  of  the  world,  the  first  really  to  try  a  great 
social  experiment.  There  had  been  no  declaration,  no  ex- 
planation. President  Wilson  had,  indeed,  said  that  nothing 
would  induce  the  Allies  to  intervene.  Their  behaviour  on 
that  point  would  be  the  'acid  test'  of  sincerity.  But  in  Arch- 
angel, Murmansk,  Vladivostock,  the  Crimea,  on  the  Polish 
border,  on  the  shores  of  the  Caspian,  our  soldiers  were  kill- 
ing  Russians,  or  organising  their  killing;  our  ships  sank  Rus- 
sian ships  and  bombarded  Russian  cities.  We  found  that 
we  were  supporting  the  Royalist  parties — ^military  leaders  who 
did  not  hide  in  the  least  their  intention  to  restore  the  monarchy. 
But  again,  there  is  no  explanation.  But  somewhere,  for  some 
purpose  undefined,  killing  has  been  proclaimed.  And  we  kill 
— ^and  blockade  and  starve. 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  151 

The  killing  and  blockading  are  not  the  important  facts. 
Whatever  may  be  behind  the  Russian  business,  the  most  dis- 
turbing portent  is  the  fact  which  no  one  challenges  and  which 
indeed  is  most  generally  offered  as  a  sort  of  defence.  It  is  this : 
Nobody  knows  what  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  Russia  is, 
or  was.  It  is  commonly  said  they  had  no  policy.  Certainly  it 
was  changeable.  That  means  that  the  Government  does  not 
need  to  give  an  explanation  in  order  to  start  upon  a  war  which 
may  affect  the  whole  future  form  of  Western  society.  They 
did  not  have  to  explain  because  nobody  particularly  cared. 
Commands  for  youths  to  die  in  wars  of  unknown  purpose  do  not 
strike  us  as  monstrous  when  the  commands  are  given  by  our 
own  Governments — Governments  which  notoriously  we  do  not 
trouble  to  control.  Public  opinion  as  a  whole  did  not  have  any 
intense  feeling  about  the  Russian  war,  and  not  the  slightest  as 
to  whether  we  used  poison  gas,  or  bombarded  Russian  cathe- 
drals, or  killed  Russian  civilians.  We  did  not  want  it  to  be  ex- 
pensive, and  Mr  Churchill  promised  that  if  it  cost  too  much  he 
would  drop  it.  He  admitted  finally  that  it  was  unnecessary  by 
dropping  it.  But  it  was  not  important  enough  for  him  to  resign 
over.  And  as  for  bringing  anybody  to  trial  for  it,  or  upsetting 
the  monarchy  .  .  .* 

There  is  another  aspect  of  our  feeling  about  the  Prussian 
tendencies  and  temper,  to  rid  the  world  of  which  we  waged  the 
War. 

All  America  (or  Britain,  for  that  matter:  America  is  only 
a  striking  and  so  a  convenient  example)  knew  that  the  Bis- 
marckian  persecution  of  the  Socialists,  the  imprisonment  of 
Bebel,  of  Liebknecht,  the  prosecution  of  newspapers  for  anti- 
militarist   doctrines,   the   rigid  control  of   education,  by  the 

*  It  is  true  that  the  Labour  Party,  alone  of  all  the  parties,  did  take 
action,  happily  effective,  against  the  Russian  adventure — after  it  had 
gone  on  in  intermittent  form  for  two  years.  But  the  above  paragraphs 
refer  particularly  to  the  period  which  immediately  succeeded  the  War, 
and  to  a  general  temper  which  was  unfortunately  a  fact  despite  labour 
action. 


152  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Government,  were  just  the  natural  prelude  to  what  ended  in 
Louvain  and  Aerschot,  to  the  shooting  down  of  the  civilians 
of  an  invaded  country.  Again,  that  was  why  Prussia  had  to  be 
destroyed  in  the  interest  of  human  freedom  and  the  safety  of 
democracy.  The  newspapers,  the  professors,  the  churches,  were 
telling  us  all  this  endlessly  for  five  years.  Within  a  year  of  the 
end  of  the  War,  America  is  engaged  in  an  anti-Socialist  cam- 
paign more  sweeping,  more  ruthless,  by  any  test  which  you  care 
to  apply — ^the  numbers  arrested,  the  severity  of  the  sentences 
imposed,  the  nature  of  the  offences  alleged — than  anything  ever 
attempted  by  Bismarck  or  the  Kaiser.  Old  men  of  seventy 
(one  selected  by  the  Socialist  party  as  Presidential  Candidate), 
young  girls,  college  students,  are  sent  to  prison  with  sentences 
of  ten,  fifteen,  or  twenty  years.  The  elected  members  of  State 
Legislatures  are  not  allowed  to  sit,  on  the  ground  of  their  So- 
cialist opinions.  There  are  deportations  in  whole  shiploads. 
I  f  one  takes  the  Espionage  Act  and  compares  it  with  any  equiv- 
alent German  legislation  (the  tests  applied  to  school  teachers  or 
the  refusal  of  mailing  privileges  to  Socialist  papers),  one  finds 
that  the  general  principle  of  control  of  political  opinion  by  the 
Government,  and  the  limitations  imposed  upon  freedom  of  dis- 
cussion, and  the  Press,  are  certainly  pushed  further  by  the  post- 
war America  than  they  were  by  the  pre-war  Germany — the  Ger- 
many that  had  to  be  destroyed  for  the  precise  reason  that  the 
principle  of  government  by  free  discussion  was  more  valuable 
than  life  itself. 

And  as  to  military  terrorism.  Americans  can  see — scores  of 
American  papers  are  saying  it  every  day — ^that  the  things  de- 
fended by  the  British  Government  in  Ireland  are  indistinguish- 
able from  what  brought  upon  Germany  the  wrath  of  Allied 
mankind.  But  they  do  not  even  know  and  certainly  would  not 
care  if  they  did  know,  that  American  marines  in  Hayti — a.  little 
independent  State  that  might  one  day  become  the  hope  and  sym- 
bol of  a  subject  nationality,  an  unredeemed  race  that  has  suf- 
fered and  does  suffer  more  at  American  hands  than  Pole  or 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  153 

Alsatian  ever  suffered  at  German  hands — have  killed  ten  times 
as  many  Haytians  as  the  Black  and  Tans  have  killed  Irish. 
Nor  for  that  matter  do  Americans  know  that  every  week  there 
takes  place  in  their  own  country — as  there  has  taken  place  week 
after  week  in  the  years  of  peace  for  half  a  century — atrocities 
more  ferocious  than  any  which  are  alleged  against  even  the 
British  or  the  German.  Neither  of  the  latter  burn  alive,  weekly, 
untried  fellow-countrymen  with  a  regularity  that  makes  the 
thing  an  institution. 

If  indeed  it  was  the  militarism,  the  terrorism,  the  crude 
assertion  of  power,  the  repressions  of  freedom,  which  made 
us  hate  the  German,  why  are  we  relatively  indifferent  when 
all  those  evils  raise  their  heads,  not  far  away,  among  a  people 
for  whom  after  all  we  are  not  responsible,  but  at  home, 
near  to  us,  where  we  have  some  measure  of  responsi- 
bility? 

For  indifferent  in  some  measure  to  those  near-by  evils  we 
all  are. 

The  hundred  million  people  who  make  up  America  include 
as  many  kindly,  humane,  and  decent  folk  as  any  other  hundred 
million  anywhere  in  the  world.  They  have  a  habit  of  carrying 
through  extraordinary  and  unusual  measures — like  Prohibition. 
Yet  nothing  effective  has  been  done  about  lynching,  for  which 
the  world  holds  them  responsible,  any  more  than  we  have  done 
anything  effective  about  Ireland,  for  which  the  world  holds 
us  responsible.  Their  evil  may  one  day  land  them  in  a  des- 
perate 'subject  nationality*  problem,  just  as  our  Irish  problem 
lands  us  in  political  difficulty  the  world  over.  Yet  neither  they 
nor  we  can  manage  to  achieve  one-tenth  of  the  emotional 
interest  in  our  own  atrocity  or  oppression,  which  we  managed 
in  a  few  weeks  to  achieve  in  war-time  over  the  German  bar- 
barities in  Belgium.  If  we  could — if  every  schoolboy  and  maid- 
servant felt  as  strongly  over  Balbriggan  or  Amritsar  as  they 
felt  over  the  Lusitania  and  Louvain — our  problem  would  be 
solved;  whereas  the  action  and  policy  which  arose  out  of  our 


154  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

feeling  about  Ix)uvain  did  not  solve  the  evil  of  military  terror- 
ism.   It  merely  made  it  nearly  universal. 

It  brings  us  back  to  the  original  question.  Is  it  mainly,  or 
at  all,  the  cruelty  or  the  danger  of  oppression  which  moves 
us,  which  is  at  the  bottom  of  our  flaming  indignation  over  the 
crimes  of  the  enemy? 

We  believed  that  we  were  fighting  because  of  a  passionate 
feeling  for  self-rule;  for  freedom  of  discussion,  of  respect 
for  the  rights  of  others,  particularly  the  weak;  the  hatred  of 
the  mere  pride  of  power  out  of  which  oppression  grows;  of 
the  regimentation  of  minds  which  is  its  instrument.  But  after 
the  War  we  find  that  in  truth  we  have  no  particular  feeling 
about  the  things  we  fought  to  make  impossible.  We  rather 
welcome  them,  if  they  are  a  means  of  harassing  people  that  we 
do  not  happen  to  like.  We  get  the  monstrous  paradox  that 
the  very  tendencies  which  it  was  the  object  of  the  War  to 
check,  are  the  very  tendencies  that  have  acquired  an  elusive 
power  in  our  own  country — possibly  as  the  direct  result  of 
the  War! 

Perhaps  if  we  examine  in  some  detail  the  process  of  the 
break-up  after  war,  within  the  nation,  of  the  unity  which 
marked  it  during  war,  we  may  get  some  explanation  of  the 
other  change  just  indicated. 

The  unity  on  which  we  congratulated  ourselves  was  for  a 
time  a  fact.  But  just  as  certainly  the  patriotism  which  prompted 
the  duchess  to  scrub  floors  was  not  simply  love  of  her  country- 
men, or  it  would  not  suddenly  cease  when  the  war  came  to  an 
end.  The  self -same  man  who  in  khaki  was  a  hero  to  be  taken 
for  drives  in  the  duchess's  motor-car,  became  as  workman — 
a  member  of  some  striking  union,  say — an  object  of  hostility 
and  dislike.  The  psychology  revealed  here  has  a  still  more 
curious  manifestation. 

When  in  war-time  we  read  of  the  duke's  son  and  the  cook's 
son  peeling  potatoes  into  the  same  tub,  we  regard  this  aspect 
of  the  working  of  conscription  as  something  in  itself  fine  and 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  155 

admirable,  a  real  national  comradeship  in  common  tasks  at 
last.  Colonel  Roosevelt  orates;  our  picture  papers  give  us 
photographs;  the  country  thrills  to  this  note  of  democracy. 
But  when  we  learn  that  for  the  constructive  purposes  of  peace 
— for  street-cleaning — the  Soviet  Government  has  introduced 
precisely  this  method  and  compelled  the  sons  of  Grand  Dukes 
to  shovel  snow  beside  common  workmen,  the  same  papers  give 
the  picture  as  an  example  of  the  intolerable  tyranny  of  socialism, 
as  a  warning  of  what  may  happen  in  England  if  the  revo- 
lutionists are  listened  to.  That  for  years  that  very  thing 
had  been  happening  in  England  for  the  purposes  of  war,  that 
we  were  extremely  proud  of  it,  and  had  lauded  it  as  whole- 
some discipline  and  a  thing  which  made  conscription  fine  and 
democratic,  is  something  that  we  are  unable  even  to  perceive, 
so  strong  and  yet  so  subtle  are  the  unconscious  factors  of 
opinion.  This  peculiar  psychological  twist  explains,  of  course, 
several  things :  why  we  are  all  socialists  for  the  purposes  of 
war,  and  why  socialism  can  then  give  results  which  nothing 
else  could  give;  why  we  cannot  apply  the  same  methods  suc- 
cessfully to  peace;  and  why  the  economic  miracles  possible 
in  war  are  not  possible  in  peace.  And  the  outcome  is  that 
forces,  originally  social  and  unifying,  are  at  present  factors 
only  of  disruption  and  destruction,  not  merely  internationally, 
but,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  nationally  as  well. 

When  the  accomplishment  of  certain  things — the  production 
of  shells,  the  assembling  of  certain  forces,  the  carriage  of 
cargoes — became  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  we  did  not  argue 
about  nationalisation  or  socialism ;  we  put  it  into  effect,  and  it 
worked.  There  existed  for  war  a  will  which  found  a  way 
round  all  the  difficulties  of  credit  adjustment,  distribution,  ade- 
quate wages,  unemployment,  incapacitation.  We  could  take 
over  the  country's  railways  and  mines,  control  its  trade,  ration 
its  bread,  and  decide  without  .much  discussion  that  those  things 
were  indispensable  for  its  purposes.  But  we  can  do  none  of 
these  things  for  the  upbuilding  of  the  country  in  peace  time. 


156  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

The  measures  to  which  we  turn  when  we  feel  that  the  country 
must  produce  or  perish,  are  precisely  the  measures  which, 
when  the  war  is  over,  we  declare  are  the  least  likely  to  get 
anything  done  at  all.  We  could  make  munitions;  we  cannot 
make  houses.  We  could  clothe  and  feed  our  soldiers  and 
satisfy  all  their  material  wants;  we  cannot  do  that  for  the 
workers.  Unemployment  in  war-time  was  practically  un- 
known; the  problem  of  unemployment  in  peace  time  seems 
beyond  us.  Millions  go  unclothed ;  thousands  of  workers  who 
could  make  clothes  are  without  employment.  One  speaks  of 
the  sufferings  of  the  army  of  poverty  as  though  they  were 
dispensations  of  heaven.  We  did  not  speak  thus  of  the  needs 
of  soldiers  in  war-time.  If  soldiers  wanted  uniforms  and 
wool  was  obtainable,  weavers  did  not  go  unemployed.  Then 
there  existed  a  will  and  common  purpose.  That  will  and 
common  purpose  the  patriotism  of  peace-time  cannot  give  us. 

Yet,  again,  we  cannot  always  be  at  war.  Women  must  have 
time  and  opportunity  to  bear  and  to  bring  up  children,  and 
men  to  build  up  a  country-side,  if  only  in  order  to  have  men 
for  war  to  slay  and  things  for  war  to  destroy.  Patriotism 
fails  as  a  social  cement  within  the  nation  at  peace,  it  fails  as 
a  stimulus  to  its  constructive  tasks;  and  as  between  nations, 
we  know  it  acts  as  a  violent  irritant  and  disruptive  force. 

We  need  not  question  the  genuineness  of  the  emotion  which 
moves  our  duchess  when  she  knits  socks  for  the  dear  boys  in 
the  trenches — or  when  she  fulminates  against  the  same  dear 
boys  as  working  men  when  they  come  home.  As  soldiers  she 
loved  them  because  her  hatred  of  Germans — that  atrocious, 
hostile  'herd' — was  deep  and  genuine.  She  felt  like  killing 
Germans  herself.  Consequently,  to  those  who  risked  their 
lives  to  fulfil  this  wish  of  hers,  her  affections  went  out  readily 
enough.  But  why  should  she  feel  any  particular  affection  for 
men  who  mine  coal,  or  couple  railway  trucks,  or  catch  fish  in 
the  North  Sea?  Dangerous  as  are  those  tasks,  they  are  not 
visibly  and  intimately  related  to  her  own  fierce  emotions.    The 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  157 

men  performing  them  are  just  workpeople,  the  relation  of 
whose  labour  to  her  own  life  is  not,  perhaps,  always  very 
clear.  The  suggestion  that  she  should  scrub  floors  or  knit 
socks  for  them  would  appear  to  her  as  merely  silly  or 
offensive. 

But  unfortunately  the  story  does  not  end  there.  During 
these  years  of  war  her  very  genuine  emotions  of  hate  were 
fed  and  nourished  by  war  propaganda;  her  emotional  hunger 
was  satisfied  in  some  measure  by  the  daily  tale  of  victories 
over  the  enemy.  She  had,  as  it  were,  ten  thousand  Germans 
for  breakfast  every  morning.  And  when  the  War  stopped, 
certainly  something  went  out  of  her  life.  No  one  would  pre- 
tend that  these  flaming  passions  of  five  years  went  for  so 
little  in  her  emotional  experience  that  they  could  just  be 
dropped  from  ose  day  to  another  without  something  going 
unsatisfied. 

And  then  she  cannot  get  coal;  her  projected  journey  to  the 
Riviera  is  delayed  by  a  railway  strike;  she  has  troubles  with 
servants;  faces  a  preposterous  super-tax  and  death  duties;  an 
historical  country  seat  can  no  longer  be  maintained  and  old 
associations  must  be  broken  up;  Labour  threatens  revolution 
— or  her  morning  paper  says  it  does;  Labour  leaders  say 
grossly  unfair  things  about  dukes.  Here,  indeed,  is  a  new 
hostility,  a  new  enemy  tribe,  on  which  the  emotions  cultivated 
so  assiduously  during  five  years,  but  hungry  and  unfed  since 
the  War,  can  once  more  feed  and  find  some  satisfaction.  The 
Bolshevist,  or  the  Labour  agitator,  takes  the  place  of  the 
Hun;  the  elements  of  enmity  and  disruption  are  already 
present. 

And  something  similar  takes  place  with  the  miner,  or  labour 
man,  in  reference  to  the  duchess  and  what  she  stands  for.  For 
him  also  the  main  problem  of  life  had  resolved  itself  during 
the  War  into  something  simple  and  emotional;  an  enemy  to 
be  fought  and  overcome.  Not  a  puzzling  intellectual  difficulty, 
with  all  the  hesitations  and  uncertainties  of  intellectual  de- 


158  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

cision  dependent  upon  sustained  mental  effort.  The  rights  and 
wrongs  were  settled  for  him;  right  was  our  side,  wrong  the 
enemy's.  What  we  had  to  do  was  to  crush  him.  That  done, 
it  would  be  a  better  world,  his  country  'a  land  fit  for  heroes 
to  live  in.' 

On  return  from  the  War  he  does  not  find  quite  that.  He 
can,  for  instance,  get  no  house  fit  to  live  in  at  all.  High  prices, 
precarious  employment.  What  is  wrong?  There  are  fifty 
theories,  all  puzzling.  As  to  housing,  he  is  sometimes  told 
it  is  his  own  fault;  the  building  unions  won't  permit  dilution. 
When  the  'high-brows'  are  all  at  sixes  and  sevens,  what  is  a 
man  to  think?  But  it  is  suggested  to  him  that  behind  all  this 
is  one  enemy:  the  Capitalist.  His  papers  have  a  picture  of 
him:  very  like  the  Hun.  Now  here  is  something  emotionally 
familiar.  For  years  he  has  learned  to  hate  and  fight,  to  embody 
all  problems  in  the  one  problem  of  fighting  some  definite — 
preferably  personified — enemy.  Smash  him;  get  him  by  the 
throat,  and  then  all  these  brain-racking  puzzles  will  clear 
themselves  up.  Our  side,  our  class,  our  tribe,  will  then  be  on 
top,  and  there  will  be  no  real  solution  until  it  is.  To  this 
respond  all  the  emotions,  the  whole  state  of  feeling  which  years 
of  war  have  cultivated.  Once  more  the  problem  of  life  is 
simple;  one  of  power,  domination,  the  fight  for  mastery; 
loyalty  to  our  side,  our  lot,  'right  or  wrong.'  Workers  to  be 
masters,  workers  who  have  been  shoved  and  ordered  about, 
to  do  the  shoving  and  the  ordering.  Dictatorship  of  the  pro- 
letariat. The  headaches  disappear  and  one  can  live  emotionally 
free  once  more. 

There  are  'high-brows'  who  will  even  philosophise  the  thing 
for  him,  and  explain  that  only  the  psychology  of  war  and 
violence  will  give  the  emotional  drive  to  get  anything  done; 
that  only  by  the  myths  which  mark  patriotism  can  real  social 
change  be  made.  Just  as  for  the  hate  which  keeps  war  going, 
the  enemy  State  must  be  a  single  'person,'  a  collectivity  in 
which  any  one  German  can  be  killed  as  vengeance  or  reprisal 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  159 

for  any  other,^  so  'the  capitalist  class'  must  be  a  personality, 
if  class  hatred  is  to  be  kept  alive  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring 
the  class  war  to  victory. 

But  that  theory  overlooks  the  fact  that  just  as  the  nationalism 
which  makes  war  also  destroys  the  Alliances  by  which  victory 
can  be  made  effective,  so  the  transfer  of  the  psychology  of 
Nationalism  to  the  industrial  field  has  the  same  eflfect  of 
Balkanisation.  We  get  in  both  areas,  not  the  definite  triumph 
of  a  cohesive  group  putting  into  operation  a  clear-cut  and 
understandable  programme  or  policy,  but  the  chaotic  conflict 
of  an  infinite  number  of  groups  unable  to  co-operate  effect- 
ively for  any  programme. 

If  the  hostilities  which  react  to  the  Syndicalistic  appeal 
were  confined  to  the  Capitalist,  there  might  be  something  to 
be  said  for  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Labour  movement. 
But  forces  so  purely  instinctive,  by  their  very  nature  repelling 
the  restraint  of  self-imposed  discipline  by  intelligent  foresight 
of  consequences,  cannot  be  the  servant  of  an  intelligent  pur- 

*  Mr  Hartley  Manners,  the  playwright,  who  produced  during  the 
War  a  book  entitled  Hate  with  a  Will  to  Victory,  writes  thus : — 

'And  in  voicing  our  doctrine  of  Hate  let  us  not  forget  that  the  Ger- 
man people  were,  and  are  still,  solidly  behind  hira  (the  Kaiser)  in 
everything  he  does.'   .  .  . 

'The  German  people  are  actively  and  passively  with  their  Govern- 
ment to  the  last  man  and  the  last  mark.  No  people  receive  their  faith 
and  their  rules  of  conduct  more  fatuously  from  their  rulers  than  do 
the  German  people.  Fronting  the  world  they  stand  as  one  with  their 
beloved  Kaiser.  He  who  builds  on  a  revolution  in  Germany  as  a  pos- 
sible ending  of  the  war,  knows  not  what  he  says.  They  will  follow 
through  any  degradation  of  the  body,  through  any  torture  of  spirit, 
the  tyrants  they  have  been  taught  from  infancy  to  regard  as  their 
Supreme  Masters  of  body  and  soul.'  .  .  . 

And  here  is  his  picture  of  'the  German'; — 

...  'a  slave  from  birth,  with  no  rights  as  a  free  man,  owing  alleg- 
iance to  a  militaristic  Government  to  whom  he  looks  for  his  very  life; 
crushed  by  taxation  to  keep  up  the  military  machine;  ill-nourished, 
ignorant,  prone  to  crime  in  greater  measure  than  the  peasants  of  any 
other  country — ^as  the  German  statistics  of  crime  show — a  degraded 
peasant,  a  wretched  future,  and  a  loathesome  past — these  are  the  inherit- 
ances to  which  the  German  peasant  is  born.  What  type  of  nature  can 
develop  in  such  conditions?  But  one — the  brute.  And  the  four  years' 
commerce  of  this  War  has  shown  the  German  from  prince  to  peasant 
as  offspring  of  the  one  family— the  brute  family.'  .  .  . 


160  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

pose,  they  become  its  master.  The  hostility  becomes  more 
important  than  the  purpose.  To  the  industrial  Jingo,  as  to 
the  nationalist  Jingo,  all  foreigners  are  potential  enemies.  The 
hostile  tribe  or  herd  may  be  constituted  by  very  small  differ- 
ences; slight  variations  of  occupation,  interest,  race,  speech, 
and — most  potently  of  all  perhaps — dogma  or  belief.  Heresy- 
hunting  is,  of  course,  one  manifestation  of  tribal  animosity; 
and  a  heretic  is  the  person  who  has  the  insufferable  impudence" 
to  disagree  with  us. 

So  the  Sorelian  philosophy  of  violence  and  instinctive 
pugnacity  gives  us,  not  the  effective  drive  of  a  whole  move- 
ment against  the  present  social  order  (for  that  would  require 
order,  discipline,  self-control,  tolerance,  and  toleration) ;  it 
gives  us  the  tendency  to  an  infinite  splitting  of  the  Labour 
movement.  No  sooner  does  the  Left  of  some  party  break  off 
and  found  a  new  party  than  it  is  immediately  confronted  by 
its  own  'Leftism.'  And  your  dogmatist  hates  the  dissenting 
member  of  his  own  sect  more  fiercely  than  the  rival  sect ;  your 
Communist  some  rival  Communism  more  bitterly  than  the 
Capitalist.  Already  the  Labour  movement  is  crossed  by  the 
hostilities  of  Communist  against  Socialist,  the  Second  Inter- 
national against  the  Third,  the  Third  against  the  Fourth; 
Trades  Unionism  by  the  hostility  of  skilled  against  unskilled, 
and  in  much  of  Europe  there  is  also  the  conflict  of  town  against 
country. 

This  tendency  has  happily  not  yet  gone  far  in  England;  but 
here,  as  elsewhere,  it  represents  the  one  great  danger,  the 
tendency  to  be  watched.  And  it  is  a  tendency  that  has  its 
moral  and  psychological  roots  in  the  same  forces  which  have 
given  us  the  chaos  in  the  international  field :  The  deep  human 
lust  for  coercion,  domination;  the  irksomeness  of  toleration, 
thought,  self -discipline. 

The  final  difiiculty  in  social  and  political  discussion  is,  of 
course,  the  fact  that  the  ultimate  values — what  is  the  highest 
good,  what  is  the  worst  evil-— cannot  usually  be  argued  about 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  161 

at  all;  you  accept  them,  you  see  that  they  are  good  or  bad  as 
the  case  may  be,  or  you  don't. 

Yet  we  cannot  organise  a  society  save  on  the  basis  of  some 
sort  of  agreement  concerning  these  least  common  denominators ; 
the  final  argument  for  the  view  that  Western  Europe  had  to 
destroy  German  Prussianism  was  that  the  system  challenged 
certain  ultimate  moral  values  common  to  Western  society.  On 
the  morrow  of  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  an  American  writer 
pointed  out  that  if  the  cold-blooded  slaughter  of  innocent 
women  and  children  were  accepted  as  a,  normal  incident  of 
war,  like  any  other,  the  whole  moral  standards  of  the  West 
would  then  definitely  be  placed  on  another  plane.  That  elusive 
but  immeasurably  important  moral  sense,  which  gives  a  society 
sufficient  community  of  aim  to  make  common  action  possible, 
would  have  been  radically  altered.  The  ancient  world — 
highly  civilised  and  cultured  as  much  of  it  was — had  a 
Sittlichkeit  which  made  the  chattel-slavery  of  the  greater  parf 
of  the  human  race  an  entirely  normal — and,  as  they  thought, 
inevitable — condition  of  things.  It  was  accepted  by  the  slaves 
themselves,  and  it  was  this  acquiescence  in  the  arrangement 
by  both  parties  to  it  which  mainly  accounted  for  its  continuance 
through  a  very  long  period  of  a  very  high  civilisation.  The 
position  of  women  illustrates  the  same  thing.  There  are  to- 
day highly  developed  civilisations  in  which  a  man  of  education 
buys  a  wife,  or  several,  as  in  the  West  he  would  buy  a  race- 
horse. And  the  wife,  or  wives,  accept  that  situation;  there 
can  be  no  change  in  that  particular  matter  until  certain  quite 
'unarguable'  moral  values  have  altered  in  the  minds  of  those 
concerned. 

The  American  writer  raised,  therefore,  an  extremely  im- 
portant question  in  relation  to  the  War.  Has  its  total  out- 
come affected  certain  values  of  the  fundamental  kind  just 
indicated?  What  has  been  its  effect  upon  social  impulses? 
Has  it  any  direct  relation  to  certain  moral  tendencies  that  have 

succeeded  it? 
u 


162  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Perhaps  the  War  is  now  old  enough  to  enable  us  to  face 
a  few  quite  undeniable  facts  with  some  measure  of  detachment. 

When  the  Germans  bombarded  Scarborough  early  in  the 
War,  there  was  such  a  hurricane  of  moralisation  that  one 
rejoiced  that  this  War  would  not  be  marked  on  our  side,  at 
least,  by  the  bombardment  of  open  cities.  But  when  our 
Press  began  to  print  reports  of  French  bombs  falling  on  circus 
tents  full  of  children,  scores  being  killed,  there  was  simply 
no  protest  at  all.  And  one  of  the  humours  of  the  situation 
was  that  after  more  than  a  year,  in  which  scores  of  such  re- 
ports had  appeared  in  the  Press,  some  journalistic  genius 
began  an  agitation  on  behalf  of  'reprisals'  for  air  raids.^ 

At  a  time  when  it  seemed  doubtful  whether  the  Germans 
would  sign  the  Treaty  or  not,  and  just  what  would  be  the  form 
of  the  Hungarian  Government,  the  Evening  News  printed  the 
following  editorial: — 

'It  might  take  weeks  or  months  to  bring  the  Hungarian 
Bolshevists  and   recalcitrant   Germans  to  book  by  ^extensive 

*The  following — which  appeared  in  The  Times  of  April  17,  1915 — 
is  merely  a  type  of  at  least  thirty  or  forty  similar  reports  published  by 
the  German  Army  Headquarters :  'In  yesterday's  clear  weather  the 
airmen  were  very  active.  Enemy  airmen  bombarded  places  behind  our 
positions.  Freiburg  was  again  visited,  and  several  civilians,  the  ma- 
jority being  children,  were  killed  and  wounded.'  A  few  days  later  the 
Paris  Temps  (April  22,  1915)  reproduced  the  German  accounts  of 
French  air-raids  where  bombs  were  dropped  on,  Kandern,  Loerrach, 
Mulheim,  Habsheim,  Wiesenthal,  Tiiblingen,  Mannheim.  These  raids 
were  carried  out  by  squads  of  airmen,  and  the  bombs  were  thrown 
particularly  at  railway  stations  and  factories.  Previous  to  this,  British 
and  French  airmen  had  been  particularly  active  in  Belgium,  dropping 
bombs  on  Zeebrugge,  Bruges,  Middlekirke,  and  other  towns.  One  Ger- 
man official  report  tells  how  a  bomb  fell  on  to  a  loaded  street  car, 
killing  many  women  and  children.  Another  (dated  September  7,  1915) 
contains  the  following:  'In  the  course  of  an  enemy  aeroplane  attack 
on  Lichtervelde,  north  of  Roulers  in  Flanders,  seven  Belgian  inhabi- 
tants were  killed  and  two  injured.'  A  despatch  from  Ziirich,  dated 
Sept.  24,  1915,  says:  'At  yesterday's  meeting  of  the  Stuttgart  City 
Council,  the  Mayor  and  Councillors  protested  vigorously  against  the 
recent  French  raid  upon  an  undefended  city.  Burgomaster  Lauten- 
schlager  asserted  that  an  enemy  that  attacked  harmless  civilians  was 
fighting  a  lost  cause.' 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  163 

operations  with  large  forces.  It  might  take  but  a  few  days 
to  bring  them  to  reason  by  adequate  use  of  aircraft. 

'Allied  airmen  could  reach  Buda-pest  in  a  few  hours,  and 
teach  its  inhabitants  such  a  lesson  that  Bolshevism  would  lose 
its  attractions  for  them. 

'Strong  Allied  aerodomes  on  the  Rhine  and  in  Poland, 
well  equipped  with  the  best  machines  and  pilots,  could  quickly 
persuade  the  inhabitants  of  the  large  German  cities  of  the 
folly  of  having  refused  to  sign  the  peace. 

'Those  considerations  are  elementary.  For  that  reason  they 
may  be  overlooked.     They  are  "milk  for  babes." '  ^ 

Now  the  prevailing  thesis  of  the  British,  and  particularly 
the  Northcliffe  Press,  in  reference  to  Bolshevism,  was  that  it 
is  a  form  of  tyranny  imposed  by  a  cruel  minority  upon  a  help- 
less people.  The  proposal  amounts,  therefore,  either  to  killing 
civilians  for  a  form  of  Government  which  they  cannot  possibly 
help,  or  to  an  admission  that  Bolshevism  has  the  support  of 
the  populace,  and  that  as  the  outcome  of  our  war  for  democ- 
racy we  should  refuse  them  the  right  to  choose  the  government 
they  prefer. 

When  the  Germans  bombarded  Scarborough  and  dropped 
bombs  on  London,  the  Northcliffe  Press  called  Heaven  to 
witness  (a)  that  only  fiends  in  human  form  could  make  war 
on  helpless  civilian  populations,  women,  and  children;  (b)  that 
not  only  were  the  Huns  dastardly  baby-killers  for  making 
war  in  that  fashion,  but  were  bad  psychologists  as  well, 
because  our  anger  at  such  unheard-of  devilries  would  only 
render  our  resistance  more  unconquerable  than  ever;  and 
(c)  that  no  consideration  whatever  would  induce  English 
soldiers  to  blow  women  and  children  to  pulp — unless  it  were 
as  a  reprisal.  Well,  Lord  Northcliffe  proposed  to  commence 
a  war  against  Hungarians  (as  it  had  already  been  commenced 
against  the  Russians)  by  such  a  wholesale  massacre  of  the 
'  March  27th,  1919. 


164  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

civil  population  that  a  Government,  which  he  tells  us  is  imposed 
upon  them  against  their  will,  may  'lose  its  attractions.'  This 
would  be,  of  course,  the  second  edition  of  the  war  waged  to 
destroy  militarist  modes  of  thought,  to  establish  the  reign  of 
righteousness  and  the  protection  of  the  defenceless  and  the 
weak. 

The  Evening  News  is  the  paper,  by  the  way,  whose  wrath 
became  violent  when  it  learned  that  some  Quakers  and  others 
were  attempting  to  make  some  provision  for  the  children  of 
interned  Austrians  and  Germans.  Those  guilty  of  such  'un- 
English'  conduct  as  a  little  mercy  and  pity  extended  to  helpless 
children,  were  hounded  in  headlines  day  after  day  as  *Hun- 
coddlers,'  traitors  'attempting  to  placate  the  Hun  tiger  by  bits 
of  cake  to  its  cubs';  and  when  the  War  is  all  over — a  year 
after  all  the  fighting  is  stopped — a  vicar  of  the  English  Church 
opposes,  with  indignation,  the  suggestion  that  his  parish  should 
be  contaminated  by  'enemy'  children  brought  from  the  famine 
area  to  save  them  from  death.^ 

On  March  3,  1919,  Mr  Winston  Churchill  stated  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  speaking  of  the  blockade: — 

*.  .  .  This  weapon  of  starvation  falls  mainly  upon  the  women 
and  children,  upon  the  old  and  the  weak  and  the  poor,  after 
all  the  fighting  has  stopped.' 

*In  Drinkwater's  play,  Abraham  Lincoln,  the  fire-eating  wife  of  the 
war-profiteer,  who  had  been  violently  abusing  an  old  Quaker  lady,  is 
thus  addressed  by  Lincoln : — 

'I  don't  agree  with  her,  but  I  honour  her.  She's  wrong,  but  she  is 
noble.  You've  told  me  what  you  think.  I  don't  agree  with  you,  and 
I'm  ashamed  of  you  and  your  like.  You,  who  have  sacrificed  nothing 
babble  about  destroying  the  South  while  other  people  conquer  it.  I 
accepted  this  war  with  a  sick  heart,  and  I've  a  heart  that's  near  to  break- 
ing every  day.  I  accepted  it  in  the  name  of  humanity,  and  just  and 
merciful  dealing,  and  the  hope  of  love  and  charity  on  earth.  And  you 
come  to  me,  talking  of  revenge  and  destruction,  and  malice,  and  endur- 
ing hate.  These  gentle  people  are  mistaken,  but  they  are  mistaken 
cleanly,  and  in  a  great  name.  It  is  you  that  dishonour  the  cause  for 
which  we  stand — it  is  you  who  would  make  it  a  mean  and  little 
thing.  .  .  .' 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  165 

One  might  take  this  as  a  prelude  to  a  change  of  policy.  Not 
at  all:  he  added  that  we  were  'enforcing  the  blockade  with 
rigour'  and  would  continue  to  do  so. 

Mr  Churchill's  indication  as  to  how  the  blockade  acts  is 
important.  We  spoke  of  it  as  'punishment'  for  Germany's 
crimes,  or  Bolshevist  infamies,  as  the  case  may  be.  But  it 
did  not  punish  'Germany'  or  the  Bolshevists.^  Its  penalties 
are  in  a  peculiar  degree  unevenly  distributed.  The  country 
districts  escape  almost  entirely,  the  peasants  can  feed  them- 
selves. It  falls  on  the  cities.  But  even  in  the  cities  the  very 
wealthy  and  the  official  classes  can  as  a  rule  escape.  Virtu- 
ally its  whole  weight — as  Mr  Churchill  implies — falls  upon 
the  urban  poor,  and  particularly  the  urban  child  population, 
the  old,  the  invalids,  the  sick.  Whoever  may  be  the  parties 
responsible  for  the  War,  these  are  guiltless.  But  it  is  these 
we  punish. 

Very  soon  after  the  Armistice  there  was  ample  evidence 
available  as  to  the  effect  of  the  blockade,  both  in  Russia  and  in 
Central  Europe.  Officers  of  our  Army  of  Occupation  reported 
that  their  men  'could  not  stand'  the  spectacle  of  the  suffering 
around  them.  Organisations  like  the  'Save  the  Children  Fund' 
devoted  huge  advertisements  to  familiarising  the  public  with 
the  facts.  Considerable  sums  for  relief  were  raised — but  the 
blockade  was  maintained.  There  was  no  connection  between 
the  two  things — our  foreign  policy  and  the  famine  in  Europe 
— in  the  public  mind.  It  developed  a  sort  of  moral  shock 
absorber.    Facts  did  not  reach  it  or  disturb  its  serenity. 

This  was  revealed  in  a  curious  way  at  the  time  of  the  signa- 
ture of  the  Treaty.    At  the  gathering  of  the  representatives, 

*The  official  record  of  the  Meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ten  on  Janu- 
ary 16,  1919,  as  furnished  to  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  the 
American  Senate,  reports  Mr  Lloyd  George  as  saying : — 

'The  mere  idea  of  crushing  Bolshevism  by  military  force  is  pure 
madness.  .  .  . 

'The  Russian  blockade  would  be  a  "death  cordon,"  condemning 
women  and  children  to  starvation,  a  policy  which,  as  humane  people, 
those  present  could  not  consider.' 


166  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  German  delegate  spoke  sitting  down.  It  turned  out  after- 
wards that  he  was  so  ill  and  distraught,  that  he  dared  not 
trust  himself  to  stand  up.  Every  paper  was  full  of  the  in- 
cident, as  also  of  the  fact  that  the  paper-cutter  in  front  of 
liim  on  the  table  was  found  afterwards  to  be  broken;  that  he 
placed  his  gloves  upon  his  copy  of  the  Treaty;  and  that  he 
had  thrown  away  his  cigarette  on  entering  the  room.  These 
were  the  offences  which  prompted  the  Daily  Mail  to  say :  'After 
this  no  one  will  treat  the  Huns  as  civilised  or  repentant.* 
Almost  the  entire  Press  rang  with  the  story  of  'Rantzau's 
insult.*  But  not  one  paper,  so  far  as  I  could  discover,  paid 
any  attention  to  what  Rantzau  had  said.    He  said : — 

*I  do  not  want  to  answer  by  reproaches  to  reproaches.  .  .  . 
Crimes  in  war  may  not  be  excusable,  but  they  are  committed 
in  the  struggle  for  victory  and  in  the  defence  of  national 
existence,  and  passions  are  aroused  which  make  the  conscience 
of  peoples  blunt.  The  hundreds  of  thousands  of  non-com- 
batants who  have  perished  since  November  11  by  reason  of  the 
blockade,  were  killed  with  cold  deliberation,  after  our  adver- 
saries had  conquered  and  victory  had  been  assured  them. 
Think  of  that  when  you  speak  of  guilt  and  punishment.* 

No  one  seems  to  have  noticed  this  trifle  in  presence  of  the 
heinousness  of  the  cigarette,  the  gloves,  and  the  other  crimes. 
Yet  this  was  an  insult  indeed.  If  true,  it  shamefully  disgraces 
England — if  England  is  responsible.  The  public  presumably 
simply  did  not  care  whether  it  was  true  or  not. 

A  few  months  after  the  Armistice  I  wrote  as  follows : — 

'When  the  Germans  sank  the  Lusitania  and  slew  several 
hundred  women  and  children,  we  knew — at  least  we  thought 
we  knew — that  that  was  the  kind  of  thing  which  Englishmen 
could  not  do.  In  all  the  hates  and  stupidities,  the  dirt  and 
heartbreaks  of  the  war,  there  was  just  this  light  on  the  hor- 


PATRIOTISM  AND  POWER  167 

izon :  that  there  were  certain  things  to  which  we  at  least  could 
never  fall,  in  the  name  of  victory  or  patriotism,  or  any  other 
of  the  deadly  masked  words  that  are  "the  unjust  stewards  of 
men's  ideas.'* 

'And  then  we  did  it.  We,  too,  sank  Lusitanias.  We,  too, 
for  some  cold  political  end,  plunged  the  unarmed,  the  weak, 
the  helpless,  the  children,  the  suffering  women,  to  agonising 
death  and  torture.  Without  a  tremor.  Not  alone  in  the 
bombing  of  cities,  which  we  did  so  much  better  than  the  enemy. 
For  this  we  had  the  usual  excuse.    It  was  war. 

'But  after  the  War,  when  the  fighting  was  finished,  the 
enemy  was  disarmed,  his  submarines  surrendered,  his  aero- 
planes destroyed,  his  soldiers  dispersed;  months  afterwards, 
we  kept  a  weapon  which  was  for  use  first  and  mainly  against 
the  children,  the  weak,  the  sick,  the  old,  the  women,  the  mothers, 
the  decrepit:  starvation  and  disease.  Our  papers  told  us — 
our  patriotic  papers — how  well  it  was  succeeding.  Corres- 
pondents wrote  complacently,  sometimes  exultingly,  of  how 
thin  and  pinched  were  all  the  children,  even  those  well  into 
teens;  how  stunted,  how  defective,  the  next  generation  would 
be;  and  how  the  younger  children,  those  of  seven  and  eight, 
looked  like  children  of  three  and  four ;  and  how  those  beneath 
this  age  simply  did  not  live.  Either  they  were  born  dead,  or 
if  they  were  born  alive — what  was  there  to  give  them  ?  Milk  ? 
An  unheard-of  luxury.  And  nothing  to  wrap  them  in;  even 
in  hospitals  the  new-born  children  were  wrapped  in  news- 
papers, the  lucky  ones  in  bits  of  sacking.  The  mothers  were 
most  fortunate  when  the  children  were  born  dead.  In  an 
insane  asylum  a  mother  wails:  "If  only  I  did  not  hear  the 
cry  of  the  children  for  food  all  day  long,  all  day  long!"  To 
"bring  Germany  to  reason"  we  had,  you  see,  to  drive  mothers 
out  of  their  reason. 

*  "It  would  have  been  more  merciful,"  said  Bob  Smillie, 
"to  turn  the  machine-guns  on  those  children."  Put  this  question 
to  yourself,  patriot  Englishmen:    "Was  the  sinking  of  the 


168  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Lusitania  as  cruel,  as  prolonged,  as  mean,  as  merciless  a  death 
as  this?"    And  we — ^you  and  I— do  it  every  day,  every  night. 

'Here  is  the  Times  of  May  21,  half  a  year  after  the  cessation 
of  war,  telling  the  Germans  that  they  do  not  know  how  much 
more  severe  we  can  still  make  the  "domestic  results"  of  star- 
vation, if  we  really  put  our  mind  to  it.  To  the  blockade  we 
shall  add  the  "horrors  of  invasion."  The  invasion  of  a  country 
already  disarmed  is  to  be  marked — when  we  do  it — by  horror. 

'But  the  purpose!  That  justifies  it!  What  purpose?  To 
obtain  the  signature  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  Many  English- 
men— not  Pacifists,  not  sentimentalists,  not  conscientious  ob- 
jectors, or  other  vermin  of  that  kind,  but  Bishops,  Judges, 
Members  of  the  House  of  Lords,  great  public  educators.  Tory 
editors — have  declared  that  this  Treaty  is  a  monstrous  in- 
justice. Some  Englishmen  at  least  think  so.  But  if  the 
Germans  say  so,  that  becomes  a  crime  which  we  shall  know 
how  to  punish.  "The  enemy  have  been  reminded  already" 
says  the  Times,  proud  organ  of  British  respectability,  of  Con- 
servatism, of  distinguished  editors  and  ennobled  proprietors, 
"that  the  machinery  of  the  blockade  can  again  be  put  into 
force  at  a  few  hours*  notice  .  .  .  the  intention  of  the  Allies 
to  take  military  action  if  necessary.  .  .  .  Rejection  of  the 
Peace  terms  now  offered  them,  will  assuredly  lead  to  fresh 
chastisement." 

'But  will  not  Mr  Lloyd  George  be  able  to  bring  back 
signatures f  Will  he  not  have  made  Peace — permanent  Peace? 
Shall  we  not  have  destroyed  this  Prussian  philosophy  of 
f rightfulness,  force,  and  hate?  Shall  we  not  have  proved  to 
the  world  that  a  State  without  military  power  can  trust  to  the 
good  faith  and  humanity  of  its  neighbours  ?  Can  we  not,  then, 
celebrate  victory  with  light  hearts,  honour  our  dead  and  glorify 
our  arms  ?  Have  we  not  served  faithfully  those  ideals  of  right 
and  justice,  mercy  and  chivalry,  for  which  a  whole  generation 
of  youth  went  through  hell  and  gave  their  lives?* 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ALTERNATIVE  RISKS  OF   STATUS  AND  CONTRACT 

The  facts  of  the  present  situation  in  Europe,  so  far  sketched, 
reveal  broadly  this  spectacle:  everywhere  the  failure  of  national 
power  to  indispensable  ends,  sustenance,  political  security, 
nationality,  right;  everywhere  a  fierce  struggle  for  national 
power. 

Germany,  which  successfully  fed  her  expanding  population 
by  a  system  which  did  not  rest  upon  national  power,  wrecked 
that  system  in  order  to  attempt  one  which  all  experience  showed 
could  not  succeed.  The  Allied  world  pilloried  both  the  folly 
and  the  wickedness  of  such  a  statecraft;  and  at  the  peace 
proceeded  to  imitate  it  in  every  particular.  The  faith  in  the 
complete  efficacy  of  preponderant  power  which  the  economic 
and  other  demands  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  policy 
towards  Russia  reveal,  is  already  seen  to  be  groundless  (for 
the  demands,  in  fact,  are  being  abandoned).  There  is  in  that 
document  an  element  of  naivete,  and  in  the  subsequent  policy 
a  cruelty  which  will  be  the  amazement  of  history — if  our  race 
remains  capable  of  history. 

Yet  the  men  who  made  the  Treaty,  and  accelerated  the 
famine  and  break-up  of  half  a  world,  including  those,  like 
M.  Tardieu,  who  still  demand  a  ruined  Germany  and  an  indem- 
nity-paying one,  were  the  ablest  statesmen  of  Europe,  experi- 
enced, realist,  and  certainly  not  morally  monsters.  They  were 
probably  no  worse  morally,  and  certainly  more  practical,  than 
the  passionate  democracies,  American  and  European,  who  en- 

169 


170  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

couraged  all  the  destructive  elements  of  policy  and  were  hostile 
to  all  that  was  recuperative  and  healing. 

It  is  perfectly  true — and  this  truth  is  essential  to  the  thesis 
here  discussed — that  the  statesmen  at  Versailles  were  neither 
fools  or  villains.  Neither  were  the  Cardinals  and  the  Princes 
of  the  Church,  who  for  five  hundred  years,  more  or  less, 
attempted  to  use  physical  coercion  for  the  purpose  of  suppress- 
ing religious  error.  There  is,  of  course  an  immeasurably 
stronger  case  for  the  Inquisition  as  an  instrument  of  social 
order  than  there  is  for  the  use  of  competing  national  military 
power  as  the  basis  of  modern  European  society.  And  the 
stronger  case  for  the  Inquisition  as  an  instrument  of  social 
by  a  modem  statesman  when  he  goes  to  war.  It  was  less. 
The  inquisitor,  in  burning  and  torturing  the  heretic,  passion- 
ately believed  that  he  obeyed  the  voice  of  God,  as  the  modern 
statesman  believes  that  he  is  justified  by  the  highest  dictates 
of  patriotism.  We  are  now  able  to  see  that  the  Inquisitor 
was  wrong,  his  judgment  twisted  by  some  overpowering  pre- 
possession :  Is  some  similar  prepossession  distorting  vision  and 
political  wisdom  in  modern  statecraft?  And  if  so,  what  is  the 
nature  of  this  prepossession? 

As  an  essay  towards  the  understanding  of  its  nature,  the 
following  suggestions  are  put  forward: — 

The  assertion  of  national  power,  domination,  is  always  in 
line  with  popular  feeling.  And  in  crises — like  that  of  the 
settlement  with  Germany — popular  feeling  dictates  policy. 

The  feelings  associated  with  coercive  domination  evidently 
lie  near  the  surface  of  oiu:  natures  and  are  easily  excited.  To 
attain  our  end  by  mere  coercion  instead  of  bargain  or  agree- 
ment, is  the  method  in  conduct  which,  in  the  order  of  experi- 
ments, our  race  generally  tries  first,  not  only  in  economics  (as 
by  slavery)  but  in  sex,  in  securing  acquiescence  to  our  religious 
beliefs,  and  in  most  other  relationships.  Coercion  is  not  only 
the  response  to  an  instinct;  it  relieves  us  of  the  trouble  and 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  171 

uncertainties  of  intellectual  decision  as  to  what  is  equitable 
in  a  bargain. 

To  restrain  the  combative  instinct  sufficiently  to  realise  the 
need  of  co-operation,  demands  a  social  discipline  which  the 
prevailing  political  traditions  and  moralities  of  Nationalism  and 
Patriotism  not  only  do  not  furnish,  but  directly  discourage. 

But  when  some  vital  need  becomes  obvious  and  we  find 
that  force  simply  cannot  fulfil  it,  we  then  try  other  methods, 
and  manage  to  restrain  our  impulse  sufficiently  to  do  so.  If 
we  simply  must  have  a  man's  help,  and  we  find  we  cannot 
force  him  to  give  it,  we  then  offer  him  inducements,  bargain, 
enter  a  contract,  even  though  it  limits  our  independence. 

Stable  international  co-operation  cannot  come  in  any  other 
way.  Not  until  we  realise  the  failure  of  national  coercive 
power  for  indispensable  ends  (like  the  food  of  our  people) 
shall  we  cease  to  idealise  power  and  to  put  our  most  intense 
political  emotions  (like  those  of  patriotism)  behind  it.  Our 
traditions  will  buttress  and  'rationalise'  the  instinct  to  power 
until  we  see  that  it  is  mischievous.  We  shall  then  begin  to 
discredit  it  and  create  new  traditions. 

An  American  sociologist  (Professor  Giddings  of  Columbia 
University)  has  written  thus : — 

*So  long  as  we  can  confidently  act,  we  do  not  argue;  but 
when  we  face  conditions  abounding  in  uncertainty,  or  when 
we  are  confronted  by  alternative  possibilities,  we  first  hesitate, 
then  feel  our  way,  then  guess,  and  at  length  venture  to  reason. 
Reasoning,  accordingly,  is  that  action  of  the  mind  to  which 
we  resort  when  the  possibilities  before  us  and  about  us  are 
distributed  substantially  according  to  the  law  of  chance  occur- 
rence, or,  as  the  mathematician  would  say,  in  accordance  with 
"the  normal  curve"  of  random  frequency.  The  moment  the 
curve  is  obviously  skewed,  we  decide ;  if  it  is  obviously  skewed 
from  the  beginning,  by  authority,  or  coercion,  our  reasoning 


172  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

is  futile  or  imperfect.  So,  in  the  State,  if  any  interest  or 
coalition  of  interests  is  dominant,  and  can  act  promptly,  it  rules 
by  absolutist  methods.  Whether  it  is  benevolent  or  cruel,  it 
wastes  neither  time  nor  resources  upon  government  by  dis- 
cussion; but  if  interests  are  innumerable,  and  so  distributed  as 
to  offset  one  another,  and  if  no  great  bias  or  overweighting 
anywhere  appears,  government  by  discussion  inevitably  arises. 
The  interests  can  get  together  only  if  they  talk.  If  power 
shall  be  able  to  dictate,  it  will  also  rule,  and  the  appeal  to  rea- 
son will  be  vain.' 

This  means  that  a  realisation  of  interdependence — even 
though  it  be  subconscious — is  the  basis  of  the  social  sense,  the 
feeling  and  tradition  which  make  possible  a  democratic 
society,  in  which  freedom  is  voluntarily  limited  for  the  purpose 
of  preserving  any  freedom  at  all. 

It  indicates  also  the  relation  of  certain  economic  truths  to 
the  impulses  and  instincts  that  underlie  international  conflict. 
We  shall  excuse  or  justify  or  fail  to  restrain  those  instincts, 
unless  and  until  we  see  that  their  indulgence  stands  in  the  way 
of  the  things  which  we  need  and  must  have  if  society  is  to 
live.  We  shall  then  discredit  them  as  anti-social,  as  we  have 
discredited  religious  fanaticism,  and  build  up  a  controlling 
Sittlichkeit. 

The  statement  of  Professor  Giddings,  quoted  above,  leaves 
out  certain  psychological  facts  which  the  present  writer  in  an 
earlier  work  has  attempted  to  indicate.  He,  therefore,  makes 
no  apology  for  reproducing  a  somewhat  long  passage  bearing 
on  the  case  before  us : — 

'The  element  in  man  which  makes  him  capable,  however 
feebly,  of  choice  in  the  matter  of  conduct,  the  one  fact  distin- 
guishing him  from  that  vast  multitude  of  living  things  which 
act  unreflectingly,  instinctively  (in  the  proper  and  scientific 
sense  of  the  word),  as  the  mere  physical  reaction  to  external 
prompting,  is  something  not  deeply  rooted,  since  it  is  the  latest 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  175 

addition  of  all  to  our  nature.  The  really  deeply  rooted  motives 
of  conduct,  those  having  by  far  the  greatest  biological  mo- 
mentum, are  naturally  the  "motives"  of  the  plant  and  the 
animal,  the  kind  that  marks  in  the  main  the  acts  of  all 
living  things  save  man,  the  unreflecting  motives,  those  contain- 
ing no  element  of  ratiocination  and  free  volition,  that  almost 
mechanical  reaction  to  external  forces  which  draw  the  leaves 
towards  the  sun-rays  and  makes  the  tiger  tear  its  living  food 
limb  from  limb. 

'To  make  plain  what  that  really  means  in  human  conduct,  we 
must  recall  the  character  of  that  process  by  which  man  turns 
the  forces  of  nature  to  his  service  instead  of  allowing  them  to 
overwhelm  him.  Its  essence  is  a  union  of  individual  forces 
against  the  common  enemy,  the  forces  of  nature.  Where  men 
in  isolated  action  would  have  been  powerless,  and  would  have 
been  destroyed,  union,  association,  co-operation,  enabled  them 
to  survive.  Survival  was  contingent  upon  the  cessation  of 
struggle  between  them,  and  the  substitution  therefor  of  common 
action.  Now,  the  process  both  in  the  beginning  and  in  the  sub- 
sequent development  of  this  device  of  co-operation  is  important. 
It  was  born  of  a  failure  of  force.  If  the  isolated  force  had 
sufficed,  the  union  of  force  would  not  have  been  resorted  to. 
But  such  union  is  not  a  mere  mechanical  multiplication  of  blind 
energies;  it  is  a  combination  involving  will,  intelligence.  If 
mere  multiplication  of  physical  energy  had  determined  the  re- 
sult of  man's  struggles,  he  would  have  been  destroyed  or  be 
the  helpless  slave  of  the  animals  of  which  he  makes  his  food. 
He  has  overcome  them  as  he  has  overcome  the  flood  and  the 
storm — by  quite  another  order  of  action.  Intelligence  only 
emerges  where  physical  force  is  ineffective. 

'There  is  an  almost  mechanical  process  by  which,  as  the 
complexity  of  co-operation  grows,  the  element  of  physical  com- 
pulsion declines  in  effectiveness,  and  is  replaced  by  agreement 
based  on  mutual  recognition  of  advantage.  There  is  through 
every  step  of  this  development  the  same  phenomenon:  intel- 


174  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

ligence  and  agreement  only  emerge  as  force  becomes  ineffective. 
The  early  (and  purely  illustrative)  slave-owner  who  spent  his 
days  seeing  that  his  slave  did  not  run  away,  and  compelling 
him  to  work,  realised  the  economic  defect  of  the  arrangement : 
most  of  the  effort,  physical  and  intellectual,  of  the  slave  was 
devoted  to  trying  to  escape;  that  of  the  owner,  trying  to  pre- 
vent him.  The  force  of  the  one,  intellectual  or  physical, 
cancelled  the  force  of  the  other,  and  the  energies  of  both  were 
lost  so  far  as  productive  value  was  concerned,  and  the  needed 
task,  the  building  of  the  shelter  or  the  catching  of  the  fish,  was 
not  done,  or  badly  done,  and  both  went  short  of  food  and 
shelter.  But  from  the  moment  that  they  struck  a  bargain  as 
to  the  division  of  labour  and  of  spoils,  and  adhered  to  it,  the  full 
energies  of  both  were  liberated  for  direct  production,  and  the 
economic  effectiveness  of  the  arrangement  was  not  merely 
doubled,  but  probably  multiplied  many  times.  But  this  sub- 
stitution of  free  agreement  for  coercion,  with  all  that  it  implied 
of  contract,  of  "what  is  fair,"  and  all  that  followed  of  mutual 
reliance  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  agreement,  was  based  upon 
mutual  recognition  of  advantage.  Now,  that  recognition,  with- 
out which  the  arrangement  could  not  exist  at  all,  required, 
relatively,  a  considerable  mental  effort,  due  in  the  first  instance 
to  the  failure  of  force.  If  the  slave-owner  had  had  more 
effective  means  of  physical  coercion,  and  had  been  able  to 
subdue  his  slave,  he  would  not  have  bothered  about  agreement, 
and  this  embryo  of  human  society  and  justice  would  not  have 
been  brought  into  being.  And  in  history  its  development  has 
never  been  constant,  but  marked  by  the  same  rise  and  fall  of 
the  two  orders  of  motive;  as  soon  as  one  party  or  the  other 
obtained  such  preponderance  of  strength  as  promised  to  be 
effective,  he  showed  a  tendency  to  drop  free  agreement  and  use 
force;  this,  of  course,  immediately  provoked  the  resistance  of 
the  other,  with  a  lesser  or  greater  reversion  to  the  earlier  profit- 
less condition. 

'This  perpetual  tendency  to  abandon  the  social  arrangement 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  175 

and  resort  to  physical  coercion  is,  of  course,  easily  explainable 
by  the  biological  fact  just  touched  on.  To  realise  at  each  turn 
and  permutation  of  the  division  of  labour  that  the  social  ar- 
rangement was,  after  all,  the  best  demanded  on  the  part  of  the 
two  characters  in  our  sketch,  not  merely  control  of  instinctive 
actions,  but  a  relatively  large  ratiocinative  effort  for  which  the 
biological  history  of  early  man  had  not  fitted  him.  The  physi- 
cal act  of  compulsion  only  required  a  stone  axe  and  a  quickness 
of  purely  physical  movement  for  which  his  biological  history 
had  afforded  infinitely  long  training.  The  more  mentally-mo- 
tived action,  that  of  social  conduct,  demanding  reflection  as  to 
its  effect  on  others,  and  the  effect  of  that  reaction  upon  our 
own  position  and  a  conscious  control  of  physical  acts,  is  of 
modern  growth;  it  is  but  skin-deep;  its  biological  momentum 
is  feeble.  Yet  on  that  feeble  structure  has  been  built  all 
civilisation. 

'When  we  remember  this — how  frail  are  the  ultimate  foun- 
dations of  our  fortress,  how  much  those  spiritual  elements 
which  alone  can  give  us  human  society  are  outnumbered  by  the 
pre-human  elements — is  it  surprising  that  those  pre-social 
promptings  of  which  civilisation  represents  the  conquest, 
occasionally  overwhelm  man,  break  up  the  solidarity  of  his 
army,  and  push  him  back  a  stage  or  two  nearer  to  the  brute 
condition  from  which  he  came?  That  even  at  this  moment  he 
is  groping  blindly  as  to  the  method  of  distributing  in  the  order 
of  his  most  vital  needs  the  wealth  he  is  able  to  wring  from  the 
earth;  that  some  of  his  most  fundamental  social  and  political 
conceptions — those,  among  others,  with  which  we  are  now  deal- 
ing— have  little  relation  to  real  facts;  that  his  animosities  and 
hatreds  are  as  purposeless  and  meaningless  as  his  enthusiasms 
and  his  sacrifices ;  that  emotion  and  effort  which  quantitatively 
would  suffice  amply  for  the  greater  tasks  before  him,  for  the 
firmer  establishment  of  justice  and  well-being,  for  the  cleaning 
up  of  all  the  festering  areas  of  moral  savagery  that  remain, 
are  as  a  simple  matter  of  fact  turned  to  those  purposes  hardly 


176  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

at  all,  but  to  objects  which,  to  the  degree  to  which  they  succeed, 
merely  stultify  each  other? 

'Now,  this  fact,  the  fact  that  civilisation  is  but  skin-deep  and 
thai  man  is  so  largely  the  unreflecting  brute,  is  not  denied  by 
pro-military  critics.  On  the  contrary  they  appeal  to  it  as  the 
first  and  last  justification  of  their  policy.  "All  your  talk  will 
never  get  over  human  nature;  men  are  not  guided  by  logic; 
passion  is  bound  to  get  the  upper  hand,"  and  such  phrases,  are 
a  sort  of  Greek  chorus  supplied  by  the  military  party  to  the 
whole  of  this  discussion. 

'Nor  do  the  militarist  advocates  deny  that  these  unreflecting 
elements  are  anti-social;  again,  it  is  part  of  their  case  that, 
unless  they  are  held  in  check  by  the  "iron  hand,"  they  will 
submerge  society  in  a  welter  of  savagery.  Nor  do  they  deny — 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  do  so — that  the  most  important  securities 
which  we  enjoy,  the  possibility  of  living  in  mutual  respect  of 
right  because  we  have  achieved  some  understanding  of  right; 
all  that  distinguishes  modern  Europe  from  the  Europe  of 
(among  other  things)  religious  wars  and  St.  Bartholomew  mas- 
sacres, and  distinguishes  British  political  methods  from  those 
Turkey  or  Venezuela,  are  due  to  the  development  of  moral 
forces  (since  physical  force  is  most  resorted  to  in  the  less 
desirable  age  and  area),  and  particularly  to  the  general  recog- 
nition that  you  cannot  solve  religious  and  political  problems  by 
submitting  them  to  the  irrelevant  hazard  of  physical  force. 

'We  have  got  thus  far,  then:  both  parties  to  the  discussion 
are  agreed  as  to  the  fundamental  fact  that  civilisation  is  based 
upon  moral  and  intellectual  elements  in  constant  danger  of  be- 
ing overwhelmed  by  more  deeply-rooted  anti-social  elements. 
The  plaip  facts  of  history  past  and  present  are  there  to  show 
that  where  those  moral  elements  are  absent  the  mere  fact  of 
the  possession  of  arms  only  adds  to  the  destructiveness  of  the 
resulting  welter. 

'Yet  all  attempts  to  secure  our  safety  by  other  than  military 
means  are  not  merely  regarded  with  indifference ;  they  are  more 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT         177 

generally  treated  either  with  a  truly  ferocious  contempt  or  with 
definite  condemnation. 

'This  apparently  on  two  grounds :  first,  that  nothing  that  we 
can  do  will  affect  the  conduct  of  other  nations ;  secondly,  that, 
in  the  development  of  those  moral  forces  which  do  undoubtedly 
give  us  security,  government  action — which  political  effort  has 
in  view — can  play  no  part. 

'Both  assumptions  are,  of  course,  groundless.  The  first  im- 
plies not  only  that  our  own  conduct  and  our  own  ideas  need 
no  examination,  but  that  ideas  current  in  one  country  have 
no  reaction  on  those  of  another,  and  that  the  political  action 
of  one  State  does  not  affect  that  of  others.  "The  way  to  be 
sure  of  peace  is  to  be  so  much  stronger  than  your  enemy  that 
he  will  not  dare  to  attack  you,"  is  the  type  of  accepted  and 
much-applauded  "axioms"  the  unfortunate  corollary  of  which 
is  (since  both  parties  can  adopt  the  rule)  that  peace  will  only 
be  finally  achieved  when  each  is  stronger  than  the  other. 

'So  thought  and  acted  the  man  with  the  stone  axe  in  our 
illustration,  and  in  both  cases  the  psychological  motive  is  the 
same:  the  long-inherited  impulse  to  isolated  action,  to  the  so- 
lution of  a  difficulty  by  some  simple  form  of  physical  movement ; 
the  tendency  to  break  through  the  more  lately  acquired  habit 
of  action  based  on  social  compact  and  on  the  mental  realisation 
of  its  advantage.  It  is  the  reaction  against  intellectual  effort 
and  responsible  control  of  instinct,  a  form  of  natural  protest 
very  common  in  children  and  in  adults  not  brought  under  the 
influence  of  social  discipline. 

'The  same  general  characteristics  are  as  recognisable  in  mili- 
tarist politics  within  the  nation  as  in  the  international  field. 
It  is  not  by  accident  that  Prussian  and  Bismarckian  conceptions 
in  foreign  policy  are  invariably  accompanied  by  autocratic 
conceptions  in  internal  affairs.  Both  are  founded  upon  a  belief 
in  force  as  the  ultimate  determinant  in  human  conduct ;  a  dis- 
belief in  the  things  of  the  mind  as  factors  of  social  control, 
a  disbelief  in  moral  forces  that  cannot  be  expressed  in  "blood 


178  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

and  iron."  The  impatience  shown  by  the  militarist  the  world 
over  at  government  by  discussion,  his  desire  to  "shut  up  the 
talking  shops"  and  to  govern  autocratically,  are  but  expressions 
of  the  same  temper  and  attitude. 

'The  forms  which  Governments  have  taken  and  the  general 
method  of  social  management,  are  in  large  part  the  result  of 
its  influence.  Most  Governments  are  to-day  framed  far  more 
as  instruments  for  the  exercise  of  physical  force  than  as  in- 
struments of  social  management. 

'The  militarist  does  not  allow  that  man  has  free  will  in  the 
matter  of  his  conduct  at  all ;  he  insists  that  mechanical  forces 
on  the  one  side  or  the  other  alone  determine  which  of  two 
given  courses  shall  be  taken;  the  ideas  which  either  hold,  the 
role  of  intelligent  volition,  apart  from  their  influence  in  the 
manipulation  of  physical  force,  play  no  real  part  in  human 
society.  "Prussianism,"  Bismarckian  "blood  and  iron,"  are 
merely  political  expressions  of  this  belief  in  the  social  field — 
the  belief  that  force  alone  can  decide  things;  that  it  is  not 
man's  business  to  question  authority  in  politics  or  authority  in 
the  form  of  inevitability  in  nature.  It  is  not  a  question  of  who 
is  right,  but  of  who  is  stronger.  "Fight  it  out,  and  right  will 
be  on  the  side  of  the  victor" — on  the  side,  that  is,  of  the  heaviest 
metal  or  the  heaviest  muscle,  or,  perhaps,  on  that  of  the  one 
who  has  the  sun  at  his  back,  or  some  other  advantage  of  external 
nature.  The  blind  material  things — not  the  seeing  mind  and 
the  soul  of  man — are  the  ultimate  sanction  of  human  society. 

*Such  a  doctrine,  of  course,  is  not  only  profoundly  anti-social, 
it  is  anti-human — fatal  not  merely  to  better  international  re- 
lations, but,  in  the  end,  to  the  degree  to  which  it  influences 
human  conduct  at  all,  to  all  those  large  freedoms  which  man 
has  so  painfully  won. 

'This  philosophy  makes  of  man's  acts,  not  something  into 
which  there  enters  the  element  of  moral  responsibility  and  free 
volition,  something  apart  from  and  above  the  mere  mechanical 
force  of  external  nature,  but  it  makes  man  himself  a  helpless 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  179 

slave;  it  implies  that  his  moral  efforts  and  the  efforts  of  his 
mind  and  understanding  are  of  no  worth — that  he  is  no  more 
the  master  of  his  conduct  than  the  tiger  of  his,  or  the  grass 
and  the  trees  of  theirs,  and  no  more  responsible. 

*To  this  philosophy  the  "civilist"  may  oppose  another:  that 
in  man  there  is  that  which  sets  him  apart  from  the  plants  and 
the  animals,  which  gives  him  control  of  and  responsibility  for 
his  social  acts,  which  makes  him  the  master  of  his  social  destiny 
if  he  but  will  it;  that  by  virtue  of  the  forces  of  his  mind  he 
may  go  forward  to  the  completer  conquest,  not  merely  of  nature, 
but  of  himself,  and  thereby,  and  by  that  alone,  redeem  human 
association  from  the  evils  that  now  burden  it.' 

From  Balance  to  Community  of  Power 

Does  the  foregoing  imply  that  force  or  compulsion  has  no 
place  in  human  society?  Not  the  least  in  the  world.  The 
conclusions  so  far  drawn  might  be  summarised,  and  certain 
remaining  ones  suggested,  thus : — 

Coercion  has  its  place  in  human  society,  and  the  considera- 
tions here  urged  do  not  imply  any  sweeping  theory  of 
non-resistance.  They  are  limited  to  the  attempt  to  show  that 
the  effectiveness  of  political  power  depends  upon  certain  moral 
elements  usually  utterly  neglected  in  international  politics, 
and  particularly  that  instincts  inseparable  from  Nationalism  as 
now  cultivated  and  buttressed  by  prevailing  political  morality, 
must  condemn  political  power  to  futility.  Two  broad  principles 
of  policy  are  available:  that  looking  towards  isolated  national 
power,  or  that  looking  towards  common  power  behind  a  com- 
mon purpose.  The  second  may  fail;  it  has  risks.  But  the 
first  is  bound  to  fail.  The  fact  would  be  self-evident  but  for 
the  push  of  certain  instincts  warping  our  judgment  in  favour 
of  the  first.  If  mankind  decides  that  it  can  do  better  than  the 
first  policy,  it  will  do  better.     If  it  decides  that  it  cannot,  that 


180  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

decision  will  itself  make  failure  inevitable.     Our  whole  social 
salvation  depends  upon  making  the  right  choice. 

In  an  earlier  chapter  certain  stultifications  of  the  Balance  of 
Power  as  applied  to  the  international  situation  were  dealt  with. 
It  was  there  pointed  out  that  if  you  could  get  such  a  thing  as 
a  real  Balance,  that  would  certainly  be  a  situation  tempting 
the  hot-heads  of  both  sides  to  a  trial  of  strength.  An  obvious 
preponderance  of  power  on  one  side  might  check  the  temper 
of  the  other.  A  'balance'  would  assuredly  act  as  no  check. 
But  preponderance  has  an  even  worse  result. 

How  in  practical  politics  are  we  to  say  when  a  group  has 
become  preponderantly  powerful?  We  know  to  our  cost  that 
military  power  is  extremely  difficult  of  precise  estimate.  It 
cannot  be  weighed  and  balanced  exactly.  In  political  practice, 
therefore,  the  Balance  of  Power  means  a  rivalry  of  power, 
because  each  to  be  on  the  safe  side  wants  to  be  just  a  bit 
stronger  than  the  other.  The  competition  creates  of  itself  the 
very  condition  it  sets  out  to  prevent. 

The  defect  of  principle  here  is  not  the  employment  of  force. 
It  is  the  refusal  to  put  force  behind  a  law  which  may  demand 
our  allegiance.  The  defect  lies  in  the  attempt  to  make  our- 
selves and  our  own  interests  by  virtue  of  preponderant  power 
superior  to  law. 

The  feature  which  stood  condemned  in  the  old  order  was 
not  the  possession  by  States  of  coercive  power.  Coercion  is 
an  element  in  every  good  society  that  we  have  heretofore 
known.  The  evil  of  the  old  order  was  that  in  case  of  States 
the  Power  was  anti-social ;  that  it  was  not  pledged  to  the  ser- 
vice of  some  code  or  rule  designed  for  mutual  protection,  but 
w£is  the  irresponsible  possession  of  each  individual,  maintained 
for  the  express  purpose  of  enabling  him  to  enforce  his  own 
views  of  his  own  rights,  to  be  judge  and  executioner  in  his  own 
case,  when  his  view  came  into  collision  with  that  of  others. 
The  old  effort  meant  in  reality  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  a 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT    181 

group  of  States  to  maintain  in  their  own  favour  a  preponderance 
of  force  of  undefined  and  imlimited  purpose.  Any  opposing 
group  that  found  itself  in  a  position  of  manifest  inferiority 
had  in  fact  to  submit  in  international  affairs  to  the  decision  of 
the  possessor  of  preponderant  power  for  the  time  being.  It 
might  be  used  benevolently;  in  that  case  the  weaker  obtained 
his  rights  as  a  gift  from  the  stronger.  But  so  long  as  the 
possession  of  power  was  unaccompanied  by  any  defined  obliga- 
tion, there  could  be  no  democracy  of  States,  no  Society  of 
Nations.  To  destroy  the  power  of  the  preponderant  group 
meant  merely  to  transpose  the  situation.  The  security  of  one 
meant  always  the  insecurity  of  the  other. 

The  Balance  of  Power  in  fact  adopts  the  fundamental  premise 
of  the  'might  makes  right'  principle,  because  it  regards  power 
as  the  ultimate  fact  in  politics;  whereas  the  ultimate  fact  is 
the  purpose  for  which  the  power  will  be  used.  Obviously  you 
don't  want  a  Balance  of  Power  between  justice  and  injustice, 
law  and  crime ;  between  anarchy  and  order.  You  want  a  pre- 
ponderance of  power  on  the  side  of  justice,  of  law  and  of 
order. 

We  approach  here  one  of  the  commonest  and  most  disastrous 
confusions  touching  the  employment  of  force  in  human  society, 
particularly  in  the  Society  of  Nations. 

It  is  easy  enough  to  make  play  with  the  absurdities  and  con- 
tradictions of  the  si  vis  pacem  para  helium  of  our  militarists. 
And  the  hoary  falsehood  does  indeed  involve  a  flouting  of  all 
experience,  an  intellectual  astigmatism  that  almost  makes  one 
despair.     But  what  is  the  practical  alternative? 

The  anti-militarist  who  disparages  our  reliance  upon  'force' 
is  almost  as  remote  from  reality,  for  all  society  as  we  know  it 
in  practice,  or  have  ever  known  it,  does  rely  a  great  deal  upon 
the  instrument  of  'force,'  upon  restraint  and  coercion. 

We  have  seen  where  the  competition  in  arming  among 
European  nations  has  led  us.  But  it  may  be  argued :  suppose 
you  were  greatly  to  reduce  all  round,  cut  in  half,  say,  the 


182  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

military  equipment  of  Europe,  would  the  power  for  mutual 
destruction  be  sensibly  reduced,  the  security  of  Europe  sensibly 
greater?  'Adequacy'  and  'destructiveness'  of  armament  are 
strictly  relative  terms.  A  country  with  a  couple  of  battleships 
has  overwhelming  naval  armament  if  its  opponent  has  none. 
A  dozen  machine-guns  or  a  score  of  rifles  against  thousands 
of  unarmed  people  may  be  more  destructive  of  life  than  a  hun- 
dred times  that  quantity  of  material  facing  forces  similarly 
armed.  (Fifty  rifles  at  Amritsar  accounted  for  two  thousand 
killed  and  wounded,  without  a  single  casualty  on  the  side  of  the 
troops.)  Wars  once  started,  instruments  of  destruction  can 
be  rapidly  improvised,  as  we  know.  And  this  will  be  truer 
still  when  we  have  progressed  from  poison  gas  to  disease  germs, 
as  we  almost  certainly  shall. 

The  first  confusion  is  this : — 

The  issue  is  made  to  appear  as  between  the  'spiritual'  and  the 
'material';  as  between  material  force,  battleships,  guns,  armies 
on  the  one  side  as  one  method,  and  'spiritual'  factors,  persuasion, 
moral  goodness  on  the  other  side,  as  the  contrary  method. 
'Force  v.  Faith,*  as  some  evangelical  writer  has  put  it.  The 
debate  between  the  Nationalist  and  the  Internationalist  is  usually 
vitiated  at  the  outset  by  an  assumption  which,  though  generally 
common  to  the  two  parties,  is  not  only  unproven,  but  flatly 
contrary  to  the  weight  of  evidence.  The  assumption  is  that  the 
military  Nationalist,  basing  his  policy  upon  material  force — ^a 
preponderant  navy,  a  great  army,  superior  artillery — can  dis- 
pense with  the  element  of  trust,  contract,  treaty. 

Now  to  state  the  issue  in  that  way  creates  a  gross  confusion, 
and  the  assumption  just  indicated  is  quite  unjustifiable.  The 
militarist  quite  as  much  as  the  anti-militarist,  the  nationalist 
quite  as  much  as  the  internationalist,  has  to  depend  upon  a 
moral  factor,  'a  contract,*  the  force  of  tradition,  and  of  moral- 
ity. Force  cannot  operate  at  all  in  human  aflFairs  without  a 
decision  of  the  human  mind  and  will.  Guns  do  not  get  pointed 
and  go  off  without  a  mind  behind  them,  and  as  already  insisted, 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  183 

the  direction  in  which  the  gun  shoots  is  determined  by  the  mind 
which  must  be  reached  by  a  form  of  moral  suasion,  discipHne, 
or  tradition;  the  mind  behind  the  gun  will  be  influenced  by 
patriotism  in  one  case,  or  by  a  will  to  rebellion  and  mutiny, 
prompted  by  another  tradition  or  persuasion,  in  another.  And 
obviously  the  moral*  decision,  in  the  circumstances  with  which 
we  are  dealing,  goes  much  deeper  and  further  back.  The 
building  of  battleships,  or  the  forming  of  armies,  the  long 
preparation  which  is  really  behind  the  material  factor,  implies 
a  great  deal  of  'faith.'  These  armies  and  navies  could  never 
have  been  brought  into  existence  and  be  manoeuvred  without 
vast  stores  of  faith  and  tradition.  Whether  the  army  serves 
the  nation,  as  in  Britain  or  France,  or  dominates  it  as  in  a 
Spanish-American  Republic  (or  in  a  somewhat  different 
sense  in  Prussia),  depends  on  a  moral  factor:  the  nature  of 
the  tradition  which  inspires  the  people  from  whom  the  army 
is  drawn.  Whether  the  army  obeys  its  officers  or  shoots  them 
is  determined  by  moral  not  material  factors,  for  the  officers 
have  not  a  preponderance  of  physical  force  over  the  men.  You 
cannot  form  a  pirate  crew  without  a  moral  factor :  the  agree- 
ment not  to  use  force  against  one  another,  but  to  act  in  consort 
and  combine  it  against  the  prey.  Whether  the  military  material 
we  and  France  supplied  Russia,  and  the  armies  France  helped 
to  train,  are  employed  against  us  or  the  Germans,  depends  upon 
certain  moral  and  political  factors  inside  Russia,  certain  ideas 
formed  in  the  minds  of  certain  men.  It  is  not  a  situation  of 
Ideas  against  Guns,  but  of  ideas  using  guns.  The  confusion 
involves  a  curious  distortion  in  our  reading  of  the  history  of  the 
struggle  against  privilege  and  tyranny. 

Usually  when  we  speak  of  the  past  struggles  of  the  people 
against  tyranny,  we  have  in  our  minds  a  picture  of  the  great 
mass  held  down  by  the  superior  physical  force  of  the  tyrant. 
But  such  a  picture  is,  of  course,  quite  absurd.  For  the  physical 
force  which  held  down  the  people  was  that  which  they  them- 
selves supplied.    The  tyrant  had  no  physical  force  save  that 


184  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

with  which  his  victims  furnished  him.  In  this  struggle  of 
'People  V.  Tyrant/  obviously  the  weight  of  physical  force  was 
on  the  side  of  the  people.  This  was  as  true  of  the  slave  States 
of  antiquity  as  it  is  of  the  modern  autocracies.  Obviously  the 
free  minority — the  five  or  ten  or  fifteen  per  cent. — of  Rome  or 
Egypt,  or  the  governing  orders  of  Prussia  or  Russia,  did  not 
impose  their  will  upon  the  remainder  by  virtue  of  superior 
physical  force,  the  sheer  weight  of  numbers,  of  sinew  and 
muscle.  If  the  tyranny  of  the  minority  had  depended  upon  its 
own  physical  power,  it  could  not  have  lasted  a  day.  The  physi- 
cal force  which  the  minority  used  was  the  physical  force  of 
the  majority.  The  people  were  oppressed  by  an  instrument 
which  they  themselves  furnished. 

In  that  picture,  therefore,  which  we  make  of  the  mass  of 
mankind  struggling  against  the  'force'  of  tyranny,  we  must 
remember  that  the  force  against  which  they  struggled  was  not 
in  the  last  analysis  physical  force  at  all ;  it  was  their  own  weight 
from  which  they  desired  to  be  liberated. 

Do  we  realise  all  that  this  means?  It  means  that  tyranny 
has  been  imposed,  as  freedom  has  been  won :  through  the  Mind. 

The  small  minority  imposes  itself  and  can  only  impose  itself 
by  getting  first  at  the  mind  of  the  majority — the  people — in  one 
form  or  another :  by  controlling  it  through  keeping  knowledge 
from  it,  as  in  so  much  of  antiquity,  or  by  controlling  the  know- 
ledge itself,  as  in  Germany.  It  is  because  the  minds  of  the 
masses  have  failed  them  that  they  have  been  enslaved.  With- 
out that  intellectual  failure  of  the  masses,  tyranny  could  have 
found  no  force  wherewith  to  impose  its  burdens. 

This  confusion  as  to  the  relation  of  'force'  to  the  moral 
factor  is  of  all  confusions  most  worth  while  clearing  up:  and 
for  that  purpose  we  may  descend  to  homely  illustrations. 

You  have  a  disorderly  society,  a  frontier  mining  camp,  every 
man  armed,  every  man  threatened  by  the  arms  of  his  neighbour 
and  every  man  in  danger.  What  is  the  first  need  in  restoring 
order?    More  force — ^more  revolvers  and  bowie  knives?    No; 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  185 

every  man  is  fully  armed  already.  If  there  exists  in  this  dis- 
order the  germ  of  order  some  attempt  will  be  made  to  move 
towards  the  creation  of  a  police.  But  what  is  the  indispensable 
prerequisite  for  the  success  of  such  an  effort?  It  is  the  capacity 
for  a  nucleus  of  the  community  to  act  in  common,  to  agree 
together  to  make  the  beginnings  of  a  community.  And  unless 
that  nucleus  can  achieve  agreement — a  moral  and  intellectual 
problem — there  can  be  no  police  force.  But  be  it  noted  well, 
this  first  prerequisite — the  agreement  among  a  few  members 
necessary  to  create  the  first  Vigilance  Committee — is  not  force ; 
it  is  a  decision  of  certain  minds  determining  how  force  shall  be 
used,  how  combined.  Even  when  you  have  got  as  far  as  the 
police,  this  device  of  social  protection  will  entirely  break  down 
unless  the  police  itself  can  be  trusted  to  obey  the  constituted 
authority,  and  the  constituted  authority  itself  to  abide  by  the 
law.  If  the  police  represents  a  mere  preponderance  of  power, 
using  that  power  to  create  a  privileged  position  for  itself  or  for 
its  employers — setting  itself,  that  is,  against  the  community — 
you  will  sooner  or  later  get  resistance  which  will  ultimately 
neutralise  that  power  and  produce  a  mere  paralysis  so  far  as 
any  social  purpose  is  concerned.  The  existence  of  the  police 
depends  upon  general  agreement  not  to  use  force  except  as  the 
instrument  of  the  social  will,  the  law  to  which  all  are  party. 
This  social  will  may  not  exist;  the  members  of  the  vigilance 
committee  or  town  council  or  other  body  may  themselves  use 
their  revolvers  and  knives  each  against  the  other.  Very  well, 
in  that  case  you  will  get  no  police.  'Force'  will  not  remedy  it. 
Who  is  to  use  the  force  if  no  one  man  can  agree  with  the  other  ? 
All  along  the  line  here  we  find  ourselves,  whatever  our  pre- 
disposition to  trust  only  'force,'  thrown  back  upon  a  moral 
factor,  compelled  to  rely  upon  contract,  an  agreement,  before 
we  can  use  force  at  all. 

It  will  be  noted  incidentally  that  effective  social  force  does 
not  rest  upon  a  Balance  of  Power:  society  does  not  need  a 
Balance  of  Power  as  between  the  law  and  crime;  it  wants  a 


186  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

preponderance  of  power  on  the  side  of  the  law.  One  does  not 
want  a  Balance  of  Power  between  rival  parties  in  the  State. 
One  wants  a  preponderance  of  power  on  behalf  of  a  certain 
fundamental  code  upon  which  all  parties,  or  an  immense  major- 
ity of  parties,  will  be  agreed.  As  against  the  Balance  of  Power 
we  need  a  Community  of  Power — ^to  use  Mr.  Wilson's  phrase — 
on  the  side  of  a  purpose  or  code  of  which  the  contributors  to 
the  power  are  aware. 

One  may  read  in  learned  and  pretentious  political  works  that 
the  ultimate  basis  of  a  State  is  force — ^the  army — which  is  the 
means  by  which  the  State's  authority  is  maintained.  But  who 
compels  the  army  to  carry  out  the  State's  orders  rather  than 
its  own  will  or  the  personal  will  of  its  commander  ?  Quis  custo- 
diet  ipsos  custodes?  The  following  passage  from  an  address 
delivered  by  the  present  writer  in  America  may  perhaps  help 
to  make  the  point  clear : — 

'When,  after  the  counting  of  the  votes,  you  ask  Mr  Wilson 
to  step  down  from  the  President's  chair,  how  do  you  know  he 
will  get  down  ?  I  repeat.  How  do  you  know  he  will  get  down  ? 
You  think  that  a  foolish  and  fantastic  question  ?  But,  in  a  great 
many  interesting  American  republics,  Mexico,  Venezuela,  or 
Hayti,  he  would  not  get  down !  You  say,  "Oh,  the  army  would 
turn  him  out."  I  beg  your  pardon.  It  is  Mr  Wilson  who  com- 
mands the  army ;  it  is  not  the  army  that  commands  Mr  Wilson. 
Again,  in  many  American  republics  a  President  who  can  depend 
on  his  army,  when  asked  to  get  out  of  the  Presidency,  would 
reply  almost  as  a  matter  of  course,  "Why  should  I  get  down 
when  I  have  an  army  that  stands  by  me?" 

*How  do  we  know  that  Mr  Wilson,  able,  we  will  assume, 
to  count  on  his  army,  or,  if  you  prefer,  some  President  par- 
ticularly popular  with  the  army,  will  not  do  that  ?  Is  it  physical 
force  which  prevents  it?  If  so,  whose?  You  may  say:  "If  he 
did  that,  he  knows  that  the  country  would  raise  an  army  of 
rebellion  to  turn  him  out."    Well,  suppose  it  did  ?    You  raise 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  187 

this  army,  as  they  would  in  Mexico,  or  Venezuela,  and  the  army 
turns  him  out.  And  your  man  gets  into  the  Presidential  chair, 
and  then,  when  you  think  he  has  stolen  enough,  you  vote  him 
down.  He  would  do  precisely  the  same  thing.  He  would  say : 
"My  dear  people,  as  very  great  philosophers  tell  you,  the  State 
is  Force,  and  as  a  great  French  monarch  once  said.  *I  am  the 
State.*  J'y  suis,  j'y  reste".  And  then  you  would  have  to  get 
another  army  of  rebellion  to  turn  him  out — just  as  they  do  in 
Mexico,  Venezuela,  Hayti,  or  Honduras.* 

There,  then,  is  the  crux  of  the  matter.  Every  constitution 
at  times  breaks  down.  But  if  that  fact  were  a  conclusive  argu- 
ment for  the  anarchical  arming  of  each  man  against  the  other 
as  preferable  to  a  police  enforcing  law,  there  could  be  no  human 
society.  The  object  of  constitutional  machinery  for  change  is 
to  make  civil  war  unnecessary. 

There  will  be  no  advance  save  through  an  improved  tradition. 
Perhaps  it  will  be  imposaible  to  improve  the  tradition.  Very 
well,  then  the  old  order,  whether  among  the  nations  of  Europe 
or  the  political  parties  of  Venezuela,  will  remain  unchanged. 
More  'force,'  more  soldiers,  will  not  do  it.  The  disturbed  areas 
of  Spanish-America  each  show  a  greater  number  of  soldiers 
to  population  than  States  like  Massachusetts  or  Ohio.  So  in 
the  international  solution.  What  would  it  have  availed  if 
Britain  had  quadrupled  the  quantity  of  rifles  to  Koltchak's  peas- 
ant soldiers  so  long  as  his  land  policy  caused  them  to  turn  their 
rifles  against  his  Government?  Or  for  France  to  have 
multiplied  many  times  the  loans  made  to  the  Ukraine,  if  at  the 
same  time  the  loans  made  to  Poland  so  fed  Polish  nationalism 
that  the  Ukrainians  preferred  making  common  cause  with 
the  Bolsheviks  to  becoming  satellites  of  an  Imperialist  Poland? 
Do  we  add  to  the  'force*  of  the  Alliance  by  increasing  the 
military  power  of  Serbia,  if  that  fact  provokes  her  to  challenge 
Italy?  Do  we  strengthen  it  by  increasing  at  one  and  the 
same  time  the  military   forces  of   two   States — ^say   Poland 


188  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

and  Czecho- Slovakia — if  the  nationalism  which  we  nurse  leads 
finally  to  those  two  States  turning  their  forces  one  against  the 
other?  Unless  we  know  the  policy  (again  a  thing  of  the  mind, 
of  opinion)  which  will  determine  the  use  to  which  guns  will  be 
put,  it  does  not  increase  our  security — it  may  diminish  it — ^to 
add  more  guns. 

The  Alternative  Risks 

We  see,  therefore,  that  the  alternatives  are  not  in  fact  a 
choice  between  'material'  and  'spiritual'  means.  The  material 
can  only  operate,  whether  for  our  defence  or  against  us,  by 
virtue  of  a  spiritual  thing,  the  will.  'The  direction  in  which 
the  gun  will  shoot' — a  rather  important  point  in  its  effectiveness 
as  a  defensive  weapon — depends  not  on  the  gun  but  on  the 
mind  of  the  man  using  it,  the  moral  factor.  The  two  cannot 
be  separated. 

It  is  imtrue  to  say  that  the  knife  is  a  magic  instrument,  sav- 
ing the  cancer  patient's  life :  it  is  the  mind  of  the  surgeon  using 
the  material  thing  in  a  certain  way  which  saves  the  patient's 
life.  A  child  or  savage  who,  failing  to  realise  the  part  played 
by  the  invisible  element  of  the  surgeon's  mind,  should  deem 
that  a  knife  of  a  particular  pattern  used  'boldly'  could  be  de- 
pended upon  to  cure  cancer,  would  merely,  of  course  commit 
manslaughter. 

It  is  foolish  to  talk  of  an  absolute  guarantee  of  security  by 
force,  as  of  guarantee  of  success  in  surgical  operations  by 
perfection  of  knives.  In  both  cases  we  are  dealing  with  instru- 
ments, indispensable,  but  not  of  themselves  enough.  The  mind 
behind  the  instrument,  technical  in  one  case,  social  in  the  other, 
may  in  both  cases  fail ;  then  we  must  improve  it.  Merely  to  go 
on  sharpening  the  knife,  to  go  on  applying,  for  instance,  to  the 
international  problem  more  'force,*  in  the  way  it  has  been  ap- 
plied in  the  past,  can  orJy  give  us  in  intenser  degree  the  present 
results. 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  189 

Yet  the  truth  here  indicated  is  perpetually  being  disregarded, 
particularly  by  those  who  pique  themselves  on  being  'practical.' 
In  the  choice  of  risks  by  men  of  the  world  and  realist  statesmen 
the  choice  which  inevitably  leads  to  destruction  is  for  ever  being 
made  on  grounds  of  safety ;  the  choice  which  leads  at  least  in 
the  direction  of  security  is  for  ever  being  rejected  on  the 
grounds  of  its  danger. 

Why  is  this  ?  The  choice  is  instinctive  assuredly ;  it  is  not  the 
result  of  'hard-headed  calculation'  though  it  often  professes  to 
be.  We  speak  of  it  as  the  'protective'  instinct.  But  it  is  a 
protective  instinct  which  obviously  destroys  us. 

I  am  suggesting  here  that,  at  the  bottom  of  the  choice  in 
favour  of  the  Balance  of  Power  or  preponderance  as  a  political 
method,  is  neither  the  desire  for  safety  nor  the  desire  to  place 
'might  behind  right,'  but  the  desire  for  domination,  the  instinct 
of  self-assertion,  the  anti-social  wish  to  be  judge  in  our  own 
case;  and  further,  that  the  way  out  of  the  difficulty  is  to  dis- 
cipline this  instinct  by  a  better  social  tradition.  To  do  that  we 
must  discredit  the  old  tradition — create  a  different  feeling 
about  it;  to  which  end  it  is  indispensable  to  face  frankly 
the  nature  of  its  moral  origins;  to  look  its  motives  in  the 
face.^ 

It  is  extremely  suggestive  in  this  connection  that  the  'realist' 
politician,  the  'hard-headed  practical  man,'  disdainful  of  'Sun- 
day School  standards,'  in  his  defence  of  national  necessity,  is 
quite  ready  to  be  contemptuous  of  national  safety  and  interest 

*  While  attempting  in  this  chapter  to  reveal  the  essential  difference 
of  the  two  methods  open  to  us,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  in  the 
complexities  and  cross-currents  of  human  society  practical  policy  can 
rarely  be  guided  by  a  single  absolute  principle.  Reference  has  been 
made  to  the  putting  of  the  pooled  force  of  the  nations  behind  a  prin- 
ciple or  law  as  the  alternative  of  each  attempting  to  use  his  own  for 
enforcing  his  own  view.  The  writer  does  not  suppose  for  an  instant 
that  it  is  possible  immediately  to  draw  up  a  complete  Federal  Code  of 
Law  for  Europe,  to  create  a  well-defined  European  constitution  and 
then  raise  a  European  army  to  defend  it,  or  body  of  police  to  enforce 
it.  He  is  probably  the  last  person  in  the  world  likely  to  believe  the 
political  ideas  of  the  European  capable  of  such  an  agile  adaptation. 


190  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

when  these  latter  point  plainly  to  a  policy  of  international 
agreement  as  against  domination.  Agreement  is  then  rejected 
as  pusillanimous,  and  consideration  for  national  interest  as 
placing  'pocket  before  patriotism,*  We  are  then  reminded,  even 
by  the  most  realist  of  nationalists,  that  nations  live  for  higher 
things  than  'profit*  or  even  safety.  'Internationalism,'  says 
Colonel  Roosevelt,  'inevitably  emasculates  its  sincere  votaries,* 
and  'every  civilisation  worth  calling  such'  must  be  based  'on 
a  spirit  of  intense  nationalism.*  For  Colonel  Roosevelt  or  Gen- 
eral Wood  in  America  as  for  Mr  Kipling,  or  Mr  Chesterton, 
or  Mr  Churchill,  or  Lord  Northciffe,  or  Mr  Bottomley,  and  a 
Veist  host  of  poets,  professors,  editors,  historians,  bishops, 
publicists  of  all  sorts  in  England  and  France,  'Internationalist' 
and  'Pacifist'  are  akin  to  political  atheist.  A  moral  consideration 
now  replaces  the  'realist.'  The  metamorphosis  is  only  intelli- 
gible on  the  assumption  here  suggested  that  both  explanations 
or  justifications  are  a  rationalisation  of  the  impulse  to  power 
and  domination. 

Our  political,  quite  as  much  as  our  social,  conduct  is  in  the 
main  the  result  of  motives  that  are  mainly  unconscious  instinct, 
habit,  unquestioned  tradition.  So  long  as  we  find  the  result 
satisfactory,  well  and  good.  But  when  the  result  of  fol- 
lowing instinct  is  disaster,  we  realise  that  the  time  has 
come  to  'get  outside  ourselves,'  to  test  our  instincts  by  their 
social  result.  We  have  then  to  see  whether  the  'reasons'  we 
have  given  for  our  conduct  are  really  its  motives.  That  exam- 
ination is  the  first  step  to  rendering  the  unconscious  motive 
conscious.  In  considering,  for  instance,  the  two  methods  indi- 
cated in  this  chapter,  we  say,  in  'rationalising'  our  decision, 
that  we  chose  the  lesser  of  two  risks.  I  am  suggesting  that  in 
the  choice  of  the  method  of  the  Balance  of  Power  our  real 
motive  was  not  desire  to  achieve  security,  but  domination.  It 
is  just  because  our  motives  are  not  mainly  intellectual  but 
'instinctive'  that  the  desire  for  domination  is  so  likely  to  have 
played  the  determining  role:    for   few  instincts   and   innate 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  191 

desires  are  stronger  than  that  which  pushes  to  'self-affirmation' 
— ^the  assertion  of  preponderant  force. 

We  have  indeed  seen  that  the  Balance  of  Power  means  in 
practice  the  determination  to  secure  a  preponderance  of  power. 
What  is  a  'Balance?'  The  two  sides  will  not  agree  on  that, 
and  each  to  be  sure  will  want  it  tilted  in  its  favour.  We  decline 
to  place  ourselves  within  the  power  of  another  who  may  differ 
from  us  as  to  our  right.  We  demand  to  be  stronger,  in  order 
that  we  may  be  judge  in  our  own  case.  This  means  that  we 
shall  resist  the  claim  of  others  to  exactly  the  same  thing. 

The  alternative  is  partnership.  It  means  trust.  But  we  have 
seen  that  the  exercise  of  any  form  of  force,  other  than  that 
which  one  single  individual  can  wield,  must  involve  an  element 
of  'trust.'  The  soldiers  must  be  trusted  to  obey  the  officers, 
since  the  former  have  by  far  the  preponderance  of  force;  the 
officers  must  be  trusted  to  obey  the  constitution  instead  of 
challenging  it;  the  police  must  be  trusted  to  obey  the  author- 
ities ;  the  Cabinet  must  be  trusted  to  obey  the  electoral  decision ; 
the  members  of  an  alliance  to  work  together  instead  of  against 
one  another,  and  so  on.  Yet  the  assumption  of  the  'Power 
Politician'  is  that  the  method  which  has  succeeded  (notably 
within  the  State)  is  the  'idealistic'  but  essentially  unpractical 
method  in  which  security  and  advantage  are  sacrificed  to 
Utopian  experiment;  while  the  method  of  competitive  arma- 
ment, however  distressing  it  may  be  to  the  Sunday  Schools, 
is  the  one  that  gives  us  real  security.  'The  way  to  be  sure 
of  preserving  peace,'  says  Mr  Churchill,  'is  to  be  so  much 
stronger  than  your  enemy  that  he  won't  dare  to  attack  you.' 
In  other  words  it  is  obvious  that  the  way  for  two  people  to 
keep  the  peace  is  for  each  to  be  stronger  than  the  other. 

'You  may  have  made  your  front  door  secure'  says  Marshal 
Foch,  arguing  for  the  Rhine  frontier,  'but  you  may  as  well  make 
sure  by  having  a  good  high  garden  wall  as  well.' 

'Make  sure,'  that  is  the  note — si  vis  pacem.  .  .  .  And  he 
can  be  sure  that  'the  average  practical  man,'  who  prides  himself 


192  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

on  'knowing  human  nature'  and  'distrusting  theories*  will 
respond  to  the  appeal.  Every  club  smoking  room  will  decide 
that  'the  simple  soldier'  knows  his  business  and  has  judged 
human  forces  aright. 

Yet  of  course  the  simple  truth  is  that  the  'hard-headed 
soldier'  has  chosen  the  one  ground  upon  which  all  experience, 
all  the  facts,  are  against  him.  Then  how  is  he  able  to  'get 
away  with  it* — to  ride  off  leaving  at  least  the  impression  of 
being  a  sternly  practical  unsentimental  man  of  the  world  by 
virtue  of  having  propounded  an  aphorism  which  all  practical 
experience  condemns?  Here  is  Mr  Churchill,  He  is  talking 
to  hard-headed  Lancashire  manufacturers.  He  desires  to  show 
that  he  too  is  no  theorist,  that  he  also  can  be  hard-headed  and 
practical.  And  he — who  really  does  know  the  mind  of  the 
'hard-headed  business  man* — is  perfectly  aware  that  the  best 
road  to  those  hard  heads  is  to  propound  an  arrant  absurdity,  to 
base  a  proposed  line  of  policy  on  the  assumption  of  a  physical 
impossibility,  to  follow  a  will-o*-the-wisp  which  in  all  recorded 
history  has  led  men  into  a  bog. 

They  applaud  Mr  Churchill,  not  because  he  has  put  before 
them  a  cold  calculation  of  relative  risk  in  the  matter  of  main- 
taining peace,  an  indication,  where,  on  the  whole,  the  balance 
of  safety  lies;  Mr  Churchill,  of  course,  knows  perfectly  well 
that,  while  professing  to  do  that,  he  has  been  doing  nothing 
of  the  sort.  He  has,  in  reality,  been  appealing  to  a  sentiment, 
the  emotion  which  is  strongest  and  steadiest  in  the  'hard-faced 
men'  who  have  elbowed  their  way  to  the  top  in  a  competitive 
society.  He  has  'rationalised*  that  competitive  sentiment  of 
domination  by  putting  forward  a  'reason'  which  can  be  avowed 
to  them  and  to  others. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  managed  to  inject  into  his  reasons  for 
predominance  a  moral  strenuousness  which  Mr  Churchill  does 
not  achieve. 

The  following  is  a  passage  from  one  of  the  last  important 
speeches  made  by  Colonel  Roosevelt — ^twice  President  of  the 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT    193 

United  States  and  one  of  the  out-standing  figures  in  the  world 
in  his  generation : — 

'Friends,  be  on  your  guard  against  the  apostles  of  weakness 
and  folly  when  peace  comes.  They  will  tell  you  that  this  is 
the  last  great  war.  They  will  tell  you  that  they  can  make 
paper  treaties  and  agreements  and  guarantees  by  which  brutal 
and  unscrupulous  men  will  have  their  souls  so  softened  that 
weak  and  timid  men  won't  have  anything  to  fear  and  that  brave 
and  honest  men  won't  have  to  prepare  to  defend  themselves. 

'Well,  we  have  seen  that  all  such  treaties  are  worth  less  than 
scraps  of  paper  when  it  becomes  to  the  interests  of  powerful 
and  ruthless  militarist  nations  to  disregard  them,  .  .  .  After 
this  War  is  over,  these  foolish  pacifist  creatures  will  again 
raise  their  piping  voices  against  preparedness  and  in  favour 
of  patent  devices  for  maintaining  peace  without  effort.  Let 
us  enter  into  every  reasonable  agreement  which  bids  fair  to 
minimise  the  chances  of  war  and  to  circumscribe  its  area. 
.  .  .  But  let  us  remember  it  is  a  hundred  times  more  important 
for  us  to  prepare  our  strength  for  our  own  defence  than  to 
enter  any  of  these  peace  treaties,  and  that  if  we  thus  prepare 
our  strength  for  our  own  defence  we  shall  minimise  the 
chances  of  war  as  no  paper  treaties  can  possibly  minimise 
them;  and  we  shall  thus  make  our  views  effective  for  peace 
and  justice  in  the  world  at  large  as  in  no  other  way  can  they 
be  made  effective.'  ^ 

Let  us  dispose  of  one  or  two  of  the  more  devastating  confu- 
sions in  the  foregoing. 

First  there  is  the  everlasting  muddle  as  to  the  internationalist 
attitude  towards  the  likelihood  of  war.  To  Colonel  Roosevelt 
one  is  an  internationalist  or  'pacifist'  because  one  thinks  war 
will  not  take  place.     Whereas  probably  the  strongest  motive 

*  Delivered  at  Portland,  Maine,  on  March  28th,  1918;  reported  in 
New  York  Times,  March  29th. 

18 


194  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  internationalism  is  the  conviction  that  without  it  war  is  in- 
evitable, that  in  a  world  of  rival  nationalisms  war  cannot  be 
avoided.  If  those  who  hate  war  believe  that  the  present  order 
will  without  effort  give  them  peace,  why  in  the  name  of  all  the 
abuse  which  their  advocacy  brings  on  their  heads  should  they 
bother  further  about  the  matter  ? 

Secondly,  internationalism  is  assumed  to  be  the  alternative 
to  the  employment  of  force  or  power  of  arms,  whereas  it  is  the 
organisation  of  force,  of  power  (latent  or  positive)  to  a  com- 
mon— an  international — end. 

Our  incurable  habit  of  giving  to  homely  but  perfectly  healthy 
and  justifiable  reasons  of  conduct  a  high  fainting  romanticism 
sometimes  does  morality  a  very  ill  service.  When  in  political 
situations — as  in  the  making  of  a  Peace  Treaty — a  nation  is 
confronted  by  the  general  alternative  we  are  now  discussing, 
the  grounds  of  opposition  to  a  co-operative  or  'Liberal'  or  'gen- 
erous' settlement  are  almost  always  these:  'Generosity'  is  lost 
upon  a  people  as  crafty  and  treacherous  as  the  enemy;  he 
mistakes  generosity  for  weakness;  he  will  take  advantage  of 
it;  his  nature  won't  be  softened  by  mild  treatment;  he  under- 
stands nothing  but  force. 

The  assumption  is  that  the  liberal  policy  is  based  upon  an 
appeal  to  the  better  side  of  the  enemy ;  upon  arousing  his  nobler 
nature.  And  such  an  assumption  concerning  the  Hun  or  the 
Bolshevik,  for  instance  (or  at  an  earlier  date,  the  Boer  or  the 
Frenchman),  causes  the  very  gorge  of  the  Roosevelt-Bottom- 
ley  patriot  to  rise  in  protest.  He  simply  does  not  believe  in  the 
effective  operation  of  so  remote  a  motive. 

But  the  real  ground  of  defence  for  the  liberal  policy  is  not 
the  existence  of  an  abnormal  if  heretofore  successfully  disguised 
nobility  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  but  of  his  very  human  if 
not  very  noble  fears  which,  from  our  point  of  view,  it  is  ex- 
tremely important  not  to  arouse  or  justify.  If  our  'punishment' 
of  him  creates  in  his  mind  the  conviction  that  we  are  certain 
to  use  our  power  for  commercial  advantage,  or  that  in  any  case 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  195 

our  power  is  a  positive  danger  to  him,  he  will  use  his  recovered 
economic  strength  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  it ;  and  we  should 
face  a  fact  so  dangerous  and  costly  to  us. 

To  take  cognisance  of  this  fact,  and  to  shape  our  policy  ac- 
cordingly is  not  to  attribute  to  the  enemy  any  particular  nobility 
of  motive.  But  almost  always  when  that  policy  is  attacked,  it 
is  attacked  on  the  ground  of  its  'Sunday  School'  assumption  of 
the  accessibility  of  the  enemy  to  gratitude  or  'softening'  in 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  phrase. 

We  reach  in  the  final  analysis  of  the  interplay  of  motive  a 
very  clear  political  pragmatism.  Either  policy  will  justify  itself, 
and  by  the  way  it  works  out  in  practice,  prove  that  it  is  right. 

Here  is  a  statesman — Italian,  say — ^who  takes  the  'realist' 
view,  and  comes  to  a  Peace  Conference  which  may  settle  for 
centuries  the  position  of  his  country  in  the  world — its  strength, 
its  capacity  for  defending  itself,  the  extent  of  its  resources. 
In  the  world  as  he  knows  it,  a  country  has  one  thing,  and  one 
thing  only,  upon  which  it  can  depend  for  its  national  security 
and  the  defence  of  its  due  rights;  and  that  thing  is  its  own 
strength.  Italy's  adequate  defence  must  include  the  naval  com- 
mand of  the  Adriatic  and  a  strategic  position  in  the  Tyrol.  This 
means  deep  harbours  on  the  Dalmatian  coast  and  the  inclusion 
in  the  Tyrol  of  a  very  considerable  non-Italian  population.  To 
take  them  may,  it  is  true,  not  only  violate  the  principle  of 
nationality  but  shut  off  the  new  Yugo-Slav  nation  from  access 
to  the  sea  and  exchange  one  irredentism  for  another.  But  what 
can  the  'realist'  Italian  statesman,  whose  first  duty  is  to  his 
own  country  do?  He  is  sorry,  but  his  own  nationality  and  its 
due  protection  are  concerned;  and  the  Italian  nation  will  be 
insecure .  without  those  frontiers  and  those  harbours.  Self- 
preservation  is  the  law  of  life  for  nations  as  for  other  living 
things.  You  have,  unfortunately,  a  condition  in  which  the  se- 
curity of  one  means  the  insecurity  of  another,  and  if  a  statesman 
in  these  circumstances  has  to  choose  which  of  the  two  is  to  be 
secure,  he  must  choose  his  own  coimtry. 


196  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Some  day,  of  course,  there  may  come  into  being  a  League  of 
Nations  so  effective  that  nations  can  really  look  to  it  for  their 
safety.  Meantime  they  must  look  to  themselves.  But,  unfor- 
tunately, for  each  nation  to  take  these  steps  about  strategic 
frontiers  means  not  only  killing  the  possibility  of  an  effective 
League :  it  means,  sooner  or  later,  killing  the  military  alliance 
which  is  the  alternative.  If  one  Alsace-Lorraine  could  poison 
European  politics  in  the  way  it  did,  what  is  going  to  be  the 
effect  ultimately  of  the  round  dozen  that  we  have  created  under 
the  treaty?  The  history  of  Britain  in  reference  to  Arab  and 
Egyptian  Nationality;  of  France  in  relation  to  Poland  and 
other  Russian  border  States;  of  all  the  Allies  in  reference  to 
Japanese  ambitions  in  China  and  Siberia,  reveals  what  is,  fun- 
damentally, a  precisely  similar  dilemma. 

When  the  statesmen — Italian  or  other — insist  upon  strategic 
frontiers  and  territories  containing  raw  materials,  on  the 
ground  that  a  nation  must  look  to  itself  because  we  live  in  a 
world  in  which  international  arrangements  cannot  be  depended 
on,  they  can  be  quite  certain  that  the  reason  they  give  is  a  sound 
one :  because  their  own  action  will  make  it  so :  their  action  cre- 
ates the  very  conditions  to  which  they  appeal  as  the  reason  for 
it.  Their  decision,  with  the  popular  impulse  of  sacred  egoism 
which  supports  it,  does  something  more  than  repudiate  Mr 
Wilson's  principles ;  it  is  the  beginning  of  the  disruption  of  the 
Alliance  upon  which  their  countries  have  depended.  The  case 
is  put  in  a  manifesto  issued  a  year  or  two  ago  by  a  number  of 
eminent  Americans  from  which  we  have  already  quoted  in 
Chapter  III. 

It  says : — 

*If,  as  in  the  past,  nations  must  look  for  their  future  security 
chiefly  to  their  own  strength  and  resources,  then  inevitably,  in 
the  name  of  the  needs  of  national  defence,  there  will  be  claims 
for  strategic  frontiers  and  territories  with  raw  material  which 
do  violence  to  the  principle  of  nationality.    Afterwards  those 


RISKS  OF  STATUS  AND  CONTRACT  197 

who  suffer  from  such  violations  would  be  opposed  to  the  League 
of  Nations,  because  it  would  consecrate  the  injustice  of  which 
they  would  be  the  victims.  A  refusal  to  trust  to  the  League  of 
Nations,  and  a  demand  for  "material"  guarantees  for  future 
safety,  will  set  up  that  very  distrust  which  will  afterwards  be 
appealed  to  as  justification  for  regarding  the  League  as  imprac- 
ticable because  it  inspires  no  general  confidence.  A  bold  "Act 
of  Political  Faith"  in  the  League  will  justify  itself  by  making 
the  League  a  success;  but,  equally,  lack  of  faith  will  justify 
itself  by  ruining  the  League/ 

That  is  why,  when  in  the  past  the  realist  statesman  has  some- 
times objected  that  he  does  not  believe  in  internationalism 
because  it  is  not  practical,  I  have  replied  that  it  is  not  practical 
because  he  does  not  believe  in  it. 

The  prerequisite  to  the  creation  of  a  society  is  the  Social 
Will.  And  herein  lies  the  difficulty  of  making  any  comparative 
estimate  of  the  respective  risks  of  the  alternative  courses.  We 
admit  that  if  the  nations  would  sink  their  sacred  egoisms  and 
pledge  their  power  to  mutual  and  common  protection,  the  risk 
of  such  a  course  would  disappear.  We  get  the  paradox  that 
there  is  no  risk  if  we  all  take  the  risk.  But  each  refuses  to 
begin.    William  James  has  illustrated  the  position: — 

*I  am  climbing  the  Alps,  and  have  had  the  ill  luck  to  work 
myself  into  a  position  from  which  the  only  escape  is  by  a  ter- 
rible leap.  Being  without  similar  experience,  I  have  no  evidence 
of  my  ability  to  perform  it  successfully ;  but  hope  and  confidence 
in  myself  make  me  sure  that  I  shall  not  miss  my  aim,  and  nerve 
my  feet  to  execute  what,  without  those  subjective  emotions, 
would  have  been  impossible. 

'But  suppose  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  emotions. .  .of  mis- 
trust predominate Why,  then,  I  shall  hesitate  so  long  that  at 

last,  exhausted  and  trembling,  and  launching  myself  in  a  mo- 
ment of  despair,  I  miss  my  foothold  and  roll  into  the  abyss.    In 


198  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

this  case,  and  it  is  one  of  an  immense  class,  the  part  of  wisdom 
is  to  beheve  what  one  desires;  for  the  behef  is  one  of  the  in- 
dispensable, preliminary  conditions  of  the  realisation  of  its 
object.  There  are  cases  where  faith  creates  its  own  justification. 
Believe,  and  you  shall  be  right,  for  you  shall  save  yourself; 
doubt,  and  you  shall  again  be  right,  for  you  shall  perish.' 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT 

'Human  Nature  is  always  what  it  is' 

'You  may  argue  as  much  as  you  like.  All  the  logic  chopping 
will  never  get  over  the  fact  that  human  nature  is  always  what 
it  is.  Nations  will  always  fight.  .  .  .  always  retaliate  at  victory.* 

If  that  be  true,  and  our  pugnacities,  and  hates,  and  instincts 
generally,  are  uncontrollable,  and  they  dictate  conduct,  no  more 
is  to  be  said.  We  are  the  helpless  victims  of  outside  forces,  and 
may  as  well  surrender,  without  further  discussion,  or  political 
agitation,  or  propaganda.  For  if  those  appeals  to  our  minds 
can  neither  determine  the  direction  nor  modify  the  manifesta- 
tion of  our  innate  instincts,  nor  influence  conduct,  one  rather 
wonders  at  our  persistence  in  them. 

Why  so  many  of  us  find  an  obvious  satisfaction  in  this  fatal- 
ism, so  patently  want  it  to  be  true,  and  resort  to  it  in  such 
convenient  disregard  of  the  facts,  has  been  in  some  measure 
indicated  in  the  preceding  chapter.  At  bottom  it  comes  to  this : 
that  it  relieves  us  of  so  much  trouble  and  responsibility;  the  life 
of  instinct  and  emotion  is  so  easily  flowing  a  thing,  and  that  of 
social  restraints  and  rationalised  decisions  so  cold  and  dry 
and  barren. 

At  least  that  is  the  alternative  as  many  of  us  see  it.  And  if 
the  only  alternative  to  an  impulse  spending  itself  in  hostilities 
and  hatreds  destructive  of  social  cohesion,  were  the  sheer  re- 
straint of  impulse  by  calculation  and  reason ;  if  our  choice  were 

199 


200  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

truly  between  chaos,  anarchy,  and  the  perpetual  repression  of 
all  spontaneous  and  vigorous  impulse — then  the  choice  of  a 
fatalistic  refusal  to  reason  would  be  justifiable. 

But  happily  that  is  not  the  alternative.  The  function  of 
reason  and  discipline  is  not  to  repress  instinct  and  impulse, 
but  to  turn  those  forces  into  directions  in  which  they  may  have 
free  play  without  disaster.  The  function  of  the  compass  is 
not  to  check  the  power  of  the  ship's  engines;  it  is  to  indicate 
a  direction  in  which  the  power  can  be  given  full  play,  because 
the  danger  of  running  on  to  the  rocks  has  been  obviated. 

Let  us  first  get  the  mere  facts  straight — facts  as  they  have 
worked  out  in  the  War  and  the  Peace. 

It  is  not  true  that  the  directions  taken  by  our  instincts  can- 
not in  any  way  be  determined  by  our  intelligence.  'A  man's 
impulses  are  not  fixed  from  the  beginning  by  his  native  dis- 
position: within  certain  limits  they  are  profoundly  modified 
by  his  circumstances  and  way  of  life.'  ^  What  we  regard  as 
the  'instinctive'  part  of  our  character  is,  again,  within  large 
limits  very  malleable:  by  beliefs,  by  social  circumstances,  by 
institutions,  and  above  all  by  the  suggestibility  of  tradition, 
the  work  is  often  of  individual  minds. 

It  is  not  so  much  the  character  of  our  impulsive  and  instinc- 

*  Bertrand  Russell :   Principles  of  Social  Reconstruction. 

Mr.  Trotter  in  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in  War  and  Peace,  says : — 

'We  see  one  instinct  producing  manifestations  directly  hostile  to  each 
other — prompting  to  ever-advancing  developments  of  altruism  while  it 
necessarily  leads  to  any  new  product  of  advance  being  attacked.  It 
shows,  moreover  .  .  .  that  a  gregarious  species  rapidly  developing  a 
complex  society  can  be  saved  from  inextricable  confusion  only  by  the 
appearance  of  reason  and  the  application  of  it  to  life.     (p.  46.) 

.  .  .  'The  conscious  direction  of  man's  destiny  is  plainly  indicated 
by  Nature  as  the  only  mechanism  by  which  the  social  life  of  so  complex 
an  animal  can  be  guaranteed  against  disaster  and  brought  to  yield  its 
full  possibilities,     (p.  162.) 

.  .  .  'Such  a  directing  intelligence  or  group  of  intelligences  would 
take  into  account  before  all  things  the  biological  character  of  man.  .  .  . 
It  would  discover  when  natural  inclinations  in  man  must  be  indulged, 
and  would  make  them  respectable,  what  inclinations  in  him  must  be 
controlled  for  the  advantage  of  the  species,  and  make  them  insignificant.' 
(p.  162-3.) 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    201 

tive  life  that  is  changed  by  these  influences,  as  the  direction. 
The  elements  of  human  nature  may  remain  unchangeable,  but 
the  manifestations  resulting  from  the  changing  combinations 
may  be  infinitely  various  as  are  the  forms  of  matter  which  result 
from  changing  combinations  of  the  same  primary  elements. 

It  is  not  a  choice  between  a  life  of  impulse  and  emotion  on 
the  one  side,  and  wearisome  repressions  on  the  other.  The 
perception  that  certain  needs  are  vital  will  cause  us  to  use  our 
emotional  energy  for  one  purpose  instead  of  another.  And  just 
because  the  traditions  that  have  grouped  around  nationalism 
turn  our  combativeness  into  the  direction  of  war,  the  energy 
brought  into  play  by  that  impulse  is  not  available  for  the 
creativeness  of  peace.  Having  become  habituated  to  a  certain 
reagent — the  stimulus  of  some  personal  or  visible  enemy — 
energy  fails  to  react  to  a  stimulus  which,  with  a  different  way 
of  life,  would  have  sufficed.  Because  we  must  have  gin  to 
summon  up  our  energy,  that  is  no  proof  that  energy  is  im- 
possible without  it.  It  is  hardly  for  an  inebriate  to  laud  the 
life  of  instinct  and  impulse.  For  the  time  being  that  is  not 
the  attitude  and  tendency  that  most  needs  encouragement. 

As  to  the  fact  that  the  instinctive  and  impulsive  part  of  our 
behaviour  is  dirigible  and  malleable  by  tradition  and  discussion, 
that  is  not  only  admitted,  but  it  is  apt  to  be  over-emphasised — 
by  those  who  insist  upon  the  'unchangeability  of  human  nature.' 
The  importance  which  we  attached  to  the  repression  of  pacifist 
and  defeatist  propaganda  during  the  War,  and  of  Bolshevist 
agitation  after  the  War,  proves  that  we  believe  these  feelings, 
that  we  allege  to  be  unchangeable,  can  be  changed  too  easily  and 
readily  by  the  influence  of  ideas,  even  wrong  ones. 

The  type  of  feeling  which  gave  us  the  Treaty  was  in  a 
large  degree  a  manufactured  feeling,  in  the  sense  that  it  was 
the  result  of  opinion,  formed  day  by  day  by  a  selection  only 
of  the  facts.  For  this  manufacture  of  opinion,  we  consciously 
created  a  very  elaborate  machinery,  both  of  propaganda  and 
of  control  of  news.    But  that  organisation  of  public  opinion. 


202  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

justifiable  in  itself  perhaps  as  a  war  measure,  was  not  guided 
(as  the  result  shows)  by  an  understanding  of  what  the  political 
ends,  which,  in  the  early  days  of  the  War,  we  declared  to  be 
ours,  would  need  in  the  way  of  psychology.  Our  machinery 
developed  a  psychology  which  made  our  higher  political  aims 
quite  impossible  of  realisation. 

Public  opinion,  'human  nature,*  would  have  been  more  man- 
ageable, its  'instincts'  would  have  been  sounder,  and  we  should 
have  had  a  Europe  less  in  disintegration,  if  we  had  told  as 
far  as  possible  that  ptrt  of  the  truth  which  our  public  bodies 
(State,  Church,  Press,  the  School)  were  largely  occupied  in 
hiding.  But  the  opinion  which  dictated  the  policy  of  repres- 
sion is  itself  the  result  of  refusing  to  face  the  truth.  To  tell 
the  truth  is  the  remedy  here  suggested. 

The  Paradox  of  the  Peace 

The  supreme  paradox  of  the  Peace  is  this: — 
We  went  into  the  War  with  certain  very  definitely  proclaimed 
principles,  which  we  declared  to  be  more  valuable  than  the  lives 
of  the  men  that  were  sacrificed  in  their  defence.  W^e  were 
completely  victorious,  and  went  into  the  Conference  with  full 
power,  so  far  as  enemy  resistance  was  concerned,  to  put  those 
principles  into  effect,^  We  did  not  use  the  victory  which  our 
young  men  had  given  us  to  that  end,  but  for  enforcing  a  policy 
which  was  in  flat  contradiction  to  the  principles  we  had  origin- 
ally proclaimed. 

In  some  respects  the  spectacle  is  the  most  astounding  of 
all  history.  It  is  literally  true  to  say  that  millions  of  young 
soldiers  gladly  gave  their  lives  for  ideals  to  which  the  survivors, 

*  The  opening  sentence  of  a  five  volume  History  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence of  Paris,  edited  by  H.  W.  V.  Temperley,  and  published  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  is  as  follows : — 

The  war  was  a  conflict  between  the  principles  of  freedom  and  of 
fcutocracy,  between  the  principles  of  moral  influence  and  of  material 
(orce,  of  government  by  consent  and  of  government  by  compulsion.' 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    203 

when  they  had  the  power  to  reaHse  them  (again  so  far  as 
physical  force  can  give  us  power,)  showed  complete  indiffer- 
ence, sometimesajcontemptuous  hostili^]^^^,^ 

It  was  not  merely  ^aiT  act  of  the  statesmen.  The  worst 
features  of  the  Treaty  were  imposed  by  popular  feeling — ^put 
into  the  Treaty  by  statesmen  who  did  not  believe  in  them, 
and  only  included  them  in  order  to  satisfy  public  opinion.  The 
policy  of  President  Wilson  failed  in  part  because  of  the  humane 
and  internationalist  opinion  of  the  America  of  1916  had  be- 
come the  fiercely  chauvinist  and  coercive  opinion  of  1919, 
repudiating  the  President's  efforts. 

Part  of  the  story  of  these  transformations  has  been  told 
in  the  preceding  pages.  Let  us  summarise  the  story  as  a 
whole. 

We  saw  at  the  beginning  of  the  War  a  real  feeling  for  the 
right  of  peoples  to  choose  their  own  form  of  government,  for 
the  principle  of  nationality.  At  the  end  of  the  War  we  deny 
that  right  in  half  a  score  of  cases,^  where  it  suits  our  monientary 
political  or  military  interest.  The  very  justification  of  'necess- 
ity,' which  shocks  our  conscience  when  put  forward  by  the 
enemy,  is  the  one  we  invoke  callously  at  the  peace — or  before 
it,  as  when  we  agree  to  allow  Czarist  Russia  to  do  what  she 
will  with  Poland,  and  Italy  with  Serbia.  Having  sacrificed 
the  small  State  to  Russia  in  1916,  we  are  prepared  to  sacrifice 
Russia  to  the  small  Statejn_12l9,  by  encouraging  the  formation 
of.  border  independencies,  which,  if  complete  independencies, 
must  throttle  Russia,  and  which  no  'White'  Russian  would 
accept.  While  encouraging  the  lesser  States  to  make  war  on 
Russia,  we  subsidise  White  Russian  military  leaders  who  will 
certainly  destroy  the  small  States  if  successful.    We  entered 

*  Foremost  as  examples  stand  out  the  claims  of  German  Austria  to. 
federate  with  Germany;  the  German  population  of  the  Southern  Tyrol 
with  Austria;  the  Bohemian  Germans  with  Austria;  the  Transyl- 
vanian  Magyars  with  Hungary;  the  Bulgarians  of  Macedonia,  the  Bul- 
garians of  the  Dobrudja,  and  the  Bulgarians  of  Western  Thrace  with 
Bulgaria;  the  Serbs  of  the  Serbian  Banat  with  Yugo-Slavia;  the 
Lithuanians  and  Ukrainians  for  freedom  from  Polish  dominion. 


204  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  War  for  the  destruction  of  militarism,  and  to  make  dis- 
armament possible,  declaring  that  German  arms  were  the  cause 
of  our  arms;  and  having  destroyed  German  arms,  we  make 
ours  greater  than  they  were  before  the  War,  and  introduce 
such  new  elementTag^the  systematic  arming  of  African  Ravages 
for  European  warfare.  We  fought  to  make  the  secret  bring- 
ing about  of  war  by  military  or  diplomatic  cliques  impossible, 
and  after  the  Armistice  the  decision  to  wage  war  on  the  Russian 
Republic. is.jmade  without  even  public  knowledge,  in  opposition 
to  sections  in  the  X^Bmets  concerned,  by  cliques  of  whose 
composition  the  public  is  completely  ignorant.^  The  invasion 
of  Russia  from  the  north,  south,  east,  and  west,  by  European, 
Asiatic,  and  negro  troops,  is  made  without  a  declaration  of 
war,  after  a  solemn  statement  by  the  chief  spokesman  of  the 
Allies  that  there  should  be  no  invasion.  Having  declared, 
during  the  War,  on  a  score  of  occasions,  that  we  were  not 
fighting  against  any  right  or  interest  of  the  German  people  ^ 
— or  the  German  people  at  all — because  we  realised  that  only 
by  ensuring  that  right  and  interest  ourselves  could  we  turn 
Germany  from  the  ways  of  the  past,  at  the  peace  we  impose 
conditions  which  make  it  impossible  for  the  German  people 


*We  know  now  (see  the  interview  with  M.  Paderewski  in  the  New 
York  World)  that  we  compelled  Poland  to  remain  at  war  when  she 
wanted  to  make  peace.  It  has  never  been  fully  explained  why  the 
Prinkipo  peace  policy  urged  by  Mr  Lloyd  George  as  early  as  December 
1918  was  defeated,  and  why  instead  we  furnished  munitions,  tanks, 
aeroplanes,  poison  gas,  military  missions  and  subsidies  in  turn  to 
Koltchak,  Denikin,  Yudenitch,  Wrangel,  and  Poland.  We  prolonged 
the  blockade — which  in  the  early  phases  forbade  Germany  that  was 
starving  to  catch  fish  in  th^-BaUic,  apd  stoppe<l~Tnfe3icme  and  hospital 
supplies  to  the  Russians — for  fear,  apparently,  of  the  very  thing  which 
might  have  helped  to  save  Europe,  the  economic  co-operation  of  Russia 
and  Central  Europe. 

*  'We  have  no  quarrel  with  the  German  people.  We  have  no  feeling 
towards  them  biit  one  of  sympathy  and  friendship.  It  was  not  upon 
their  impulse  that  their  government  acted  in  entering  this  war.' 
'We  are  glad  ...  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the  world, 
and  for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples,  the  German  peoples  included 
for  the  rights  of  nations  great  and  small  ...  to  choose  their  way 
life.'    (President  Wilson,  Address  to  Congress,  April  2nd,  1917). 


Id,  . 
d:  \ 
of^ 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    205 

even  adequately  to  feed  their  population,  and  leave  them  no 
recourse  but  the  recreation  of  their  power.  Having  promised 
at  the  Armistice  not  to  use  our  power  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  the  due  feeding  of  Germany,  we  continue  for  months 
a  blockade  which,  even  by  the  testimony  of  our  own  officials, 
creates  famine  conditions  and  literally  kills  very  many  of  the 
children.  

At  the  beginning  of  the  War,  our  statesmen,  if  not  our  public, 
had  some  rudimentary  sense  of  the  economic  unity  of  mankind, 
of  our  need  of  one  another's  work,  and  the  idea  of  blockading 
half  a  world  in  time  of  dire  scarcity  would  have  appalled  them. 
Yet  at  the  Armistice  it  was  done  so  light-heartedly  that,  having 
at  last  abandoned  it,  they  have  never  even  explained  what 
they  proposed  to  accomplish  by  it,  for,  says  Mr  Maynard 
Keynes.  'It  is  an  extraordinary  fact  that  the  fundamental 
economic  problem  of  a  Europe  starving  and  disintegrating  be- 
fore their  eyes,  was  the  one  question  in  which  it  was  impossible 
to  arouse  the  jnterest  of  the  Four.'  ^  At  the  beginning  of  the 
War  we  invoked  Tngh  "fieaven  to  witness  the  danger  and  anom- 
aly of  autocratic  government  in  our  day.  We  were  fighting 
for  Parliamentary  institutions,  'open  Covenants  openly  arrived 
at.'  After  victory,  we  leave  the  real  settlement  of  Europe  to  be 
made  by  two  or  three  Prime  Ministers,  rendering  no  account  of 
their  secret  deliberations  and  discussions  to  any  Parliament 
until,  in  practice,  it  Is  too  late  to  alter  them.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  War  we  were  profoundly  moved  by  the  wickedness 
of  military  terrorism;  at  its  close  we  employ  it — whether  by 
means  of  starvation,  blockade,  armed  negro  savages  in  German 
cities,  reprisals,  in  Ireland,  or  the  ruthless  slaughter  of  unarmed 
civilians  in  India — without  creating  any  strong  revulsion  of 
feeling  at  home.  At  the  beginning  of  the  War  we  realised 
that  the  governmental  organisation  of  hatred  with  the  prosti- 
tution of  art  to  'hymns_QlJiate'_was  vile  and  despicable.  We 
copied  that  governmental  organisation  of  hatred,  and  famous 

*  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  p.  211. 


206  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

English  authors  duly  produce  our  hymns  of  hate.*  We  felt 
at  the  beginning  that  all  human  freedom  was  menaced  by  the 
German  theory  of  the  State  as  the  master  of  man  and  not  as  his 
instrument,  with  all  that  means  of  political  inquisition  and 
repression.  When  some  of  its  worst  features  are  applied  at 
home,  we  are  so  indifferent  to  the  fact  that  we  do  not  even 
recognise  that  the  thing  against  which  we  fought  has  been 
imposed  upon  ourselves.^ 

Many  will  dissent  from  this  indictment.  Yet  its  most  im- 
portant item — our  indifference  to  the  very  evils  against  which 
we  fought — is  something  upon  which  practically  all  witnesses 
testifying  to  the  state  of  public  opinion  to-day  agree.  It  is  a 
commonplace  of  current  discussion  of  present-day  feeling. 
Take  one  or  two  at  random.  Sir  Philip  Gibbs  and  Mr.  Sisley 
Huddleston,  both  English  journalists.  (I  choose  journalists 
because  it  is  their  business  to  know  the  nature  of  the  public 
mind  and  spirit.)  Speaking  of  the  wholesale  starvation,  un- 
imaginable misery,  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea,  Mr. 
Huddleston  writes: — 

*We  read  these  things.  They  make  not  the  smallest  im- 
pression on  us.  Why?  How  is  it  that  we  are  not  horrified 
and  do  not  resolve  that  not  for  a  single  day  shall  any  pre- 
ventable evil  exist?  How  is  it,  that,  on  the  contrary,  for 
two  years  we  have  been  cheerfully  engaged  in  intensifying 
the  sum  of  human  suffering  ?  Why  are  we  so  heedless?  Why 
are  we  so  callous?  Why  do  we  allow  to  be  committed,  in 
our  name,  a  thousand  atrocities,  and  to  be  written,  in  our 
name  and  for  our  delectation,  a  million  vile  words  which  re- 
veal the  most  amazing  lack  cither  of  feeling  or  of  common 
sense  ? 

'There  have  been  crimes  perpetrated  by  the  politicians — 

*  See  quotations  from  Sir  A.  Conan  Doyle,  later  in  this  Chapter. 
*See,  e.g.,  the  facts  as  to  the  repression  of  Socialism  in  America, 
Chapter  V. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    207 

by  all  the  politicians — which  no  condemnation  could  fitly  charac- 
terise. But  the  peoples  must  be  blamed.  The  peoples  sup- 
port the  war-making  politicians.  It  is  my  business  to  follow 
the  course  of  events  day  by  day,  and  it  is  sometimes  difficult 
to  stand  back  and  take  a  general  view.  \Vhenever  I  do  so,  I 
am  appalled  at  the  blundering  or  the  wickedness  of  the  leaders 
of  the  world.  Without  party  prejudices  or  personal  predilec- 
tions, an  impartial  observer,  I  cannot  conceive  how  it  is  possible 
to  be  always  blind  to  the  truth,  the  glaring  truth,  that  since 
the  Armistice  we  .hav£_oever^  sought  to  make  peace,  but  have 
sought  only  some  pretext  and  method  for  prolonging  the 
War. 

'Hate  exudes  from  every  journal  in  speaking  of  certain 
peoples — a  weary  hate,  a  conventional  hate,  a  hate  which  is 
always  whipping  itself  into  a  passion.  It  is,  perhaps,  more 
strictly,  apathy  masquerading  as  hate — which  is  worst  of  all. 
The  people  are  blase:  they  seek  only  bread  aud-xircuses.  for 
themselves.  They  regard  no  bread  for  others  as  a  rather  bor- 
ing circus  for  themselves.' 

Mr.  Huddleston  was  present  throughout  most  of  the  Con- 
ference.   This  is  his  verdict: — 

'.  .  .  Cynicism  soon  became  naked.  In  the  East  all  pre- 
tence of  righteousness  was  abandoned.  Every  successive 
Treaty  was  more  frankly  the  expression  of  shameful  appe- 
tites. There  was  no  pretence  of  conscience  in  politics.  Force 
rules  without  disguise.  What  was  still  more  amazing  was 
the  way  in  which  strife  was  stirred  up  gratuitously.  What 
advantage  was  it,  even  for  a  moment,  to  any  one  to  foment 
civil  war  in  Russia,  to  send  against  the  unhappy,  famine- 
stricken  country  army  after  army?  The  result  was  so  obvi- 
ously to  consolidate  the  Bolshevist  Government  around  which 
were  obliged  to  rally  all  Russians  who  had  the  spirit  of  na- 
tionality.    It  seemed  as  if  everywhere  we  were  plotting  our 


208  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

own  ruin  and  hastening  our  own  end.  A  strange  dementia 
seized  our  rulers,  who  thought  peace,  replenishment  of  empty 
larders,  the  fraternisation  of  sorely  tired  nations,  ignoble 
and  delusive  objects.  It  appeared  that  war  was  for  evermore 
to  be  humanity's  fate. 

'Time  after  time  I  saw  excellent  opportunities  of  universal 
peace  deliberately  rejected.  There  was  somebody  to  wreck 
every  Prinkipo,  every  Spa.  It  was  almost  with  dismay  that 
all  Europeans  who  had  kept  their  intelligence  unclouded  saw 
the  frustration  of  peace,  and  heard  the  peoples  applaud  the 
men  who  frustrated  peace.  I  care  not  whether  they  still  enjoy 
esteem :  history  will  judge  them  harshly  and  will  judge  harshly  ' 
the  turbulence  which  men  plumed  themselves  on  creating  two| 
years  after  the  War.'  "^ 

As  to  the  future: — 

*If  it  is  certain  that  France  must  force  another  fight  with 
Germany  in  a  short  span  of  years,  if  she  pursues  her  present 
policy  of  implacable  antagonism;  if  it  is  certain  that  England 
is  already  carefully  seeking  the  European  equilibrium,  and 
that  a  responsible  minister  has  already  written  of  the  possi- 
bility of  a  military  accord  with  Germany;  if  there  has  been 
seen,  owing  to  the  foolish  belief  of  the  Allies  in  force — ^ 
belief  which  increases  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  Allied  possession 
of  effective  force — ^the  re-birth  of  Russian  militarism,  as  there 
will  assuredly  be  seen  the  re-birth  of  German  militarism;  if 
there  are  quarrels  between  Greece  and  Italy,  between  Italy  and 
the  Jugo-Slavs,  between  Hungary  and  Austria,  between  every 
tiny  nation  and  its  neighbour,  even  between  England  and 
France,  it  is  because,  when  war  has  once  been  invoked,  it 
cannot  easily  i»£..£xorcise^  It  will  linger  long  in  Europe : 
the  straw  will  smoulder  and  at  any  moment  may  break  into 
flame.  .  .  . 

'This  is  not  lurid  imagining:  it  is  as  logical  as  a  piece  of 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    209 

Euclidean  reasoning.  Only  by  a  violent  effort  to  change  our' 
fashion  of  seeing  things  can  it  be  averted.  War-making  is  now 
a  habit.' 

And  as  to  the  outcome  on  the  mind  of  the  people : — 

'The  war  has  killed  elasticity  of  mind,  independence  of 
judgment,  and  liberty  of  expression.  We  think  not  so  much 
of  the  truth  as  of  conforming  to  the  tacitly  accepted  fiction 
of  the  hour.  ^ 

Sir  Philip  Gibbs  renders  on  the  whole  a  similar  verdict.    He 
says : — 

'The  people  of  all  countries  were  deeply  involved  in  the 
general  blood-guiltiness  of  Europe.  They  made  no  passion- 
ate appeal  in  the  name  of  Christ  or  in  the  name  of  humanity 
for  the  cessation  of  the  slaughter  of  boys  and  the  suicide  of 
nations,  and  for  a  reconciliation  of  peoples  upon  terms  of 
some  more  reasonable  argument  than  that  of  high  explosives. 
Peace  proposals  from  the  Pope,  from  Germany,  from  Aus- 
tria, were  rejected  with  fierce  denunciation,  most  passionate 
scorn,  as  "peace  plots"  and  "peace  traps,"  not  without  the 
terrible  logic  of  the  vicious  circle,  because  indeed,  there  was 
no  sincerity  of  renunciation  in  some  of  those  offers  of  peace, 
and  the  Powers  opposite  to  us  were  simply  trying  our  strength 
and  our  weakness  in  order  to  make  their  own  kind  of  peace, 
which  should  be  that  of  conquest.  The  gamblers,  playing 
the  game  of  "poker,"  with  crowns  and  armies  as  their  stakes,  / 
were  upheld  generally  by  the  peoples,  who  would  not  abate  | 
one  point  of  pride,  one  fraction  of  hate,  one  claim  of  ven- 
geance, though  all  Europe  should  fall  in  ruin,  and  the  last  i 
legions  of  boys  be  massacred.  There  was  no  call  from  people 
to  people  across  the  frontiers  of  hostility.     "Let  us  end  this 

*  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  November  1920. 

14 


210  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

homicidal  mania.  Let  us  get  back  to  sanity  and  save  our 
younger  sons.  Let  us  hand  over  to  justice  those  who  will 
continue  the  slaughter  of  our  youth!"  There  was  no  for- 
giveness, no  generous  instinct,  no  large-hearted  common  sense 
in  any  combatant  nation  of  Europe.  Like  wolves  they  had 
their  teeth  in  one  another's  throats,  and  would  not  let  go, 
though  all  bloody  and  exhausted,  until  one  should  fall  at  the 
last  gasp,  to  be  mangled  by  the  others.  Yet  in  each  nation, 
even  in  Germany,  there  were  men  and  women  who  saw  the 
folly  of  the  war  and  the  crime  of  it,  and  desired  to  end  it  by 
some  act  of  renunciation  and  repentance,  and  by  some  uplift- 
ing of  the  people's  spirit  to  vault  the  frontiers  of  hatred  and 
the  barbed  wire  which  hedged  in  patriotism.  Some  of  them 
were  put  in  prison.  Most  of  them  saw  the  impossibility  of 
counteracting  the  forces  of  insanity  which  had  made  the  world 
mad,  and  kept  silent,  hiding  their  thoughts  and  brooding  over 
them.  The  leaders  of  the  nations  continued  to  use  mob-passion 
as  their  argument  and  justification,  excited  it  anew  when  its 
fires  burned  low,  focussed  it  upon  definite  objectives,  and  gave 
it  a  sense  of  righteousness  by  the  high-sounding  watchwords 
of  liberty,  justice,  honour,  and  retribution.  Each  side  pro- 
claimed Christ  as  its  captain,  and  invoked  the  blessing  and 
aid  of  the  God  of  Christendom,  though  Germans  were  allied 
with  Turks,  and  France  was  full  of  black  and  yellow  men. 
The  German  people  did  not  try  to  avert  their  ruin  by  de- 
nouncing the  criminal  acts  of  their  War  Lords  nor  by  de- 
ploring the  cruelties  they  had  committed.  The  Allies  did  not 
help  them  to  do  so,  because  of  their  lust  for  bloody  vengeance 
and  their  desire  for  the  spoils  of  victory.  The  peoples  shared 
the  blame  of  their  rulers  because  they  were  not  nobler  than 
their  rulers.  They  cannot  now  plead  ignorance  or  betrayal 
by  false  ideals  which  duped  them,  because  character  does 
not  depend  on  knowledge,  and  it  was  the  character  of  European 
peoples  which  failed  in  the  crisis  of  the  world's  fate,  so 
that  they  followed  the  call-back  of  the  beast  in  the  jungle 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    211 

rather  than  the  voice  of  the  Crucified  One  whom  they  pre- 
tended to  adore.'  ^^ 

And  perhaps  most  important  of  all  (though  the  clergy  here 
just  stand  for  the  complacent  mob  mind;  they  were  no  worse 
than  the  laity),  this: — 

*I  think  the  clergy  of  all  nations,  apart  from  a  heroic  and 
saintly  few,  subordinated  their  faith,  which  is  a  gospel  of 
charity,  to  national  limitations.  They  were  patriots  before 
they  were  priests,  and  their  patriotism  was  sometimes  as 
limited,  as  narrow,  as  fierce,  and  as  blood-thirsty  as  that  of 
the  people  who  looked  to  them  for  truth  and  light.  They 
were  often  fiercer,  narrower,  and  more  desirous  of  vengeance 
than  the  soldiers  who  fought,  because  it  is  now  a  known  truth 
that  the  soldiers,  German  and  Austrian,  French  and  Italian 
and  British,  were  sick  of  the  unending  slaughter  long  before- 
the  ending  of  the  war,  and  would  have  made  a  peace  more 
fair  than  that  which  now  prevails  if  it  had  been  put  to  the 
common  vote  in  the  trenches;  whereas  the  Archbishop  of 
Canterbury,  the  Archbishop  of  Cologne,  and  the  clergy  who 
spoke  from  many  pulpits  in  many  nations  under  the  Cross 
of  Christ,  still  stoked  up  the  fires  of  hate  and  urged  the 
armies  to  go  on  fighting  "in  the  cause  of  Justice,"  "for  the  de- 
fence of  the  Fatherland,"  "for  Christian  righteousness,"  to  the 
bitter  end.  Those  words  are  painful  to  write,  but  as  I  am 
writing  this  book  for  truth's  sake,  at  all  cost,  I  let  them  stand.'  ^ 

From  Passion  to  Indifference:  the  Result  of  Drift 

A  common  attitude  just  now  is  something  like  this: — 
'With  the  bitter  memory  of  all  that  the  Allies  had  suffered 
strong  upon  them,  it  is  not  astonishing  that  at  the  moment  of 
victory  an  attitude  of  judicial  impartiality  proved  too  much 

*  Realities  of  War,  pp.  426-7,  441. 


212  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

to  ask  of  human  nature.  The  real  terms  will  depend  upon  the 
fashion  in  which  the  formal  terms  are  enforced.  Much  of 
the  letter  of  the  Treaty — ^trial  of  the  Kaiser,  etc. — has  already 
disappeared.  It  is  an  intolerable  priggishness  to  rake  up 
this  very  excusable  debauch  just  as  we  are  returning  to  so- 
briety.* 

And  that  would  be  true,  if,  indeed,  we  had  learned  the 
lesson,  and  were  adopting  a  new  policy.  But  we  are  not.  We 
have  merely  in  some  measure  exchanged  passion  for  lassitude 
and  indifference.  Later  on  we  shall  plead  that  the  lassitude 
was  as  'inevitable'  as  the  passion.  On  such  a  line  of  reason- 
ing, it  is  no  good  reacting  by  a  perception  of  consequences 
against  a  mood  of  the  moment.  That  is  bad  psychology  and 
disastrous  politics.  To  realise  what  'temperamental  politics' 
have  already  involved  us  in,  is  the  first  step  towards  turning 
our  present  drift  into  a  more  consciously  directed  progress. 

Note  where  the  drift  has  already  carried  us  with  reference 
to  the  problem  of  the  new  Germany  which  it  was  our  declared 
object  to  create.  There  were  weeks  following  the  Armistice 
in  Germany,  when  a  faithful  adherence  to  the  spirit  of  the 
declarations  made  by  the  Allies  during  the  War  would  have 
brought  about  the  utter  moral  collapse  of  the  Prussianism  we 
had  fought  to  destroy.  The  Prussian  had  said  to  the  people: 
*Only  Germany's  military  power  has  stood  between  her  and 
humiliating  ruin.  The  Allies  victorious  will  use  their  victory 
to  deprive  Germany  of  her  vital  rights.'  Again  and  again  had 
the  Allies  denied  this,  and  Germany,  especially  young  Germany, 
watched  to  see  which  should  prove  right.  A  blockade,  falling 
mainly,  as  Mr  Churchill  complacently  pointed  out  (months 
after  an  armistice  whose  terms  had  included  a  promise  to 
take  into  consideration  the  food  needs  of  Germany)  upon  the 
feeble,  the  helpless,  the  children,  answered  that  question  for 
millions  in  Germany.  Her  schools  and  universities  teem  with 
hundreds  of  thousands  stricken  in  their  health,  to  whom  the 
words  'never  again'  mean  that  never  more  will  they  put  their 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    213 

trust  in  the  'naive  innocence'  of  an  internationalism  that  could 
so  betray  them. 

The  militarism  which  morally  was  at  so  low  an  ebb  at  the 
Armistice,  has  been  rehabilitated  by  such  things  as  the  blockade 
and  its  effects,  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  and  by  minor  but 
dramatic  features  like  the  retention  of  German  prisoners  long 
after  Allied  prisoners  had  returned  home,  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  German  university  town  by  African  negroes.  So  that 
to-day  a  League  of  Nations  offered  by  the  Allies  would 
probably  be  regarded  with  a  contemptuous  scepticism — 
somewhat  similar  to  that  with  which  America  now  regards  the 
political  beatitudes  which  it  applauded  in  1916-17. 

We  are  in  fact  modifying  the  Treaty.  But  those  modifi- 
cations will  not  meet  the  present  situation,  though  they  might 
well  have  met  the  situation  in  1918.  If  we  had  done  then 
what  we  are  prepared  to  do  now,  Europe  would  have  been 
set  on  the  right  road. 

Suppose  the  Allies  had  said  in  December,  1918  (as  they 
are  in  effect  being  brought  to  say  in  1920)  :  'We  are  not  going 
to  play  into  the  hands  of  your  militarists  by  demanding  the 
surrender  of  the  Kaiser  or  the  punishment  of  the  war  crimi- 
nals, vile  as  we  believe  their  offences  to  be.  We  are  not  go- 
ing to  stimulate  your  waning  nationalism  by  demanding  an 
acknowledgment  of  your  sole  guilt.  Nor  are  we  going  to  ruin 
your  industry  or  shatter  your  credit.  On  the  contrary,  we 
will  start  by  making  you  a  loan,  facilitating  your  purchases 
of  food  and  raw  materials,  and  we  will  admit  you  into  the 
League  of  Nations.' 

We  are  coming  to  that.  If  it  could  have  been  our  policy 
early  instead  of  late,  how  different  this  story  would  have  been. 

And  the  tragedy  is  this :  To  do  it  late  is  to  cause  it  to  lose 
its  effectiveness,  for  the  situation  changes.  The  measures 
which  would  have  been  adequate  in  1918  are  inadequate  in 
1920.  It  is  the  story  of  Home  Rule.  In  the  eighties  Ireland 
would  have  accepted  Gladstonian  Home  Rule  as  a  basis  at 


214  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

least  of  co-operation.  English  and  Ulster  opinion  was  not 
ready  even  for  Home  Rule.  Forty  years  later  it  had  reconciled 
itself  to  Home  Rule.  But  by  the  time  Britain  was  ready  for 
the  remedy,  the  situation  had  got  quite  beyond  it.  It  now 
demanded  something  for  which  slow-moving  opinion  was  un- 
prepared. So  with  a  League  of  Nations.  The  plan  now  sup- 
ported by  Conservatives  would,  as  Lord  Grey  has  avowed, 
have  assuredly  prevented  this  War  if  adopted  in  place  of  the 
mere  Arbitration  plans  of  the  Hague  Conference.  At  that 
date  the  present  League  of  Nations  Covenant  would  have  been 
adequate  to  the  situation.  But  some  of  the  self-same  Con- 
servatives who  now  talk  the  language  of  internationalism — 
even  in  economic  terms — ^poured  contumely  and  scorn  upon 
those  of  us  who  used  it  a  decade  or  two  since.  And  now, 
it  is  to  be  feared,  the  Government  for  which  they  are  ready 
will  certainly  be  inadequate  to  the  situation  which  we  face. 

'An  evil  idealism  and  self-sacrificing  hates.* 

*The  cause  of  this  insanity,'  says  Sir  Philip  Gibbs,  *is  the 
failure  of  idealism.'  Others  write  in  much  the  same  strain 
that  selfishness  and  materialism  have  reconquered  the  world. 
But  this  does  not  get  us  very  far.  By  what  moral  alchemy 
was  this  vast  outpouring  of  unselfishness,  which  sent  millions 
to  their  death  as  to  a  feast  (for  men  cannot  die  for  selfish 
motives,  unless  more  certain  of  their  heavenly  reward  than 
we  in  the  Western  world  are  in  the  habit  of  being)  turned 
into  selfishness;  their  high  ideals  into  low  desires — if  that 
is  what  has  happened?  Can  it  be  a  selfishness  which  ruins 
and  starves  us  all  ?  Is  it  selfishness  on  the  part  of  the  French 
which  causes  them  to  adopt  towards  Germany  a  policy  of 
vengeance  that  prevents  them  receiving  the  Reparations  that 
they  so  sorely  need?  Is  it  not  indeed  what  one  of  their  writers 
had  called  a  'holy  hate,'  instinctive,  intuitive,  purged  of  all 
calculation  of  advantage  or  disadvantage?    Would  not  selfish- 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    215 

ness — enlightened  selfishness — have  given  us  not  only  a  sounder 
Europe  in  the  material  sense,  but  a  more  humane  Europe, 
with  its  hostilities  softened  by  the  very  fact  of  contact  and 
co-operation,  and  the  very  obviousness  of  our  need  for  one 
another  ?  The  last  thing  desired  here  is  to  raise  the  old  never- 
ending  question  of  egoism  versus  altruism.  All  that  is  de- 
sired is  to  point  out  that  a  mere  appeal  to  feeling,  to  a  'sense 
of  righteousness'  and  idealism,  is  not  enough.  We  have  an 
illimitable  capacity  for  sublimating  our  own  motives,  and  of 
convincing  ourselves  completely,  passionately,  that  our  evil 
is  good.  And  the  greater  our  fear  that  intellectual  inquiry, 
some  sceptical  rationalism,  might  shake  the  certitude  of  our 
righteousness,  the  greater  the  passion  with  which  we  shall 
stand  by  the  guide  of  'instinct  and  intuition.'  Can  there  not 
be  a  destructive  idealism  as  well  as  a  social  one?  What  of  the 
Holy  Wars?  What  of  the  Prussian  who,  after  all,  had  his 
ideal,  as  the  Bolshevist  has  his?  What  of  all  fanatics  ready 
to  die  for  their  idealism? 

It  is  never  the  things  that  are  obviously  and  patently  evil 
that  constitute  the  real  menace  to  mankind.  If  Prussian  na- 
tionalism had  been  nothing  but  gross  lust  and  cruelty  and 
oppression,  as  we  managed  to  persuade  ourselves  during  the 
War  that  it  was,  it  would  never  have  menaced  the  world. 
It  did  that  because  it  could  rally  to  its  end  great  enthusiasms ; 
because  men  were  ready  to  die  for  it.  Then  it  threatened 
us.  Only  those  things  which  have  some  element  of  good 
are  dangerous. 

A  Treaty  of  the  character  of  that  Versailles  would  never 
have  been  possible  if  men  had  not  been  able  to  justify  it  to 
themselves  on  the  ground  of  its  punitive  justice.  The  greeds 
expressed  in  the  annexation  of  alien  territory,  and  the  viola- 
tion of  the  principle  of  nationality,  would  never  have  been 
possible  but  for  the  plea  of  the  sacred  egoism  of  patriotism; 
our  country  before  the  enemy's,  our  country  right  or  wrong. 
The  assertion  of  sheer  immoralism  embodied  in  this  last  slogan 


216  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

can  be  made  into  the  garments  of  righteousness  if  only  our 
idealism  is  instinctive  enough. 

Some  of  the  worst  crimes  against  justice  have  been  due 
to  the  very  fierceness  of  our  passion  for  righteousness — a 
passion  so  fierce  that  it  becomes  undiscriminating  and  unseeing. 
It  was  the  passion  for  what  men  believed  to  be  religious 
truth  which  gave  us  the  Inquisition  and  the  religious  wars; 
it  was  the  passion  for  patriotism  which  made  France  for  so 
many  years,  to  the  astonishment  of  the  world,  refuse  justice 
to  Dreyfus;  it  is  a  righteous  loathing  for  negro  crime  which 
has  made  lynching  possible  for  half  a  century  in  the  United 
States,  and  which  prevents  the  development  of  an  opinion  which 
will  insist  on  its  suppression.  It  is  'the  just  anger  that  makes 
men  unjust.'  The  righteous  passion  that  insists  on  a  crimi- 
nal's dying  for  some  foul  crime,  is  the  very  thing  which  pre- 
vents our  seeing  that  the  crime  was  not  committed  by  him 
at  all. 

It  was  something  akin  to  this  that  made  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  possible.  That  is  why  merely  to  appeal  to  idealism 
and  feeling  will  fail,  unless  the  defect  of  vision  which  makes 
evil  appear  good  is  corrected.  It  is  not  the  feeling  which  is 
at  fault;  it  is  the  defective  vision  causing  feeling  to  be  mis- 
used, as  in  the  case  of  our  feeling  against  the  man  accused 
on  what  seem  to  us  good  grounds,  of  a  detestable  offence. 
He  is  loathsome  to  our  sight,  because  the  crime  is  loathsome. 
But  when  some  one  else  confesses  to  the  crime,  our  feeling 
against  the  innocent  man  disappears.  The  direction  it  took, 
the  object  upon  which  it  settled,  was  due  to  a  misconception. 

Obviously  that  error  may  occur  in  politics.  Equally  cer- 
tainly something  worse  may  happen.  With  some  real  doubt 
in  our  mind  whether  this  man  is  the  criminal,  we  may  yet, 
in  the  absence  of  any  other  culprit,  stifle  that  doubt  because 
of  our  anger,  and  our  vague  desire  to  have  some  victim  suf- 
fer for  so  vile  a  crime.  Feeling  will  be  at  fault,  in  such  a 
case,  as  well  as  vision.    And  this  thing  happens,  as  many  a 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    217 

lynching  testifies.  ('The  innocence  of  Dreyfus  would  be  a 
crime,'  said  a  famous  anti-Drey fusard.)  Both  defects  may  have 
played  their  part  in  the  tragedy  of  Versailles.  In  making  our 
appeal  to  idealism,  we  assume  that  it  is  there,  somewhere,  to 
be  aroused  on  behalf  of  justice;  we  must  assume,  conse- 
quently, that  if  it  has  not  been  aroused,  or  has  attached  it- 
self to  wrong  purposes,  it  is  because  it  has  not  seen  where 
justice  lay. 

Our  only  protection  against  these  miscarriages,  by  which 
our  passion  is  borne  into  the  wrong  channel,  against  the  inno- 
cent while  the  guilty  escape,  is  to  keep  our  minds  open  to 
all  the  facts,  all  the  truth.  But  this  principle,  which  we  have 
proclaimed  as  the  very  foundation  stone  of  our  democratic 
faith,  was  the  first  to  go  when  we  began  the  War.  The  idea 
that  in  war  time,  most  particularly,  a  democracy  needs  to 
know  the  enemy's,  or  the  Pacifist,  or  even  the  internationalist 
and  liberal  case,  would  have  been  regarded  as  a  bad  joke. 
Yet  the  failure  to  do  just  that  thing  inevitably  created  a 
conviction  that  all  the  wrong  was  on  one  side  and  all  the  right 
on  the  other,  and  that  the  problem  of  the  settlement  was  mainly 
a  problem  of  ruthless  punishment.  One  of  that  temper  may 
have  come  the  errors  of  the  Treaty  and  the  miseries  that  have 
flowed  from  them.  It  was  the  virtual  suppression  of  free  de- 
bate on  the  purposes  and  aims  of  the  War  and  their  realisa- 
tion that  delivered  public  opinion  into  the  keeping  of  the  ex- 
tremest  Jingoes  when  we  came  to  make  the  peace. 

We  create  the  temper  that  destroys  us 

Behind  the  war-time  attitude  of  the  belligerents,  when  they 
suppressed  whatever  news  might  tell  in  favour  of  the  enemy, 
was  the  conviction  that  if  we  could  really  understand  the 
enemy's  position  we  should  not  want  to  fight  him.  That  is 
probably  true.  Let  us  assume  that,  and  assume  consequently 
the  need  for  control  of  news  and  discussion.     If  we  are  to 


218  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

come  to  the  control  by  governments  of  political  belief,  as  we 
once  attempted  control  by  ecclesiastical  authority  of  religious 
belief,  let  us  face  the  fact,  and  drop  pretence  about  freedom 
of  discussion,   and  see  that  the  organisation  of   opinion   is 
honest  and  efficient.    There  is  a  great  deal  to  be  said  for  the 
suppression  of  freedom  of  discussion.     Some  of  the  greatest 
minds  in  the  world  have  refused  to  accept  it  as  a  working 
principle  of  society.    Theirs  is  a  perfectly  arguable,  extremely 
strong  and  thoroughly  honest  case.^     But  virtually  to   sub- 
press  the  free  dissemination  of  facts,  as  we  have  done  not 
only  during,  but  after  the  War,  and  at  the  same  time  to  go 
on  with  our  talk  about  free  speech,  free  Press,  free  discus- 
sion, free  democracy  is  merely  to  add  to  the  insincerities  and 
falsehoods,  which  can  only  end  by  making  society  unworkable. 
We  not  only  disbelieve  in  free  discussion  in  the  really  vital 
crises ;  we  disbelieve  in  truth.    That  is  one  fact.    There  is  an- 
other related  to  it.    If  we  frankly  admitted  that  public  opinion 
has  to  be  'managed,*  organised,  shaped,    we  should  demand 
that  it  be  done  efficiently  with  a  view  to  the  achievement  of 
conscious    ends,    which    we    should    place    before    ourselves. 
What  happened  during  the  War  was  that  everybody,  includ- 
ing the  governments  who  ought  to  have  been  free  from  the 
domination  of  the  myths  they  were  engaged  in  creating,  lost 
sight  of  the  ultimate  purposes  of  the  War,  and  of  the  fact  that 
they  were  creating  forces  which  would  make  the  attainment  of 
those  ends  impossible ;  rob  victory,  that  is,  of  its  effectiveness. 
Note  how  the  process  works.     We  say  when  war  is  de- 
clared: *A  truce  to  discussion.     The  time  is  for  action,  not 
words.*     But  the  truce  is  a  fiction.     It  means,  not  that  talk 
and  propaganda  shall  cease,  only  that  all  liberal  contribution 
to  it  must  cease.     The  Daily  News  suspends  its  internation- 
alism, but  the  Daily  Mail  is  more  fiercely  Chauvinist  than 
ever.    We  must  not  debate  terms.    But  Mr  Bottomley  debates 
them  every  week,  on  the  text  that  Germans  are  to  be  extermi- 

*Is  it  necessary  to  say  that  the  present  writer  does  not  accept  it? 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    219 

nated  like  vermin.  What  results?  The  natural  defenders  of 
a  policy  even  as  liberal  as  that  of  an  Edward  Grey  are  silenced. 
The  function  of  the  liberal  Press  is  suspended.  The  only  really 
articulate  voices  on  policy  are  the  voices  of  Lord  Northcliffe 
and  Mr  Bottomley.  On  such  subjects  as  foreign  policy  those 
gentlemen  do  not  ordinarily  embrace  all  wisdom ;  there  is  some- 
thing to  be  said  in  criticism  of  their  views.  But  in  the  mat- 
ter of  the  future  settlement  of  Europe,  to  have  criticised 
those  views  during  the  War  would  have  exposed  the  critic  to 
the  charge  of  pro-Germanism.  So  Chauvinism  had  it  all  its 
own  way.  For  months  and  years  the  country  heard  one  view 
of  policy  only.  The  early  policy  of  silence  did  really  impose 
a  certain  silence  upon  the  Daily  News  or  the  Manchester 
Guardian;  none  whatever  upon  the  Times  or  the  Daily  Mail. 
None  of  us  can,  day  after  day,  be  under  the  influence  of  such  a 
process  without  being  affected  by  it.^  The  British  public 
were  affected  by  it.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  policy  began  to 
appear  weak,  anaemic,  pro-German.  And  in  the  end  he  and 
his  colleagues  disappeared,  partly,  at  least,  as  the  result  of 
the  very  policy  of  'leaving  it  to  the  Government'  upon  which 
they  had  insisted  at  the  beginning  of  the  War.  And  the  very 
group  which,  in  1914,  was  most  insistent  that  there  should 
be  no  criticism  of  Asquith,  or  McKenna,  or  Grey,  were  the 
very  group  whose  criticisms  turned  those  leaders  out  of  office ! 
While  in  1914  it  was  accepted  as  proof  of  treason  to  say  a 
word  in  criticism  of  (say)  Grey,  by  1916  it  had  almost  be- 
come evidence  of  treason  to  say  a  word  for  him  .  .  .  and 
that  while  he  was  still  in  office! 

The  history  of  America's  attitude  towards  the  War  dis- 
plays a  similar  line  of  development.  We  are  apt  to  forget 
that  the  League  of  Nations  idea  entered  the  realm  of  practical 
politics    as    the    result    of    a    great    spontaneous    popular 

*  The  argument  is  not  invalidated  in  the  least  by  sporadic  instances  of 
liberal  activity  here — an  isolated  article  or  two.  For  iteration  is  the 
essence  of  propaganda  as  an  opinion  forming  factor. 


220  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

movement  in  America  iri  1916,  as  powerful  and  striking  as  any 
since  the  movement  against  chattel-slavery.  A  year  of  war 
morale  resulted,  as  has  already  been  noted,  in  a  complete 
reversal  of  attitude.  America  became  the  opponent  and  Britain 
the  protagonist  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

In  passing,  one  of  the  astonishing  things  is  that  statesmen, 
compelled  by  the  conditions  of  their  profession  to  work  with 
the  raw  material  of  public  opinion,  seem  blind  to  the  fact 
that  the  total  effect  of  the  forces  which  they  set  in  motion 
will  be  to  transform  opinion  and  render  it  intractable.  Ameri- 
can advisers  of  President  Wilson  scouted  the  idea,  when  it 
was  suggested  to  them  early  in  the  War,  that  the  growth  of 
the  War  temper  would  make  it  difficult  for  the  President  to 
carry  out  his  policy.^  A  score  of  times  the  present  writer 
has  heard  it  said  by  Americans  who  ought  to  have  known 
better,  that  the  public  did  not  care  what  the  foreign  policy 
of  the  country  was,  and  that  the  President  could  carry  out  any 
policy  that  he  liked.  At  that  particular  moment  it  was  true, 
but  quite  obviously  there  was  growing  up  at  the  time,  as  the 
direct  result  of  war  propaganda,  a  fierce  Chauvinism,  which 
should  have  made  it  plain  to  any  one  who  observed  its 
momentum,  that  the  notion  of  President  Wilson's  policy  being 
put  into  execution  after  victory  was  simply  preposterous. 

Mr  Asquith's  Government  was  thus  largely  responsible  for 

*  In  an  article  in  the  North  American  Review,  just  before  America's 
entrance  into  the  War,  I  attempted  to  indicate  the  danger  by  making 
one  character  in  an  imaginary  symposium  say :  'One  talks  of  "Wilson's 
programme,"  "Wilson's  policy."  There  will  be  only  one  programme 
and  one  policy  possible  as  soon  as  the  first  American  soldier  sets  foot 
on  European  soil :  Victory.  Bottomley  and  Maxse  will  be  milk  and 
water  to  what  we  shall  see  America  producing.  We  shall  have  a 
settlement  so  monstrous  that  Germany  will  offer  any  price  to  Russia 
and  Japan  for  their  future  help  .  .  .  America's  part  in  the  War  will 
absorb  about  all  the  attention  and  interest  that  busy  people  can  give 
to  public  affairs.  They  will  forget  about  these  international  arrange- 
ments concerning  the  sea,  the  League  of  Peace — the  things  for  whicli 
the  country  entered  the  War.  In  fact  if  Wilson  so  much  as  tries  to 
remind  them  of  the  objects  of  the  War  he  will  be  accused  of  pro- 
Germanism,  and  you  will  have  their  ginger  Press  demanding  that  the 
"old  gang"  be  "combed  out" ' 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    221 

creating  a  balance  of  force  in  public  opinion  (as  we  shall  see 
presently)  which  was  responsible  for  its  collapse.  Mr  Lloyd 
George  has  himself  sanctioned  a  jingoism  which,  if  useful 
temporarily,  becomes  later  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  the  put- 
ting into  force  of  workable  policies.  For  while  Versailles 
could  do  what  it  liked  in  matters  that  did  not  touch  the  popu- 
lar passion  of  the  moment,  in  the  matters  that  did,  the  states- 
men were  the  victims  of  the  temper  they  had  done  so  much  to 
create.  There  was  a  story  current  in  Paris  at  the  time  of 
the  Conference:  'You  can't  really  expect  to  get  an  indemnity 
of  ten  thouand  millions,  so  what  is  the  good  of  putting  it 
in  the  Treaty,'  an  expert  is  said  to  have  remarked.  'My  dear 
fellow,*  said  the  Prime  Minister,  'if  the  election  had  gone  on 
another  fortnight,  it  would  have  been  fifty  thousand  millions.' 
But  the  insertion  of  these  mythical  millions  into  the  Treaty 
has  not  been  a  joke;  it  has  been  an  enormous  obstacle  to  the 
reconstruction  of  Europe.  It  was  just  because  public  opinion 
was  not  ready  to  face  facts  in  time,  that  the  right  thing  had 
to  be  done  at  the  wrong  time,  when  perhaps  it  was  too  late. 
The  effect  on  French  policy  has  been  still  more  important. 
It  is  the  illusions  concerning  illimitable  indemnities — directly 
fostered  by  the  Governments  in  the  early  days  of  the  Armis- 
tice— still  dominating  French  public  opinion,  which  more  than 
anything  else,  perhaps,  explains  an  attitude  on  the  part  of  the 
French  Government  that  has  come  near  to  smashing  Europe. 
Even  minds  extraordinarily  brilliant,  as  a  rule,  miscalcu- 
lated the  weight  of  this  factor  of  public  passion  stimulated 
by  the  hates  of  war,  and  the  deliberate  exploitation  of  it  for 
purposes  of  'war  morale'  and  propaganda.    Thus  Mr   Wells,^ 

*'If  we  take  the  extremist  possibility,  and  suppose  a  revolution  in 
Germany  or  in  South  Germany,  and  the  replacement  of  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  in  all  or  part  of  Germany  by  a  Republic,  then  I  am  convinci'd 
that  for  republican  Germany  there  would  be  not  simply  forgiveness,  but 
a  warm  welcome  back  to  the  comity  of  nations.  The  French,  British, 
Belgians,  and  Italians,  and  every  civilised  force  in  Russia  would  tumble 
over  one  another  in  their  eager  greeting  of  this  return  to  sanity.' 
iiVhat  is  coming  f  p.  198). 


222  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

writing  even  after  two  years  of  war,  predicted  that  if  the 
Germans  were,  to  make  a  revolution  and  overthrow  the  Kaiser, 
the  AUies  would  'tumble  over  each  other'  to  oflfer  Germany 
generous  terms.  What  is  worse  is  that  British  propaganda 
in  enemy  countries  seems  to  have  been  based  very  largely  on 
this  assumption.^  It  constituted  an  elaboration  of  the  offers 
implicit  in  Mr  Wilson's  speeches,  that  once  Germany  was 
democratised  there  should  be,  in  Mr  Wilson's  words,  'no  re- 
prisal upon  the  German  people,  who  have  themselves  suffered 
all  things  in  this  War  which  they  did  not  choose.'  The  state- 
ment made  by  the  German  rulers  that  Germany  was  fighting 
against  a  harsh  and  destructive  fate  at  the  hands  of  the  vic- 
tors, was,  President  Wilson  said,  'wantonly  false.'  'No  one 
is  threatening  the  peaceful  enterprise  of  the  German  Empire.' 
Our  propaganda  in  Germany  seems  to  have  been  an  expansion 
of  this  text,  while  the  negotiations  which  preceded  the  Armis- 
tice morally  bound  us  to  a  'Fourteen  Points  peace'  (less  the 
British  reservation  touching  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas).  The 
economic  terms  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  the  meaning  of  which 
has  been  so  illuminatingly  explained  by  the  representative  of  the 
British  Treasury  at  the  Conference,  give  the  measure  of  our 
respect  for  that  obligation  of  honour,  once  we  had  the  Ger- 
mans at  our  mercy.^ 

*  See  the  memoranda  published  in  The  Secrets  of  Crewe  House. 

*  Mr  Keynes  is  not  alone  in  declaring  that  the  Treaty  makes  of  our 
armistice  engagements  a  'scrap  of  paper.'  The  Round  Table,  in  an 
article  which  aims  at  justifying  the  Treaty  as  a  whole,  says:  'Opin- 
ions may  differ  as  to  the  actual  letter  of  the  engagements  which  we 
made  at  the  Armistice,  but  the  spirit  of  them  is  imdoubtedly  strained  in 
some  of  the  detailed  provisions  of  the  peace.  There  is  some  honest 
ground  for  the  feeling  manifested  in  Germany  that  the  terms  on  which 
she  laid  down  her  arms  have  not  been  observed  in  all  respects.' 

A  very  unwilling  witness  to  our  obligations  is  Mr  Leo  Maxse,  who 
writes  {National  Review,  February,  1921): — 

'Thanks  to  the  American  revelations  we  are  in  a  better  position  to 
appreciate  the  trickery  and  treachery  of  the  pre-Armistice  negotiations, 
as  well  as  the  hideous  imposture  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  which, 
we  now  learn  for  the  first  time,  was  governed  by  the  self-denying 
ordinance  of  the  previous  November,  when,  unbeknown  to  the  coun- 
tries betrayed,  the  Fourteen  Points  had  been  inextricably  woven  into 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    223 
Fundamental  Falsehoods  and  their  Outcome 

We  witnessed  both  in  England  and  America  very  great 
changes  in  the  dynamics  of  opinion.  Not  only  was  one  type 
of  public  man  being  brought  forward  and  another  thrust  into 
the  background,  but  one  group  of  emotions  and  of  motives  of 
public  policy  were  being  developed  and  another  group  atro- 
phied. The  use  of  the  word  'opinion,*  with  its  implication 
of  a  rationalised  process  of  intellectual  decision,  may  be  mis- 
leading. 'Public  opinion'  is  here  used  as  the  sum  of  the  forces 
which  become  articulate  in  a  country,  and  which  a  govern- 
ment is  compelled  not  necessarily  to  obey,  but  to  take  into  ac- 
count. (A  government  may  bamboozle  it  or  dodge  it,  but  it 
cannot  openly  oppose  it.) 

And  when  reference  is  made  to  the  force  of  ideas —  Na- 
tionalist or  Socialist  or  Revolutionary — a  power  which  we  all 
admit  by  our  panic  fears  of  defeatist  or  Red  Propaganda,  it 
is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  the  kind  of  force  that  is  meant. 
One  speaks  of  Communist  or  Socialist,  Pacifist  or  Patriotic 
ideas  gaining  influence,  or  creating  a  ferment.  The  idea  of 
Communism,  for  instance,  has  obviously  played  some  part 
in  the  vast  upheavals  that  have  followed  the  War.^  But  in  a 
world  where  the  great  majority  are  still  condemned  to  in- 
tense physical  labour  in  order  to  live  at  all,  where  peoples  as 
a  whole  are   overworked,   harassed,   pre-occupied,    it   is   im- 

the  Armistice.  Thus  was  John  Bull  eflFectively  'dished'  of  every  farthing 
of  his  war  costs.' 

As  a  fact,  of  course,  the  self-denying  ordinance  was  not  'unbeknown 
to  the  countries  betrayed.'  The  Fourteen  Points  commitment  was  quite 
open;  the  European  Allies  could  have  repudiated  them,  as,  on  one 
point,  Britain  did. 

*A  quite  considerable  school,  who  presumably  intend  to  be  taken 
seriously,  would  have  us  believe  that  the  French  Revolution,  the  Russian 
Revolution,  the  English  Trade  Union  Movement  are  all  the  work  of  a 
small  secret  Jewish  Club  or  Junta — their  work,  that  is,  in  the  sense  that 
but  for  them  the  Revolutions  or  Revolutionary  movements  would  not 
have  taken  place.  These  arguments  are  usually  brought  by  'intense 
nationalists'  who  also  believe  that  sentiments  like  nationalism  are  so 
deeply  rooted  that  mere  ideas  or  theories  can  never  alter  them. 


224  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

possible  that  ideas  like  those  of  Karl  Marx  should  be  sub- 
jected to  elaborate  intellectual  analysis.  Rather  is  it  an  idea — 
of  the  common  ownership  of  wealth  or  its  equal  distribution, 
of  poverty  being  the  fault  of  a  definite  class  of  the  corporate 
body — an  idea  which  fits  into  a  mood  produced  largely  by  the 
prevailing  conditions  of  life,  which  thus  becomes  the  predomi- 
nating factor  of  the  new  public  opinion.  Now  foreign  policy  is 
certainly  influenced,  and  in  some  great  crises  determined,  by 
public  opinion.  But  that  opinion  is  not  the  resultant  of  a  series 
of  intellectual  analyses  of  problems  of  Balkan  nationalities 
or  of  Eastern  frontiers;  that  is  an  obvious  impossibility  for 
a  busy  headline-reading  public,  hard  at  work  all  day  and 
thirsty  for  relaxation  and  entertainment  at  night.  The  public 
opinion  which  makes  itself  felt  in  Foreign  Policy — which, 
when  war  is  in  the  balance  after  a  longish  period  of  peace, 
gives  the  preponderance  of  power  to  the  most  Chauvinistic 
elements ;  which,  at  the  end  of  a  war  and  on  the  eve  of  Treaty- 
making,  as  in  the  December  1918  election,  insists  upon  a 
rigorously  punitive  peace — this  opinion  is  the  result  of  a  few 
predominant  'sovereign  ideas'  or  conceptions  giving  a  direc- 
tion to  certain  feelings. 

Take  one  such  sovereign  idea,  that  of  the  enemy  nation  as 
a  person:  the  conception  of  it  as  a  completely  responsible 
corporate  body.  Some  offence  is  committed  by  a  German: 
'Germany'  did  it,  Germany  including  all  Germans.  To  punish 
any  German  is  to  inflict  satisfactory  punishment  for  the  of- 
fence, to  avenge  it.  The  idea,  when  we  examine  it,  is  found 
to  be  extremely  abstract,  with  but  the  faintest  relation  to 
human  realities.  'They  drowned  my  brother,'  said  an  Allied 
airman,  when  asked  his  feelings  on  a  reprisal  bombing  raid 
over  German  cities.  Thus,  because  a  sailor  from  Hamburg 
drowns  an  Englishman  in  the  North  Sea,  an  old  woman  in  a 
garret  in  Freiburg,  or  some  children,  who  have  but  dimly 
heard  of  the  war,  and  could  not  even  remotely  be  held  respon- 
sible for  it,  or  have  prevented  it,  are  killed  with  a  clear  con- 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    225 

science  because  they  are  German.  We  cannot  understand  the 
Chinese,  who  punish  one  member  of  a  family  for  another's 
fault,  yet  that  is  very  much  more  rational  than  the  concep- 
tion which  we  accept  as  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world. 
It  is  never  questioned,  indeed,  until  it  is  applied  to  ourselves. 
When  the  acts  of  British  troops  in  Ireland  or  India,  having 
an  extraordinary  resemblance  to  German  acts  in  Belgium,  are 
taken  by  certain  American  newspapers  as  showing  that  'Bri- 
tain,' (i.e.  British  people)  is  a  bloodthirsty  monster  who  de- 
lights in  the  killing  of  unarmed  priests  or  peasants,  we  know 
that  somehow  the  foreign  critic  has  got  it  all  wrong.  We  should 
realise  that  for  some  Irishman  or  Indian  to  dismember  a  char- 
woman or  decapitate  a  little  girl  in  Somersetshire,  because  of 
the  crime  of  some  Black  and  Tan  in  Cork,  or  English  General 
at  Amritsar,  would  be  unadulterated  savagery,  a  sort  of  de- 
mentia. In  any  case  the  poor  folk  in  Somerset  were  not 
responsible;  millions  of  English  folk  are  not.  They  are  only 
dimly  aware  of  what  goes  on  in  India  or  Ireland,  and  are  not 
really  able  in  all  matters,  by  any  means,  to  control  their  govern- 
ment— any  more  than  the  Americans  are  able  to  control  theirs. 
Yet  the  idea  of  responsibility  attaching  to  a  whole  group, 
as  justification  for  retaliation,  is  a  very  ancient  idea,  savage, 
almost  animal  in  its  origin.  And  anything  can  make  a  col- 
lectivity. To  one  small  religious  sect  in  a  village  it  is  a  rival 
sect  who  are  the  enemies  of  the  human  race;  in  the  mind  of 
the  tortured  negro  in  the  Congo  any  man,  woman,  or  child 
of  the  white  world  could  fairly  be  punished  for  the  pains  that 
he  has  suffered.^  The  conception  has  doubtless  arisen  out  of 
something  protective,   some  instinct  useful,   indispensable  to 

*An  American  playwright  has  indicated  amusingly  with  what  in- 
genuity we  can  create  a  'collectivity.*  One  of  the  characters  in  the 
play  applies  for  a  chauflfeur's  job.  A  few  questions  reveal  the  fact 
that  he  does  not  know  anything  about  it.  'Why  does  he  want  to  be  a 
chauffeur?'  'Well,  I'll  tell  you,  boss.  Last  year  I  got  knocked  down 
by  an  automobile  and  badly  hurt.  And  I  made  up  my  mind  that 
when  I  came  out  of  the  hospital  I'd  get  a  bit  of  my  own  back.  Get 
even  by  knocking  over  a  few  guys,  see?'    A  polipy  oi  're^isals,'  in  fact. 

16 


226  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

the  race;  as  have  so  many  of  the  instincts  which,  applied 
unadapted  to  altered  conditions,  become  socially  destructive. 

Here  then  is  evidence  of  a  great  danger,  which  can,  in  some 
measure,  be  avoided  on  one  condition:  that  the  truth  about 
the  enemy  collectively  is  told  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  a  re- 
minder to  us  not  to  slip  into  injustices  that,  barbarous  in 
themselves,  drag  us  back  into  barbarism. 

But  note  how  all  the  machinery  of  Press  control  and  war- 
time colleges  of  propaganda  prepared  the  public  mind  for  the 
extremely  difficult  task  of  the  settlement  and  Treaty-making 
that  lay  before  it.  (It  was  a  task  in  which  ever)rthing  indi- 
cated that,  unless  great  care  were  taken,  public  judgment 
would  be  so  swamped  in  passion  that  a  workable  peace  would 
be  impossible.)  The  more  tribal  and  barbaric  aspect  of  the 
conception  of  collective  responsibility  was  fortified  by  the  in- 
tensive and  deliberate  exploitation  of  atrocities  during  the 
years  of  the  War.  The  atrocities  were  not  just  an  incident 
of  war-time  news :  the  principal  emotions  of  the  struggle  came 
to  centre  around  them.  Millions  whom  the  obscure  political 
debate  behind  the  conflict  left  entirely  cold,  were  profoundly 
moved  by  these  stories  of  cruelty  and  barbarity.  Sir  Arthur 
Conan  Doyle  was  among  those  who  urged  their  systematic 
exploitation  on  that  ground,  in  a  Christmas  communication 
to  the  Times}  With  reference  to  stories  of  German  cruelty, 
he  said:- 

'Hate  has  its  uses  in  war,  as  the  Germans  have  long  dis- 
covered. It  steels  the  mind  and  sets  the  resolution  as  no  other 
emotion  can  do.  So  much  do  they  feel  this  that  Germans  are 
constrained  to  invent  all  sorts  of  reasons  for  hatred  against 
us,  who  have,  in  truth,  never  injured  them  in  any  way  save 
that  history  and  geography  both  place  us  before  them  and 
their  ambitions.  To  nourish  hatred  they  invent  every  lie 
against  us,  and  so  they  attain  a  certain  national  solidity.  .  .  , 

*  December  26th,  1917. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    227 

*The  bestiality  of  the  German  nation  has  given  us  a  driving 
power  which  we  are  not  using,  and  which  would  be  very 
valuable  in  this  stage  of  the  war.  Scatter  the  facts.  Put  them 
in  red-hot  fashion.  Do  not  preach  to  the  solid  south,  who  need 
no  conversion,  but  spread  the  propaganda  wherever  there  are 
signs  of  any  intrigue — on  the  Tyne,  the  Clyde,  in  the  Mid- 
lands, above  all  in  Ireland,  and  French  Canada.  Let  us  pay 
no  attention  to  platitudinous  Bishops  or  gloomy  Deans  or 
any  other  superior  people,  who  preach  against  retaliation  or 
whole-hearted  warfare.  We  have  to  win,  and  we  can  only  win 
by  keeping  up  the  spirit  of  resolution  of  our  own  people.' 

Particularly  does  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle  urge  that  the 
munition  workers — who  were,  it  will  be  remembered,  largely 
woman — ^be  stimulated  by  accounts  of  atrocities: 

'The  munition  workers  have  many  small  vexations  to  en- 
dure, and  their  nerves  get  sadly  frayed.  They  need  strong 
elemental  emotions  to  carry  them  on.  Let  pictures  be  made  of 
this  and  other  incidents.  Let  them  be  hung  in  every  shop. 
Let  them  be  distributed  thickly  in  the  Sinn  Fein  districts  of 
Ireland,  and  in  the  hot-beds  of  Socialism  and  Pacifism  in 
England  and  Scotland.  The  Irishman  has  always  been  of  a 
most  chivalrous  nature.* 

It  is  possible  that  Sinn  Fein  has  now  taken  to  heart  this 
counsel  as  to  the  use  that  may  be  made  of  cruelties  committed 
by  the  enemy  in  war. 

Now  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  truth  of  atrocities, 
whether  they  concern  the  horrible  ill-treatment  of  prisoners 
in  war-time  of  which  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Do>-le  writes,  or 
the  burning  alive  of  negro  women  in  peace  time  in  Texas  and 
Alabama,  or  the  flogging  of  women  in  India,  or  reprisals  by 
British  soldiers  in  Ireland,  or  by  Red  Russians  against  White 
and  White  against  Red.  Every  story  may  be  true.  And  if 
each  side  told  the  whole  truth,  instead  of  a  part  of  it,  these 


228  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY  ' 

atrocities  would  help  us  towards  an  understanding  of  this 
complex  nature  of  ours.  But  we  never  do  tell  the  whole  truth. 
Always  in  war-time  does  each  side  leave  out  two  things  essen- 
tial to  the  truth:  the  good  done  by  the  enemy  and  the  evii 
done  by  ourselves.  If  that  elementary  condition  of  truth  were 
fulfilled,  these  pictures  of  cruelty,  bestiality,  obscenity,  rape, 
sadism,  sheer  ferocity,  might  possibly  tell  us  this:  'There  is 
the  primeval  tiger  in  us;  man's  history — and  especially  the 
history  of  his  wars — is  full  of  these  warnings  of  the  depths 
to  which  he  can  descend.  Those  ten  thousand  men  and 
women  of  pure  English  stock  gloating  over  the  helpless 
prisoners  whom  they  are  slowly  roasting  alive,  are  not  normally 
savages.^  Most  of  them  are  kindly  and  decent  folk.  These 
stories  of  the  September  massacres  of  the  Terror  no  more  prove 
French  nature  to  be  depraved  than  the  history  of  the  Inquisi- 
tion, or  of  Ireland  or  India,  proves  Spanish  or  British  nature 
to  be  depraved.* 

But  the  truth  is  never  so  told.  It  was  not  so  told  during 
the  War.  Day  after  day,  month  after  month,  we  got  these 
selected  stories.  In  the  Press,  in  the  cinemas,  in  Church  serv- 
ices, they  were  related  to  us.  The  message  the  atrocity  car- 
ried was  not :  here  is  a  picture  of  what  human  nature  is  capable 
of;  let  us  be  on  our  guard  that  nothing  similar  marks  our 
history.  That  was  neither  the  intention  nor  the  result  of 
propaganda.     It  said  in  effect  and  was  intended  to  say: — 

'This  lecherous  brute  abusing  a  woman  is  a  picture  of  Ger- 
many. All  Germans  are  like  that ;  and  no  people  but  Germans 
are  like  that.  That  sort  of  thing  never  happens  in  other 
armies;  cruelty,  vengeance,  and  blood-lust  are  unknown  in  the 
A.llied  forces.  That  is  why  we  are  at  war.  Remember  this 
at  the  peace  table.' 

That  falsehood  was  conveyed  by  what  the  Press  and  the 
cinema  systematically  left  out.  While  they  told  us  of  every 
vile  thing  done  by  the  enemy,  they  told  us  of  not  one  act  of 

*A  thing  which  happens  about  once  a  week  in  the  United  States. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    229 

kindness  or  mercy  among  all  those  hundred  million  during 
the  years  of  war. 

The  suppression  of  everything  good  of  the  enemy  was 
paralleled  by  the  suppression  of  everything  evil  done  by  our 
side.  You  may  search  Press  and  cinemas  in  vain  for  one 
single  story  of  brutality  committed  by  Serbian,  Rumanian, 
Greek,  Italian,  French,  or  Russian — ^until  the  last  in  time  be- 
came an  enemy.  Then  suddenly  our  papers  were  full  of 
Russian  atrocities.  At  first  these  were  Bolshevik  atrocities 
only,  and  of  the  'White'  troops  we  heard  no  evil.  Then 
when  later  the  self -same  Russian  troops  that  had  fought  on  our 
side  during  the  War  fought  Poland,  our  papers  were  full  of 
the  atrocities  inflicted  on  Poles. 

By  the  daily  presentation  during  years  of  a  picture  which 
makes  the  enemy  so  entirely  bad  as  not  to  be  human  at  all, 
and  ourselves  entirely  good,  the  whole  nature  of  the  problem 
is  changed.  Admit  these  premises,  and  policies  like  those 
proposed  by  Mr  Wells  become  sheer  rubbish.  They  are 
based  on  the  assumption  that  Germans  are  accessible  to  ordin- 
ary human  influences  like  other  human  beings.  But  every  day 
for  years  we  have  been  denying  that  premise.  If  the  daily 
presentation  of  the  facts  is  a  true  presentation,  the  New  York 
Tribune  is  right: — 

*We  shall  not  get  permanent  peace  by  treating  the  Hun 
as  if  he  were  not  a  Hun.  One  might  just  as  well  attempt  to 
cure  a  man-eating  tiger  of  his  hankering  for  human  flesh 
by  soft  words  as  to  break  the  German  of  his  historic  habits 
by  equally  futile  kind  words.  The  way  to  treat  a  German, 
while  Germans  follow  their  present  methods,  is  as  a  common 
peril  to  all  civilised  mankind.  Since  the  German  employs 
the  method  of  the  wild  beast  he  must  be  treated  as  beyond 
the  appeal  of  generous  or  kind  methods.  When  one  is  gener- 
ous to  a  German,  he  plans  to  take  advantage  of  that  generosity 
to  rob  or  murder;  this  is  his  international  history,  never  more 


230  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

conspicuously  illustrated  than  here  in  America.  Kindness  he 
interprets  as  fear,  regard  for  international  law  as  proof  of 
decadence;  agitation  for  disarmament  has  been  for  him  the 
final  evidence  of  the  degeneracy  of  his  neighbours.'^ 

That  conclusion  is  inevitable  if  the  facts  are  really  as  pre- 
sented by  the  Daily  Mail  for  four  years.  The  problem  of 
peace  in  that  case  is  not  one  of  finding  a  means  of  dealing,  by 
the  discipline  of  a  common  code  or  tradition,  with  common 
shortcomings — violences,  hates,  cupidities,  blindnesses.  The 
problem  is  not  of  that  nature  at  all.  We  don't  have  these 
defects;  they  are  German  defects.  For  five  years  we  have 
indoctrinated  the  people  with  a  case,  which  if  true,  renders 
only  one  policy  in  Europe  admissible;  either  the  ruthless 
extermination  of  these  monsters,  who  are  not  human  beings 
at  all;  or  their  permanent  subjugation,  the  conversion  of 
Germany  into  a  sort  of  world  lunatic  asylum. 

When  therefore  the  big  public,  whether  in  America  or 
France  or  Britain,  simply  will  not  hear  (in  1919)  of  any 
League  of  Nations  that  shall  ever  include  Germany  they  are 
right — if  we  have  been  telling  them  the  truth. 

Was  it  necessary  thus  to  'organise*  hate  for  the  purposes  of 
war?  Violent  partisanship  would  assuredly  assert  itself  in 
war-time  without  such  stimulus.  And  if  we  saw  more  clearly 
the  relationship  of  these  instincts  and  emotions  to  the  forma- 
tion of  policy,  we  should  organise,  not  their  development,  but 
their  restraint  and  discipline,  or,  that  being  impossible  in  suffi- 
cient degree  (which  it  may  be),  organise  their  re-direction  to 
less  anti-social  ends. 

As  it  was,  it  ended  by  making  the  war  entered  upon 
sincerely,  so  far  as  public  feeling  was  concerned,  for  a  princi- 
ple or  policy,  simply  a  war  for  no  purpose  beyond  victory — 
and  finally  for  domination  at  the  price  of  its  original  purpose. 
For  one  who  is  attracted  to  the  purpose,  a  thousand  are  at- 

*  October  16th,  1917. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    231 

tracted  to  the  war — the  simple  success  of  'our  side.'  Partisan- 
ship as  a  motive  is  animal  in  its  deep,  remote  innateness.  Little 
boys  and  girls  at  the  time  of  the  University  boat  race  will 
choose  the  Oxford  or  the  Cambridge  colours,  and  from  that 
moment  passionately  desire  the  victory  of  'their'  side.  They 
may  not  know  what  Oxford  is,  or  what  a  University  is,  or  what 
a  boat  race  is :  it  does  not  in  the  least  detract  from  the  violence 
of  their  partisanship.  You  get  therefore  a  very  simple  mathe- 
matical explanation  of  the  increasing  subservience  of  the  War's 
purpose  to  the  simple  purpose  of  victory  and  domination  for 
itself.  Every  child  can  understand  and  feel  for  the  latter, 
very  few  adults  for  the  former. 

This  competitive  feeling,  looking  to  victory,  domination,  is 
feeding  the  whole  time  the  appetite  for  power.  These  instincts, 
and  the  clamant  appetite  for  domination  and  coercion  are 
whetted  to  the  utmost  and  then  re-inforced  by  a  moral  indig- 
nation, which  justifies  the  impulse  to  retaliation  on  the  ground 
of  punitive  justice  for  inhuman  horrors.  We  propose  to 
establish  with  this  outlaw  a  relationship  of  contract!  To  bar- 
gain with  him  about  our  respective  rights !  In  the  most  favour- 
able circumstances  it  demands  a  very  definite  effort  of  disci- 
pline to  impose  upon  ourselves  hampering  restrictions  in  the 
shape  of  undertakings  to  another  Power,  when  we  believe  that 
we  are  in  a  position  to  impose  our  will.  But  to  suggest  im- 
posing upon  ourselves  the  restrictions  of  such  a  relationship 
with  an  enemy  of  the  human  race  .  .  .  The  astonishing  thing 
is  that  those  who  acquiesced  in  this  deliberate  cultivation  of 
the  emotions  and  instincts  inseparable  from  violent  partisan- 
ship, should  ever  have  expected  a  policy  of  impartial  justice 
to  come  out  of  that  state  of  mind.  They  were  asking  for  psy- 
chological miracles. 

That  the  propaganda  was  in  large  part  conscious  and  directed 
WBS  proved  by  the  ease  with  which  the  flood  of  atrocity  stories 
could  suddenly  be  switched  over  from  Germans  to  Russians. 
During  the  time  that  the  Russian  armies  were  fighting  on  our 


232  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

side,  there  was  not  a  single  story  in  our  Press  of  Russian 
barbarity.  But  when  the  same  armies,  under  the  same  officers, 
are  fighting  against  the  Poles,  atrocities  even  more  ingenious 
and  villainous  than  those  of  the  Germans  in  Belgium  suddenly 
characterise  the  conduct  of  the  Russian  troops.  The  atrocities 
are  transposed  with  an  ease  equal  to  that  with  which  we  trans- 
fer our  loyalties.^  When  Pilsudski's  troops  fought  against 
Russia,  all  the  atrocities  were  committed  by  them,  and  of  the 
Russian  troops  we  heard  nothing  but  heroism.  When  Brusiloff 
fights  under  Bolshevik  command  our  papers  print  long  Polish 
accounts  of  the  Russian  barbarities. 

We  have  seen  that  behind  the  conception  of  the  enemy  as  a 
single  person  is  a  falsehood :  it  is  obvious  that  seventy  millions 
of  men,  women,  and  children,  of  infinitely  varying  degrees  of 
responsibility,  are  not  a  single  person.  The  falsehood  may  be, 
in  some  degree,  an  unwitting  one,  a  primitive  myth  that  we  have 
inherited  from  tribal  forbears.  But  if  that  is  so,  we  should 
control  our  news  with  a  view  to  minimizing  the  dangers  of 
mythical  fallacies,  bequeathed  to  us  by  a  barbaric  past.  If  it  is 
necessary  to  use  them  for  the  purposes  of  war  morale,  we 

*  The  amazing  rapidity  with  which  we  can  change  sides  and  causes, 
and  the  enemy  become  the  Ally,  and  the  Ally  the  enemy,  in  the  course 
of  a  few  weeks,  approaches  the  burtesque. 

At  the  head  of  the  Polish  armies  is  Marshal  Pilsudski,  who  fought 
under  Austro-German  command,  against  Russia.  His  ally  is  the 
Ukrainian  adventurer,  General  Petlura,  who  first  made  a  separate  peace 
at  Brcst-Litovsk,  and  contracted  there  to  let  the  German  armies  into 
the  Ukraine,  and  to  deliver  up  to  them  its  stores  of  grain.  These  in 
May  1920  were  the  friends  of  the  Allies.  The  Polish  Finance  Minister 
at  the  time  we  were  aiding  Poland  was  Baron  Bilinski,  a  gentleman 
who  filled  the  same  post  in  the  Austrian  Cabinet  which  let  loose  the 
world  war,  insisted  hotly  on  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  helped  to  ruin 
the  finances  of  the  Hapsburg  dominions  by  war,  and  then  after  the 
collapse  repeated  the  same  operation  in  Poland.  On  the  other  side 
the  command  has  passed,  it  is  said,  to  the  dashing  General  Brusiloff, 
who  again  and  again  saved  the  Elastern  front  from  Austrian  and  Ger- 
man oflfensives.  He  is  now  the  'enemy'  and  his  opponents  our  'Allies.' 
They  are  fighting  to  tear  the  Ukraine,  which  means  all  South  Russia, 
away  from  the  Russian  State.  The  preceding  year  we  spent  millions 
to  achieve  the  opposite  result.  The  French  sent  their  troops  to  Odessa, 
and  we  gave  our  tanks  to  Denikin,  in  order  to  enable  him  to  recover 
this  region  for  Imperial  Russia. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    233 

should  drop  them  when  the  war  is  over,  and  pass  round  the 
word,  to  the  Churches  for  instance,  that  on  the  signing  of  an 
armistice  the  moratorium  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  comes 
to  an  end.  As  it  is,  two  years  after  the  Armistice,  an  English 
Vicar  tells  his  congregation  that  to  bring  Austrian  children  to 
English,  to  save  them  from  death  by  famine,  is  an  unpatriotic 
and  seditious  act. 

Note  where  the  fundamental  dishonesties  of  our  propaganda 
lead  us  in  the  matter  of  policy,  in  what  we  declared  to  be  one 
of  the  main  objects  of  the  War :  the  erection  of  Europe  upon  a 
basis  of  nationality.  Our  whole  campaign  implied  that  the 
problem  resolved  itself  into  the  destruction  of  one  great  Power, 
who  denied  that  principle,  as  against  the  Allies,  who  were 
ready  to  grant  it.  How  near  that  came  to  the  truth,  the  round 
score  of  'unredeemed'  nationalities  deliberately  created  by  the 
Allies  in  the  Treaties  sufficiently  testifies.  If  we  had  avowed 
the  facts,  that  a  Europe  of  completely  independent  nationalities 
is  not  possible,  that  great  populations  will  not  be  shut  off  from 
the  sea,  or  recognise  independent  nationalities  to  the  extent  of 
risking  economic  or  political  strangulation,  we  should  then 
necessarily  have  gone  on  to  devise  the  limitations  and  obliga- 
tions which  all  must  accept  and  the  rights  which  all  must  accord. 
We  should  have  been  fighting  for  a  body  of  principles  as  the 
basis  of  a  real  association  of  States.  The  truth,  or  some 
measure  of  it,  would  have  prepared  us  all  for  that  limitation  of 
independence  without  which  no  nationality  can  be  secure.  The 
falsehood  that  Germany  alone  stood  in  the  way  of  the  recog- 
nition of  nationality,  made  a  treaty  really  based  on  that  princi- 
ple (namely,  upon  all  of  us  consenting  to  limit  our  indepen- 
dence) impossible  of  acceptance  by  our  own  opinion.  And 
one  falsehood  leads  to  another.  Because  we  refused  to  be 
sincere  about  the  inducements  which  we  held  out  in  turn  to 
Italy,  Bulgaria,  Rumania,  Greece,  we  staggered  blindly  into 
the  alternative  betrayal  first  of  one  party,  then  of  another. 
Just  as  we  were  faithless  to  the  principle  of  nationality  when 


234  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

we  acquiesced  in  the  Russian  attitude  towards  Finland  and 
Poland,  and  the  Italian  towards  Serbia,  so  later  we  were  to 
prove  faithless  to  the  principle  of  the  Great  State  when  we 
supported  the  Border  Nationalities  in  their  secession  from 
Russia.  We  have  encouraged  and  helped  States  like  Ukrainia, 
Azerbaidjan.  But  we  have  been  just  as  ready  to  stand  for 
'Great  Russia,'  if  Koltchak  appeared  to  be  winning,  knowing 
perfectly  well  that  we  cannot  be  loyal  to  both  causes. 

Our  defence  is  apparent  enough.  It  is  fairly  illustrated  in 
the  case  of  Italy.  If  Italy  had  not  come  into  the  war,  Serbia's 
prospect  of  any  redemption  at  all  would  have  been  hopeless; 
we  were  doing  the  best  we  could  for  Serbia.^ 

Assuredly — but  we  happened  to  be  doing  it  by  false  pre- 
tences, sham  heroics,  immeasurable  hypocrisy.  And  the  final 
effect  was  to  be  the  defeat  of  the  aims  for  which  we  were 
fighting.  If  our  primary  aims  had  been  those  we  proclaimed, 
we  could  no  more  have  violated  the  principle  of  nationality  to 
gain  an  ally,  than  we  could  have  ceded  the  Isle  of  Wight  to 
Germany,  and  the  intellectual  rectitude  which  would  have 
enabled  us  to  see  that,  would  also  have  enabled  us  to  see  the 
necessity  of  the  conditions  on  which  alone  a  society  of  nations 
is  possible. 

The  indispensable  step  to  rendering  controllable  those  pas- 
sions now  'uncontrollable'  and  disrupting  Europe,  is  to  tell 
the  truth  about  the  things  by  which  we  excuse  them.  Again, 
our  fundamental  nature  may  not  change,  any  more  than  it 
would  if  we  honestly  investigated  the  evidence  proving  the 
innocence  of  the  man,  whose  execution  we  demand,  of  the 
crime  which  is  the  cause  of  our  hatred.  That  investigation 
would  be  an  effort  of  the  mind;  the  result  of  it  would  be  a 
change  in  the  direction  of  our  feelings.  The  facts  which  it 
is  necessary  to  face  are  not  abstruse  or  difficult.  They  are  self- 
evident  to  the  simplest  mind.    The  fact  that  the  'person'  whose 

'The  Russian  case  is  less  evident.  But  only  the  moral  inertia  fol- 
lowing on  a  long  war  could  have  made  our  Russian  record  possible. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    235 

punishment  we  demand  in  the  case  of  the  enemy  is  not  a  person 
at  all,  either  bad  or  good,  but  milHons  of  different  persons  of 
varying  degrees  of  badness  and  goodness,  many  of  them — 
minions — without  any  responsibiUty  at  all  for  the  crime  that 
angers  us,  this  fact,  if  faced,  would  alter  the  nature  of  our 
feelings.  We  should  see  that  we  were  confronted  by  a  case 
of  mistaken  identity.  Perhaps  we  do  not  face  this  evidence 
because  we  treasure  our  hate.  If  there  were  not  a  'person* 
our  hate  could  have  no  meaning ;  we  could  not  hate  an  'admin- 
istrative area,'  nor  is  there  much  satisfaction  in  humiliating 
it  and  dominating  it.  We  can  desire  to  dominate  and  humiliate 
a  person,  and  are  often  ready  to  pay  a  high  price  for  the 
pleasure.  If  we  ceased  to  think  of  national  States  as  persons, 
we  might  cease  to  think  of  them  as  conflicting  interests,  in 
competition  with  one  another,  and  begin  to  think  of  them 
instead  as  associations  within  a  great  association. 

Take  another  very  simple  truth  that  we  will  not  face:  that 
our  arms  do,  and  must  do,  the  things  that  raise  our  passions 
when  done  by  the  enemy.  Our  blockades  and  bombardments 
also  kill  old  women  and  children.  Our  soldiers,  too,  the  gal- 
lant lads  who  mount  our  aeroplanes,  the  sailors  who  man  our 
blockades,  are  baby-killers.  They  must  be;  they  cannot  help 
it  if  they  are  to  bomb  or  blockade  at  all.  Yet  we  never  do 
admit  this  obvious  fact.  We  erect  a  sheer  falsehood,  and  then 
protect  ourselves  against  admitting  it  by  being  so  'noble'  about 
it  that  we  refuse  to  discuss  it.  We  simply  declare  that  in  no 
circumstances  could  England,  or  English  soldiers,  ever  make 
war  upon  women  and  children,  or  even  be  unchivalrous  to  them. 
That  is  a  moral  premise  beyond  or  behind  which  patriotism 
will  not  permit  our  minds  to  go.  If  the  'nobility*  of  attitude 
had  any  relation  to  our  real  conduct,  one  would  rejoice.  When, 
during  the  armistice  negotiations,  the  Germans  exacted  that  they 
should  be  permitted  means,  after  the  surrender  of  their  fleet, 
of  feeding  their  people,  a  New  York  paper  declared  the  con- 
dition an  insult  to  the  Allies.     The  Germans  are  prisoners/ 


236  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

it  said,  'and  the  Allies  do  not  starve  prisoners.'  But  one  dis- 
covers a  few  weeks  later  that  these  noble  gestures  are  quite 
compatible  with  the  maintenance  of  the  blockade,  on  the  ground 
that  Germans  for  their  sins  ought  to  be  starved.  We  then 
become  the  agents  of  Providence  in  punitive  justice. 

When  the  late  Lord  Fisher  ^  came  out  squarely  and  publicly 
in  defence  of  the  killing  of  women  and  children  (in  the  sub- 
marine sinking)  as  a  necessary  part  of  war,  there  seemed  a 
chance  for  intellectual  honesty  in  the  matter;  for  a  real 
examination  of  the  principles  of  our  conduct.  If  we  faced  the 
facts  in  this  honest  sailor-like  fashion  there  was  some  hope 
either  that  we  should  refuse  to  descend  to  reprisals  by  disem- 
bowelling little  girls;  or,  if  it  should  appear  that  such  things 
are  inseparable  from  war,  that  it  would  help  to  get  a  new 
feeling  about  war.  But  Lord  Fisher  complains  that  the  Editor 
of  the  paper  to  which  he  sent  his  letter  suppressed  it  from  the 
later  editions  of  his  paper  for  fear  it  should  shock  the  public. 
Shock! 

You  see,  our  shells  falling  on  schools  and  circuses  don't 
disembowel  little  girls;  our  blockades  don't  starve  them. 
Everybody  knows  that  British  shells  and  British  blockades 
would  not  do  such  things.  When  Britain  blockades,  pestilence 
and  hunger  and  torture  are  not  suffering;  a  dying  child  is  not 
a  dying  child.  Patriotism  draws  a  shutter  over  our  eyes  and 
ears. 

When  this  degree  of  self-deception  is  possible,  there  is  no 
infamy  of  which  a  kindly,  humane,  and  emotionally  moral 
people  may  not  prove  themselves  capable ;  no  moral  contradiction 
or  absurdity  which  mankind  may  not  approve.  Anything  may 
become  right,  anything  may  become  wrong. 

The  evil  is  not  only  in  its  resultant  inhumanities.  It  lies 
much  more  in  the  fact  that  this  development  of  moral  blinkers 

*He  complained  that  I  had  'publicly  reproved  him'  for  supporting 
severity  in  warfare.  He  was  mistaken.  As  he  really  did  believe  in 
the  effectiveness  of  terrorism,  he  did  a  very  real  service  by  standing 
publicly  for  his  conviction. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    237 

deprives  us  of  the  capacity  to  see  where  we  are  going,  and 
what  we  are  crushing  underfoot;  and  that  may  well  end  by 
our  walking  over  the  precipice. 

During  the  War,  we  formed  judgments  of  the  German 
character  which  literally  make  it  sub-human.  For  our  praise 
of  the  French  (during  the  same  period)  language  failed  us. 
Yet  less  than  twenty  years  ago  the  roles  were  reversed.^  The 
French  were  the  mad  dogs,  and  the  Germans  of  our  community 
of  blood. 

*  Here  is  what  the  Times  of  December  10th,  1870,  has  to  say  about 
France  and  Germany  respectively,  and  on  the  Alsace-Lorraine  ques- 
tion : — 

'We  must  say  with  all  frankness  that  France  has  never  shown  her- 
self so  senseless,  so  pitiful,  so  worthy  of  contempt  and  reprobation,  as 
at  the  present  moment,  when  she  obstinately  declines  to  look  facts  in 
the  face,  and  refuses  to  accept  the  misfortune  her  own  conduct  has 
brought  upon  her.  A  France  broken  up  in  utter  anarchy,  Ministers 
who  have  no  recognised  chief,  who  rise  from  the  dust  in  their  air 
balloons,  and  who  carry  with  them  for  ballast  shameful  and  manifest 
lies  and  proclamations  of  victories  that  exist  only  in  their  imagination, 
a  Government  which  is  sustained  by  lies  and  imposture,  and  chooses 
rather  to  continue  and  increase  the  waste  of  lives  than  to  resign  its 
own  dictatorship  and  its  wonderful  Utopia  of  a  republic;  that  is  the 
spectacle  which  France  presents  to-day.  It  is  hard  to  say  whether  any 
nation  ever  before  burdened  itself  with  such  a  load  of  shame.  The 
quantity  of  lies  which  France  officially  and  unofficially  has  been  manu- 
facturing for  us  in  the  full  knowledge  that  they  are  lies,  is  something 
frightful  and  absolutely  unprecedented.  Perhaps  it  is  not  much  after 
all  in  comparison  with  the  immeasurable  heaps  of  delusions  and  uncon- 
scious lies  which  have  so  long  been  in  circulation  among  the  French. 
Their  men  of  genius  who  are  recognised  as  such  in  all  departments 
of  literature  are  apparently  of  opinion  that  France  outshines  other 
nations  in  a  superhuman  wisdom,  that  she  is  the  new  Zion  of  the  whole 
world,  and  that  the  literary  productions  of  the  French,  for  the  last 
fifty  years,  however  insipid,  unhealthy,  and  often  indeed  devilish,  con- 
tain a  real  gospel,  rich  in  blessing  for  all  the  children  of  men. 

We  believe  that  Bismarck  will  take  as  much  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
too,  as  he  chooses,  and  that  it  will  be  the  better  for  him,  the  better  for 
us,  the  better  for  all  the  world  but  France,  and  the  better  in  the  long 
run  for  France  herself.  Through  large  and  quiet  measures.  Count  von 
Bismarck  is  aiming  with  eminent  ability  at  a  single  object;  the  well- 
being  of  Germany  and  of  the  world,  of  the  large-hearted,  peace-loving, 
enlightened,  and  honest  people  of  Germany  growing  into  one  nation; 
and  if  Germany  becomes  mistress  of  the  Continent  in  place  of  France, 
which  is  light-hearted,  ambitious,  quarrelsome,  and  over-excitable,  it 
will  be  the  most  momentous  event  of  the  present  day,  and  all  the  world 
must  hope  that  it  will  soon  come  about.* 


238  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

The  refusal  to  face  the  plain  facts  of  life,  a  refusal  made 
on  grounds  which  we  persuade  ourselves  are  extremely  noble, 
but  which  in  fact  result  too  often  in  simple  falsehood  and 
distortion,  is  revealed  by  the  common  pre-war  attitude  to  the 
economic  situation  dealt  with  in  this  book.  The  present  writer 
took  the  ground  before  the  War  that  much  of  the  dense  popu- 
lation of  modern  Europe  could  not  support  itself  save  by  virtue 
of  an  economic  internationalism  which  political  ideas  (ideas 
which  war  would  intensify)  were  tending  to  make  impossible. 
Now  it  is  obvious  that  before  there  can  be  a  spiritual  life,  there 
must  be  a  fairly  adequate  physical  one.  If  life  is  a  savage 
and  greedy  scramble  over  the  means  of  sheer  physical  suste- 
nance, there  cannot  be  much  in  it  that  is  noble  and  inspiring. 
The  point  of  the  argument  was,  as  already  mentioned,  not 
that  the  economic  pre-occupation  should  occupy  the  whole  of 
life,  but  that  it  will  if  it  is  simply  disregarded;  the  way  to 
reduce  the  economic  pre-occupation  is  to  solve  the  economic 
problem.  Yet  these  plain  and  undeniable  truths  were  somehow 
twisted  into  the  proposition  that  men  went  to  war  because 
they  believed  it  'paid,'  in  the  stockbroking  sense,  and  that  if 
they  saw  it  did  not  'pay'  they  would  not  go  to  war.  The  task 
of  attempting  to  find  the  conditions  in  which  it  will  be  possible 
for  men  to  live  at  all  with  decent  regard  for  their  fellows, 
without  drifting  into  cannibalistic  struggles  for  sustenance  one 
against  another,  is  made  to  appear  something  sordid,  a  'usurer's 
gospel.*  And  on  that  ground,  very  largely,  the  'economics*  of 
international  policy  were  neglected.  We  are  still  facing  the 
facts.     Self  deception  has  become  habitual. 

President  Wilson  failed  to  carry  through  the  policy  he  had 
proclaimed,  as  greater  men  have  failed  in  similar  moral  circum- 
stancesv  The  failure  need  not  have  been  disastrous  to  the 
cause  which  he  had  espoused.  It  might  have  marked  merely 
a  step  towards  ultimate  success,  if  he  had  admitted  the  failure. 
Had  he  said  in  effect:  'Reaction  has  won  this  battle;  we  have 
been  guilty  of  errors  and  shortcomings,  but  we  shall  maintain 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    239 

the  fight,  and  avoid  such  errors  in  future,*  he  would  have 
created  for  the  generation  which  followed  a  clear-cut  issue. 
Whatever  there  was  of  courage  and  sincerity  of  purpose  in 
the  idealism  he  had  created  earlier  in  the  War,  would  have 
rallied  to  his  support.  Just  because  such  a  declaration  would 
have  created  an  issue  dividing  men  sharply  and  even  bitterly, 
it  would  have  united  each  side  strongly;  men  would  have  had 
the  two  paths  clearly  and  distinctly  before  their  eyes,  and 
though  forced  for  the  time  along  that  of  reaction,  they  would 
have  known  the  direction  in  which  they  were  travelling.  Again 
and  again  victory  has  come  out  of  defeat;  again  and  again 
defeat  has  nerved  men  to  greater  effort.  / 

But  when  defeat  is  represented  as  victory  by  the  trusted 
leader,  there  follows  the  sublest  and  most  paralysing  form  of 
confusion  and  doubt.  Men  no  longer  know  who  are  the  friends 
and  who  the  enemies  of  the  things  they  care  for.  When 
callous  cruelty  is  called  righteous,  and  cynical  deception  justice, 
men  begin  to  lose  their  capacity  to  distinguish  the  one  from 
the  other,  and  to  change  sides  without  consciousness  of  their 
treason. 

In  the  field  of  social  relationship,  the  better  management 
by  men  of  their  society,  a  sincere  facing  of  the  simple  truths 
of  life,  right  conclusions  from  facts  that  are  of  universal 
knowledge,  are  of  immeasurably  greater  importance  than 
erudition.  Indeed  we  see  that  again  and  again  learning 
obscures  in  this  field  the  simpler  truths.  The  Germany  that 
had  grown  up  before  the  War  is  a  case  in  point.  Vast  learn- 
ing, meticulous  care  over  infinite  detail,  had  become  the  mark 
of  German  scholarship.  But  all  the  learning  of  the  professors 
did  not  prevent  a  gross  misreading  of  what,  to  the  rest  of  the 
world,  seemed  all  but  self-evident — simple  truths  which  perhaps 
would  have  been  clearer  if  the  learning  had  been  less,  used 
as  it  was  to  buttress  the  lusts  of  domination  and  power. 

The  main  errors  of  the  Treaty  (which,  remember,  was  the 
work  of  the  greatest  diplomatic  experts  in  Europe)   reveal 


240  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

something  similar.  If  the  punitive  element — ^which  is  still 
aoplauded — defeats  finally  the  aims  alike  of  justice,  our  own 
security,  appeasement,  disarmament,  and  sets  up  moral  forces 
that  will  render  our  New  World  even  more  ferociously  cruel 
and  hopeless  than  the  Old,  it  will  not  be  because  we  were 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  'Germany' — or  'Austria*  or  'Russia' 
— is  not  a  person  that  can  be  held  responsible  and  punished 
in  this  simple  fashion.  It  did  not  require  an  expert  knowledge 
of  economics  to  realise  that  a  ruined  Germany  could  not  pay 
vast  indemnities.  Yet  sometimes  very  learned  men  were 
possessed  by  these  fallacies.  It  is  not  learning  that  is  needed 
to  penetrate  them.  A  wisdom  founded  simply  on  the  sincere 
facing  of  self-evident  facts  would  have  saved  European  opinion 
from  its  most  mischievous  excesses.  This  ignorance  of  the 
learned  may  perhaps  be  related  to  another  phenomenon ;  a  great 
increase  in  our  understanding  of  inert  matter,  unaccompanied 
by  any  corresponding  increase  in  our  understanding  of  human 
conduct.  This  latter  understanding  demands  a  temperamental 
self-control  and  detachment,  which  mere  technical  knowledge 
does  not  ask.  Although  in  technical  science  we  have  made 
such  advances  as  would  cause  the  Athenians,  say,  to  look  on 
us  as  gods,  wc  show  no  corresponding  advance  upon  them,  or 
upon  the  Hebrew  prophets  for  that  matter,  in  the  understanding 
of  conduct  and  its  motives.  And  the  spectacle  of  Germany — 
of  the  modern  world,  indeed — so  efficient  in  the  management 
of  matter,  so  clumsy  in  the  understanding  of  the  essentials  of 
human  relationship,  reminds  us  once  more  of  the  futility  of 
mere  technical  knowledge,  unless  accompanied  by  a  better 
moral  understanding.  For  without  the  latter  we  are  unable 
to  use  the  improvement  in  technique  (as  Europe  is  unable 
to  use  it  to-day)  for  indispensable  human  ends.  Or  worse 
still,  technical  knowledge,  in  the  absence  of  wisdom  and  disci- 
pline, merely  gives  us  more  efficient  weapons  of  collective 
suicide.  Butler's  fantasy  of  the  machines  which  men  have 
made  acquiring  a  mind  of  their  own,  and  then  rounding  upon 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    241 

their  masters  and  destroying  them,  has  very  nearly  come  true. 
If  some  new  force,  like  the  release  of  atomic  energy,  had  been 
discovered  during  this  war,  and  applied  (as  Mr  Wells  has 
imagined  it  being  applied)  to  bombs  that  would  go  on  exploding 
without  cessation  for  a  week  or  two,  we  know  that  passions 
ran  so  high  that  both  sides  would  have  used  them,  as  both 
sides  in  the  next  war  will  use  super-poison  gas  and  disease 
germs.  Not  only  the  destruction,  therefore,  but  the  passion 
and  the  ruthlessness,  the  fears  and  hates,  the  universal  pre- 
emption of  wealth  for  'defence'  perpetually  translating  itself 
into  preventive  offence,  would  have  grown.  Man's  society  would 
assuredly  have  been  destroyed  by  the  instruments  that  he  him- 
self had  made,  and  Butler's  fantasy  would  have  come  true. 

It  is  coming  true  to-day.  What  starves  Europe  is  not  lack 
of  technical  knowledge ;  there  is  more  technical  knowledge  than 
when  Europe  could  feed  itself.  If  we  could  combine  our 
forces  to  effective  co-operation,  the  Malthusian  dragon  could  be 
kept  at  bay.  It  is  the  group  of  ideas  which  underlie  the  process 
of  Balkanisation  that  stand  in  the  way  of  turning  our  combined 
forces  against  Nature  instead  of  against  one  another. 

We  have  gone  wrong  mainly  in  certain  of  the  simpler  and 
broader  issues  of  human  relationship,  and  this  book  has  at- 
tempted to  disentangle  from  the  complex  mass  of  facts  in  the 
international  situation,  those  'sovereign  ideas*  which  constitute 
in  crises  the  basic  factors  of  public  action  and  opinion.  In  so 
doing  there  may  have  been  some  over-simplification.  That  will 
not  greatly  matter,  if  the  result  is  some  re-examination  and 
clarification  of  the  predominant  beliefs  that  have  been  analysed. 
'Truth  comes  out  of  error  more  easily  than  out  of  confusion,'  as 
Bacon  warned  us.  It  is  easier  to  correct  a  working  hypothesis 
of  society,  which  is  wrong  in  some  detail,  than  to  achieve  wise 
conduct  in  society  without  any  social  principle.  If  social  or 
political  phenomena  are  for  us  first  an  unexplained  tangle  of 
forces,  and  we  live  morally  from  hand  to  mouth,  by  opinions 
which  have  no  guiding  principle,  our  emotions  will  be  at  the 


242  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

mercy  first  of  one  isolated  fact  or  incident,  and  then  of  another. 

A  certain  parallel  has  more  than  once  been  suggested  in  these 
pages.  European  society  is  to-day  threatened  with  disintegra- 
tion as  the  result  of  ideas  and  emotions  that  have  collected  round 
Patriotism.  A  century  or  two  since  it  was  threatened  by  ideas 
and  passions  which  gathered  round  religious  dogma.  By  what 
process  did  we  arrive  at  religious  toleration  as  a  social  principle  ? 
That  question  has  been  suggested  because  to  answer  it  may 
throw  some  light  on  our  present  problem  of  rendering  Patrio- 
tism a  social  instead  of  an  anti-social  force. 

If  to-day,  for  the  most  part,  in  Europe  and  America  one 
sect  can  live  beside  another  in  peace,  where  a  century  or  two 
ago  there  would  have  been  fierce  hatreds,  wars,  massacres,  and 
burnings,  it  is  not  because  the  modern  population  is  more  learned 
in  theology  (it  is  probably  less  so),  but  rather  conversely,  be- 
cause theological  theory  gave  place  to  lay  judgment  in  the 
ordinary  facts  of  life. 

If  we  have  a  vast  change  in  the  general  ideas  of  Europe  in 
the  religious  sphere,  in  the  attitude  of  men  to  dogma,  in  the 
importance  which  they  attach  to  it,  in  their  feeling  about  it;  a 
change  which  for  good  or  evil  is  a  vast  one  in  its  consequences, 
a  moral  and  intellectual  revulsion  which  has  swept  away  one 
great  difficulty  of  human  relationship  and  transformed  society ; 
it  is  because  the  laity  have  brought  the  discussion  back  to  prin- 
ciples so  broad  and  fundamental  that  the  data  became  the  facts 
of  human  life  and  experience — data  with  which  the  common 
man  is  as  familiar  as  the  scholar.  Of  the  present-day  millions 
for  whom  certain  beliefs  of  the  older  theologians  would  be 
morally  monstrous,  how  many  have  been  influenced  by  elaborate 
study  concerning  the  validity  of  this  or  that  text?  The  texts 
simply  do  not  weigh  with  them,  though  for  centuries  they  were 
the  only  things  that  counted.  What  do  weigh  with  them  are  pro- 
founder  and  simpler  things — a  sense  of  justice,  compassion — 
things  which  would  equally  have  led  the  man  of  the  sixteenth 
century  to  question  the  texts  and  the  premises  of  the  Church, 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    243 

if  discussion  had  been  free.  It  is  because  it  was  not  free  that 
the  social  instinct  of  the  mass,  the  general  capacity  to  order  their 
relations  so  as  to  make  it  possible  for  them  to  live  together, 
became  distorted  and  vitiated.  And  the  wars  of  religion  re- 
sulted. To  correct  this  vitiation,  to  abolish  these  disastrous 
hates  and  misconceptions,  elaborate  learning  was  not  needed. 
Indeed,  it  was  largely  elaborate  learning  which  had  occasioned 
them.  The  judges  who  burned  women  alive  for  witchcraft,  or 
inquisitors  who  sanctioned  that  punishment  for  heresy,  had  vast 
and  terrible  stores  of  learning.  What  was  needed  was  that 
these  learned  folk  should  question  their  premises  in  the  light 
of  facts  of  common  knowledge.  It  is  by  so  doing  that  their 
errors  are  patent  to  the  quite  unlearned  of  our  time.  No  layman 
was  equipped  to  pass  judgment  on  the  historical  reasons  which 
might  support  the  credibility  of  this  or  that  miracle,  or  the 
intricate  argiunents  which  might  justify  this  or  that  point  of 
dogma.  But  the  layman  was  as  well  equipped,  indeed,  he  was 
better  equipped  than  the  schoolman,  to  question  whether  God 
would  ever  torture  men  everlastingly  for  the  expression  of 
honest  belief ;  the  observer  of  daily  occurrences,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  physicist,  was  as  able  as  the  theologian  to  question 
whether  a  readiness  to  believe  without  evidence  is  a  virtue  at 
all.  Questions  of  the  damnation  of  infants,  eternal  torment, 
were  settled  not  by  the  men  equipped  with  historical  and  ec- 
clesiastical scholarship,  but  by  the  average  man,  going  back  to 
the  broad  truths,  to  first  principles,  asking  very  simple  questions, 
the  answer  to  which  depended  not  upon  the  validity  of  texts, 
but  upon  correct  reasoning  concerning  facts  which  are  accessible 
to  all ;  upon  our  general  sense  of  life  as  a  whole,  and  our  more 
elementary  institutions  of  justice  and  mercy ;  reasoning  and  in- 
tuitions which  the  learning  of  the  expert  often  distorts. 

Exactly  the  service  which  extricated  us  from  the  intellectual 
and  moral  confusion  that  resulted  in  such  catastrophes  in  the 
field  of  religion,  is  needed  in  the  field  of  politics.  From  certain 
learned  folk — writers,  poets,  professors  (German  and  other). 


244  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

journalists,  historians,  and  rulers —  the  public  have  taken  a 
group  of  ideas  concerning  Patriotism,  Nationalism,  Imperialism, 
the  nature  of  our  obligation  to  the  State,  and  so  on,  ideas  which 
may  be  right  or  wrong,  but  which  we  are  all  agreed,  will  have 
to  be  very  much  changed  if  men  are  ever  to  live  together  in 
peace  and  freedom;  just  as  certain  notions  concerning  the  in- 
stitution of  private  property  will  have  to  be  changed  if  the 
mass  of  men  are  to  live  in  plenty. 

It  is  a  commonplace  of  militarist  argument  that  so  long  as  men 
feel  as  they  do  about  their  Fatherland,  about  patriotism  and 
nationalism,  internationalism  will  be  an  impossibility.  If  that  is 
true — and  I  think  it  is — peace  and  freedom  and  welfare  will 
wait  until  those  large  issues  have  been  raised  in  men's  minds 
with  sufficient  vividness  to  bring  about  a  change  of  idea  and  so 
a  change  of  feeling  with  reference  to  them. 

It  is  unlikely,  to  say  the  least,  that  the  mass  of  Englishmen 
or  Frenchmen  will  ever  be  in  possession  of  detailed  knowledge 
sufficient  to  equip  them  to  pass  judgment  on  the  various  rival 
solutions  of  the  complex  problems  that  face  us,  say,  in  the 
Balkans.  And  yet  it  was  immediately  out  of  a  problem  of  Bal- 
kan politics  that  the  War  arose,  and  future  wars  may  well  arise 
out  of  those  same  problems  if  they  are  settled  as  badly  in  the 
future  as  in  the  past. 

The  situation  would  indeed  be  hopeless  if  the  nature  of  human 
relationship  depended  upon  the  possession  by  the  people  as  a 
whole  of  expert  knowledge  in  complex  questions  of  that  kind. 
But  happily  the  Sarajevo  murders  would  never  have  developed 
into  a  war  involving  twenty  nations  but  for  the  fact  that  there 
had  been  cultivated  in  Europe  suspicions,  hatreds,  insane  pas- 
sions, and  cupidities,  due  largely  to  false  conceptions  (  though 
in  part  also  themselves  prompting  the  false  conceptions)  of  a 
few  simple  facts  in  political  relationship ;  conceptions  concerning 
the  necessary  rivalry  of  nations,  the  idea  that  what  one  nation 
gains  another  loses,  that  States  are  doomed  by  a  fate  over  which 
they  have  no  control  to  struggle  together  for  the  space  and 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    245 

opportunities  of  a  limited  world.  But  for  the  atmosphere  that 
these  ideas  create  (as  false  theological  notions  once  created  a 
similar  atmosphere  between  rival  religious  groups)  most  of  these 
at  present  difficult  and  insoluble  problems  of  nationality  and 
frontiers  and  government,  would  have  solved  themselves. 

The  ideas  which  feed  and  inflame  these  passions  of  rivalry, 
hostility,  fear,  hate,  will  be  modified,  if  at  all,  by  raising  in  the 
mind  of  the  European  some  such  simple  elementary  questions 
as  were  raised  when  he  began  to  modify  his  feeling  about  the 
man  of  rival  religious  belief.  The  Political  Reformation  in 
Europe  will  come  by  questioning,  for  instance,  the  whole  phi- 
losophy of  patriotism,  the  morality  or  the  validity,  in  terms  of 
human  well-being,  of  a  principle  like  that  of  *my  country,  right 
or  wrong';  *  by  questioning  whether  a  people  really  benefit  by 
enlarging  the  frontiers  of  their  State;  whether  'greatness*  in  a 
nation  particularly  matters ;  whether  the  man  of  the  small  State 
is  not  in  all  the  great  htunan  values  the  equal  of  the  man  of  the 
great  Empire;  whether  the  real  problems  of  life  are  greatly 
affected  by  the  colour  of  the  flag ;  whether  we  have  not  loyalties 
to  other  things  as  well  as  to  our  State;  whether  we  do  not  in 
our  demand  for  national  sovereignty  ignore  international  obli- 
gation without  which  the  nations  can  have  neither  security  nor 
freedom;  whether  we  should  not  refuse  to  kill  or  horribly 
mutilate  a  man  merely  because  we  differ  from  him  in  politics. 
And  with  those,  if  the  emergence  from  chattel-slavery  is  to  be 
complemented  by  the  emergence  from  wage  slavery,  must  be  put 
similarly  fundamental  questions  touching  problems  like  that  of 
private  property  and  the  relation  of  social  freedom  thereto ;  we 
must  ask  why,  if  it  is  rightly  demanded  of  the  citizen  that  his 
life  shall  be  forfeit  to  the  safety  of  the  State,  his  surplus  money, 
property,  shall  not  be  forfeit  to  its  welfare. 

*We  realise  without  difficulty  that  no  society  could  be  formed  by 
individuals  each  of  whom  had  been  taught  to  base  his  conduct  on 
adages  such  as  these:  'Myself  alone';  'myself  before  anybody  else'; 
'my  ego  is  sacred';  'myself  over  all';  'myself  right  or  wrong.'  Yet 
those  are  the  slogans  of  Patriotism  the  world  over  and  are  regarded 
as  noble  and  inspiring,  shouted  with  a  moral  and  approving  thrill. 


246  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

To  very  many,  these  questions  will  seem  a  kind  of  blasphemy, 
and  they  will  regard  those  who  utter  them  as  the  subjects  of  a 
loathsome  perversion.  In  just  that  way  the  orthodox  of  old 
regarded  the  heretic  and  his  blasphemies.  And  yet  the  solution 
of  the  difficulties  of  our  time,  this  problem  of  learning  to  live 
together  without  mutual  homicide  and  military  slavery,  depends 
upon  those  blasphemies  being  uttered.  Because  it  is  only  in 
some  such  way  that  the  premises  of  the  differences  which  divide 
us,  the  realities  which  underlie  them,  will  receive  attention.  It 
is  not  that  the  implied  answer  is  necessarily  the  truth — I  am  not 
concerned  now  for  a  moment  to  urge  that  it  is — ^but  that  until 
the  problem  is  pushed  back  in  our  minds  to  these  great  yet 
simple  issues,  the  will,  temper,  general  ideas  of  Europe  on  this 
subject  will  remain  unchanged.  And  if  they  remain  unchanged 
so  will  its  conduct  and  condition. 

The  tradition  of  nationalism  and  patriotism,  around  which 
have  gathered  our  chief  political  loyalties  and  instincts,  has  be- 
come in  the  actual  conditions  of  the  world  an  anti-social  and 
disruptive  force.  Although  we  realize  perhaps  that  a  society  of 
nations  of  some  kind  there  must  be,  each  unit  proclaims  proudly 
its  anti-social  slogan  of  sacred  egoisms  and  defiant  immoralism ; 
its  espousal  of  country  as  against  right.^ 

The  danger — and  the  difficulty — resides  largely  in  the  fact 
that  the  instincts  of  gregariousness  and  group  solidarity,  which 
prompt  the  attitude  of  'my  country  right  or  wrong,'  are  not  in 
themselves  evil :  both  gregariousness  and  pugnacity  are  indispen- 
sable to  society.  Nationality  is  a  very  precious  manifestation 
of   the   instincts   by   which   alone   men   can   become   socially 

*  However  mischievous  some  of  the  manifestations  of  Nationalism 
may  prove,  the  worst  possible  method  of  dealing  with  it  is  by  the 
forcible  repression  of  any  of  its  claims  which  can  be  granted  with 
due  regard  to  the  general  interest.  To  give  Nationalism  full  play,  as 
far  as  possible,  is  the  best  means  of  attenuating  its  worst  features  and 
preventing  its  worst  developments.  This,  after  all,  is  the  line  of  con- 
duct which  we  adopt  to  certain  religious  beliefs  which  we  may  regard 
as  dangerous  superstitions.  Although  the  belief  may  have  dangers,  the 
social  dangers  involved  in  forcible  repression  would  be  greater  still. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    247 

conscious  and  act  in  some  corporate  capacity.  The  identifica- 
tion of  'self  with  society,  which  patriotism  accomplishes  within 
certain  limits,  the  sacrifice  of  self  for  the  community  which  it 
inspires — even  though  only  when  fighting  other  patriotisms — 
are  moral  achievements  of  infinite  hope. 

The  Catharian  heresy  that  Jehovah  of  the  Old  Testament  is 
in  reality  Satan  masquerading  as  God  has  this  pregnant  sug- 
gestion :  if  the  Father  of  Evil  ever  does  destroy  us,  we  may  be 
sure  that  he  will  come,  not  proclaiming  himself  evil,  but  pro- 
claiming himself  good,  the  very  Voice  of  God.  And  that  is  the 
danger  with  patriotism  and  the  instincts  that  gather  round  it. 
If  the  instincts  of  nationalism  were  simply  evil,  they  would 
constitute  no  real  danger.  It  is  the  good  in  them  that  has  made 
them  the  instrument  of  the  immeasurable  devastation  which 
they  accomplish. 

That  Patriotism  does  indeed  transcend  all  morality,  all  re- 
ligious sanctions  as  we  have  heretofore  known  them,  can  be 
put  to  a  very  simple  test.  Let  an  Englishman,  recalling,  if  he 
can,  his  temper  during  the  War,  ask  himself  this  question:  Is 
there  anything,  anything  whatsoever,  that  he  would  have  refused 
to  do,  if  the  refusal  had  meant  the  triumph  of  Germany  and  the 
defeat  of  England?  In  his  heart  he  knows  that  he  would  have 
justified  any  act  if  the  safety  of  his  country  had  hung  upon  it. 

Other  patriotisms  have  like  justifications.  Yet  would  defeat, 
submission,  even  to  Germany,  involve  worse  acts  than  those  we 
have  felt  compelled  to  commit  during  the  War  and  since — in  the 
work  of  making  our  power  secure  ?  Did  the  German  ask  of  the 
Alsatian  or  the  Pole  worse  than  we  have  been  compelled  to  ask 
of  our  own  soldiers  in  Russia,  India,  or  Ireland  ? 

The  old  struggle  for  power  goes  on.  For  the  purpose  of  that 
struggle  we  are  prepared  to  transform  our  society  in  any  way 
that  it  may  demand.  For  the  purposes  of  the  war  for  power 
we  will  accept  anything  that  the  strength  of  the  enemy  imposes : 
we  will  be  socialist,  autocratic,  democratic,  or  communist;  we 
will  conscribe  the  bodies,  souls,  wealth  of  our  people;  we  will 


248  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

proscribe,  as  we  do,  the  Christian  doctrine,  and  all  mercy  and 
humanity;  we  will  organise  falsehood  and  deceit,  and  call  it 
statecraft  and  strategy;  lie  for  the  purpose  of  inflaming  hate, 
and  rejoice  at  the  effectiveness  of  our  propaganda ;  we  will  tor- 
ture helpless  millions  by  pestilence  and  famine — as  we  have  done 
— and  look  on  unmoved;  our  priests,  in  the  name  of  Christ,  will 
reprove  misplaced  pity,  and  call  for  the  further  punishment  of 
the  wicked,  still  greater  efforts  in  the  Fight  for  Right.  We  shall 
not  care  what  transformations  take  place  in  our  society  or  our 
natures ;  or  what  happens  to  the  human  spirit.  Obediently,  at 
the  behest  of  the  enemy — ^because,  that  is,  his  power  demands 
that  conduct  of  us — shall  we  do  all  those  things,  or  anything, 
save  only  one :  we  will  not  negotiate  or  make  a  contract  with 
him.  That  would  limit  our  'independence' ;  by  which  we  mean 
that  his  submission  to  our  mastery  would  be  less  complete. 

We  can  do  acts  of  infinite  cruelty;  disregard  all  accepted 
morality ;  but  we  cannot  allow  the  enemy  to  escape  the  admission 
of  defeat. 

If  we  are  to  correct  the  evils  of  the  older  tradition,  and  build 
up  one  which  will  restore  to  men  the  art  of  living  together,  we 
must  honestly  face  the  fact  that  the  older  tradition  has  failed. 
So  long  as  the  old  loyalties  and  patriotisms,  tempting  us  with 
power  and  dominion,  calling  to  the  deep  himger  excited  by  those 
things,  and  using  the  banners  of  righteousness  and  justice,  seem 
to  offer  security,  and  a  society  which,  if  not  ideal,  is  at  least 
workable,  we  certainly  shall  not  pay  the  price  which  all  pro- 
found change  of  habit  demands.  We  have  seen  that  as  a  fact 
of  his  history  man  only  abandons  power  and  force  over  others 
when  it  fails.  At  present,  almost  everywhere,  we  refuse  to 
face  the  failure  of  the  old  forms  of  political  power.  We  don't 
believe  that  we  need  the  co-operation  of  the  foreigner,  or  we 
believe  that  we  can  coerce  him. 

Little  attention  has  been  given  here  to  the  machinery  of  in- 
ternationalism— League  of  Nations,  Courts  of  Arbitration, 
Disarmament.    This  is  not  because  machinery  is  unimportant. 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    249 

But  if  we  possessed  the  Will,  if  we  were  ready  each  to  pay  his 
contribution  in  some  sacrifice  of  his  independence,  of  his  oppor- 
tunity of  domination,  the  difficulties  of  machinery  would  largely 
disappear.  The  story  of  America's  essay  in  internationalism  has 
warned  us  of  the  real  difficulty.  Courts  of  Arbitration,  Leagues 
of  Nations,  were  devices  to  which  American  opinion  readily 
enough  agreed;  too  readily.  For  the  event  showed  that  the 
old  conceptions  were  not  changed.  They  had  only  been  disre- 
garded. No  machinery  of  internationalism  can  work  so  long 
as  the  impulses  and  prepossessions  of  irresponsible  nationalism 
retain  their  power.  The  test  we  must  apply  to  our  sincerity  is 
our  answer  to  the  question : — ^What  price,  in  terms  of  national 
independence,  are  we  prepared  to  pay  for  a  world  law  ?  What, 
in  fact,  »^  the  price  that  is  asked  of  us?  To  this  last  question, 
the  pages  that  precede,  and  to  some  extent  those  that  follow, 
have  attempted  to  supply  an  answer.  We  should  gain  many 
times  in  freedom  and  independence  the  contribution  in  those 
things  that  we  made. 

Perhaps  we  may  be  driven  by  hunger — ^the  actual  need  of  our 
children  for  bread — to  forsake  a  method  which  cannot  give 
them  bread  or  freedom,  in  favour  of  one  that  can.  But,  for  the 
failure  of  power  to  act  as  a  deterrent  upon  our  desire  for  it, 
we  must  perceive  the  failure.  Our  angers  and  hatreds  obscure 
that  failure,  or  render  us  indifferent  to  it.  Hunger  does  not 
necessarily  help  the  understanding ;  it  may  bemuse  it  by  passion 
and  resentment.  We  may  in  our  passion  wreck  civilisation  as  a 
passionate  man  in  his  anger  will  injure  those  he  loves.  Yet, 
well  fed,  we  may  refuse  to  concern  ourselves  with  problems  of 
the  morrow.  The  mechanical  motive  will  no  longer  suffice.  In 
the  simpler,  more  animal  forms  of  society,  the  instinct  of  each 
moment,  with  no  thought  of  ultimate  consequence,  may  be 
enough.  But  the  Society  which  man  has  built  up  can  only  go 
forward  or  be  preserved  as  it  began:  by  virtue  of  something 
which  is  more  than  instinct.  On  man  is  cast  the  obligation  to  be 
intelligent ;  the  responsibility  of  will ;  the  burden  of  thought. 


250  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

If  some  of  us  have  felt  that,  beyond  all  other  evils  which 
translate  themselves  into  public  policy,  those  with  which  these 
pages  deal  constitute  the  greatest,  it  is  not  because  war  means 
the  loss  of  life,  the  killing  of  men.  Many  of  our  noblest  activi- 
ties do  that.  There  are  so  many  of  us  that  it  is  no  great  disaster 
that  a  few  should  die.  It  is  not  because  war  means  suffering. 
Suffering  endured  for  a  conscious  and  clearly  conceived  human 
purpose  is  redeemed  by  hope  of  real  achievement;  it  may  be 
a  glad  sacrifice  for  some  worthy  end.  But  if  we  have  floundered 
hopelessly  into  a  bog  because  we  have  forgotten  our  end  and 
purpose  in  the  heat  of  futile  passion,  the  consolation  which  we 
may  gather  from  the  willingness  with  which  men  die  in  the  bog 
should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  our  determination  to  rediscover 
our  destination  and  create  afresh  our  purpose.  These  pages 
have  been  concerned  very  little  with  the  loss  of  life,  the  suf- 
fering of  the  last  seven  years.  What  they  have  dealt  with  mainly 
is  the  fact  that  the  War  has  left  us  a  less  workable  society,  has 
been  marked  by  an  increase  in  the  forces  of  chaos  and  disin- 
tegration. That  is  the  ultimate  indictment  of  this  War  as  of 
all  wars :  the  attitude  towards  life,  the  ideas  and  motive  forces 
out  of  which  it  grows,  and  which  it  fosters,  makes  men  less 
able  to  live  together,  their  society  less  workable,  and  must  end 
by  making  free  society  impossible.  War  not  only  arises  out  of 
the  failure  of  human  wisdom,  from  the  defect  of  that 
intelligence  by  which  alone  we  can  successfully  fight  the 
forces  of  nature;  it  perpetuates  that  failure  and  worsens  it. 
For  only  by  a  passion  which  keeps  thought  at  bay  can  the 
'morale'  of  war  be  maintained.  The  very  justification  which 
we  advance  for  our  war-time  censorships  and  propaganda,  our 
suspension  of  free  speech  and  discussion,  is  that  if  we  gave 
full  value  to  the  enemy's  case,  saw  him  as  he  really  is,  blunder- 
ing, foolish,  largely  helpless  like  ourselves ;  saw  the  defects  of 
our  own  and  our  Allies'  policy,  saw  what  our  own  acts  in  war 
really  involved  and  how  nearly  they  resembled  those  which 
aroused  our  anger  when  done  by  the  enemy,  if  we  saw  all  this 


SPIRITUAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT    251 

and  kept  our  heads,  we  should  abandon  war.  A  thousand  times 
it  has  been  explained  that  in  an  impartial  mood  we  cannot 
carry  on  war;  that  unless  the  people  come  to  feel  that  all  the 
right  is  on  our  side  and  all  the  wrong  on  the  enemy's,  morale 
will  fail.  The  most  righteous  war  can  only  be  kept  going  by 
falsehood.  The  end  of  that  falsehood  is  that  our  mind  col- 
lapses. And  although  the  mind,  thought,  judgment,  are  not 
all-sufficient  for  man's  salvation,  it  is  impossible  without  them. 
Behind  all  other  explanations  of  Europe's  creeping  paralysis 
is  the  blindness  of  the  millions,  their  inability  to  see  the  effects 
of  their  demands  and  policy,  to  see  where  they  are  going. 

Only  a  keener  feeling  for  truth  will  enable  them  to  see.  About 
indifferent  things — about  the  dead  matter  that  we  handle  in 
our  science — we  can  be  honest,  impartial,  true.  That  is  why 
we  succeed  in  dealing  with  matter.  But  about  the  things  we 
care  for — which  are  ourselves — our  desires  and  lusts,  our 
patriotisms  and  hates,  we  find  a  harder  test  of  thinking  straight 
and  truly.  Yet  there  is  the  greater  need ;  only  by  that  rectitude 
shall  we  be  saved.    There  is  no  refuge  but  in  truth. 


ADDENDUM 
THE  ARGUMENT  OF  THE  GREAT  ILLUSION 


253 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  'impossibility  OF  WAR'  MYTH 

It  will  illustrate  certain  difficulties  which  have  marked — and 
mark — the  presentation  of  the  argument  of  this  book,  if  the 
reader  will  consider  for  a  few  minutes  the  justice  of  certain 
charges  which  have  been  brought  against  The  Great  Illusion. 
Perhaps  the  commonest  is  that  it  argued  that  'war  had  become 
impossible.'  The  truth  of  that  charge  at  least  can  very  easily 
be  tested.  The  first  page  of  that  book,  the  preface,  referrii^ 
to  the  thesis  it  proposed  to  set  out,  has  these  words:  'the 
argument  is  not  that  war  is  impossible,  but  that  it  is  futile.' 
The  next  page  but  one  describes  what  the  author  believes  to 
be  the  main  forces  at  work  in  international  politics:  a  fierce 
struggle  for  preponderant  power  'based  on  the  universal 
assumption  that  a  nation,  in  order  to  find  outlets  for  expanding 
population  and  increasing  industry,  or  simply  to  ensure  the 
best  conditions  possible  for  its  people,  is  necessarily  pushed  to 
territorial  expansion  and  the  exercise  of  political  force  against 
others  .  .  .  that  nations  being  competing  units,  advantage,  in 
the  last  resort,  goes  to  the  possessor  of  preponderant  military 
force,  the  weaker  going  to  the  wall,  as  in  the  other  forms  of 
the  struggle  for  life.'  A  whole  chapter  is  devoted  to  the 
evidence  which  goes  to  show  that  this  aggressive  and  warlike 
philosophy  was  indeed  the  great  actuating  force  in  European 
politics.  The  first  two  paragraphs  of  the  first  chapter  fore- 
cast the  likelihood  of  an  Anglo-German  explosion ;  that  chapter 
goes  on  to  declare  that  the  pacifist  effort  then  current  was 

255 


256  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

evidently  making  no  headway  at  all  against  the  tendencies 
towards  rivalry  and  conflict.  In  the  third  chapter  the  ideas 
underlying  those  tendencies  are  described  as  'so  profoundly 
mischievous,'  and  so  'desperately  dangerous,'  as  to  threaten 
civilisation  itself.  A  chapter  is  devoted  to  showing  that  the 
fallacy  and  folly  of  those  all  but  universal  ideas  was  no 
guarantee  at  all  that  the  nations  would  not  act  upon  them. 
(Particularly  is  the  author  insistent  on  the  fact  that  the  futility 
of  war  will  never  in  itself  suffice  to  stop  war.  The  folly  of  a 
given  course  of  action  will  only  be  a  deterrent  to  the  degree  to 
which  men  realise  its  folly.  That  was  why  the  book  was 
written.)  A  warning  is  uttered  against  any  reliance  upon  the 
Hague  Conferences,  which,  it  is  explained  at  length,  are  likely 
to  be  quite  ineffective  against  the  momentum  of  the  motives 
of  aggression.  A  warning  is  uttered  towards  the  close  of  the 
book  against  any  reduction  of  British  armaments,  accompanied, 
however,  by  the  warning  that  mere  increase  of  armaments 
unaccompanied  by  change  of  policy,  a  Political  Reformation  in 
the  direction  of  internationalism,  will  provoke  the  very  catas- 
trophe it  is  their  object  to  avoid ;  only  by  that  change  of  policy 
could  we  take  a  real  step  towards  peace  'instead  of  a  step 
towards  war,  to  which  the  mere  piling  up  of  armaments,  un- 
checked by  any  other  factor,  must  in  the  end  inevitably  lead.'  *■ 

The  last  paragraph  of  the  book  asks  the  reader  which  of 
two  courses  we  are  to  follow:  a  determined  effort  towards 
placing  European  policy  on  a  new  basis,  or  a  drift  along  the 
current  of  old  instincts  and  ideas,  a  course  which  would  con- 
demn us  to  the  waste  of  mountains  of  treasure  and  the  spilling 
of  oceans  of  blood. 

Yet,  it  is  probably  true  to  say  that,  of  the  casual  newspaper 
references  (as  distinct  from  reviews)  made  during  the  last  ten 
years  to  the  book  just  described,  four  out  of  five  are  to  the 
effect  that  its  author  said  'war  was  impossible  because  it  did 
not  pay.* 

'  The  Great  Illusion,  p.  326 


THE  'IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  WAR'  MYTH        257 

The  following  are  some  passages  referred  to  in  the  above 
summary : — 

'Not  the  facts,  but  men's  opinions  about  the  facts  is  what 
matters.  This  is  because  men's  conduct  is  determined,  not 
necessarily  by  the  right  conclusion  from  facts,  but  the  con- 
clusion they  believe  to  be  right.  ...  As  long  as  Europe  is 
dominated  by  the  old  beliefs,  those  beliefs  will  have  virtually 
the  same  effect  in  politics  as  though  they  were  intrinsically 
sound.' — (p.  327.) 

'It  is  evident  that  so  long  as  the  misconception  we  are  dealing 
with  is  all  but  universal  in  Europe,  so  long  as  the  nations 
believe  that  in  some  way  the  military  and  political  subjugation 
of  others  will  bring  with  it  a  tangible  material  advantage  to 
the  conqueror,  we  all  do,  in  fact,  stand  in  danger  from  such 
aggression.  Not  his  interest,  but  what  he  deems  to  be  his  inter- 
est, will  furnish  the  real  motive  of  our  prospective  enemy's 
action.  And  as  the  illusion  with  which  we  are  dealing  does, 
indeed,  dominate  all  those  minds  most  active  in  European 
politics,  we  must,  while  this  remains  the  case,  regard  an  aggres- 
sion, even  such  as  that  which  Mr  Harrison  foresees,  as  within 
the  bounds  of  practical  politics.  .  .  .  On  this  ground  alone  I 
deem  that  we  or  any  other  nation  are  justified  in  taking  means 
of  self-defence  to  prevent  such  aggression.  This  is  not,  there- 
fore, a  plea  for  disarmament  irrespective  of  the  action  of  other 
nations.  So  long  as  current  political  philosophy  in  Europe 
remains  what  it  is,  I  would  not  urge  the  reduction  of  our  war 
budget  by  a  single  sovereign.* — (p.  329.) 

'The  need  for  defence  arises  from  the  existence  of  a  motive 
for  attack.  .  .  .  That  motive  is,  consequently,  part  of  the 
problem  of  defence.  .  .  .  Since  as  between  the  European 
peoples  we  are  dealing  with  in  this  matter,  one  party  is  as  able 
in  the  long  run  to  pile  up  armaments  as  the  other,  we  cannot 
get  nearer  to  solution  by  armaments  alone ;  we  must  get  at  the 
original  provoking  cause — the  motive  making  for  aggression. 

XT 


258  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

...  If  that  motive  results  from  a  true  judgment  of  the  facts;  if 
the  determining  factor  in  a  nation's  well-being  and  progress  is 
really  its  power  to  obtain  by  force  advantage  over  others,  the 
present  situation  of  armament  rivalry  tempered  by  war  is  a 
natural  and  inevitable  one.  ...  If,  however,  the  view  is  a 
false  one,  our  progress  towards  solution  will  be  marked  by  the 
extent  to  which  the  error  becomes  generally  recognised  in 
European  public  opinion.' — (p.  337.) 

'In  this  matter  it  seems  fatally  easy  to  secure  either  one  of 
two  kind^  of  action:  that  of  the  "practical  man"  who  limits 
his  energies  to  securing  a  policy  which  will  perfect  the  machin- 
ery of  war  and  disregard  anything  else ;  or  that  of  the  Pacifist, 
who,  persuaded  of  the  brutality  or  immorality  of  war,  is  apt 
to  deprecate  effort  directed  at  self-defence.  What  is  needed 
is  the  type  of  activity  which  will  include  both  halves  of  the 
problem:  provision  for  education,  for  a  Political  Reformation 
in  this  matter,  as  well  as  such  means  of  defence  as  will  mean- 
time counterbalance  the  existing  impulse  to  aggression.  To 
concentrate  on  either  half  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other  half 
is  to  render  the  whole  problem  insoluble.' — (p.  330.) 

'Never  has  the  contest  of  armament  been  so  keen  as  when 
Europe  began  to  indulge  in  Peace  Conferences.  Speaking 
roughly  and  generally,  the  era  of  great  armament  expansion 
dates  from  the  first  Hague  Conference.  The  reader  who  has 
appreciated  the  emphasis  laid  in  the  preceding  pages  on  work- 
ing through  the  reform  of  ideas  will  not  feel  much  astonishment 
at  the  failure  of  efforts  such  as  these.  The  Hague  Conferences 
represented  an  attempt,  not  to  work  through  the  reform  of 
ideas,  but  to  modify  by  mechanical  means  the  political 
machinery  of  Europe,  without  reference  to  the  ideas  which 
had  brought  it  into  existence. 

'Arbitration  treaties,  Hague  Conferences,  International 
Federation,  involve  a  new  conception  of  relationship  between 
nations.  But  the  ideals — political,  economical,  and  social — 
on  which  the  old  conceptions  are  based,  our  terminology,  our 


THE  'IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  WAR'  MYTH        259 

political  literature,  our  old  habits  of  thought,  diplomatic  inertia, 
which  all  combine  to  perpetuate  the  old  notions,  have  been  left 
serenely  undisturbed.  And  surprise  is  expressed  that  such 
schemes  do  not  succeed.' — (p.  350.) 

Very  soon  after  the  appearance  of  the  book,  I  find  I  am 
shouting  myself  hoarse  in  the  Press  against  this  monstrous 
'impossibility  of  war'  foolishness.  An  article  in  the  Daily  Mail 
of  September  15th,  1911,  begins  thus: — 

*  .  .  .  One  learns,  with  some  surprise,  that  the  very  simple 
facts  to  which  I  have  now  for  some  years  been  trying  to  draw 
the  attention  they  deserve,  teach  that: — 

1.  War  is  now  impossible. 

2.  War  would  ruin  both  the  victor  and  the  vanquished. 

3.  War  would  leave  the  victor  worse  off  than  the  van- 

quished. 

'May  I  say  with  every  possible  emphasis  that  nothing  I  have 
ever  written  justifies  any  one  of  these  conclusions. 
'I  have  always,  on  the  contrary,  urged  that: — 

( 1 )  War  is,  unhappily,  quite  possible,  and,  in  the  prevailing 
condition  of  ignorance  concerning  certain  elementary  politico- 
economic  facts,  even  likely. 

(2)  There  is  nothing  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  war 
would  "ruin"  both  victor  and  vanquished.  Indeed,  I  do  not 
quite  know  what  the  "ruin"  of  a  nation  means. 

(3)  While  in  the  past  the  vanquished  has  often  profited 
more  by  defeat  than  he  could  possibly  have  done  by  victory,  it 
is  no  necessary  result,  and  we  are  safest  in  assuming  that  the 
vanquished  will  suffer  most.' 

Nearly  two  years  later  I  find  myself  still  engaged  in  the  same 
task.  Here  is  a  letter  to  the  Saturday  Review  (March  8th, 
1913)  :— 


260  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

'You  are  good  enough  to  say  that  I  am  "one  of  the  very  few 
advocates  of  peace  at  any  price  who  is  not  altogether  an  ass." 
And  yet  you  also  state  that  I  have  been  on  a  mission  "to  per- 
suade the  German  people  that  war  in  the  twentieth  century  is 
impossible."  If  I  had  ever  tried  to  teach  anybody  such  sorry 
rubbish  I  should  be  altogether  an  unmitigated  ass.  I  have 
never,  of  course,  nor  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  has  any  one  ever 
said  that  war  was  impossible.  Personally,  not  only  do  I  regard 
war  as  possible,  but  extremely  likely.  What  I  have  been 
preaching  in  Germany  is  that  it  is  impossible  for  Germany  to 
benefit  by  war,  especially  a  war  against  us ;  and  that,  of  course, 
is  quite  a  different  matter.* 

It  is  true  that  if  the  argument  of  the  book  as  a  whole  pointed 
to  the  conclusion  that  war  was  'impossible,'  it  would  be  beside 
the  point  to  quote  passages  repudiating  that  conclusion.  They 
might  merely  prove  the  inconsequence  of  the  author's  thought. 
But  the  book,  and  the  whole  effort  of  which  it  was  a  part, 
would  have  had  no  raison  d'etre  if  the  author  had  believed 
war  unlikely  or  impossible.  It  was  a  systematic  attack  on 
certain  political  ideas  which  the  author  declared  were  dominant 
in  international  politics.  If  he  had  supposed  those  powerful 
ideas  were  making  not  for  war,  but  for  peace,  why  as  a  pacifist 
should  he  be  at  such  pains  to  change  them?  And  if  he  thought 
those  war-provoking  ideas  which  he  attacked  were  not  likely 
to  be  put  into  effect,  why,  in  that  case  either,  should  he  bother 
at  all?  Why,  for  that  matter,  should  a  man  who  thought  war 
impossible  engage  in  not  too  popular  propaganda  against  war 
— against  something  which  could  not  occur? 

A  moment's  real  reflection  on  the  part  of  those  responsible 
for  this  description  of  The  Great  Illusion,  should  have  con- 
vinced them  that  it  could  not  be  a  true  one. 

I  have  taken  the  trouble  to  go  through  some  of  the  more 
serious  criticisms  of  the  book  to  see  whether  this  extraordinary 
confusion  was  created  in  the  mind  of  those  who  actually  read 


THE  'IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  WAR'  MYTH        261 

the  book  instead  of  reading  about  it.  So  far  as  I  know,  not 
a  single  serious  critic  has  come  to  a  conclusion  that  agrees  with 
the  'popular'  verdict.  Several  going  to  the  book  after  the  War, 
seem  to  express  surprise  at  the  absence  of  any  such  conclusion. 
Professor  Lindsay  writes: — 

'Let  us  begin  by  disposing  of  one  obvious  criticism  of  the 
doctrines  of  The  Great  Illusion  which  the  out-break  of  war 
has  suggested.  Mr  Angell  never  contended  that  war  was  im- 
possible, though  he  did  contend  that  it  must  always  be  futile. 
He  insisted  that  the  futility  of  war  would  not  make  war  im- 
possible or  armament  unnecessary  until  all  nations  recognised 
its  futility.  So  long  as  men  held  that  nations  could  advance 
their  interests  by  war,  so  long  war  would  last.  His  moral 
was  that  we  should  fight  militarism,  whether  in  Germany  or 
in  our  own  country,  as  one  ought  to  fight  an  idea  with  better 
ideas.  He  further  pointed  out  that  though  it  is  pleasanter  to 
attack  the  wrong  ideals  held  by  foreigners,  it  is  more  effective 
to  attack  the  wrong  ideals  held  in  our  own  country.  .  .  .  The 
pacifist  hope  was  that  the  outbreak  of  a  European  war,  which 
was  recognised  as  quite  possible,  might  be  delayed  until,  with 
the  progress  of  pacifist  doctrine,  war  became  impossible.  That 
hope  has  been  tragically  frustrated,  but  if  the  doctrines  of 
pacifism  are  convincing  and  irrefutable,  it  was  not  in  itself  a 
vain  hope.  Time  was  the  only  thing  it  asked  of  fortune,  and 
time  was  denied  it.' 

Another  post-war  critic — on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic 

— writes : — 

'Mr.  Angell  has  received  too  much  solace  from  the  unwisdom 
of  his  critics.  Those  who  have  denounced  him  most  vehemently 
are  those  who  patently  have  not  read  his  books.  For  example, 
he  cannot  properly  be  classed,  as  frequently  asserted  in  recent 
months,  as  one  of  those  Utopian  pacifists  who  went  about 


262  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

proclaiming  war  impossible.  A  number  of  passages  in  The 
Great  Illusion  show  him  fully  alive  to  the  danger  of  the  present 
collapse;  indeed,  from  the  narrower  view  of  politics  his  book 
was  one  of  the  several  fruitless  attempts  to  check  that  grow- 
ing estrangement  between  England  and  Germany  whose  sinister 
menace  far-sighted  men  discerned.  Even  less  justifiable  are 
the  flippant  sneers  which  discard  his  argument  as  mercenary 
or  sordid.  Mr  Angell  has  never  taken  an  "account  book"  or 
"breeches  pocket"  view  of  war.  He  inveighs  against  what 
he  terms  its  political  and  moral  futilities  as  earnestly  as  against 
its  economic  futility.' 

It  may  be  said  that  there  must  be  some  cause  for  so  persis- 
tent a  misrepresentation.  There  is.  Its  cause  is  that  obstinate 
and  deep-seated  fatalism  which  is  so  large  a  part  of  the  pre- 
vailing attitude  to  war  and  against  which  the  book  under 
consideration  was  a  protest.  Take  it  as  an  axiom  that  war 
comes  upon  us  as  an  outside  force,  like  the  rain  or  the  earth- 
quake, and  not  as  something  that  we  can  influence,  and  a  man 
who  'does  not  believe  in  war,'  must  be  a  person  who  believes 
that  war  is  not  coming ;  ^  that  men  are  naturally  peaceable. 
To  be  a  Pacifist  because  one  believes  that  the  danger  of  war 
is  very  great  indeed,  or  because  one  believes  men  to  be  naturally 
extremely  prone  to  war,  is  a  position  incomprehensible  until 
we  have  rid  our  minds  of  the  fatalism  which  regards  war  as 
an  'inevitable'  result  of  uncontrollable  forces. 

What  is  a  writer  to  do,  however,  in  the  face  of  persistent 
misrepresentation  such  as  this?  If  he  were  a  manufacturer 
of  soap  and  some  one  said  his  soap  was  underweight,  or  he 
were  a  grocer  and  some  one  said  his  sugar  was  half  sand,  he 
could  of  course  obtain  enormous  damages.  But  a  mere  writer, 
having  given  some  years  of  his  life  to  the  study  of  the  most 
important  problem  of  his  time,  is  quite  helpless  when  a  tired 

*  The  Pacifists  lie  when  they  tell  us  that  the  danger  of  war  is  over.' 
General  Leonard  Wood. 


THE  'IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  WAR'  MYTH        263 

headline  writer,  or  a  journalist  indulging  his  resentment,  or 
what  he  thinks  is  likely  to  be  the  resentment  of  his  readers, 
describes  a  book  as  proclaiming  one  thing  when  as  a  matter 
of  simple  fact  it  proclaims  the  exact  contrary. 

So  much  for  myth  or  misrepresentation  No.  1.  We  come 
to  a  second,  namely,  that  The  Great  Illusion  is  an  appeal  to 
avarice;  that  it  urges  men  not  to  defend  their  country  'because 
to  do  so  does  not  pay;'  that  it  would  have  us  place  'pocket 
before  patriotism,'  a  view  reflected  in  Benjamin  Kidd's  last 
book,  pages  of  which  are  devoted  to  the  condemnation  of  the 
'degeneracy  and  futility'  of  resting  the  cause  of  peace  on  no 
higher  ground  than  that  it  is  'a  great  illusion  to  believe  that  a 
national  policy  founded  on  war  can  be  a  profitable  policy  for  any 
people  in  the  long  run.'  ^  He  quotes  approvingly  Sir  William 
Robertson  Nicoll  for  denouncing  those  who  condemn  war 
because  'it  would  postpone  the  blessed  hour  of  tranquil  money 
getting.'  ^  As  a  means  of  obscuring  truths  which  it  is  import- 
ant to  realise,  of  creating  by  misrepresentation  a  moral  repuls- 
ion to  a  thesis,  and  thus  depriving  it  of  consideration,  this 
second  line  of  attack  is  even  more  important  than  the  first. 

To  say  of  a  book  that  it  prophesied  'the  impossibility  of 
war,'  is  to  imply  that  it  is  mere  silly  rubbish,  and  its  author 
a  fool.  Sir  William  Robertson  Nicoll's  phrase  would  of 
course  imply  that  its  doctrine  was  morally  contemptible. 

The  reader  must  judge,  after  considering  dispassionately 
what  follows,  whether  this  second  description  is  any  truer  than 
the  first. 

^The  Science  of  Power,  p.  14.  'Ibid,  p.  144. 


CHAPTER  II 

'economic'  and  'moral'  motives  in  international  affairs 

The  Great  Illusion  dealt —  among  other  factors  of  international 
conflict — with  the  means  by  which  the  population  of  the  world 
is  driven  to  support  itself ;  and  studied  the  effect  of  those  efforts 
to  find  sustenance  upon  the  relations  of  States.  It  therefore 
dealt  with  economics. 

On  the  strength  of  this,  certain  critics  (like  some  of  those 
quoted  in  the  last  chapter)  who  cannot  possibly  have  read  the 
book  thoroughly,  seem  to  have  argued:  If  this  book  about 
war  deals  with  'economics,*  it  must  deal  with  money  and 
profits.  To  bring  money  and  profits  into  a  discussion  of  war 
is  to  imply  that  men  fight  for  money,  and  won't  fight  if  they 
don't  get  money  from  it;  that  war  does  not  'pay.'  This  is 
wicked  and  horrible.  Let  us  denounce  the  writer  for  a  shallow 
Hedonist  and  money-grubber.  .  .  . 

As  a  matter  of  simple  fact,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  the 
book  was  largely  an  attempt  to  show  that  the  economic  argu- 
ment usually  adduced  for  a  particularly  ruthless  form  of 
national  selfishness  was  not  a  sound  argtunent;  that  the  com- 
monly invoked  justification  for  a  selfish  immoralism  in 
Foreign  Policy  was  a  fallacy,  an  illusion.  Yet  the  critics 
somehow  managed  to  turn  what  was  in  fact  an  argument  against 
national  egoism  into  an  argument  for  selfishness. 

What  was  the  political  belief  and  the  attitude  towards  life 
which  The  Great  Illusion  challenged?  And  what  was  the 
counter  principle  which  it  advocated  as  a  substitute  therefore? 

264 


'ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         265 

It  challenged  the  theory  that  the  vital  interests  of  nations 
are  conflicting,  and  that  war  is  part  of  the  inevitable  struggle 
for  life  among  them;  the  view  that,  in  order  to  feed  itself, 
a  nation  with  an  expanding  population  must  conquer  territory 
and  so  deprive  others  of  the  means  of  subsistence;  the  view 
that  war  is  the  'struggle  for  bread.'  ^  In  other  words,  it 
challenged  the  economic  excuse  or  justification  for  the  'sacred 
egoism'  which  is  so  largely  the  basis  of  the  nationalist  political 
philosophy,  an  excuse,  which,  as  we  shall  see,  the  nationalist 
invokes  if  not  to  deny  the  moral  law  in  the  international  field, 
at  least  to  put  the  morality  governing  the  relations  of  States 
on  a  very  different  plane  from  that  which  governs  the  relations 
of  individuals.  As  against  this  doctrine  The  Great  Illusion 
advanced  the  proposition,  among  others,  that  the  economic  or 
biological  assumption  on  which  it  is  based  is  false;  that  the 
policy  of  political  power  which  results  from  this  assumption 
is  economically  unworkable,  its  benefits  an  illusion;  that  the 
amount  of  sustenance  provided  by  the  earth  is  not  a  fixed 
quantity  so  that  what  one  nation  can  seize  another  loses,  but 
is  an  expanding  quantity,  its  amount  depending  mainly  upon 
the  efficiency  with  which  men  co-operate  in  their  exploitation 
of  Nature.  As  already  pointed  out,  a  hundred  thousand  Red 
Indians  starved  in  a  country  where  a  hundred  million  modern 
Americans  have  abundance.  The  need  for  co-operation,  and 
the  faith  on  which  alone  it  can  be  maintained,  being  indispen- 
sable to  our  common  welfare,  the  violation  of  the  social  com- 
pact, international  obligation,  will  be  visited  with  penalties  just 
as  surely  as  are  violations  of  the  moral  law  in  relations  between 
individuals.  The  economic  factor  is  not  the  sole  or  the  largest 
element  in  human  relations,  but  it  is  the  one  which  occupies 
the  largest  place  in  public  law  and  policy.  (Of  twp  contest- 
ants, each  can  retain  his  religion  or  literary  preferences  with- 
out depriving  the  other  of  like  possessions;  they  cannot  both 
retain  the  same  piece  of  material  property.)     The  economic 

*  See  quotations,  Part  I,  Chapters  I  and  III. 


266  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

problem  is  vital  in  the  sense  of  dealing  with  the  means  by  which 
we  maintain  life;  and  it  is  invoked  as  justification  for  the 
political  immoralism  of  States.  Until  the  confusions  concern- 
ing it  are  cleared  up,  it  will  serve  little  purpose  to  analyse  the 
other  elements  of  conflict. 

What  justifies  the  assumption  that  the  predatory  egotism, 
sacred  or  profane,  here  implied,  was  an  indispensable  part  of 
the  pre-war  political  philosophy,  explaining  the  great  part  of 
policy  in  the  international  field  ?^ 

First  the  facts:  the  whole  history  of  international  conflict 
in  the  decade  or  two  which  preceded  the  War ;  and  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  If  you  would  find  out  the  nature 
of  a  people's  (or  a  statesman's)  political  morality,  note  their 
conduct  when  they  have  complete  power  to  carry  their  desires 
into  effect.  The  terms  of  peace,  and  the  relations  of  the  Allies 
with  Russia,  show  a  deliberate  and  avowed  pre-occupation  with 
sources  of  oil,  iron,  coal;  with  indemnities,  investments,  old 
debts;  with  Q)lonies,  markets;  the  elimination  of  commercial 
rivals — with  all  these  things  to  a  degree  very  much  greater 
and  in  a  fashion  much  more  direct  than  was  assumed  in  The 
Great  Illusion. 

But  the  tendency  had  been  evident  in  the  conflicts  which 
preceded  the  War.  These  conflicts,  in  so  far  as  the  Great 
Powers  were  concerned,  had  been  in  practically  every  case 
over  territory,  or  roads  to  territory;  over  Madagascar,  Egypt, 
Morocco,  Koreaj  Mongolia;  'warm  water'  ports,  the  division 

*  The  validity  of  this  assumption  still  holds  even  though  we  take  the 
view  that  the  defence  of  war  as  an  inevitable  struggle  for  bread  is 
merely  a  rationalisation  (using  that  word  in  the  technical  sense  of  the 
psychologists)  of  impulse  or  instinct,  merely,  that  is,  an  attempt  to  find 
a  'reason'  for  conduct  the  real  explanation  of  which  is  the  subcon- 
scious promptings  of  pugnacities  or  hostilities,  the  craving  of  our 
nature  for  certain  kinds  of  action.  If  we  could  not  justify  our  behaviour 
in  terms  of  self-preservation,  it  would  stand  so  plainly  condemned 
ethically  and  socially  that  discipline  of  instinct — as  in  the  case  of  sex 
instinct — would  obviously  be  called  for  and  enforced.  In  either  case, 
the  road  to  better  behaviour  is  by  a  clearer  revelation  of  the  social 
mischief  of  the  predominant  policy. 


•ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         267 

of  Africa,  the  partitioning  of  China,  loans  thereto  and  con- 
cessions therein;  the  Persian  Gulf,  the  Bagdad  Railway,  the 
Panama  Canal.  Where  the  principle  of  nationality  was  denied 
by  any  Great  Power  it  was  generally  because  to  recognise  it 
might  block  access  to  the  sea  or  raw  materials,  throw  a  barrier 
across  the  road  to  undeveloped  territory. 

There  was  no  denial  of  this  by  those  who  treated  of  public 
affairs.  Mr  Lloyd  George  declared  that  England  would  be 
quite  ready  to  go  to  war  rather  than  have  the  Morocco  question 
settled  without  reference  to  her.  Famous  writers  like  Mahan 
did  not  ball<  at  conclusions  like  this : — 

'It  is  the  great  amount  of  unexploited  raw  material  in  terri- 
tories politically  backward,  and  now  imperfectly  possessed 
by  the  nominal  owners,  which  at  the  present  moment  consti- 
tutes the  temptation  and  the  impulse  to  war  of  European 
States.'  ^ 

Nor  to  justify  them  thus : — 

'More  and  more  Germany  needs  the  assured  importation 
of  raw  materials,  and,  where  possible,  control  of  regions 
productive  of  such  materials.  More  and  more  she  requires 
assured  markets,  and  security  as  to  the  importation  of  food, 
since  less  and  less  comparatively  is  produced  within  her  own 
borders  for  her  rapidly  increasing  population.  This  all  means 
security  at  sea.  .  .  .  Yet  the  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  in 
European  seas  means  a  perpetually  latent  control  of  German 
commerce.  .  .  .  The  world  has  long  been  accustomed  to  the 
idea  of  a  predominant  naval  power,  coupling  it  accurately 
with  the  name  of  Great  Britain:  and  it  has  been  noted  that 
such  power,  when  achieved,  is  commonly  found  associated 
with  commercial  and  industrial  pre-eminence,  the  struggle  for 
which  is  now  in  progress  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 

*  Rear-Admiral  A.  T.  Mahan :    Force  in  International  Relations. 


268  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Such  pre-eminence  forces  a  nation  to  seek  markets,  and,  where 
possible,  to  control  them  to  its  own  advantage  by  preponderant 
force,  the  ultimate  expression  of  which  is  possession.  .  .  . 
From  this  flow  two  results:  the  attempt  to  possess,  and  the 
organisation  of  force  by  which  to  maintain  possession  already 
achieved.  .  .  .  This  statement  is  simply  a  specific  formulation  of 
the  general  necessity  stated;  itself  an  inevitable  link  in  a  chain 
of  logical  sequence:    industry,  markets,  control,  navy,  bases. 

Mr  Spenser  Wilkinson,  of  a  corresponding  English  school, 
is  just  as  definite : — 

'The  effect  of  growth  is  an  expansion  and  an  increase  of 
power.  It  necessarily  affects  the  environment  of  the  growing 
organisms;  it  interferes  with  the  status  quo.  Existing  rights 
and  interests  are  disturbed  by  the  fact  of  growth,  which  is 
itself  a  change.  The  growing  community  finds  itself  hedged 
in  by  previously  existing  and  surviving  conditions,  and  fet- 
tered by  prescriptive  rights.  There  is,  therefore,  an  exertion 
of  force  to  overcome  resistance.  No  process  of  law  or  of 
arbitration  can  deal  with  this  phenomenon,  because  any  tribunal 
administering  a  system  of  right  or  law  must  base  its  decision 
upon  the  tradition  of  the  past  which  has  become  unsuited  to 
the  new  conditions  that  have  arisen.  The  growing  State  is 
necessarily  expansive  or  aggressive.'  '^ 

Even  more  decisive  as  a  definite  philosophy  are  the  proposi- 
tions of  Mr  Petre,  who,  writing  on  'The  Mandate  of  Human- 
ity,' says: — 

'The  conscience  of  a  State  cannot,  therefore,  be  as  delicate, 
as  disinterested,  as  altruistic,  as  that  of  the  noblest  individ- 
uals.   The  State  exists  primarily  for  its  own  people  and  only 

*  The  Interest  of  America  in  International  Conditions,  by  Rear- 
Admiral  A.  T.  Mahan,  pp.  47-87. 

*  Government  and  the  War,  p.  62. 


'ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         269 

secondarily  for  the  rest  of  the  world.  Hence,  given  a  dispute 
in  which  it  feels  its  rights  and  welfare  to  be  at  stake,  it  may, 
however  erroneously,  set  aside  its  moral  obligations  to  inter- 
national society  in  favour  of  its  obligations  to  the  people  for 
whom  it  exists. 

'But  no  righteous  conscience,  it  may  be  said,  could  give  its 
verdict  against  a  solemn  pledge  taken  and  reciprocated;  no 
righteous  conscience  could,  in  a  society  of  nations,  declare 
against  the  ends  of  that  society.  Indeed  I  think  it  could,  and 
sometimes  would,  if  its  sense  of  justice  were  outraged,  if 
its  duty  to  those  who  were  bone  of  its  bone  and  flesh  of  its 
flesh  came  into  conflict  with  its  duty  to  those  who  were  not 
directly  belonging  to  it.  .  .  . 

'The  mechanism  of  a  State  exists  mainly  for  its  own  preser- 
vation, and  cannot  be  turned  against  this,  its  legitimate  end. 
The  conscience  of  a  State  will  not  traverse  this  main  condition, 
and  to  weaken  its  conscience  is  to  weaken  its  life.  .  .  . 

'The  strong  will  not  give  way  to  the  weak;  the  one  who 
thinks  himself  in  the  right  will  not  yield  to  those  whom  he 
believes  to  be  in  the  wrong;  the  living  generations  will  not 
be  restrained  by  the  promises  to  a  dead  one;  nature  will  not 
be  controlled  by  conventions.'^ 

It  is  the  last  note  that  gives  the  key  to  popular  feeling 
about  the  scramble  for  territory.  In  The  Great  Illusion  whole 
pages  of  popular  writing  are  quoted  to  show  that  the  concep- 
tion of  the  struggle  as  in  truth  the  struggle  for  survival  had 
firmly  planted  itself  in  the  popular  consciousness.  One  of 
the  critics  who  is  so  severe  upon  the  present  writer  for  trying 
to  undermine  the  economic  foundation  of  that  popular  creed, 
Benjamin  Kidd,  himself  testifies  to  the  depth  and  sweep  of  this 
pseudo-Darwinism  (he  seems  to  think  indeed  that  it  is  true 
Darwinism,  which  it  is  not,  as  Darwin  himself  pointed  out). 
He  declares  that  'there  is  no  precedent  in  the  history  of  the 

*  State  Morality  and  a  League  of  Nations,  pp  83-85 


270  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

human  mind  to  compare  with  the  saturnalia  of  the  Western 
intellect*  which  followed  the  popularisation  of  what  he  regards 
as  Darwin's  case  and  I  would  regard  as  a  distortion  of  it. 
Kidd  says  it  'touched  the  profoundest  depth  of  the  psychology 
of  the  West.*  'Everywhere  throughout  civilisation  an  al- 
most inconceivable  influence  was  given  to  the  doctrine  of 
the  law  of  biological  necessity  in  books  of  statecraft  and  war- 
craft,  of  expanding  military  empires/  'Struggle  for  life,' 
'a  biological  necessity,'  'survival  of  the  fit/  had  passed  into 
popular  use  and  had  come  to  buttress  popular  feeling  about  the 
inevitability  of  war  and  its  ultimate  justification  and  the  use- 
lessness  of  organising  the  natives  save  on  a  basis  of  conflict. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  see  the  respective  moral  posi- 
tions of  the  two  protagonists. 

The  advocate  of  Political  Theory  No.  1,  which  an  over- 
whelming preponderance  of  evidence  shows  to  be  the  pre- 
vailing theory,  says: — You  Pacifists  are  asking  us  to  commit 
national  suicide;  to  sacrifice  future  generations  to  your  politi- 
cal ideals.  Now,  as  voters  or  statesmen  we  are  trustees,  we 
act  for  others.  Sacrifice,  suicide  even,  on  behalf  of  an  ideal, 
may  be  justified  when  we  are  sacrificing  ourselves.  But  we 
cannot  sacrifice  others,  our  wards.  Our  first  duty  is  to  our  own 
nation,  our  own  children;  to  their  national  security  and  future 
welfare.  It  is  regrettable  if,  by  the  conquests,  wars,  block- 
ades, rendered  necessary  by  those  objects  other  people  starve, 
and  lose  their  national  freedom  and  see  their  children  die ;  but 
that  is  the  hard  necessity  of  life  in  a  hard  world. 

Advocate  of  Political  Theory  No.  2  says: — I  deny  that  the 
excuse  of  justification  which  you  give  for  your  cruelty  to 
others  is  a  valid  excuse  or  justification.  Pacifism  does  not 
ask  you  to  sacrifice  your  people,  to  betray  the  interest  of  your 
wards.  You  will  serve  their  interests  best  by  the  policy  we 
advocate.  Your  children  will  not  be  more  assured  of  their 
sustenance  by  these  conquests  that  attempt  to  render  the  feed- 
ing of  foreign  children  more  difficult ;  yours  will  be  less  secure* 


'ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         271 

By  co-operating  with  those  others  instead  of  using  your  ener- 
gies against  them,  the  resultant  weahh.  .  .  . 

Advocate  No,  1 : — Wealth !  Interest !  You  introduce  your 
wretched  economic  calculations  of  interest  into  a  question  of 
Patriotism.  You  have  the  soul  of  a  bagman  concerned  only 
to  restore  'the  blessed  hour  of  tranquil  money-getting,'  and 
Sir  William  Robertson  NicoU  shall  denounce  you  in  the  Brit- 
ish Weekly! 

And  the  discussion  usually  ends  with  this  moral  flourish 
and  gestures  of  melodramatic  indignation. 

But  are  they  honest  gestures?  Here  are  the  upholders  of 
a  certain  position  who  say : — 'In  certain  circumstances  as  when 
you  are  in  a  position  of  trustee,  the  only  moral  course,  the 
only  right  course,  is  to  be  guided  by  the  interests  of  your 
ward.  Your  duty  then  demands  a  calculation  of  advantage. 
You  may  not  be  generous  at  your  ward's  expense.  This  is 
the  justification  of  the  "sacred  egoism"  of  the  poet.' 

If  in  that  case  a  critic  says:  'Very  well.  Let  us  consider 
what  will  be  the  best  interests  of  your  ward,*  is  it  really  open 
to  the  first  party  to  explain  in  a  paroxysm  of  moral  indigna- 
tion: 'You  are  making  a  shameful  and  disgraceful  appeal  to 
selfishness  and  avarice?' 

This  is  not  an  attempt  to  answer  one  set  of  critics  by  quoting 
another  set.  The  self-same  people  take  those  two  attitudes. 
I  have  quoted  above  a  passage  of  Admiral  Mahan's  in  which 
he  declares  that  nations  can  never  be  expected  to  act  from  any 
other  motive  than  that  of  interest  (a  generalisation,  by  the 
way,  from  which  I  should  most  emphatically  dissent).  He 
goes  on  to  declare  that  Governments  'must  put  first  the  rival 
interests  of  their  own  wards  .  .  .  their  own  people,'  and  are 
thus  pushed  to  the  acquisition  of  markets  by  means  of  military 
predominance. 

Very  well.  The  Great  Illusion  argued  some  of  Admiral 
Mahan's  propositions  in  terms  of  interest  and  advantage.  And 
then,  when  he  desired  to  demolish  that  argument,  he  did  not 


272  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

hesitate  in  a  long  article  in  the  North  American  Review  to 
write  as  follows : — 

'The  purpose  of  armaments,  in  the  minds  of  those  main- 
taining them,  is  not  primarily  an  economical  advantage,  in 
the  sense  of  depriving  a  neighbour  State  of  its  own,  or  fear 
of  such  consequences  to  itself  through  the  deliberate  aggres- 
sion of  a  rival  having  that  particular  end  in  view.  .  .  .  The 
fundamental  proposition  of  the  book  is  a  mistake.  Nations 
are  under  no  illusion  as  to  the  unprofitableness  of  war  in 
itself.  .  .  .  The  entire  conception  of  the  work  is  itself  an 
illusion,  based  upon  a  profound  misreading  of  human  action. 
To  regard  the  world  as  governed  by  self-interest  only  is  to 
live  in  a  non-existent  world,  an  ideal  world,  a  world  possessed 
by  an  idea  much  less  worthy  than  those  which  mankind,  to  do 
it  bare  justice,  persistently  entertains.'  * 

Admiral  Mahan  was  a  writer  of  very  great  and  deserved 
reputation,  in  the  very  first  rank  of  those  dealing  with  the 
relations  of  power  to  national  politics,  certainly  incapable  of 
any  conscious  dishonesty  of  opinion.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen, 
his  opinion  on  the  most  important  fact  of  all  about  war — 
its  ultimate  purpose,  and  the  reasons  which  justify  it  or  provoke 
it — swings  violently  in  absolute  self-contradiction.  And  the 
flat  contradiction  here  revealed  shows — and  this  surely  is  the 
moral  of  such  an  incident — that  he  could  never  have  put  to 
himself  detachedly,  coldly,  impartially  the  question:  'What  do 
I  really  believe  about  the  motives  of  nations  in  War?  To 
what  do  the  facts  as  a  whole  really  point?'  Had  he  done  so, 
it  might  have  been  revealed  to  him  that  what  really  de- 
termined his  opinion  about  the  causes  of  war  was  a  desire  to 
justify  the  great  profession  of  arms,  to  one  side  of  which  he 
had  devoted  his  life  and  given  years  of  earnest  labour  and 
study;  to  defend  from  some  imputation  of  futility  one  of  the 

*  North  American  Review,  March  1912. 


•ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         273 

most  ancient  of  man's  activities  that  calls  for  some  at  least 
of  the  sublimest  of  human  qualities.  If  a  widened  idealism 
clearly  discredited  that  ancient  institution,  he  was  prepared 
to  show  that  an  ineradicable  conflict  of  national  interests  ren- 
dered it  inevitable.  If  it  was  shown  that  war  was  irrelevant 
to  those  conflicts,  or  ineffective  as  a  means  of  protecting  the 
interests  concerned,  he  was  prepared  to  show  that  the  mo- 
tives pushing  to  war  were  not  those  of  interest  at  all. 

It  may  be  said  that  none  the  less  the  thesis  under  discus- 
sion substitutes  one  selfish  argument  for  another;  tries  by 
appealing  to  self-interest  (the  self-interest  of  a  group  or 
nation)  to  turn  selfishness  from  a  destructive  result  to  a 
more  social  result.  Its  basis  is  self.  Even  that  is  not  really 
true.  For,  first,  that  argument  ignores  the  question  of  trus- 
teeship; and,  secondly,  it  involves  a  confusion  between  the 
motive  of  a  given  policy  and  the  criterion  by  which  its  good- 
ness or  badness  shall  be  tested. 

How  is  one  to  deal  with  the  claim  of  the  'mystic  nation- 
alist' (he  exists  abundantly  even  outside  the  Balkans)  that 
the  subjugation  of  some  neighbouring  nationalism  is  demanded 
by  honour;  that  only  the  great  State  can  be  the  really  good 
State;  that  power — 'majesty,'  as  the  Oriental  would  say — 
is  a  thing  good  in  itself  ?  ^  There  are  ultimate  questions  as  to 
what  is  good  and  what  is  bad  that  no  argument  can  answer; 
ultimate  values  which  cannot  be  discussed.  But  one  can  re- 
duce those  unarguable  values  to  a  minimum  by  appealing  to  cer- 
tain social  needs.  A  State  which  has  plenty  of  food  may  not  be 
a  good  State;   but  a  State  which  cannot  feed  its  population 

*  Admiral  Mahan  himself  makes  precisely  this  appeal : — 
'That  extension  of  national  authority  over  alien  communities,  which 
is  the  dominant  note  in  the  world  politics  of  to-day,  dignifies  and  en- 
larges each  State  and  each  citizen  that  enters  its  fold . . .  Sentiment, 
imagination,  aspiration,  the  satisfaction  of  the  rational  and  moral 
faculties  in  some  object  better  than  bread  alone,  all  must  find  a  part 
in  a  worthy  motive.  Like  individuals,  nations  and  empires  have  souls 
as  well  as  bodies.  Great  and  beneficent  achievement  ministers  to 
worthier  contentment  than  the  filling  of  the  pocket.' 


274  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

cannot  be  a  good  State,  for  in  that  case  the  citizens  will  be 
hungry,  greedy,  and  violent. 

In  other  words,  certain  social  needs  and  certain  social  utili- 
ties— which  we  can  all  recognise  as  indispensables — furnish 
a  ground  of  agreement  for  the  common  action  without  which 
no  society  can  be  established.  And  the  need  for  such  a 
criterion  becomes  more  manifest  as  we  learn  more  of  the 
wonderful  fashion  in  which  we  sublimate  our  motives.  A 
country  refuses  to  submit  its  dispute  to  arbitration,  because 
its  'honour'  is  involved.  Many  books  have  been  written  to  try 
and  find  out  precisely  what  honour  of  this  kind  is.  One  of 
the  best  of  them  has  decided  that  it  is  anything  which  a  coun- 
try cares  to  make  it.  It  is  never  the  presence  of  coal,  or  iron, 
or  oil,  which  makes  it  imperative  to  retain  a  given  territory: 
it  is  honour  (as  Italy's  Foreign  Minister  explained  when  Italy 
went  to  war  for  the  conquest  of  Tripoli).  Unfortunately, 
rival  States  have  also  impulses  of  honour  which  compel  them 
to  claim  the  same  undeveloped  territory.  Nothing  can  prove — 
or  disprove — ^that  honour,  in  such  circumstances,  is  invoked 
by  each  or  either  of  the  parties  concerned  to  make  a  piece  of 
acquisitiveness  or  megalomania  appear  as  fine  to  himself  as 
possible:  that,  just  because  he  has  a  lurking  suspicion  that  all 
is  not  well  with  the  operation,  he  seeks  to  justify  it  to  him- 
self with  fine  words  that  have  a  very  vague  content.  But 
on  this  basis  there  can  be  no  agreement.  If,  however,  one 
shifts  the  discussion  to  the  question  of  what  is  best  for  the 
social  welfare  of  both,  one  can  get  a  modus  vivendi.  For  each 
to  admit  that  he  has  no  right  so  to  use  his  power  as  to  deprive 
the  other  of  means  of  life,  would  be  the  beginning  of  a  code 
which  could  be  tested.  Each  might  conceivably  have  that 
right  to  deprive  the  other  of  means  of  livelihood,  if  it  were 
a  choice  between  the  lives  of  his  own  people  or  others. 

The  economic  fact  is  the  test  of  the  ethical  claim :  if  it  really 
be  true  that  we  must  withhold  sources  of  food  from  others 
because  otherwise  our  own  would  starve,  there  is  some  ethical 


'ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         275 

justification  for  such  use  of  our  power.  If  such  is  not  the 
fact,  the  whole  moral  issue  is  changed,  and  with  it,  to  the 
degree  to  which  it  is  mutually  realised,  the  social  outlook  and 
attitude.  The  knowledge  of  interdependence  is  part,  at  least, 
of  an  attitude  which  makes  the  'social  sense' — the  sense  that 
one  kind  of  arrangement  is  fair  and  workable,  and  another 
is  not.  To  bring  home  the  fact  of  this  interdependence  is 
not  simply  an  appeal  to  selfishness :  it  is  to  reveal  a  method  by 
which  an  apparently  irreconcilable  conflict  of  vital  needs  can 
be  reconciled.  The  sense  of  interdependence,  of  the  need  of 
one  for  another,  is  part  of  the  foundation  of  the  very  diffi- 
cult art  of  living  together. 

Much  mischief  arises  from  the  misunderstanding  of  the 
term  'economic  motive.'  Let  us  examine  some  further  exam- 
ples of  this.  One  is  a  common  confusion  of  terms:  an  eco- 
nomic motive  may  be  the  reverse  of  selfish.  The  long  sustained 
efforts  of  parents  to  provide  fittingly  for  their  children — 
efforts  continued,  it  may  be,  through  half  a  lifetime — are 
certainly  economic.  Just  as  certainly  they  are  not  selfish  in 
any  exact  sense  of  the  term.  Yet  something  like  this  confu- 
sion seems  to  overlie  the  discussion  of  economics  in  connec- 
tion with  war. 

Speaking  broadly,  I  do  not  believe  that  men  ever  go  to  war 
from  a  cold  calculation  of  advantage  or  profit.  I  never  have 
believed  it.  It  seems  to  me  an  obvious  and  childish  misread- 
ing of  human  psychology.  I  cannot  see  how  it  is  possible  to 
imagine  a  man  laying  down  his  life  on  the  battle-field  for 
personal  gain.  Nations  do  not  fight  for  their  money  or  inter- 
ests, they  fight  for  their  rights,  or  what  they  believe  to  be 
their  rights.  The  very  gallant  men  who  triumphed  at  Bull 
Run  or  Chancellorsville  were  not  fighting  for  the  profits  on 
slave-labour:  they  were  fighting  for  what  they  believed  to 
be  their  independence:  the  rights,  as  they  would  have  said, 
to  self-government  or,  as  we  should  now  say,  of  self-deter- 
mination.    Yet  it  was  a  conflict  which  arose  out  of   slave 


276  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

labour:  an  economic  question.  Now  the  most  elementary  of 
all  rights,  in  the  sense  of  the  first  right  which  a  people  will 
claim,  is  the  right  to  existence — the  right  of  a  population  to 
bread  and  a  decent  livelihood.^  For  that  nations  certainly  will 
fight.  Yet,  as  we  see,  it  is  a  right  which  arises  out  of  an 
economic  need  or  conflict.  We  have  seen  how  it  works  as  a 
factor  in  our  own  foreign  policy:  as  a  compelling  motive  for 
the  command  of  the  sea.  We  believe  that  the  feeding  of  these 
islands  depends  upon  it:  that  if  we  lost  it  our  children  might 
die  in  the  streets  and  the  lack  of  food  compel  us  to  an  igno- 
minious surrender.  It  is  this  relation  of  vital  food  supply  to 
preponderant  sea  power  which  has  caused  us  to  tolerate  no 
challenge  to  the  latter.  We  know  the  part  which  the  growth 
of  the  German  Navy  played  in  shaping  Anglo-Continental  re- 
lations before  the  War;  the  part  which  any  challenge  to  our 
naval  preponderance  has  always  played  in  determining  our 
foreign  policy.  The  command  of  the  sea,  with  all  that  that 
means  in  the  way  of  having  built  up  a  tradition,  a  battle-cry  in 
politics,  has  certainly  bound  up  with  it  this  life  and  death 
fact  of  feeding  our  population.  That  is  to  say  it  is  an  economic 
need.  Yet  the  determination  of  some  millions  of  Englishmen 
to  fight  for  this  right  to  life,  to  die  rather  than  see  the  daily 
bread  of  their  people  in  jeopardy,  would  be  adequately  de- 
scribed by  some  phrase  about  Englishmen  going  to  war  be- 
cause it  'paid.'  It  would  be  a  silly  or  dishonest  gibe.  Yet 
that  is  precisely  the  kind  of  gibe  that  I  have  had  to  face  these 
fifteen  years  in  attempting  to  disentangle  the  forces  and  mo- 
tives underlying  international  conflict. 

What  picture  is  summoned  to  our  minds  by  the  word  'eco- 
nomics* in  relation  to  war?  To  the  critics  whose  indignation 
is  so  excited  at  the  introduction  of  the  subject  at  all  into  the 
discussion  of  war — and  they  include,  unhappily,  some  of  the 

*  It  is  not  necessary  to  enter  exhaustively  into  the  difficult  problem 
of  'natural  right.'  It  suffices  for  the  purpose  of  this  argument  that  the 
claim  of  others  to  life  will  certainly  be  made  and  that  we  can  only  re- 
fuse it  at  a  cost  which  diminishes  our  own  chances  of  survival. 


'ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         277 

great  names  of  English  literature — 'economic'  seems  to  carry 
no  picture  but  that  of  an  obese  Semitic  stockbroker,  in  quak- 
ing fear  for  his  profits.  This  view  cannot  be  said  to  imply 
either  much  imagination  or  much  sense  of  reality.  For  among 
the  stockbrokers,  the  usurers,  those  closest  to  financial  manip- 
ulation and  in  touch  with  financial  changes,  are  to  be  found 
some  groups  numerically  small,  who  are  more  likely  to  gain 
than  to  lose  by  war;  and  the  present  writer  has  never  sug- 
gested the  contrary. 

But  the  'economic  futility'  of  war  expresses  itself  other- 
wise :  in  half  a  Continent  unable  to  feed  or  clothe  or  warm 
itself;  millions  rendered  neurotic,  abnormal,  hysterical  by 
malnutrition,  disease,  and  anxiety;  millions  rendered  greedy, 
selfish,  and  violent  by  the  constant  strain  of  hunger;  resulting 
in  'social  unrest'  that  threatens  more  and  more  to  become 
sheer  chaos  and  confusion:  the  dissolution  and  disintegra- 
tion of  society.  Everywhere,  in  the  cities,  are  the  children 
who  cry  and  who  are  not  fed,  who  raise  shrunken  arms  to 
our  statesmen  who  talk  with  pride  ^  of  their  stern  measures 
of  'rigorous'  blockade.  Rickety  and  dying  children,  and  un- 
dying hate  for  us,  their  murderers,  in  the  hearts  of  their 
mothers — ^these  are  the  human  realities  of  the  'economics  of 
war.' 

The  desire  to  prevent  these  things,  to  bring  about  an  order 
that  would  render  possible  both  patriotism  and  mercy,  would 
save  us  from  the  dreadful  dilemma  of  feeding  our  own  children 
only  by  the  torture  and  death  of  others  equally  innocent — the 
effort  to  this  end  is  represented  as  a  mere  appeal  to  selfishness 
and  avarice,  something  mean  and  ignoble,  a  degradation  of 
human  motive. 

'These  theoretical  dilemmas  do  not  state  accurately  the  real 
conditions  of  politics,'  the  reader  may  object.  'No  one  pro- 
poses to  inflict  famine  as  a  means  of  enforcing  our  policy' 
.  .  .  'England  does  not  make  war  on  women  and  children.' 

*  See  Mr  Churchill's  declaration,  quoted  Part  I  Chapter  V. 


278  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Not  one  man  or  woman  in  a  million,  English  or  other,  would 
wittingly  inflict  the  suffering  of  starvation  upon  a  single  child, 
if  the  child  were  visible  to  his  eyes,  present  in  his  mind,  and  if 
the  simple  human  fact  were  not  obscured  by  the  much  more 
complex  and  aitificial  facts  that  have  gathered  round  our  con- 
ceptions of  patriotism.  The  heaviest  indictment  of  the  military- 
nationalist  philosophy  we  are  discussing  is  that  it  manages 
successfully  to  cover  up  human  realities  by  dehiunanising 
abstractions.  From  the  moment  that  the  child  becomes  a  part 
of  that  abstraction — 'Russia,'  'Austria,'  'Germany' — it  loses  its 
human  identity,  and  becomes  merely  an  impersonal  part  of  the 
political  problem  of  the  struggle  of  our  nation  with  others. 
The  inverted  moral  alchemy,  by  which  the  golden  instinct  that 
we  associate  with  so  much  of  direct  human  contact  is  trans- 
formed into  the  leaden  cruelty  of  nationalist  hate  and  high 
statecraft,  has  been  dealt  with  at  the  close  of  Part  I.  When 
in  tones  of  moral  indignation  it  is  declared  that  Englishmen 
'do  not  make  war  on  women  and  children,'  we  must  face  the 
truth  and  say  that  Englishmen,  like  all  peoples,  do  make  such 
war. 

An  action  in  public  policy — ^the  proclamation  of  the  blockade, 
or  the  confiscation  of  so  much  tonnage,  or  the  cession  of  terri- 
tory, or  the  refusal  of  a  loan — ^these  things  are  remote  and 
vague;  not  only  is  the  relation  between  results  and  causes  re- 
mote and  sometimes  difficult  to  establish,  but  the  results  them- 
selves are  invisible  and  far  away.  And  when  the  results  of  a 
policy  are  remote,  and  can  be  slurred  over  in  our  minds,  we 
are  perfectly  ready  to  apply,  logically  and  ruthlessly,  the  most 
ferocious  of  political  theories.  It  is  of  supreme  importance 
then  what  those  theories  happen  to  be.  When  the  issue  of  war 
and  peace  hangs  in  the  balance,  the  beam  may  well  be  kicked 
one  way  or  the  other  by  our  general  political  philosophy,  these 
somewhat  vague  and  hazy  notions  about  life  being  a  struggle, 
and  nature  red  of  tooth  and  claw,  about  wars  being  part  of 
the  cosmic  process,  sanctioned  by  professors  and  bishops  and 


•ECONOMIC  AND  'MORAL'  MOTIVES         279 

writers.  It  may  well  be  these  vague  notions  that  lead  us  to 
acquiesce  in  the  blockade  or  the  newest  war.  The  typhus  or 
the  rickets  do  not  kill  or  maim  any  the  less  because  we  do  not 
in  our  minds  connect  those  results  with  the  political  abstractions 
that  we  bandy  about  so  lightly.  And  we  touch  there  the  great- 
est service  which  a  more  'economic'  treatment  of  European 
problems  may  perform.  If  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  had  been 
more  economic  it  would  also  have  been  a  more  humane  and 
human  document.  If  there  had  been  more  of  Mr  Keynes  and 
less  of  M.  Clemenceau,  there  would  have  been  not  only  more 
food  in  the  world,  but  more  kindliness ;  not  only  less  famine, 
but  less  hate;  not  only  more  life,  but  a  better  way  of  life; 
those  living  would  have  been  nearer  to  understanding  and  dis- 
carding the  way  of  death. 

Let  us  summarise  the  points  so  far  made  with  reference  to 
the  'economic'  motive. 

We  need  not  accept  any  hard  and  fast  (and  in  the  view  of 
the  present  writer,  unsound)  doctrine  of  economic  determinism, 
in  order  to  admit  the  truth  of  the  following : — 

1.  Until  economic  difficulties  are  so  far  solved  as  to  give  the 
mass  of  the  people  the  means  of  secure  and  tolerable  physical 
existence,  economic  considerations  and  motives  will  tend  to 
exclude  all  others.  The  way  to  give  the  spiritual  a  fair  chance 
with  ordinary  men  and  women  is  not  to  be  magnificently 
superior  to  their  economic  difficulties,  but  to  find  a  solution  for 
them.  Until  the  economic  dilemma  is  solved,  no  solution  of 
moral  difficulties  will  be  adequate.  If  you  want  to  get  rid  of 
the  economic  preoccupation,  you  must  solve  the  worst  of  the 
economic  problem. 

2.  In  the  same  way  the  solution  of  the  economic  conflict  be- 
tween nations  will  not  of  itself  suffice  to  establish  peace;  but 
no  peace  is  possible  until  that  conflict  is  solved.  That  makes 
it  of  sufficient  importance. 

3.  The  'economic'  problem  involved  in  international  politics 
the  use  of  political  power  for  economic  ends — is  also  one  of 


280  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Right,  including  the  most  elemental  of  all  rights,  that  to  exist. 

4.  The  answer  which  we  give  to  that  question  of  Right  will 
depend  upon  our  answer  to  the  actual  query  of  The  Great 
Illusion:  must  a  country  of  expanding  population  expand  its 
territory  or  trade  by  means  of  its  political  power,  in  order  to 
live?  Is  the  political  struggle  for  territory  a  struggle  for 
bread  ? 

5.  If  we  take  the  view  that  the  truth  is  contained  in  neither 
an  unqualified  affirmative  nor  an  unqualified  negative,  then  all 
the  more  is  it  necessary  that  the  interdependence  of  peoples, 
the  necessity  for  a  truly  international  economy,  should  become 
a  commonplace.  A  wider  realisation  of  those  facts  would  help 
to  create  that  pre-disposition  necessary  for  a  belief  in  the 
workability  of  voluntary  co-operation,  a  belief  which  must 
precede  any  successful  attempt  to  make  such  co-operation  the 
basis  of  an  international  order. 

6.  The  economic  argument  of  The  Great  Illusion,  if  valid, 
destroys  the  pseudo-scientific  justification  for  political  immoral- 
ism,  the  doctrine  of  State  necessity,  which  has  marked  so  much 
of  classical  statecraft. 

7.  The  main  defects  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  are  due  to 
the  pressure  of  a  public  opinion  obsessed  by  just  those  ideas  of 
nations  as  persons,  of  conflicting  interests,  which  The  Great 
Illusion  attempted  to  destroy.  If  the  Treaty  had  been  inspired 
by  the  ideas  of  interdependence  of  interest,  it  would  have  been 
not  only  more  in  the  interests  of  the  Allies,  but  morally  sounder, 
providing  a  better  ethical  basis  for  future  peace. 

8.  To  go  on  ignoring  the  economic  unity  and  interdependence 
of  Europe,  to  refuse  to  subject  nationalist  pugnacities  to  that 
needed  unity  because  'economics'  are  sordid,  is  to  refuse  to  face 
the  needs  of  human  life,  and  the  forces  that  shape  it.  Such  an 
attitude,  while  professing  moral  elevation,  involves  a  denial  of 
the  right  of  others  to  live.  Its  worst  defect,  perhaps,  is  that  its 
heroics  are  fatal  to  intellectual  rectitude,  to  truth.  No  society 
built  upon  such  foundations  can  stand. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  GREAT   ILLUSION   ARGUMENT 

The  preceding  chapters  have  dealt  rather  with  misconceptions 
concerning  The  Great  Illusion  than  with  its  positive  proposi- 
tions. What,  outhned  as  briefly  as  possible,  was  its  central 
argument  ? 

That  argument  was  an  elaboration  of  these  propositions: 
Military  preponderance,  conquest,  as  a  means  to  man's  most 
elemental  needs  —  bread,  sustenance  —  is  futile,  because  the 
processes  (exchange,  division  of  labour)  to  which  the  dense 
populations  of  modern  Western  society  are  compelled  to  resort, 
cannot  be  exacted  by  military  coercion ;  they  can  only  operate 
as  the  result  of  a  large  measure  of  voluntary  acquiescence  by 
the  parties  concerned.  A  realisation  of  this  truth  is  indispen- 
sable for  the  restraint  of  the  instinctive  pugnacities  that  hamper 
human  relationship,  particularly  where  nationalism  enters.^ 
The  competition  for  power  so  stimulates  those  pugnacities  and 
fears,  that  isolated  national  power  cannot  ensure  a  nation's 
political  security  or  independence.  Political  security  and  eco- 
nomic well-being  can   only  be  ensured   by   international   co- 

*Mr  J.  L.  Garvin,  who  was  among  those  who  bitterly  criticised  this 
thesis  on  account  of  its  'sordidness,'  now  writes :  'Armageddon  might 
become  almost  as  frequent  as  General  Elections  if  belligerency  were 
not  restrained  by  sheer  dread  of  the  consequences  in  an  age  of  economic 
interdependence  when  even  victory  has  ceased  to  pay.' 

(Quoted  in  Westminster  Gazette,  Jan.  24,  1921.) 
281 


282  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

operation.  This  must  be  economic  as  well  as  political,  be 
directed,  that  is,  not  only  at  pooling  military  forces  for  the 
purpose  of  restraining  aggression,  but  at  the  maintenance  of 
some  economic  code  which  will  ensure  for  all  nations,  whether 
militarily  powerful  or  not,  fair  economic  opportunity  and 
means  of  subsistence. 

It  was,  in  other  words,  an  attempt  to  clear  the  road  to  a  more 
workable  international  policy  by  undermining  the  main  concep- 
tions and  prepossessions  inimical  to  an  international  order .^  It 
did  not  elaborate  machinery,  but  the  facts  it  dealt  with  point 
clearly  to  certain  conclusions  on  that  head. 

While  arguing  that  prevailing  beliefs  (false  beliefs  for  the 
most  part)  and  feelings  (largely  directed  by  the  false  beliefs) 
were  the  determining  factors  in  international  politics,  the  author 
challenged  the  prevailing  assumption  of  the  unchangeability  of 
those  ideas  and  feelings,  particularly  the  proposition  that  war 
between  human  groups  arises  out  of  instincts  and  emotions 
incapable  of  modification  or  control  or  re-direction  by  con- 
scious effort.  The  author  placed  equal  emphasis  on  both  parts 
of  the  proposition — that  dealing  with  the  alleged  immutability 
of  human  pugnacity  and  ideas,  and  that  which  challenged  the 
representation  of  war  as  an  inevitable  struggle  for  physical 

*  The  introductory  synopsis  reads : — 

What  are  the  fundamental  motives  that  explain  the  present  rivalry 
of  armaments  in  Europe,  notably  the  Anglo-German?  Each  nation 
pleads  the  need  for  defence;  but  this  implies  that  some  one  is  likely  to 
attack,  and  has  therefore  a  presumed  interest  in  so  doing.  What  are 
the  motives  which  each  State  thus  fears  its  neighbours  may  obey? 

They  are  based  on  the  universal  assumption  that  a  nation,  in  order 
to  find  outlets  for  expanding  population  and  increasing  industry,  or 
simply  to  ensure  the  best  conditions  possible  for  its  people,  is  necessarily 
pushed  to  territorial  expansion  and  the  exercise  of  political  force  against 
others  (German  naval  competition  is  assimied  to  be,  the  expression  of 
the  growing  need  of  an  expanding  population  for  a  larger  place  in  the 
world,  a  need  which  will  find  a  realisation  in  the  conquest  of  English 
Colonies  or  trade,  unless  these  were  defended)  ;  it  is  assumed,  there- 
fore, that  a  nation's  relative  prosperity  is  broadly  determined  by  its 
political  power;  that  nations  being  competing  units,  advantage,  in  the 
last  resort,  goes  to  the  possessor  of  preponderant  military  force,  the 
weaker  going  to  the  wall,  as  in  the  other  forms  of  the  struggle  for  life. 

The  author  challenges  this  whole  doctrine. 


THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  ARGUMENT  283 

sustenance — if  only  because  no  exposure  of  the  biological 
fallacy  would  be  other  than  futile  if  the  former  proposition 
were  true.^ 

If  conduct  in  these  matters  is  the  automatic  reaction  to  un- 
controllable instinct  and  is  not  affected  by  ideas,  or  if  ideas 
themselves  are  the  mere  reflection  of  that  instinct,  obviously  it 
is  no  use  attempting  demonstrations  of  futility,  economic  or 
other.  The  more  we  demonstrate  the  intensity  of  our  inherent 
pugnacity  and  irrationalism,  the  more  do  we  in  fact  demonstrate 
the  need  for  the  conscious  control  of  those  instincts.  The 
alternative  conclusion  is  fatalism:  an  admission  not  only  that 
our  ship  is  not  under  control,  but  that  we  have  given  up  the 
task  of  getting  it  under  control.  We  have  surrendered  our 
freedom. 

Moreover,  our  record  shows  that  the  direction  taken  by  our 
pugnacities — their  objective — is  in  fact  largely  determined  by 
traditions  and  ideas  which  are  in  part  at  least  the  sum  of  con- 
scious intellectual  eflFort.  The  history  of  religious  persecution 
— its  wars,  inquisitions,  repressions — shows  a  great  change 
(which  we  must  admit  as  a  fact,  whether  we  regard  it  as  good 
or  bad)  not  only  of  idea  but  of  feeling.^    The  book  rejected 


*  See  chapters  The  Psychological  Case  for  Peace,  Unchanging  Human 
Nature,  and  Is  the  Political  Reformation  Possible? 

'Not  the  facts,  but  men's  opinions  about  the  facts,  is  what  matters. 
Men's  conduct  is  determined,  not  necessarily  by  the  right  conclusion 
from  facts,  but  the  conclusion  they  believe  to  be  right.' 

In  another  pre-war  book  of  the  present  writer  {The  Foundations  of 
International  Polity)  the  same  view  is  developed,  particularly  in  the 
passage  which  has  been  reproduced  in  Chapter  VI  of  this  book,  'The 
Alternative  Risks  of  Status  and  Contract.' 

*  'The  cessation  of  religious  war  indicates  the  greatest  outstanding  fact 
in  the  history  of  civilised  mankind  during  the  last  thousand  years,  which 
is  this :  that  all  civilised  Governments  have  abandoned  their  claim  to 
dictate  the  belief  of  their  subjects.  For  very  long  that  was  a  right 
tenaciously  held,  and  it  was  held  on  grounds  for  which  there  is  an 
immense  deal  to  be  said.  It  was  held  that  as  belief  is  an  integral  part 
of  conduct,  that  as  conduct  springs  from  belief,  and  the  purpose  of  the 
State  is  to  ensure  such  conduct  as  will  enable  us  to  go  about  our  business 
in  safety,  it  was  obviously  the  duty  of  the  State  to  protect  those  beliefs, 
the  abandonment  of  which  seemed  to  undermine  the  foundations  of  con- 


284  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

instinct  as  sufficient  guide  and  urged  the  need  of  discipline  by 
intelligent  foresight  of  consequence. 

To  examine  our  subconscious  or  unconscious  motives  of 
conduct  is  the  first  step  to  making  them  conscious  and  modify- 
ing them. 

This  does  not  imply  that  instincts — whether  of  pugnacity  or 
other— can  readily  be  repressed  by  a  mere  effort  of  will.  But 
their  direction,  the  object  upon  which  they  expend  themselves, 
will  depend  upon  our  interpretation  of  facts.  If  we  interpret 
the  hailstorm  or  the  curdled  milk  in  one  way,  our  fear  and 
hatred  of  the  witch  is  intense;  the  same  facts  interpreted 
another  way  make  the  witch  an  object  of  another  emotion,  pity. 

Reason  may  be  a  very  small  part  of  the  apparatus  of  human 
conduct  compared  with  the  part  played  by  the  unconscious  and 
subconscious,  the  instinctive  and  the  emotional.  The  power 
of  a  ship's  compass  is  very  small  indeed  compared  with  the 


duct.  I  do  not  believe  that  this  case  has  ever  been  completely  answered . . . 
Men  of  profound  thought  and  profound  learning  to-day  defend  it,  and 
personally  I  have  found  it  very  difficult  to  make  a  clear  and  simple 
case  for  the  defence  of  the  principle  on  which  every  civilised  Govern- 
ment in  the  world  is  to-day  founded.  How  do  you  account  for  this — 
tliat  a  principle  which  I  do  not  believe  one  man  in  a  million  could  defend 
from  all  objections  has  become  the  dominating  rule  of  civilised  govern- 
ment throughout  the  world? 

'Well,  that  once  universal  policy  has  been  abandoned,  not  because  every 
argument,  or  even  perhaps  most  of  the  arguments,  which  led  to  it,  have 
been  answered,  but  because  the  fundamental  one  has.  The  conception 
on  which  it  rested  has  been  shown  to  be,  not  in  every  detail,  but  in  the 
essentials  at  least,  an  illusion,  a  «u.yconception. 

'The  world  of  religious  wars  and  of  the  Inquisition  was  a  world  which 
had  a  quite  definite  conception  of  the  relation  of  authority  to  religious 
belief  and  to  truth — as  that  authority  was  the  source  of  truth ;  that 
truth  could  be,  and  should  be,  protected  by  force ;  that  Catholics  who  did 
not  resent  an  insult  offered  to  their  faith  (like  the  failure  of  a  Huguenot 
to  salute  a  passing  religious  procession)  were  renegade. 

'Now.  what  broke  down  this  conception  was  a  growing  realisation  that 
authority,  force,  was  irrelevant  to  the  issues  of  truth  (a  party  of  heretics 
triumphed  by  virtue  of  some  physical  accident,  as  that  they  occupied  a 
mountain  region)  ;  that  it  was  ineflfective,  and  that  the  essence  of  truth 
was  something  outside  the  scope  of  physical  conflict.  As  the  realisation 
of  this  grew,  the  conflicts  declined.' — Foundations  of  International 
Polity,  p.  214. 


THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  ARGUMENT  285 

power  developed  by  the  engines.  But  the  greater  the  power 
of  the  engines,  the  greater  will  be  the  disaster  if  the  relatively 
tiny  compass  is  deflected  and  causes  the  ship  to  be  driven  on 
to  the  rocks.  The  illustration  indicates,  not  exactly  but  with 
sufficient  truth,  the  relationship  of  'reason'  to  'instinct.* 

The  instincts  that  push  to  self-assertion,  to  the  acquisition  of 
preponderant  power,  are  so  strong  that  we  shall  only  abandon 
that  method  as  the  result  of  perceiving  its  futility.  Co-opera- 
tion, which  means  a  relationship  of  partnership  and  give  and 
take,  will  not  succeed  till  force  has  failed. 

The  futility  of  power  as  a  means  to  our  most  fundamental 
and  social  ends  is  due  mainly  to  two  facts,  one  mechanical,  and 
the  other  moral.  The  mechanical  fact  is  that  if  we  really  need 
another,  our  power  over  him  has  very  definite  limits.  Our 
dependence  on  him  gives  him  a  weapon  against  us.  The  moral 
fact  is  that  in  demanding  a  position  of  domination,  we  ask 
something  to  which  we  should  not  accede  if  it  were  asked  of 
us:  the  claim  does  not  stand  the  test  of  the  categorical  im- 
perative. If  we  need  another's  labour,  we  cannot  kill  him;  if 
his  custom,  we  cannot  forbid  him  taearn  money.  If  his  labour 
is  to  be  effective,  we  must  give  him  tools,  knowledge;  and 
these  things  can  be  used  to  resist  our  exactions.  To  the  degree 
to  which  he  is  powerful  for  service  he  is  powerful  for  resist- 
ance. A  nation  wealthy  as  a  customer  will  also  be  ubiquitous 
as  a  competitor. 

The  factors  which  have  operated  to  make  physical  compul- 
sion (slavery)  as  a  means  of  obtaining  service  less  economical 
than  service  for  reward,  operate  just  as  effectively  between 
nations.  The  employment  of  military  force  for  economic  ends 
is  an  attempt  to  apply  indirectly  the  principle  of  chattel-slavery 
to  groups;  and  involves  the  same  disadvantages.* 

*  An  attempt  is  made,  in  The  Great  Illusion,  to  sketch  the  process 
which  lies  behind  the  progressive  substitution  of  bargain  for  coercion 
(The  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  History  of  Development  'From 
Status  to  Contract')  on  pages  187-192,  and  further  developed  in  a  cliap- 
ter  'the  Diminishing  Factor  of  Physical  Force'  (p.  257). 


286  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

In  so  far  as  coercion  represents  a  means  of  securing  a  wider 
and  more  effective  social  co-operation  as  against  a  narrower 
social  co-operation,  or  more  anarchic  condition,  it  is  likely  to 
be  successful  and  to  justify  itself  socially.  The  imposition  of 
Western  government  upon  backward  peoples  approximates  to 
the  role  of  police;  the  struggles  between  the  armed  forces  of 
rival  Western  Powers  do  not.  The  function  of  a  police  force 
is  the  exact  contrary  to  that  of  armies  competing  with  one 
another.* 

The  demonstration  of  the  futility  of  conquest  rested  mainly 
on  these  facts.    After  conquest  the  conquered  people  cannot  be 

*  'When  we  learn  that  London,  instead  of  using  its  police  for  the  run- 
ning in  of  burglars  and  "drunks,"  is  using  them  to  lead  an  attack  on 
Birmingham  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  that  city  as  part  of  a  policy 
of  "municipal  expansion,"  or  "Civic  Imperialism,"  or  "Pan-Londonism," 
or  what  not ;  or  is  using  its  force  to  repel  an  attack  by  the  Birmingham 
police  acting  as  the  result  of  a  similar  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Birming- 
ham patriots — when  that  happens  you  can  safely  approximate  a  police 
force  to  a  European  army.  But  until  it  does,  it  is  quite  evident  that  the 
two — the  army  and  the  police  force-^have  in  reality  diametrically  op- 
posed roles.  The  police  exist  as  an  instrument  of  social  co-operation; 
the  armies  as  the  natural  outcome  of  the  quaint  illusion  that  though  one 
city  could  never  enrich  itself  by  "capturing"  or  "subjugating"  another, 
in  some  wonderful  (and  unexplained)  way  one  country  can  enrich  itself 
by  capturing  or  subjugating  another. . . . 

'France  has  benefited  by  the  conquest  of  Algeria,  England  by  that 
of  India,  because  in  each  case  the  arms  were  employed  not,  properly 
speaking,  for  conquest,  but  for  police  purposes,  for  the  establishment 
and  maintenance  of  order;  and,  so  far  as  they  filled  that  role,  their 
role  was  a  useful  one 

'Germany  has  no  need  to  maintain  order  in  England,  nor  England  in 
Germany,  and  the  latent  struggle,  therefore,  between  these  two  countries 
is  futile 

'It  is  one  of  the  humours  of  the  whole  Anglo-German  conflict  that 
so  much  has  the  British  public  been  concerned  with  tlie  myths  and 
bogeys  of  the  matter,  that  it  seems  calmly  to  have  ignored  the  realities. 
While  even  the  wildest  Pan-German  does  not  cast  his  eyes  in  the  direction 
of  Canada,  he  does  cast  them  in  the  direction  of  Asia  Minor;  and  the 
political  activities  of  Germany  may  centre  on  that  area  for  precisely 
the  reasons  which  result  from  the  distinction  between  policing  and  con* 
quest  which  I  have  drawn.  German  industry  is  coming  to  have  a 
dominating  situation  in  the  Near  East,  and  as  those  interests — her 
markets  and  investments — increase,  the  necessity  for  better  order  in,  and 
the  better  organisation  of,  such  territories,  increases  in  corresponding 
degree.  Germany  may  need  to  police  Asia  Minor.'  {The  Great  Illusion, 
pp.  131-2-3.) 


THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  ARGUMENT  287 

killed.  They  cannot  be  allowed  to  starve.  Pressure  of  popula- 
tion on  means  of  subsistence  has  not  been  reduced,  but  probably 
increased,  since  the  number  of  mouths  to  fill  eliminated  by  the 
casualty  lists  is  not  equivalent  to  the  reduced  production  occa- 
sioned by  war.  To  impose  by  force  (e.g.  exclusion  from  raw 
materials)  a  lower  standard  of  living,  creates  (a)  resistance 
which  involves  costs  of  coercion  (generally  in  military  estab- 
lishments, but  also  in  the  political  difficulties  in  which  the  coer- 
cion of  hostile  peoples — ^as  in  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Ireland — 
generally  involves  their  conqueror),  costs  which  must  be 
deducted  from  the  economic  advantage  of  the  conquest;  and 
(b)  loss  of  markets  which  may  be  indispensable  to  countries 
(like  Britain)  whose  prosperity  depends  upon  an  international 
division  of  labour.  A  population  that  lives  by  exchanging  its 
coal  and  iron  for  (say)  food,  does  not  profit  by  reducing  the 
productivity  of  subject  peoples  engaged  in  food  production. 
In  The  Great  Illusion  the  case  was  put  as  follows : — 

'When  we  conquer  a  nation  in  these  days,  we  do  not  exter- 
minate it:  we  leave  it  where  it  was.  When  we  "overcome" 
the  servile  races,  far  from  eliminating  them,  we  give  them 
added  chances  of  life  by  introducing  order,  etc.,  so  that  the 
lower  human  quality  tends  to  be  perpetuated  by  conquest  by 
the  higher.  If  ever  it  happens  that  the  Asiatic  races  challenge 
the  white  in  the  industrial  or  military  field,  it  will  be  in  large 
part  thanks  to  the  work  of  race  conservation,  which  has  been 
the  result  of  England's  conquest  in  India,  Egypt,  and  Asia 
generally.'— (pp.  191-192.) 

'When  the  division  of  labour  was  so  little  developed  that 
every  homestead  produced  all  that  it  needed,  it  mattered  nothing 
if  part  of  the  community  was  cut  off  from  the  world  for  weeks 
and  months  at  a  time.  All  the  neighbours  of  a  village  or  home- 
stead might  be  slain  or  harassed,  and  no  inconvenience  resulted. 
But  if  to-day  an  English  county  is  by  a  general  railroad  strike 
cut  oflf  for  so  much  as  forty-eight  hours  from  the  rest  of  the 


288  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

economic  organism,  we  know  that  whole  sections  of  its  popu- 
lation are  threatened  with  famine.  If  in  the  time  of  the  Danes 
England  could  by  some  magic  have  killed  all  foreigners,  she 
would  presumably  have  been  the  better  off.  If  she  could  do 
the  same  thing  to-day  half  her  population  would  starve  to 
death.  If  on  one  side  of  the  frontier  a  community  is,  say, 
wheat-producing,  and  on  the  other  coal-producing,  each  is  de- 
pendent for  its  very  existence  on  the  fact  of  the  other  being 
able  to  carry  on  its  labour.  The  miner  cannot  in  a  week  set  to 
and  grow  a  crop  of  wheat ;  the  farmer  must  wait  for  his  wheat 
to  grow,  and  must  meantime  feed  his  family  and  dependents. 
The  exchange  involved  here  must  go  on,  and  each  party  have 
fair  expectation  that  he  will  in  due  course  be  able  to  reap  the 
fruits  of  his  labour,  or  both  starve;  and  that  exchange,  that 
expectation,  is  merely  the  expression  in  its  simplest  form  of 
commerce  and  credit;  and  the  interdependence  here  indicated 
has,  by  the  countless  developments  of  rapid  communication, 
reached  such  a  condition  of  complexity  that  the  interference 
with  any  given  operation  affects  not  merely  the  parties  directly 
involved,  but  numberless  others  having  at  first  sight  no  connec- 
tion therewith. 

'The  vital  interdependence  here  indicated,  cutting  athwart 
frontiers,  is  largely  the  work  of  the  last  forty  years;  and  it 
has,  during  that  time,  so  developed  as  to  have  set  up  a  financial 
interdependence  of  the  capitals  of  the  world,  so  complex  that 
disturbance  in  New  York  involves  financial  and  commercial 
disturbance  in  London,  and,  if  sufficiently  grave,  compels 
financiers  of  London  to  co-operate  with  those  of  New  York 
to  put  an  end  to  the  crisis,  not  as  a  matter  of  altruism,  but 
as  a  matter  of  commercial  self -protection.  The  complexity 
of  modern  finance  makes  New  York  dependent  on  London, 
London  upon  Paris,  Paris  upon  Berlin,  to  a  greater  degree 
than  has  ever  yet  been  the  case  in  history.  This  interdepen- 
dence is  the  result  of  the  daily  use  of  those  contrivances  of 
civilisation  which  date   from  yesterday — the  rapid  post,   the 


THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  ARGUMENT  289 

instantaneous  dissemination  of  financial  and  commercial  in- 
formation by  means  of  telegraphy,  and  generally  the  incredi- 
ble progress  of  rapidity  in  communication  which  has  put  the 
half-dozen  chief  capitals  of  Christendom  in  closer  contact 
financially,  and  has  rendered  them  more  dependent  the  one  upon 
the  other  than  were  the  chief  cities  of  Great  Britain  less  than 
a  hundred  years  ago. — (pp.  49-50.) 

'Credit  is  merely  an  extension  of  the  use  of  money,  and 
we  can  no  more  shake  off  the  domination  of  the  one  than 
we  can  of  the  other.  We  have  seen  that  the  bloodiest  despot 
is  himself  the  slave  of  money,  in  the  sense  that  he  is  com- 
pelled to  employ  it.  In  the  same  way  no  physical  force  can 
in  the  modern  world  set  at  naught  the  force  of  credit.  It  is 
no  more  possible  for  a  great  people  of  the  modern  world  to 
live  without  credit  than  without  money,  of  which  it  is  a 
part.  .  .  .  The  wealth  of  the  world  is  not  represented  by  a 
fixed  amount  of  gold  or  money  now  in  the  possession  of  one 
Power,  and  now  in  the  possession  of  another,  but  depends  on 
all  the  unchecked  multiple  activities  of  a  community  for  the  time 
being.  Check  that  activity,  whether  by  imposing  tribute,  or 
disadvantageous  commercial  conditions,  or  an  unwelcome  ad- 
ministration which  sets  up  sterile  political  agitation,  and  you 
get  less  wealth — less  wealth  for  the  conqueror,  as  well  as  less 
for  the  conquered.  The  broadest  statement  of  the  case  is 
that  all  experience — especially  the  experience  indicated  in  the 
last  chapter — shows  that  in  trade  by  free  consent  carrying 
mutual  benefit  we  get  larger  results  for  effort  expended  than 
in  the  exercise  of  physical  force  which  attempts  to  exact 
advantage  for  one  party  at  the  expense  of  the  other.' — (pp. 
270-272.) 

In  elaboration  of  this  general  thesis  it  is  pointed  out  that 
the  processes  of  exchange  have  become  too  complex  for  direct 
barter,  and  can  only  take  place  by  virtue  of  credit;  and  it  is 
by  the  credit  system,  the  'sensory  nerve'  of  the  economic  organ- 


290  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

ism,  that  the  self-injurious  results  of  economic  war  are  first 
shown.  If,  after  a  victorious  war,  we  allow  enemy  industry 
and  international  trade  to  go  on  much  as  before,  then  obvi- 
ously our  victory  will  have  had  very  little  effect  on  the  funda- 
mental economic  situation.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  attempt 
for  political  or  other  reasons  to  destroy  our  enemy's  industry 
and  trade,  to  keep  him  from  the  necessary  materials  of  it,  we 
should  undermine  our  own  credit  by  diminishing  the  exchange 
value  of  much  of  our  own  real  wealth.  For  this  reason  it 
is  'a  great  illusion*  to  suppose  that  by  the  political  annexation 
of  colonies,  territories  with  iron-mines,  coal-mines,  we  enrich 
ourselves  by  the  amount  of  wealth  their  exploitation  repre- 
sents.^ 

The  large  place  which  such  devices  as  an  international  credit 
system  must  take  in  our  international  economy,  adds  enormously 
to  the  difficulty  of  securing  any  'spoils  of  victory'  in  the 
shape  of  indemnity.  A  large  indemnity  is  not  impossible,  but 
the  only  condition  on  which  it  can  be  made  possible — a  large 
foreign  trade  by  the  defeated  people — is  not  one  that  will  be 
readily  accepted  by  the  victorious  nation.  Yet  the  dilemma 
is  absolute :  the  enemy  must  do  a  big  foreign  trade  (or  deliver 
in  lieu  of  money  large  quantities  of  goods)  which  will  compete 
with  home  production,  or  he  can  pay  no  big  indemnity — 
nothing  commensurate  with  the  cost  of  modern  war. 

Since   we   are  physically   dependent   on   co-operation   with 

"If  a  great  country  benefits  every  time  it  annexes  a  province,  and 
her  people  are  the  richer  for  the  widened  territory,  the  small  nations 
ought  to  be  immeasurably  poorer  than  the  great;  instead  of  which,  by 
every  test  which  you  like  to  apply — public  credit,  amounts  in  savings 
banks,  standard  of  living,  social  progress,  general  well-being — citizens 
of  small  States  are,  other  things  being  equal,  as  well  off  as,  or  better 
off  than,  the  citizens  of  great.  The  citizens  of  coimtries  like  Holland, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway,  are,  by  every  possible  test,  just 
as  well  off  as  the  citizens  of  countries  like  Grermany,  Austria,  or  Russia. 
These  are  the  facts  which  are  so  much  more  potent  than  any  theory. 
If  it  were  true  that  a  country  benefited  by  the  acquisition  of  territory, 
and  widened  territory  meant  general  well-being,  why  do  the  facts  so 
eternally  deny  it?  Thert  is  something  wrong  with  the  theory.'  {The 
Great  Illusion,  p.  44). 


THE  GREAT  ILLUSION  ARGUMENT  291 

foreigners,  it  is  obvious  that  the  frontiers  of  the  national  State 
are  not  co-terminous  with  the  frontiers  of  our  society.  Human 
association  cuts  athwart  frontiers.  The  recognition  of  the  fact 
would  help  to  break  down  that  conception  of  nations  as  per- 
sonalities which  plays  so  large  a  part  in  international  hatred. 
The  desire  to  punish  this  or  that  'nation'  could  not  long  sur- 
vive if  we  had  in  mind,  not  the  abstraction,  but  the  babies,  the 
little  girls,  old  men,  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  offences 
that  excited  our  passions,  whom  we  treated  in  our  minds  as  a 
single  individual.'- 

As  a  means  of  vindicating  a  moral,  social,  religious,  or 
cultural  ideal — as  of  freedom  or  democracy — war  between 
States,  and  still  more  between  Alliances,  must  be  largely 
ineffective  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  because  the 
State  and  the  moral  unit  do  not  coincide.  France  or  the 
British  Empire  could  not  stand  as  a  unit  for  Protestanism  as 
opposed  to  Catholicism,  Christianity  as  opposed  to  Moham- 
medanism, or  Individualism  as  opposed  to  Socialism,  or  Par- 
liamentary Government  as  opposed  to  Bureaucratic  Autoc- 
racy, or  even  for  European  ascendancy  as  against  Coloured 
Races.  For  both  Empires  include  large  coloured  elements; 
the  British  Empire  is  more  Mohammedan  than  Christian,  has 
larger  areas  under  autocratic  than  under  Parliamentary  govern- 
ment ;  has  powerful  parties  increasingly  Socialistic.  The  State 
power  in  both  cases  is  being  used,  not  to  suppress,  but  to  give 
actual  vitality  to  the  non-Christian  or  non-European  or  coloured 
elements  that  it  has  conquered.  The  second  great  reason  why 
it  is  futile  to  attempt  to  use  the  military  power  of  States  for 
ends  such  as  freedom  and  democracy,  is  that  the  instincts  to 
which  it  is  compelled  to  appeal,  the  spirit  it  must  cultivate  and 
the  methods  it  is  compelled  increasingly  to  employ,  are  them- 
selves inimical  to  the  sentiment  upon  which  freedom  must  rest. 
Nations  that  have  won  their  freedom  as  the  result  of  military 

*  See  Chapters  of  The  Great  Illusion,  The  State  as  a  Person,  and  A 
False  Analogy  and  its  Consequences. 


292  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

victory,  usually  employ  that  victory  to  suppress  the  freedom 
of  others.  To  rest  our  freedom  upon  a  permanent  basis  of 
nationalist  military  power,  is  equivalent  to  seeking  security 
from  the  moral  dangers  of  Prussianism  by  organising  our 
States  on  the  Prussian  model. 

Our  real  struggle  is  with  nature:  internecine  struggles 
between  men  lessen  the  effectiveness  of  the  human  army.  A 
Continent  which  supported  precariously,  with  recurrent  famine, 
a  few  hundred  thousand  savages  fighting  endlessly  between 
themselves,  can  support,  abundantly  a  hundred  million  whites 
who  can  manage  to  maintain  peace  among  themselves  and  fight 
nature. 

Nature  here  includes  human  nature.  Just  as  we  turn  the 
destructive  forces  of  external  nature  from  our  hurt  to  our 
service,  not  by  their  unintelligent  defiance,  but  by  utilising 
them  through  a  knowledge  of  their  qualities,  so  can  the  irre- 
pressible but  not  'undirectable'  forces  of  instinct,  emotion, 
sentiment,  be  turned  by  intelligence  to  the  service  of  our  greatest 
and  most  permanent  needs. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ARGUMENTS    NOW    OUT    OF    DATE 

For  the  purposes  of  simplicity  and  brevity  the  main  argument 
of  The  Great  Illusion  assumed  the  relative  permanence  of  the 
institution  of  private  property  in  Western  society,  and  the 
persistence  of  the  tendency  of  victorious  belligerents  to  respect 
it,  a  tendency  which  had  steadily  grown  in  strength  for  five 
hundred  years.  The  book  assumed  that  the  conqueror  would 
do  in  the  future  what  he  has  done  to  a  steadily  increasing 
degree  in  the  past,  especially  as  the  reasons  for  such  policy, 
in  terms  of  self-interest,  have  so  greatly  grown  in  force  during 
the  last  generation  or  two.  To  have  argued  its  case  in  terms 
of  non-existent  and  hypothetical  conditions  which  might  not 
exist  for  generations  or  centuries,  would  have  involved  hope- 
lessly bewildering  complications.  And  the  decisive  reason  for  not 
adding  this  complication  was  the  fact  that  though  it  would  vary 
the  form  of  the  argument, it  would  not  effect  the  final  conclusion. 
As  already  explained  in  the  first  part  of  this  book  (Chapter 
II)  this  war  has  marked  a  revolution  in  the  position  of  private 
property  and  the  relation  of  the  citizen  to  the  State.  The 
Treaty  of  Versailles  departs  radically  from  the  general  princi- 
ples adhered  to,  for  instance,  in  the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt;  the 
position  of  German  traders  and  that  of  the  property  of  German 
citizens  does  not  at  all  to-day  resemble  the  position  in  which 
the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt  left  the  French  trader  and  French 
private  property. 

293 


294  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

The  fact  of  the  difference  has  already  been  entered  into  at 
some  length.  It  remains  to  see  how  the  change  affects  the 
general  argument  adopted  in  The  Great  Illusion. 

It  does  not  affect  its  final  conclusions.  The  argument  ran: 
A  conqueror  cannot  profit  by  'loot'  in  the  shape  of  confiscations, 
tributes,  indemnities,  which  paralyse  the  economic  life  of  the 
defeated  enemy.  They  are  economically  futile.  They  are 
unlikely  to  be  attempted,  but  if  they  are  attempted  they  will 
still  be  futile.  ^ 

Events  have  confirmed  that  conclusion,  though  not  the  expec- 
tation that  the  enemy's  economic  life  would  be  left  undisturbed. 
We  have  started  a  policy  which  does  injure  the  economic  life  of 
the  enemy.  The  more  it  injures  him,  the  less  it  pays  us.  And 
we  are  abandoning  it  as  rapidly  as  nationalist  hostilities  will 
permit  us.  In  so  far  as  pre-war  conditions  pointed  to  the 
need  of  a  definitely  organised  international  economic  code,  the 
situation  created  by  the  Treaty  has  only  made  the  need  more 
visible  and  imperative.  For,  as  already  explained  in  the  first 
Part,  the  old  understandings  enabled  industry  to  be  built  up 
on  an  international  basis;  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  its 
confiscations,  prohibitions,  controls,  have  destroyed  those 
foundations.  Had  that  instrument  treated  German  trade  and 
industry  as  the  Germans  treated  French  in  1871  we  might 
have  seen  a  recovery  of  German  economic  life  relatively  as 
rapid  as  that  which  took  place  in  France  during  the  ten  years 
which  followed  her  defeat.  We  should  not  to-day  be  faced 
by  thirty  or  forty  millions  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
without  secure  means  of  livelihood. 

The  present  writer  confesses  most  frankly — ^and  the  critics 
of  The  Great  Illusion  are  hereby  presented  with  all  that  they 

'  In  the  synopsis  of  the  book  the  point  is  put  thus :  'If  credit  and  com- 
mercial contract  are  tampered  with  an  attempt  at  confiscation,  the 
credit-dependent  wealth  is  undermined,  and  its  collapse  involves  that  of 
the  conqueror;  so  that  if  conquest  is  not  to  be  self -injurious  it  must 
respect  the  enemy's  propetry,  in  which  case  it  becomes  economically 
iutUe.' 


ARGUMENTS  NOW  OUT  OF  DATE     295 

can  make  of  the  admission — that  he  did  not  expect  a  Euro- 
pean conqueror,  least  of  all  Allied  conquerors,  to  use  their 
victory  for  enforcing  a  policy  having  these  results.  He  believed 
that  elementary  considerations  of  self-interest,  the  duty  of 
statesmen  to  consider  the  needs  of  their  own  countries  just 
emerging  from  war,  would  stand  in  the  way  of  a  policy  of  this 
kind.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was  under  no  illusions  as  to 
what  would  result  if  they  did  attempt  to  enforce  that  policy. 
Dealing  with  the  damage  that  a  conqueror  might  inflict,  the 
book  says  that  such  things  as  the  utter  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  trade 

could  only  be  inflicted  by  an  invader  as  a  means  of  punish- 
ment costly  to  himself,  or  as  the  result  of  an  unselfish  and 
expensive  desire  to  inflict  misery  for  the  mere  joy  of  inflicting 
it.  In  this  self-seeking  world  it  is  not  practical  to  assume  the 
existence  of  an  inverted  altruism  of  this  kind. — (p.  29.) 

Because  of  the  'interdependence  of  our  credit-built  finance 
and  industry' 

the  confiscation  by  an  invader  of  private  property,  whether 
stocks,  shares,  ships,  mines,  or  anything  more  valuable  than 
jewellery  or  furniture — anything,  in  short,  which  is  bound  up 
with  the  economic  life  of  the  people — would  so  react  upon  the 
finance  of  the  invader's  country  as  to  make  the  damage  to  the 
invader  resulting  from  the  confiscation  exceed  in  value  the 
property  confiscated — (p.  29). 

Speaking  broadly  and  generally,  the  conqueror  in  our  day 
has  before  him  two  alternatives:  to  leave  things  alone,  and 
in  order  to  do  that  he  need  not  have  left  his  shores;  or  to 
interfere  by  confiscation  in  some  form,  in  which  case  he  dries 
up  the  source  of  the  profit  which  tempted  him — (p.  59). 

All  the  suggestions  made  as  to  the  economic  futility  of  such 


296  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

a  course — including  the  failure  to  secure  an  indemnity — ^have 
been  justified.^ 

In  dealing  with  the  indemnity  problem  the  book  did  fore- 
cast the  likelihood  of  special  trading  and  manufacturing 
interests  within  the  conquering  nation  opposing  the  only  con- 
dition upon  which  a  very  large  indemnity  would  be  possible 
— that  condition  being  either  the  creation  of  a  large  foreign 
trade  by  the  enemy  or  the  receipt  of  payment  in  kind,  in  goods 
which  would  compete  with  home  production.  But  the  author 
certainly  did  not  think  it  likely  that  England  and  France  would 
impose  conditions  so  rapidly  destructive  of  the  enemy's 
economic  life  that  they — ^the  conquerors — would,  for  their  own 
economic  preservation,  be  compelled  to  make  loans  to  the 
defeated  enemy. 

Let  us  note  the  phase  of  the  argument  that  the  procedure 
adopted  renders  out  of  date.  A  good  deal  of  The  Great  Illusion 
was  devoted  to  showing  that  Germany  had  no  need  to  expand 
territorially;  that  her  desire  for  overseas  colonies  was  senti- 
mental, and  had  little  relation  to  the  problem  of  providing  for 
her  population.  At  the  beginning  of  1914  that  was  certainly 
true.  It  is  not  true  to-day.  The  process  by  which  she  sup- 
ported her  excess  population  before  the  War  will,  to  put  it 
at  its  lowest,  be  rendered  extremely  difficult  of  maintenance 
as  the  result  of  allied  action.    The  point,  however,  is  that  we 

"We  need  markets.  What  is  a  market?  "A  place  where  things  are 
sold."  That  is  only  half  the  truth.  It  is  a  place  where  things  are 
bought  and  sold,  and  one  operation  is  impossible  without  the  other,  and 
the  notion  that  one  nation  can  sell  for  ever  and  never  buy  is  simply  the 
theory  of  perpetual  motion  applied  to  economics;  and  international 
trade  can  no  more  be  based  upon  perpetual  motion  than  can  engineering. 
As  between  economically  highly-organised  nations  a  customer  must  also 
be  a  competitor,  a  fact  which  bayonets  cannot  alter.  To  the  extent  to 
which  they  destroy  him  as  a  competitor,  they  destroy  him,  speaking 

generally  and   largely,  as  a  customer This   is  the   paradox,  the 

futility  of  conquest — the  great  illusion  which  the  history  of  our  own 
empire  so  well  illustrates.  We  "own"  our  empire  by  allowing  its  com- 
ponent parts  to  develop  themselves  in  their  own  way,  and  in  view  of 
their  own  ends,  and  all  the  empires  which  have  pursued  any  other 
policy  have  only  ended  by  impoverishing  their  own  populations  and 
falling  to  pieces.'  (p.  75). 


ARGUMENTS  NOW  OUT  OF  DATE     297 

are  not  benefiting  by  this  paralysis  of  German  industry.  We 
are  suffering  very  greatly  from  it:  suffering  so  much  that  we 
can  be  neither  politically  nor  economically  secure  until  this 
condition  is  brought  to  an  end.  There  can  be  no  peace  in 
Europe,  and  consequently  no  safety  for  us  or  France,  so  long 
as  we  attempt  by  power  to  maintain  a  policy  which  denies  to 
millions  in  the  midst  of  our  civilisation  the  possibility  of 
earning  their  living.  In  so  far  as  the  new  conditions  create 
difficulties  which  did  not  originally  exist,  our  victory  does  but 
the  more  glaringly  demonstrate  the  economic  futility  of  our 
policy  towards  the  vanquished. 

An  argument  much  used  in  The  Great  Illusion  as  disproving 
the  claims  made  for  conquest  was  the  position  of  the  popula- 
tion of  small  States.  'Very  well,'  may  say  the  critic,  'Germany 
is  now  in  the  position  of  a  small  State.  But  you  talk  about 
her  being  ruined!' 

In  the  conditions  of  1914,  the  small  State  argument  was 
entirely  valid  (incidentally  the  Allied  Governments  argue  that 
it  still  holds). ^  It  does  not  hold  to-day.  In  the  conditions 
of  1920  at  any  rate,  the  small  State  is,  like  Germany,  econom- 
ically at  the  mercy  of  British  sea  power  or  the  favoritism 
of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  to  a  degree  that  was  unknown 
before  the  War.  How  is  the  situation  to  develop?  Is  the 
Dutch  or  Swedish  or  Austrian  industrial  city  permanently  to 
be  dependent  upon  the  good  graces  of  some  foreign  official 
sitting  in  Whitehall  or  the  Quai  d'Orsay?  At  present,  if  an 
industrialist  in  such  a  city  wishes  to  import  coal  or  to  ship 
a  cargo  to  one  of  the  new  Baltic  States,  he  may  be  prevented 
owing  to  political  arrangements  between  France  and  England. 
If  that  is  to  be  the  permanent  situation  of  the  non-Entente 
world,  then  peace  will  become  less  and  less  secure,  and  all  our 
talk  of  having  fought  for  the  rights  of  the  small  and  weak 
will  be  a  farce.  The  friction,  the  irritation,  and  sense  of 
grievance  will  prolong  the  unrest  and  uncertainty,  and  the 

*  See  Part  I,  Chapter  II. 


298  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

resultant  decline  in  the  productivity  of  Europe  will  render 
our  own  economic  problems  the  more  acute.  The  power  by 
which  we  thus  arrogate  to  ourselves  the  economic  dictatorship 
of  Europe  will  ultimately  be  challenged. 

Can  we  revert  to  the  condition  of  things  which,  by  virtue 
of  certain  economic  freedoms  that  were  respected,  placed  the 
trader  or  industrialist  of  a  small  State  pretty  much  on  an 
equality,  in  most  things,  with  the  trader  of  the  Great  State? 
Or  shall  we  go  forward  to  a  recognised  international  economic 
system,  in  which  the  small  States  will  have  their  rights  secured 
by  a  definite  code? 

Reversion  to  the  old  individualist  'trans-nationalism'  or  an 
internationalism  without  considerable  administrative  machinery 
— seems  now  impossible.  The  old  system  is  destroyed  at  its 
sources  within  each  State.  The  only  available  course  now  is, 
recognising  the  fact  of  an  immense  growth  in  the  govern- 
mental control  or  regulation  of  foreign  trade,  to  devise  definite 
codes  or  agreements  to  meet  the  case.  If  the  obtaining  of 
necessary  raw  materials  by  all  the  States  other  than  France  and 
England  is  to  be  the  subject  of  wrangles  between  officials,  each 
case  to  be  treated  on  its  merits,  we  shall  have  a  much  worse 
anarchy  than  before  the  War.  A  condition  in  which  two  or 
three  powers  can  lay  down  the  law  for  the  world  will  indeed 
be  an  anti-climax. 

We  may  never  learn  the  lesson ;  the  old  futile  struggles  may 
go  on  indefinitely.  But  if  we  do  put  our  intelligences  to  the 
situation  it  will  call  for  a  method  of  treatment  somewhat 
different  from  that  which  pre-war  conditions  required. 

For  the  purposes  of  the  War,  in  the  various  Inter-Allied 
bodies  for  the  apportionment  of  shipping  and  raw  material, 
we  had  the  beginnings  of  an  economic  League  of  Nations, 
an  economic  World  Government.  Those  bodies  might  have 
been  made  democratic,  and  enlarged  to  include  neutral  interests, 
and  maintained  for  the  period  of  Reconstruction  (which  might 
in  any  case  have  been  regarded  as  a  phase  properly  subject 


ARGUMENTS  NOW  OUT  OF  DATE     299 

to  war  treatment  in  these  matters).  But  these  international 
organisations  were  allowed  to  fall  to  pieces  on  the  removal  of 
the  common  enmity  which  held  the  European  Allies  and 
America  together. 

The  disappearance  of  these  bodies  does  not  mean  the  dis- 
appearance of  'controls,'  but  the  controls  will  now  be  exercised 
in  considerable  part  through  vast  private  Capitalist  Trusts 
dealing  with  oil,  meat,  and  shipping.  Nor  will  the  interference 
of  government  be  abolished.  If  it  is  considered  desirable  to 
ensure  to  some  group  a  monoply  of  phosphates,  or  palm 
nuts,  the  aid  of  governments  will  be  invoked  for  the  purpose. 
But  in  this  case  the  government  will  exercise  its  powers  not 
as  the  result  of  a  publicly  avowed  and  agreed  principle,  but 
illicitly,  hypocritically. 

While  professing  to  exercise  a  'mandate'  for  mankind,  a 
government  will  in  fact  be  using  its  authority  to  protect  special 
interests.  In  other  words  we  shall  get  a  form  of  international- 
ism in  which  the  international  capitalist  Trust  will  control  the 
Government  instead  of  the  Government's  controlling  the 
Trust. 

The  fact  that  this  was  happening  more  and  more  before  the 
War  was  one  reason  why  the  old  individualist  order  has  broken 
down.  More  and  more  the  professed  position  and  function 
of  the  State  was  not  its  real  position  and  function.  The 
amount  of  industry  and  trade  dependent  upon  governmental 
intervention  (enterprises  of  the  Chinese  Loan  and  Bagdad 
Railway  type)  before  the  War  was  small  compared  with  the 
quantity  that  owed  nothing  to  governmental  protection.  But 
the  illicit  pressure  exercised  upon  goverments  by  those  inter- 
ested in  the  exploitation  of  backward  countries  was  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  public  importance  of  their  interests. 

It  was  this  failure  of  democratic  control  of  'big  business' 
by  the  pre-war  democracies  which  helped  to  break  down  the 
old  individualism.  While  private  capital  was  apparently 
gaining  control  over  the  democratic  forces,  moulding  the  policy 


300  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  democratic  governments,  it  was  in  fact  digging  its  own 
grave.  If  political  democracy  in  this  respect  had  been  equal 
to  its  task,  or  if  the  captains  of  industry  had  shown  a  greater 
scruple  or  discernment  in  their  use  of  political  power,  the 
individualist  order  might  have  given  us  a  workable  civilisation ; 
or  its  end  might  have  been  less  painful. 

The  Great  Illusion  did  not  assume  its  impending  demise. 
Democracy  had  not  yet  organised  socialistic  controls  within 
the  nation.  To  have  assumed  that  the  world  of  nationalisms 
would  face  socialistic  regulation  and  control  as  between  States, 
would  have  implied  an  agility  on  the  part  of  the  public  im- 
agination which  it  does  not  in  fact  possess.  An  international 
policy  on  these  lines  would  have  been  unintelligible  and  pre- 
posterous. It  is  only  because  the  situation  which  has  followed 
victory  is  so  desperate,  so  much  worse  than  anything  The  Great 
Illusion  forecast,  that  we  have  been  brought  to  face  these 
remedies  to-day. 

Before  the  War,  the  line  of  advance,  internationally,  was 
not  by  elaborate  regulation.  We  had  seen  a  congeries  of  States 
like  those  of  the  British  Empire  maintain  not  only  peace  but 
a  sort  of  informal  Federation,  without  limitation  in  any  formal 
way  of  the  national  freedom  of  any  one  of  them.  Each  could 
impose  tariffs  against  the  mother  country,  exclude  citizens  of 
the  Empire,  recognise  no  common  defined  law.  The  British 
Empire  seemed  to  forecast  a  type  of  international  Association 
which  could  secure  peace  without  the  restraints  or  restrictions 
of  a  central  authority  in  anything  but  the  most  shadowy  form. 
If  the  merely  moral  understanding  which  held  it  together  and 
enabled  co-operation  in  a  crisis  could  have  been  extended  to 
the  United  States;  if  the  principle  of  'self-determination'  that 
had  been  applied  to  the  white  portion  of  the  Empire  were 
gradually  extended  to  the  Asiatic;  if  a  bargain  had  been  made 
with  Germany  and  France  as  to  the  open  door,  and  equality 
of  access  to  undeveloped  territory  made  a  matter  of  defined 
agreement,  we  should  have  possessed  the  nucleus  of  a  world 


ARGUMENTS  NOW  OUT  OF  DATE     301 

organisation  giving  the  widest  possible  scope  for  independent 
national  development.  But  world  federation  on  such  lines 
depended  above  all,  of  course,  upon  the  development  of  a 
certain  'spirit,'  a  guiding  temper,  to  do  for  nations  of  different 
origin  what  had  already  been  done  for  nations  of  a  largely 
common  origin  (though  Britain  has  many  different  stocks — 
English,  Scottish,  Irish,  Welsh,  and,  overseas,  Dutch  and 
French  as  well).  But  the  spirit  was  not  there.  The  whole 
tradition  in  the  international  field  was  one  of  domination,  com- 
petition, rivalry,  conflicting  interest,  'Struggle  for  life.' 

The  possibility  of  such  a  free  international  life  has  disap- 
peared with  the  disappearance  of  the  laisser-faire  ideal  in 
national  organisation.  We  shall  perforce  be  much  more  con- 
cerned now  with  the  machinery  of  control  in  both  spheres  as 
the  only  alternative  to  an  anarchy  more  devastating  than  that 
which  existed  before  the  War.  For  all  the  reasons  which 
point  to  that  conclusion  the  reader  is  referred  once  more  to  the 
second  chapter  of  the  first  part  of  this  book. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  ARGUMENT  AS  AN  ATTACK  ON  THE  STATE 

There  was  not  before  the  War,  and  there  has  not  been  since, 
any  serious  challenge  to  the  economic  argument  of  The  Great 
Illusion.  Criticism  (which  curiously  enough  does  not  seem 
to  have  included  the  point  dealt  with  in  the  preceding  Chapter) 
seems  to  have  centred  rather  upon  the  irrelevance  of  economic 
considerations  to  the  problem  of  war — the  problem,  that  is,  of 
creating  an  international  society.  The  answer  to  that  is,  of 
course,  both  explicit  and  implicit  in  much  of  what  precedes. 

The  most  serious  criticism  has  been  directed  to  one  specific 
point.  It  is  made  notably  both  by  Professor  Spenser  Wilkin- 
son ^  and  Professor  Lindsay,^  and  as  it  is  relevant  to  the 
existing  situation  and  to  much  of  the  argument  of  the  present 
book,  it  is  worth  dealing  with. 

The  criticism  is  based  on  the  alleged  disparagement  of  the 
State  implied  in  the  general  attitude  of  the  book.  Professor 
Lindsay  (whose  article,  by  the  way,  although  hostile  and  mis- 
apprehending the  spirit  of  the  book,  is  a  model  of  fair,  sincere, 
and  useful  criticism)  describes  the  work  under  criticism 
largely  as  an  attack  on  the  conception  of  'the  State  as  a  person.' 
He  says  in  effect  that  the  present  author  argues  thus : — 

*  Government  and  the  War,  pp.  52-59. 

'The  Political  Theory  of  Mr  Norman  Angell,  by  Professor  A.  D. 
Lindsay,  The  Political  Quarterly.  December  1914. 

302 


ARGUMENT  AS  AN  ATTACK  ON  THE  STATE  303 

'The  only  proper  thing  to  consider  is  the  interest  or  the 
happiness  of  individuals.  If  a  political  action  conduces  to  the 
interests  of  individuals,  it  must  be  right;  if  it  conflicts  with 
these  interests  it  must  be  wrong.' 

Professor  Lindsay  continues: — 

'Now  if  pacifism  really  implied  such  a  view  of  the  relation 
of  the  State  and  the  individual,  and  of  the  part  played  by  self- 
interest  in  life,  its  appeal  has  little  moral  force  behind  it.  .  .  . 

'Mr.  Angell  seems  to  hold  that  not  only  is  the  national  State 
being  superseded,  but  that  the  supersession  is  to  be  welcomed. 
The  economic  forces  which  are  destroying  the  State  will  do  all 
the  State  has  done  to  bind  men  together,  and  more.' 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Professor  Lindsay  has  himself  answered 
his  own  criticism.    For  he  goes  on : — 

'The  argument  of  The  Great  Illusion  is  largely  based  on  the 
public  part  played  by  the  organisation  of  credit.  Mr  Angell 
has  been  the  first  to  notice  the  great  significance  of  its  activ- 
ity. It  has  misled  him,  however,  into  thinking  that  it  presaged 
a  supersession  of  political  by  econmic  control.  .  .  .  The  facts 
are,  not  that  political  forces  are  being  superseded  by  economic, 
but  that  the  new  industrial  situation  has  called  into  being 
new  political  organisations ....  To  co-ordinate  their  activities 
. .  .will  be  impossible  if  the  spirit  of  exclusive  nationalism  and 
distrust  of  foreigners  wins  the  day;  it  will  be  equally  impos- 
sible if  the  strength  of  our  existing  centres  of  patriotism  and 
public  spirit  are  destroyed.' 

Very  well.  We  had  here  in  the  pre-war  period  two  dangers, 
either  of  which  in  Professor  Lindsay's  view  would 'Hiake  the 
preservation  of  civilisation  impossible:  one  danger  was  that 
men   would   over-emphasise   their    narrower    patriotism    and 


304  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

surrender  themselves  to  the  pugnacities  of  exclusive  national- 
ism and  distrust  of  foreigners,  forgetting  that  the  spiritual 
life  of  densely  packed  societies  can  only  be  rendered  possible 
by  certain  widespread  economic  co-operations,  contracts;  the 
other  danger  was  that  we  should  under-emphasise  each  our 
own  nationalism  and  give  too  much  importance  to  the  wider 
international  organisation  of  mankind. 

Into  which  danger  have  we  run  as  a  matter  of  simple  fact? 
Which  tendency  is  it  that  is  acting  as  the  present  disruptive 
force  in  Europe?  Has  opinion  and  statesmanship — as  ex- 
pressed in  the  Treaty,  for  instance — ^given  too  much  or  too 
little  attention  to  the  interdependence  of  the  world,  and  the 
internationally  economic  foundations  of  our  civilisation? 

We  have  seen  Europe  smashed  by  neglecting  the  truths  which 
The  Great  Illusion  stressed,  perhaps  over-stressed,  and  by  sur- 
rendering to  the  exclusive  nationalism  which  that  book  attacked. 
The  book  was  based  on  the  anticipation  that  Europe  would  be 
very  much  more  likely  to  come  to  grief  through  over-stressing 
exclusive  nationalism  and  neglecting  its  economic  interdepen- 
dence, than  through  the  decay  of  the  narrower  patriotism. 

If  the  book  had  been  written  in  vacuo,  without  reference  to 
impending  events,  the  emphasis  might  have  been  different.  ^ 

*  In  order  that  the  reader  may  grasp  more  clearly  Mr  Lindsay's  point, 
here  are  some  longer  passages  in  which  he  elaborates  it: — 

'If  all  nations  really  recognised  the  truth  of  Mr  Angell's  arguments, 
that  they  all  had  common  interests  which  war  destroyed,  and  that  there- 
fore war  was  an  evil  for  victors  as  well  as  for  vanquished,  the 
European  situation  would  be  less  dangerous,  but  were  every  one  in  the 
world  as  wisely  concerned  with  their  own  interests  as  Mr  Angell  would 
have  men  to  be,  if  they  were  nevertheless  bound  by  no  political  ties, 
the  situation  would  be  infinitely  more  dangerous  tlian  it  is.  For  un- 
checked competition,  as  Hobbes  showed  long  ago,  leads  straight  to  war 
however  rational  men  are.  The  only  escape  from  its  dangers  is  by 
submitting  it  to  some  political  control.  And  for  that  reason  the  growth 
of  economic  relations  at  the  expense  of  political,  which  Mr  Angell 
heralds  with  such  enthusiasm,  is  the  greatest  peril  of  modern  times. 

'If  men  are  to  avoid  the  danger  that,  in  competing  with  one  another 
in  the  small  but  immediate  matters  where  their  interests  diverge,  they 
may  overreach  themselves  and  bring  about  their  mutual  ruin,  two  things 
are  essential,  one  moral  or  emotional,  the  other  practical.     It  is  not 


ARGUMENT  AS  AN  ATTACK  ON  THE  STATE  305 

But  in  criticising  the  emphasis  that  is  thrown  upon  the 
welfare  of  the  individual,  Professor  Lindsay  would  seem  to 
be  guilty  of  confusing  the  test  of  good  political  conduct  with 
the  motive.  Certainly  The  Great  Illusion  did  not  disparage  the 
need  of  loyalty  to  the  social  group — to  the  other  members  of  the 
partnership.  That  need  is  the  burden  of  most  that  has  been 
written  in  the  preceding  pages  when  dealing  with  the  facts 
of  interdependence.  An  individual  who  can  see  only  his 
own  interest  does  not  see  even  that;  for  such  interest  is 
dependent  on  others.  (These  arguments  of  egoism  versus 
altruism  are  always  circular.)  But  it  insisted  upon  two 
facts  which  modern  Europe  seemed  in  very  great  danger 
of  forgetting.  The  first  was  that  the  Nation-State  was  not 
the  social  group,  not  co-terminous  with  the  whole  of  Society, 


enough  that  men  should  recogfnise  that  what  they  do  affects  other  men, 
and  vice  versa.  They  must  care  for  how  their  actions  affect  other  men, 
not  only  for  how  they  may  react  on  themselves.  They  must,  that  is, 
love  their  neighbours.  They  must  further  agree  with  one  another  in 
caring  for  certain  ways  of  action  quite  irrespective  of  how  such  ways  of 
action  affect  their  personal  interests.  They  must,  that  is,  be  not  only 
economic  but  moral  men.  Secondly,  recognising  that  the  range  of  their 
personal  sympathies  with  other  men  is  more  restricted  than  their  inter- 
dependence, and  that  in  the  excitement  of  competition  all  else  is  apt  to 
be  neglected,  they  must  depute  certain  persons  to  stand  out  of  the  com- 
petitive struggle  and  look  after  just  those  vital  common  interests  and 
greater  issues  which  the  contending  parties  are  apt  to  neglect.  These 
men  will  represent  the  common  interests  of  all,  their  common  ideals 
and  their  mutual  sympathies;  they  will  give  to  men's  concern  for  these 
common  ends  a  focus  which  will  enable  them  to  resist  the  pull  of  diver- 
gent interests  and  round  their  actions  will  gather  the  authority  which 
these  common  ends  inspire 

' . . .  Such  propositions  are  of  course  elementary.  It  is,  however,  im- 
portant to  observe  that  economic  relations  are  in  this  most  distinquished 
from  political  relations,  that  men  can  enter  into  economic  relations  with- 
out having  any  real  purpose  in  common.  For  the  money  which  they 
gain  by  their  co-operation  may  represent  power  to  carry  out  the  most 
diverse  and  conflicting  purposes 

'...  Politics  implies  mutual  confidence  and  respect  and  a  certain 
measure  of  agreement  in  ideals.  The  consequence  is  that  co-operation 
for  economic  is  infinitely  easier  than  for  political  purposes  and  spreads 
much  more  rapidly.  Hence  it  easily  overruns  any  political  boundaries, 
and  by  doing  so  has  produced  the  modern  situation  which  Mr  Angell 
has  described.' 


306  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

only  a  very  arbitrarily  chosen  part  of  it;  and  the  second  was 
that  the  test  of  the  'good  State'  was  the  welfare  of  the  citizens 
who  composed  it.  How  otherwise  shall  we  settle  the  adjust- 
ment between  national  right  and  international  obligation, 
answer  the  old  and  inevitable  question,  'What  is  the  Good 
State  ?'  .  The  only  intelligible  answer  is :  the  State  which  pro- 
duces good  men,  subserves  their  welfare.  A  State  which  did 
not  subserve  the  welfare  of  its  citizens,  that  produced  men 
morally,  intellectually,  physically  poor  and  feeble,  could  not 
be  a  good  State.  A  State  is  tested  by  the  degree  to  which  it 
serves  individuals. 

Now  the  fact  of  forgetting  the  first  truth,  that  the  Nation- 
State  is  not  the  whole  of  Society  but  only  a  part,  and  that  we 
have  obligations  to  the  other  part,  led  to  a  distortion  of  the 
second.  The  Hegelianism  which  denied  any  obligation  above 
or  beyond  that  of  the  Nation- State  sets  up  a  conflict  of  sov- 
ereignties, a  competition  of  power,  stimulating  the  instinct  of 
domination,  making  indeed  the  power  and  position  of  the 
State  with  reference  to  rival  States  the  main  end  of  politics. 
The  welfare  of  men  is  forgotten.  The  fact  that  the  State  is 
made  for  man,  not  man  for  the  State,  is  obscured.  It  was 
certainly  forgotten  or  distorted  by  the  later  political  philos- 
ophers of  Prussia.  The  oversight  gave  us  Prussianism  and 
Imperialism,  the  ideal  of  political  power  as  an  end  in  itself, 
against  which  The  Great  Illusion  was  a  protest.  The  Imper- 
ialism, not  alone  in  Prussia,  takes  small  account  of  the  quality 
of  individual  life,  under  the  flag.  The  one  thing  to  be  sought 
is  that  the  flag  should  be  triumphant,  be  flown  over  vast  terri- 
tories, inspire  fear  in  foreigners,  and  be  an  emblem  of  'glory.' 
There  is  a  discernible  distinction  of  aim  and  purpose  between 
the  Patriot,  Jingo,  Chauvinist,  and  the  citizen  of  the  type 
interested  in  such  things  as  social  reform.  The  military  Patriot 
the  world  over  does  not  attempt  to  hide  his  contempt  for 
efforts  at  the  social  betterment  of  his  countryman.  That  is 
'parish  pump.'    Mr  Maxse  or  Mr  Kipling  is  keenly  interested 


ARGUMENT  AS  AN  ATTACK  ON  THE  STATE  307 

in  England,  but  not  in  the  betterment  of  Englishmen;  indeed, 
both  are  in  the  habit  of  abusing  Englishmen  very  heartily, 
unless  they  happen  to  be  soldiers.  In  other  words,  the  real  end 
of  politics  is  forgotten.  It  is  not  only  that  the  means  have 
become  the  end,  but  that  one  element  of  the  means,  power, 
has  become  the  end. 

.  The  point  I  desired  to  emphasise  was  that  unless  we  keep 
before  ourselves  the  welfare  of  the  individual  as  the  test  of 
politics  (not  necessarily  the  motive  of  each  individual  for  him- 
self) we  constantly  forget  the  purpose  and  aim  of  politics, 
and  patriotism  becomes  not  the  love  of  one's  fellow  countrymen 
and  their  welfare,  but  the  love  of  power  expressed  by  that 
larger  'ego'  which  is  one's  group.  'Mystic  Nationalism'  comes 
to  mean  something  entirely  divorced  from  any  attribute  of 
individual  life.  The  'Nation'  becomes  an  abstraction  apart 
from  the  life  of  the  individual. 

There  is  a  further  consideration.  The  fact  that  the  Nation- 
State  is  not  co-terminous  with  Society  is  shown  by  its  vital 
need  of  others ;  it  cannot  live  by  itself ;  it  must  co-operate  with 
others;  consequently  it  has  obligations  to  those  others.  The 
demonstration  of  that  fact  involves  an  appeal  to  'interest,'  to 
welfare.  The  most  visible  and  vital  co-operation  outside  the 
limits  of  the  Nation-State  is  the  economic;  it  gives  rise  to  the 
most  definite,  as  to  the  most  fundamental  obligation — the  obli- 
gation to  accord  to  others  the  right  to  existence.  It  is  out  of  the 
common  economic  need  that  the  actual  structure  of  some  mutual 
arrangement,  some  social  code,  will  arise,  has  indeed  arisen. 
This  makes  the  beginning  of  the  first  visible  structure  of  a 
world  society.  And  from  these  homely  beginnings  will  come, 
if  at  all,  a  more  vivid  sense  of  the  wider  society.  And  the 
'economic'  interest,  as  distinct  from  the  temperamental  interest 
of  domination,  has  at  least  this  social  advantage.  Welfare  is 
a  thing  that  in  society  may  well  grow  the  more  it  is  divided: 
the  better  my  countrymen  the  richer  is  my  life  likely  to  become. 
Domination  has  not  this  quality :  it  is  mutually  exclusive.    We 


308  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

cannot  all  be  masters.  If  any  country  is  to  dominate,  some- 
body or  some  one  else's  country  must  be  dominated;  if  the 
one  is  to  be  the  Superior  Race,  some  other  must  be  inferior. 
And  the  inferior  sooner  or  later  objects,  and  from  that  resis- 
tance comes  the  disintegration  that  now  menaces  us. 

It  is  perfectly  true  that  we  cannot  create  the  kind  of  State 
which  will  best  subserve  the  interests  of  its  citizens  unless 
each  is  ready  to  give  allegiance  to  it,  irrespective  of  his  immedi- 
ate personal  'interest.'  (The  word  is  put  in  inverted  commas 
because  in  most  men  not  compelled  by  bad  economic  circum- 
stances to  fight  fiercely  for  daily  bread,  sheer  physical  suste- 
nance, the  satisfaction  of  a  social  and  creative  instinct  is  a  very 
real  'interest,'  and  would,  in  a  well-organised  society,  be  as 
spontaneous  as  interest  in  sport  or  social  ostentation.)  The 
State  must  be  an  idea,  an  abstraction,  capable  of  inspiring 
loyalty,  embodying  the  sense  of  interdependence.  But  the 
circumstances  of  the  independent  modern  national  State,  in 
frequent  and  unavoidable  contact  with  other  similar  States, 
are  such  as  to  stimulate  not  mainly  the  motives  of  social  co- 
hesion, but  those  instincts  of  domination  which  become  anti- 
social and  disruptive.  The  nationalist  stands  condemned  not 
because  he  asks  allegiance  or  loyalty  to  the  social  group,  but 
first,  because  he  asks  absolute  allegiance  to  something  which 
is  not  the  social  group  but  only  part  of  it,  and  secondly, 
because  that  exclusive  loyalty  gives  rise  to  disruptive  pugnac- 
ities, injurious  to  all. 

In  pointing  out  the  inadequacy  of  the  unitary  political 
Nation- State  as  the  embodiment  of  final  sovereignty,  an  in- 
adequacy due  to  precisely  the  development  of  such  organisations 
as  Labour,  the  present  writer  merely  anticipated  the  drift  of 
much  political  writing  of  the  last  ten  years  on  the  problem 
of  State  sovereignty;  as  also  the  main  drift  of  events.^ 

*I  have  in  mind,  of  course,  the  writings  of  Cole,  Laski,  Figgis,  and 
Webb.  In  A  Constitution  for  the  Socialist  Commonwealth  of  Great 
Britain,  Mr  Webb  writes : — 

'Whilst  metaphysical  philosophers  had  been  debating  what  was  the 


ARGUMENT  AS  AN  ATTACK  ON  THE  STATE  309 

If  Mr  Lindsay  finds  the  very  mild  suggestions  in  The  Great 
Illusion  touching  the  necessary  quaHfication  of  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Nation-State  subversive,  one  wonders  what  his  feeUngs 
are  on  reading,  say,  Mr  Cole,  who  in  a  recent  book  {Social 
Theory)  leaves  the  Political  State  so  attenuated  that  one 
questions  whether  what  is  left  is  not  just  ghost.  At  the  best 
the  State  is  just  one  collateral  association  among  others. 

The  sheer  mechanical  necessities  of  administration  of  an  in- 
dustrial society,  so  immeasurably  more  complex  than  the  simple 
agricultural  society  which  gave  us  the  unitary  political  State, 
seem  to  be  pushing  us  towards  a  divided  or  manifold  sover- 
eignty. If  we  are  to  carry  over  from  the  National  State  into 
the  new  form  of  the  State — as  we  seem  now  in  danger  of 
doing — the  attitude  of  mind  which  demands  domination  for 
'our'  group,  the  pugnacities,  suspicions,  and  hostilities  character- 
istic of  nationalist  temper,  we  may  find  the  more  complex 
society  beyond  our  social  capacity.  I  agree  that  we  want  a 
common  political  loyalty,  that  mere  obedience  to  the  momentary 
interest  of  our  group  will  not  give  it;  but  neither  will  the 
temper  of  patriotism  as  we  have  seen  it  manifested  in  the 
European  national  State.  The  loyalty  to  some  common 
code  will  probably  only  come  through  a  sense  of  its  social 

nature  of  the  State — by  which  they  always  meant  the  sovereign  Political 
State — the  sovereignty,  and  even  the  moral  authority  of  the  State  itself, 
in  the  sense  of  the  political  government,  were  being  silently  and  almost 
unwittingly  imdermined  by  the  growth  of  new  forms  of  Democracy.' 
(p.  XV.) 

In  Social  Theory,  Mr  Cole,  speaking  of  the  necessary  co-ordination 
of  the  new  forms  of  association,  writes : — 

To  entrust  the  State  with  the  function  of  co-ordination  would  be  to 
entrust  it  in  many  cases  with  the  task  of  arbitrating  between  itself  and 
some  other  functional  association,  say  a  church  or  a  trade  union.'  There 
must  be  a  co-ordinating  body,  but  it  'must  be  not  any  single  association, 
but  a  combination  of  associations,  a  federal  body  in  which  some  or  all 
of  the  various  functional  associations  are  linked  together.'  (pp.  101  and 
134.)  A  reviewer  summarises  Mr  Cole  as  saying:  'I  do  not  want  any 
single  supreme  authority.  It  is  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  that  I  object 
to,  as  fatal  to  liberty.  For  single  sovereignty  I  substitute  a  federal 
union  of  functions,  and  I  see  the  guarantee  of  personal  freedom  in  the 
severalty  which  prevents  any  one  of  them  from  undue  encroachments.' 


310  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

need.  (It  is  on  the  ground  of  its  social  need  that  Mr 
Lindsay  defends  the  political  State.)  At  present  we  have 
little  sense  of  that  need,  because  we  have  (as  Versailles  proved) 
a  belief  in  the  effectiveness  of  our  own  power  to  exact  the 
services  we  may  require.  The  rival  social  or  industrial  groups 
have  a  like  belief.  Only  a  real  sense  of  interdependence  can 
undermine  that  belief ;  and  it  must  be  a  visible,  economic  inter- 
dependence. 

A  social  sense  may  be  described  as  an  instinctive  feeling  for 
'what  will  work.*  We  are  only  yet  at  the  beginning  of  the 
study  of  human  motive.  So  much  is  subconscious  that  we 
are  certainly  apt  to  ascribe  to  one  motive  conduct  which  in 
fact  is  due  to  another.  And  among  the  neglected  motives  of 
conduct  is  perhaps  a  certain  sense  of  art — a  sense,  in  this 
connection,  of  the  difficult  'art  of  living  together.'  It  is  prob- 
ably true  that  what  some,  at  least,  find  so  revolting  in  some 
of  the  manifestations  of  nationalism,  chauvinism,  is  that  they 
violently  challenge  the  whole  sense  of  what  will  work,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  rights  of  others.  'If  every  one  took  that  line, 
nobody  could  live.'  In  a  social  sense  this  is  gross  and  offensive. 
It  has  an  effect  on  one  like  the  manners  of  a  cad.  It  is  that 
sort  of  motive,  perhaps,  more  than  any  calculation  of  'interest,' 
which  may  one  day  cause  a  revulsion  against  Balkanisation. 
But  to  that  motive  some  informed  sense  of  interdependence 
is  indispensable. 


CHAPTER  VI 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS 


If  the  question  merely  concerned  the  past,  if  it  were  only  a 
matter  of  proving  that  this  or  that  'School  of  thought'  was 
right,  this  re-examination  of  arguments  put  forward  before 
the  War  would  be  a  sterile  business  enough.  But  it  concerns 
the  present  and  the  future ;  bears  directly  and  pertinently  upon 
the  reasons  which  have  led  us  into  the  existing  chaos ;  and  the 
means  by  which  we  might  hope  to  emerge.  As  much  to-day 
as  before  the  War  (and  far  more  obviously)  is  it  true  that 
upon  the  reply  to  the  questions  raised  in  this  discussion  de- 
pends the  continuance  of  our  civilisation.  Our  society  is  still 
racked  by  a  fierce  struggle  for  political  power,  our  populations 
still  demand  the  method  of  coercion,  still  refuse  to  face  the 
facts  of  interdependence,  still  insist  cleunorously  upon  a  policy 
which  denies  those  facts. 

The  propositions  we  are  here  discussing  were  not,  it  is  well 
to  recall,  merely  to  the  effect  that  'war  does  not  pay,'  but  that 
the  ideas  and  impulses  out  of  which  it  grows,  and  which 
underlay  —  and  still  underlie  —  European  politics,  give  us 
an  unworkable  society;  and  that  unless  they  can  be  cor- 
rected they  will  increasingly  involve  social  collapse  and  dis- 
integration. 

That  conclusion  was  opposed,  as  we  have  seen,  on  two  main 

grounds.    One  was  that  the  desire  for  conquest  and  extension 

of  territory  did  not  enter  appreciably  into  the  causes  of  war, 
— 311 


312  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

'since  no  one  really  believed  that  victory  could  advantage  them.* 
The  other  ground  of  objection,  in  contradistinction,  was  that 
the  economic  advantages  of  conquest  or  military  predomi- 
nance were  so  great  and  so  obvious  that  to  deny  them  was 
mere  paradox-mongering. 

The  validity  of  both  criticisms  has  been  very  thoroughly 
tested  in  the  period  that  has  followed  the  Armistice.  Whether 
it  be  true  or  not  that  the  competition  for  territory,  the  belief 
that  predominant  power  could  be  turned  to  economic  account, 
entered  into  the  causes  of  the  War,  that  competition  and  belief 
have  certainly  entered  into  the  settlement  and  must  be  reckoned 
among  the  causes  of  the  next  war.  The  proposition  that  the 
economic  advantages  of  conquest  and  coercion  are  illusory  is 
hardly  to-day  a  paradox,  however  much  policy  may  still  ignore 
the  facts. 

The  outstanding  facts  of  the  present  situation  most  worth 
our  attention  in  this  connection  are  these:  Military  predom- 
inance, successful  war,  evidently  offer  no  solution  either  of 
specifically  international  or  of  our  common  social  and  economic 
problems.  The  political  disintegration  going  on  over  wide 
areas  in  Europe  is  undoubtedly  related  very  intimately  to  eco- 
nomic conditions:  actual  lack  of  food,  the  struggle  for  ever- 
increasing  wages  and  better  conditions.  Our  attempted  rem- 
edies— our  conferences  for  dealing  with  international  credit, 
the  suggestion  of  an  international  loan,  the  loans  actually  made 
to  the  enemy — ^are  a  confession  of  the  international  character 
of  that  problem.  All  this  shows  that  the  economic  question, 
alike  nationally  and  internationally,  is  not,  it  is  true,  something 
that  ought  to  occupy  all  the  energies  of  men,  but  something 
that  will,  unless  dealt  with  adequately ;  is  a  question  that  simply 
cannot  be  swept  aside  with  magnificent  gestures.  Finally,  the 
nature  of  the  settlement  actually  made  by  the  victor,  its  charac- 
teristic defects,  the  failure  to  realise  adequately  the  victor's 
dependence  on  the  economic  life  of  the  vanquished,  show  clearly 
enough  that,  even  in  the  free  democracies,  orthodox  statecraft 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  313 

did  indeed  suffer  from  the  misconception  which  The  Great 
Illusion  attributed  to  it. 

What  do  we  see  to-day  in  Europe?     Our  preponderant 
military   power — overwhelming,    irresistible,    unquestioned — is 
impotent  to  secure  the  most  elementary  forms  of  wealth  needed 
by  our  people:    fuel,  food,  shelter.    France,  who  in  the  forty 
years  of  her  'defeat'  had  the  soundest  finances  in  Europe,  is,   { 
as  a  victor  over  the  greatest  industrial  nation  in  Europe,  all  / 
but  bankrupt.     (The  franc  has  fallen  to  a  discount  of  over  I 
seventy  per  cent.)    All  the  recurrent  threats  of  extended  mili-  ' 
tary  occupation  fail  to  secure  reparations  and  indemnities,  the 
restoration   of   credit,    exchange,   of    general   confidence   and 
security. 

And  just  as  we  are  finding  that  the  things  necessary  for  the 

life  of  our  peoples  cannot  be  secured  by  military  force  exercised 

against  foreign  nations  or  a  beaten  enemy,  so  are  we  finding 

that  the  same  method  of  force  within  the  limits  of  the  nation 

used  by  one  group  as  against  another,    fails  equally.     The 

temper  or  attitude  towards  life  which  leads  us  to  attempt  to 

/  achieve  our  end  by  the  forcible  imposition  of  our  will  upon 

f  others,  by  dictatorship,  and  to  reject  agreement,  has  produced 

I    in  some  degree  everywhere  revolt  and  rebellion  on  the  one  side, 

and  repression  on  the  other;  or  a  general  disruption  and  the 

breakdown  of  the  co-operative  processes  by  which  mankind 

lives.    All  the  raw  materials  of  wealth  are  here  on  the  earth  * 

as  they  were  ten  years  ago.     Yet  Europe  either  starves  cr 

slips  into  social  chaos,  because  of  the  economic  difficulty. 

In  the  way  of  the  necessary  co-operation  stands  the  Balkan- 
isation  of  Europe.  Why  are  we  Balkanised  rather  than 
Federalised?  Why  do  Balkan  and  other  border  States  fight 
fiercely  over  this  coalfield  or  that  harbour?  Why  does  France 
still  oppose  trade  with  Russia,  and  plot  for  the  control  of  an 
enlarged  Poland  or  a  reactionary  Hungary  ?  Why  does  Ameri- 
ca now  wash  her  hands  of  the  whole  muddle  in  Europe? 
Because  everywhere  the  statesmen  and  the  public  believe  that 


i 


314  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

if  only  the  power  of  their  State  were  great  enough,  they  could 
be  independent  of  rival  States,  achieve  political  and  economic 
security  and  dispense  with  agreements  and  obligations. 

If  they  had  any  vivid  sense  of  the  vast  dangers  to  which 
reliance  upon  isolated  power  exposed  any  State,  however  great ; 
if  they  had  realised  how  the  prosperity  and  social  peace  of  their 
own  States  depended  upon  the  reconciliation  and  well-being  of 
the  vanquished,  the  Treaty  would  have  been  a  very  different 
document,  peace  would  long  since  have  been  established  with 
Russia,  and  the  moral  foundations  of  co-operation  would  be 
present. 

By  every  road  that  presented  itself,  The  Great  Illusion  at- 
tempted to  reveal  the  vital  interdependence  of  peoples — within 
and  without  the  State — and,  as  a  corollary  to  that  interdepen- 
dence, the  very  strict  limits  of  the  force  that  can  be  exercised 
against  any  one  whose  life,  and  daily — and  willing — ^labour  is 
necessary  to  us.  It  was  not  merely  the  absence  of  these  ideas 
but  the  very  active  presence  of  the  directly  contrary  ideas  of 
rival  and  conflicting  interest,  which  explained  the  drift  that  the 
present  writer  thought — and  said  so  often — would,  unless 
checked,  lead  Western  civilisation  to  a  vast  orgy  of  physical 
self-destruction  and  moral  violence  and  chaos. 

The  economic  conditions  which  constitute  one  part  of  the 
vindication  of  The  Great  Illusion  are  of  course  those  de- 
scribed in  the  first  part  of  this  book,  particularly  in  the  first 
chapter.  All  that  need  be  added  here  are  a  few  suggestions  as 
to  the  relationship  between  those  conditions  and  the  propositions 
we  are  concerned  to  verify. 

As  bearing  upon  the  truth  of  those  propositions,  we  cannot 
neglect  the  condition  of  Germany. 

If  ever  national  military  power,  the  sheer  efficiency  of  the 
military  instrument,  could  ensure  a  nation's  political  and  eco- 
nomic security,  Germany  should  have  been  secure.  It  was  not 
any  lack  of  the  'impulse  to  defence,'  of  the  'manly  and  virile 
qualities'  so  beloved  of  the  militarist,  no  tendency  to  'softness,' 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  315 

no  'emasculating  internationalism'  which  betrayed  her.  She  fell 
because  she  failed  to  realise  that  she  too,  for  all  her  power, 
had  need  of  a  co-operation  throughout  the  world,  which  her 
force  could  not  compel ;  and  that  she  must  secure  a  certain  moral 
co-operation  in  her  purposes  or  be  defeated.  She  failed,  not 
for  lack  of  'intense  nationalism/  but  by  reason  of  it,  because 
the  policy  which  guided  the  employment  of  her  military  instru-  *- 
ment  had  in  it  too  small  a  regard  for  the  moral  factors  in  the 
world  at  large,  which  might  set  in  motion  material  forces  against 
her. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  doubt  that  the  easy  victories  of  1871 
marked  the  point  at  which  the  German  spirit  took  the  wrong 
turning,  and  rendered  her  statesmen  incapable  of  seeing  the 
forces  which  were  massing  for  her  destruction.  The  presence 
in  1919  of  Grerman  delegates  at  Versailles  in  the  capacity  of 
vanquished  can  only  be  adequately  explained  by  recalling  the 
presence  there  of  German  statesmen  as  victors  in  1871.  It  took 
forty  years  for  some  of  the  moral  fruits  of  victory  to  manifest 
themselves  in  the  German  spirit. 

But  the  very  severity  of  the  present  German  lot  is  one  that 
lends  itself  to  sophistry.  It  will  be  argued :  'You  say  that  pre- 
ponderant military  power,  victory,  is  ineffective  to  economic 
ends.  Well,  look  at  the  difference  between  ourselves  and 
Germany.  The  victors,  though  they  may  not  flourish,  are  at 
least  better  off  than  the  vanquished.  If  we  are  lean,  they 
starve.    Our  military  power  is  not  economically  futile.' 

If  to  bring  about  hardship  to  ourselves  in  order  that  some 
one  else  may  suffer  still  greater  hardship  is  an  economic  gain,  -V^ 
then  it  is  untrue  to  say  that  conquest  is  economically  futile. 
But  I  had  assumed  that  advantage  or  utility  was  to  be  measured 
by  the  good  to  us,  not  by  the  harm  done  to  others  at  our  cost. 
We  are  arguing  for  the  moment  the  economic,  and  not  the  ethical 
aspect  of  the  thing.  Keep  for  a  moment  to  those  terms.  If 
you  were  told  that  an  enterprise  was  going  to  be  extremely 
profitable  and  you  lost  half  your  fortune  in  it,  you  would  cer- 


316  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

tainly  regard  as  curious  the  logic  of  the  reply,  that  after  all 
you  had  gained,  because  others  in  the  same  enterprise  had  lost 
everything. 

We  are  considering  in  eflfect  whether  the  facts  show  that 
nations  must,  in  order  to  provide  bread  for  their  people,  defeat 
in  war  competing  nations  who  otherwise  would  secure  it.  But 
that  economic  case  for  the  'biological  inevitability*  of  war  is 
destroyed  if  it  is  true  that,  after  having  beaten  the  rival  nation, 
we  find  that  we  have  less  bread  than  before;  that  the  future 
security  of  our  food  is  less ;  and  that  out  of  our  own  diminished 
store  we  have  to  feed  a  defeated  enemy  who,  before  his  defeat, 
managed  to  feed  himself,  and  helped  to  feed  us  as  well. 

And  that  is  precisely  what  the  present  facts  reveal. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  position  of  France. 
In  the  forty  years  of  her  defeat  France  was  the  banker  of 
Europe.  She  exacted  tribute  in  the  form  of  dividends  and 
interest  upon  investments  from  Russia,  the  Near  East,  Germany 
herself;  exacted  it  in  a  form  which  suited  the  peculiar  genius 
of  her  people  and  added  to  the  security  of  her  social  life.  She 
was  Germany's  creditor,  and  managed  to  secure  from  her 
conqueror  of  1871  the  prompt  payment  of  the  debts  owing  to 
her.  When  France  was  not  in  a  position  to  compel  anything 
whatsoever  from  Germany  by  military  fDrce,  the  financial  claims 
of  Frenchmen  upon  Germany  were  readily  discountable  in  any 
market  of  the  world.  To-day,  the  financial  claims  on  Germany, 
made  by  a  France  which  is  militarily  all-powerful,  simply  can- 
not be  discounted  anywhere.  The  indemnity  vouchers,  whatever 
may  be  the  military  predominance  behind  them,  are  simply  not 
negotiable  instruments  so  long  as  they  depend  upon  present 
policy.  They  are  a  form  of  paper  which  no  banker  would 
dream  of  discounting  on  their  commercial  merits. 

To-day  France  stands  as  the  conquerer  of  the  richest  ore- 
fields  in  the  world,  of  territory  which  is  geographically  the 
industrial  centre  of  Europe;  of  a  vast  Empire  in  Africa  and 
Asia;   in  a  position   of  predominance   in   Poland,    Hungary, 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  317 

and  Rumania.  She  has  acquired  through  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission such  power  over  the  enemy  countries  as  to  reduce  them 
almost  to  the  economic  position  of  an  Asiatic  or  African  colony. 
If  ever  wealth  could  be  conquered,  France  has  conquered  it. 
If  political  power  could  really  be  turned  to  economic  account, 
France  ought  to-day  to  be  rich  beyond  any  nation  in  history. 
Never  was  there  such  an  opportunity  of  turning  military  power 
into  wealth. 

Then  why  is  she  bankrupt?  Why  is  France  faced  by  eco- 
nomic and  financial  difficulties  so  acute  that  the  situation  seems 
inextricable  save  by  social  revolution,  a  social  reconstruction, 
that  is,  involving  new  principles  of  taxation,  directly  aiming  at 
the  re-distribution  of  wealth,  a  re-distribution  resisted  by  the 
property-owning  classes.  These>  like  other  classes,  have  since 
the  Armistice  been  so  persistently  fed  upon  the  fable  of  making 
the  Boche  pay,  that  the  government  is  unable  to  induce  them  to 
face  reality.  ^ 

*  The  British  Treasury  has  issued  statements  showing  that  the  French 
people  at  the  end  of  last  year  were  paying  £2.  7s.,  and  the  British  people 
£15.  3s.  per  head  in  direct  taxation.  The  French  tax  is  calculated  at 
3.5.  per  cent,  on  large  incomes,  whereas  similar  incomes  in  Great  Britain 
would  pay  at  least  25  per  cent.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  burden  of 
taxes  on  the  poor  in  France  is  small.  Both  the  working  and  middle 
classes  have  been  very  hard  hit  by  indirect  taxes  and  by  the  rise  in 
prices,  which  is  greater  in  France  than  in  England. 

The  point  is  that  in  France  the  taxation  is  mainly  indirect,  this  falling 
most  heavily  upon  the  poor ;  while  in  England  it  is  much  more  largely 
direct. 

The  French  consumers  are  much  more  heavily  taxed  than  the  British, 
but  the  protective  taxes  of  France  bring  in  comparatively  little  revenue, 
while  they  raise  the  price  of  living  and  force  the  French  Government 
and  the  French  local  authorities  to  spend  larger  and  larger  amounts 
on  salaries  and  wages. 

The  Budget  for  the  year  1920  is  made  the  occasion  for  an  illuminating 
review  of  France's  financial  position  by  the  reporter  of  the  Finance 
Commission,  M.  Paul  Doumar. 

The  expenditure  due  to  the  War  until  the  present  date  amounts 
roughly  to  233,000  million  francs  ^equivalent,  at  the  normal  rate  of 
exchange,  to  £9,320,000,000)  wheVeof  the  sum  of  43,000  million  francs 
has  been  met  out  of  revenue,  leaving  a  deficit  of  190  billions. 

This  huge  sum  has  been  borrowed  in  various  ways — Id  billions  from 
the  Bank  of  France,  35  billions  from  abroad,  46  billions  in  Treasury 
notes,  and  12  billions  in  regular  loans.    The  total  public  debt  on  July  1 


V 


318  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

With  a  public  debt  of  233,729  million  of  francs  (about 
i9, 300,000,000,  at  the  pre-war  rate  of  exchange)  ;  with  the 
permanent  problem  of  a  declining  population  accentuated  by 
the  loss  of  millions  of  men  killed  and  wounded  in  the  war,  and 
complicated  by  the  importation  of  coloured  labour;  with  the 
exchange  value  of  the  franc  reduced  to  sixty  in  terms  of 
the  British  pound,  and  to  fifteen  in  terms  of  the  American 
dollar,  *  the  position  of  victorious  France  in  the  hour  of  her 
complete  military  predominance  over  Europe  seems  wellnigh 
desperate. 

She  could  of  course  secure  very  considerable  alleviation  of 
her  present  difficulties  if  she  would  consent  to  the  only  condition 
upon  which  Germany  could  make  a  considerable  contribution 
to  Reparations;  the  restoration  of  German  industry.  But  to 
that  one  indispensable  condition  of  indemnity  or  reparation 
France  will  not  consent,  because  the  French  feel  that  a  flourish- 
ing Germany  would  be  a  Germany  dangerous  to  the  security  of 
France. 

In  this  condition  one  may  recall  a  part  of  The  Great  Illusion 
case  which,  more  than  any  other  of  the  'preposterous  propo- 
sitions,' excited  derision  and  scepticism  before  the  War.  That 
was  the  part  dealing  with  the  difficulties  of  securing  an  indem- 
nity. In  a  chapter  (of  the  early  1910  Edition)  entitled  The 
Indemnity  Futility,  occurred  these  passages: — 

'The  difficulty  in  the  case  of  a  large  indemnity  is  not  so  much 
the  payment  by  the  vanquished  as  the  receiving  by  the  victor . . . 

'When  a  nation  receives  an  indemnity  of  a  large  amount  of 
gold,  one  or  two  things  happens :  either  the  money  is  exchanged 
for  real  wealth  with  other  nations,  in  which  case  the  greatly 


is  put  at  233,729  millions,  reckoning  foreign  loans  on  the  basis  of  ex- 
change at  par. 

M.  Doumer  declares  that  so  long  as  this  debt  weighs  on  the  State, 
the  financial  situation  must  remain  precarious  and  its  credit  mediocre. 

^January,  1921. 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  319 

increased  imports  compete  directly  with  the  home  producers, 
or  the  money  is  kept  within  the  frontiers  and  is  not  exchanged 
for  real  wealth  from  abroad,  and  prices  inevitably  rise ....  The 
rise  in  price  of  home  commodities  hampers  the  nation  receiving 
the  indemnity  in  selling  those  commodities  in  the  neutral  markets 
of  the  world,  especially  as  the  loss  of  so  large  a  sum  by  the 
vanquished  nation  has  just  the  reverse  eflfect  of  cheapening 
prices  and  therefore,  enabling  that  nation  to  compete  on  better 
terms  with  the  conqueror  in  neutral  markets.' — (p.  76.) 

The  effect  of  the  payment  of  the  French  indemnity  of  1872 
upon  German  industry  was  analysed  at  length. 

This  chapter  was  criticised  by  economists  in  Britain,  France, 
and  America.  I  do  not  think  that  a  single  economist  of  note 
admitted  the  slightest  validity  in  this  argument.  Several  accused 
the  author  of  adopting  protectionist  fallacies  in  an  attempt  to 
'make  out  a  case.'  It  happens  that  he  is  a  convinced  Free 
Trader.  But  he  is  also  aware  that  it  is  quite  impracticable  to 
dissociate  national  psychology  from  international  commercial 
problems.  Remembering  what  popular  feeling  about  the  ex- 
pansion of  enemy  trade  must  be  on  the  morrow  of  war,  he 
asked  the  reader  to  imagine  vast  imports  of  enemy  goods  as 
the  means  of  paying  an  indemnity,  and  went  on : — 

'Do  we  not  know  that  there  would  be  such  a  howl  about  the 
ruin  of  home  industry  that  no  Government  could  stand  the 
clamour  for  a  week?. . .  That  this  influx  of  goods  for  nothing 
would  be  represented  as  a  deep-laid  plot  on  the  part  of  foreign 
nations  to  ruin  the  home  trade,  and  that  the  citizens  would 
rise  in  their  wrath  to  prevent  the  accomplishment  of  such  a  plot? 
Is  not  this  very  operation  by  which  foreign  nations  tax  them- 
selves to  send  abroad  goods,  not  for  nothing  (that  would  be  a 
crime  at  present  unthinkable),  but  at  below  cost,  the  offence 
to  which  we  have  given  the  name  of  "dumping"?  When  it  is 
carried  very  far,  as  in  the  case  of  sugar,  even  Free  Trade 


320  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

/    nations  like  Great  Britain  join  International  Conferences  to  pre- 
vent these  gifts  being  made ! ' 

The  fact  that  not  one  single  economist,  so  far  as  I  know, 
would  at  the  time  admit  the  validity  of  these  arguments,  is 
worth  consideration.  Very  learned  men  may  sometimes  be  led 
astray  by  keeping  their  learning  in  watertight  compartments, 
'economics'  in  one  cortjpartment  and  'politics'  or  political  psy- 
chology in  another.  /The  politicians  seemed  to  misread  the 
economies  and  the  economists  the  politics. 

What  are  the  post-war  facts  in  this  connection?  We  may 
get  them  summarised  on  the  one  hand  by  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Great  Britain  and  on  the  other  by  the  expert  adviser  of  the 
British  Delegation  to  the  Peace  Conference. 

Mr  Lloyd  Czeorge,  speaking  two  years  after  the  Armistice, 
and  after  prolonged  and  exhaustive  debates  on  this  problem, 
says : — 

'What  I  have  put  forward  is  an  expression  of  the  views  of 
all  the  experts ....  Every  one  wants  gold,  which  Germany  has 
not  got,  and  they  will  not  take  German  goods.  Nations  can 
only  pay  debts  by  gold,  goods,  services,  or  bills  of  exchange  on 
nations  which  are  its  debtors.  ^ 

'The  real  difficulty  ...  is  due  to  the  difficulty  of  securing 
payment  outside  the  limits  of  Germany.  Germany  could  pay — 
pay  easily — inside  her  own  boundary,  but  she  could  not  export 

*An  authorised  interview  published  by  the  daily  papers  of  January 
/    28th,  1921. 

M.  Briand,  the  French  Premier,  in  explaining  what  he  and  Mr  Lloyd 
George  arranged  at  Paris  to  the  Chamber  and  Senate  on  February  3rd, 
remarked : — 

'We  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  in  order  to  pay  us  Germany 
must  every  year  create  wealth  abroad  for  herself  by  developing  her 
exports  and  reducing  her  imports  to  strictly  necessary  things.  She  can 
only  do  that  to  the  detriment  of  the  commerce  and  industry  of  the 
Allies.  That  is  a  strange  and  regrettable  consequence  of  facts.  The 
placing  of  an  annuity  on  her  exports,  payable  in  foreign  values,  will, 
however,  correct  as  much  as  possible  this  paradoxical  situation.' 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  321 

her  forests,  railways,  or  land  across  her  own  frontiers  and 
make  them  over  to  the  Allies.  Take  the  railways,  for  example. 
Suppose  the  Allies  took  possession  of  them  and  doubled  the 
charges;  they  would  be  paid  in  paper  marks  which  would  be 
valueless  directly  they  crossed  the  frontier. 

'The  only  way  Germany  could  pay  was  by  way  of  exports — 
that  is  by  difference  between  German  imports  and  exports.  If, 
however,  German  imports  were  too  much  restricted,  the  Ger- 
mans would  be  unable  to  obtain  food  and  raw  materials 
necessary  for  their  manufactures.  Some  of  Germany's  principal 
markets — Russia  and  Central  Europe — were  no  longer  pur- 
chasers, and  if  she  exported  too  much  to  the  Allies,  it  meant 
the  ruin  of  their  industry  and  lack  of  employment  for  their 
people.  Even  in  the  case  of  neutrals  it  was  only  possible 
generally  to  increase  German  exports  by  depriving  our  traders 
of  their  markets.*  ^ 

There  is  not  a  line  here  that  is  not  a  paraphrase  of  the  chapter 
in  the  early  edition  of  The  Great  Illusion. 

The  following  is  the  comment  of  Mr  Maynard  Keynes,  ex- 
Advisor  to  the  British  Treasury,  on  the  claims  put  forward 
after  the  Paris  Conference  of  January  1921 : — 

*It  would  be  easy  to  point  out  how,  if  Germany  could  com- 
pass the  vast  export  trade  which  the  Paris  proposals  contemplate, 
it  could  only  be  by  ousting  some  of  the  staple  trades  of  Great 
Britain  from  the  markets  of  the  world.  Exports  of  what 
commodities,  we  may  ask,  in  addition  to  her  present  exports,  is 
Germany  going  to  find  a  market  for  in  1922 — ^to  look  no  farther 
ahead — ^which  will  enable  her  to  make  the  payment  of  between 
i  150,000,000  and  £200,000,000  including  the  export  proportion 
which  will  be  due  from  her  in  that  year  ?  Germany's  five  prin- 
cipal exports  before  the  War  were  iron,  steel,  and  machinery, 

'Version  appearing  in  the  Times  of  January  28th,  1921. 

21 


.322  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

coal  and  coke,  woollen  goods  and  cotton  goods.  Which  of  these 
trades  does  Paris  think  she  is  going  to  develop  on  a  hitherto 
unprecedented  scale?  Or  if  not  these,  what  others ?  And  how 
is  she  going  to  finance  the  import  of  raw  materials  which,  except 
in  the  case  of  coal  and  coke,  are  a  prior  necessity  to  manufac- 
ture, if  the  proceeds  of  the  goods  when  made  will  not  be 
available  to  repay  the  credits  ?  I  ask  these  questions  in  respect 
of  the  year  1922  because  many  people  may  erroneously  believe 
that  while  the  proposed  settlement  is  necessarily  of  a  problematic 
character  for  the  later  years — only  time  can  show — it  makes 
some  sort  of  a  start  possible.  These  questions  are  serious  and 
practical,  and  they  deserve  to  be  answered.  If  the  Paris  pro- 
posals are  more  than  wind,  they  mean  a  vast  re-organisation  of 
the  channels  of  international  trade.  If  anything  remotely  like 
them  is  really  intended  to  happen,  the  reactions  on  the  trade  and 
industry  of  this  country  are  incalculable.  It  is  an  outrage  that 
they  should  be  dealt  with  by  the  methods  of  the  poker  party  of 
which  news  comes  from  Paris.*  * 

If  the  expert  economists  failed  to  admit  the  validity  of  The 
Great  Illusion  argument  fifteen  years  ago,  the  general  public 
has  barely  a  glimmering  of  it  to-day.  It  is  true  that  our  miners 
realise  that  vast  deliveries  of  coal  for  nothing  by  Germany  dis- 
organise our  coal  export  trade.  British  shipbuilding  has  been 
disastrously  affected  by  the  Treaty  clauses  touching  the  sur- 
render of  German  tonnage — so  much  so  that  the  Government 
have  now  recommended  the  abandonment  of  these  clauses, 
which  were  among  the  most  stringent  and  popular  in  the  whole 
Treaty.  The  French  Government  has  flatly  refused  to  accept 
German  machinery  to  replace  that  destroyed  by  the  German 
\  armies,  while  French  labour  refuses  to  allow  German  labour, 
in  any  quantity,  to  operate  in  the  devastated  regions.  Thus 
coal,  ships,  machinery,  manufactures,  labour,  as  means  of  pay- 
ment, have  either  already  created  great  economic  havoc  or  have 
*  The  Manchester  Guardian.  Jan  31st,  1921. 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  323 

been  rejected  because  they  might.  Yet  our  papers  continue  to 
shout  that  'Germany  can  pay,'  implying  that  failure  to  do  so 
is  merely  a  matter  of  her  will.  Of  course  she  can  pay — if  we 
Jet  her.  Payment  means  increasing  German  foreign  trade. 
Suppose,  then,  we  put  the  question  'Can  German  Foreign  Trade 
be  increased  ?'  Obviously  it  can.  It  depends  mainly  on  us.  To 
put  the  question  in  its  truer  form  shows  that  the  problem  is 
much  more  a  matter  of  our  will  than  of  Germany's.  Inci- 
dentally, of  course,  German  diplomacy  has  been  as  stupid  as 
our  own.  If  the  German  representatives  had  said,  in  effect: 
'It  is  common  ground  that  we  can  pay  only  in  commodities. 
If  you  will  indicate  the  kind  and  quantity  of  goods  we  shall 
deliver,  and  will  facilitate  the  import  into  Germany  of,  and 
the  payment  for,  the  necessary  food  and  raw  material,  we  will 
accept — on  that  condition — even  your  figures  of  reparation.' 
The  Allies,  of  course,  could  not  have  given  the  necessary  un- 
dertaking, and  the  real  nature  of  the  problem  would  have  stood 
revealed.  * 

The  review  of  the  situation  of  France  given  in  the  preceding 
pages  will  certainly  be  criticised  on  the  ground  that  it  gives  alto- 
gether too  great  weight  to  the  temporary  embarrassment,  and 
leaves  out  the  advantages  which  future  generations  of  French- 
men will  reap. 

Now,  whatever  the  future  may  have  in  store,  it  will  certainly 
have  for  France  the  task  of  defending  her  conquests  if  she 
either  withholds  their  product  (particularly  iron)  from  the 
peoples  of  Central  Europe  who  need  them,  or  if  she  makes  of 
their  possession  a  means  of  exacting  a  tribute  which  they  feel 
to  be  burdensome  and  unjust.  Again  we  are  faced  by  the  same 
dilemma;  if  Germany  gets  the  iron,  her  population  goes  on 

*  Mr  John  Foster  Dulles,  who  was  a  member  of  the  American  delega- 
tion at  the  Peace  Conference,  has,  in  an  article  in  The  New  Republic 
for  March  30th,  1921,  outlined  the  facts  concerning  the  problem  of 
payment  more  completely  than  I  have  yet  seen  it  done.  The  facts  he 
reveals  constitute  a  complete  and  overwhelming  vindication  of  the  case 
as  stated  in  the  first  edition  of  The  Great  Illusion. 


324  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

expanding  and  her  potential  power  of  resistance  goes  on  increas- 
ing. Thus  France's  burden  of  defence  would  grow  steadily 
greater,  while  her  population  remained  constant  or  declined. 
This  difficulty  of  French  deficiency  in  human  raw  material  is 
not  a  remote  contingency;  it  is  an  actual  difficulty  of  to-day, 
which  France  is  trying  to  meet  in  part  by  the  arming  of  the 
negro  population  of  her  African  colonies,  and  in  part  by  the 
device  of  satellite  militarisms,  as  in  Poland.  But  the  precarious- 
ness  of  such  methods  is  already  apparent. 

The  arming  of  the  African  negro  carries  its  appalling 
possibilities  on  its  face.  Its  development  cannot  possibly  avoid 
the  gravest  complication  of  the  industrial  problem.  It  is  the 
Servile  State  in  its  most  sinister  form;  and  tmless  Europe  is 
itself  ready  for  slavery  it  will  stop  this  reintroduction  of  slavery 
for  the  purposes  of  militarism. 

The  other  device  has  also  its  self-defeating  element.  To  sup- 
port an  imperialist  Poland  means  a  hostile  Russia;  yet  Poland, 
wedged  in  between  a  hostile  Slav  mass  on  the  one  side  and  a 
hostile  Teutonic  one  on  the  other,,  herself  compounded  of 
Russian.  German,  Austrian,  Lithuanian,  Ukrainian,  and  Jewish 
elements,  ruled  largely  by  a  landowning  aristocracy  when  the 
countries  on  both  sides  have  managed  to  transfer  the  great 
estates  to  the  peasants,  is  as  likely,  in  these  days,  to  be  a  military 
liability  as  a  military  asset. 

These  things  are  not  irrelevant  to  the  problem  of  turning 
military  power  to  economic  account:  they  are  of  the  very  es- 
sence of  the  problem. 

Not  less  so  is  this  consideration:  If  France  should  for 
political  reasons  persist  in  a  policy  which  means  a  progressive 
reduction  in  the  productivity  of  Europe,  that  policy  would  be 
at  its  very  roots  directly  contrary  to  the  vital  interests  of 
England.  The  foregoing  pages  have  explained  why  the  increas- 
ing population  of  these  islands,  that  live  by  selling  coal  or  its 
products,  are  dependent  upon  the  high  productivity  of  the  out- 
side   world.      France    is    self-supporting    and    has    no    such 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  325 

pre-occupation.  Already  the  divergence  is  seen  in  the  case  of 
the  Russian  poHcy.  Britain  direly  needs  the  wheat  of  Russia 
to  reduce  the  cost  of  living — or  improve  the  value  of  what  she 
has  to  sell,  which  is  very  nearly  the  same  thing.  France  does 
not  need  Russian  foodstuffs,  and  in  terms  of  narrow  self-interest 
(cutting  her  losses  in  Czarist  bonds)  can  afford  to  be  indifferent 
to  the  devastation  of  Russia.  As  soon  as  this  divergence  reaches 
a  certain  degree,  rupture  becomes  inevitable. 

The  mainspring  of  French  policy  during  the  last  two  years 
has  been  fear — fear  of  the  economic  revival  of  Germany  which 
might  be  the  beginning  of  a  military  revival.  The  measures 
necessary  to  check  German  economic  revival  inevitably  increase 
German  resentment,  which  is  taken  as  proof  of  the  need  for 
increasingly  severe  measures  of  repression.  Those  measures 
are  tending  already  to  deprive  France  of  her  most  powerful 
military  Allies.  That  fact  still  further  increases  the  burden 
that  will  be  thrown  upon  her.  Such  burdens  must  inevitably 
make  very  large  deductions  from  the  'profits'  of  her  new  con- 
quests. 

Note  in  view  of  these  circumstances  some  further  difficulties 
of  turning  those  conquests  to  account.  Take  the  iron  mines  of 
Lorraine.  ^  France  has  now  within  her  borders  what  is,  as 
already  noted,  the  geographical  centre  of  Continental  industry. 
How  shall  she  turn  that  fact  to  account  ? 

For  the  iron  to  become  wealth  at  all,  for  France  to  become 
the  actual  centre  of  European  industry,  there  must  be  a  Euro- 
pean industry:  the  railroads  and  factories  and  steamship  lines 
as  consumers  of  the  iron  must  once  more  operate.  To  do  that 
they  in  their  turn  must  have  their  market  in  the  shape  of  active 
consumption  on  the  part  of  the  millions  of  Europe.  In  other 
words  the  Continent  must  be  economically  restored.    But  that 

*  As  the  Lorraine  ores  are  of  a  kind  that  demand  much  less  than  their 
own  weight  of  coal  for  smelting,  it  is  more  economic  to  bring  the  coal 
to  the  ore  than  vice  versa.  It  was  for  political  and  military  reasons 
that  the  German  State  encouraged  the  placing  of  some  of  the  great 
furnaces  on  the  right  instead  of  the  left  bank  of  tlie  Rhine. 


326  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

it  cannot  be  while  Germany  is  economically  paralysed.  Ger- 
many's industry  is  the  very  keystone  of  the  European  industry 
and  agriculture — whether  in  Russia,  Poland,  the  Balkansj  or 
the  Near  East — ^which  is  the  indispensable  market  of  the  French 
iron.  ^  Even  if  we  could  imagine  such  a  thing  as  a  reconstruc- 
tion of  Europe  on  lines  that  would  in  some  wonderful  way  put 
seventy  or  eighty  million  Germans  into  a  secondary  place — 
involving  as  it  would  vast  redistributions  of  population — the 
process  obviously  would  take  years  or  generations.  Meantime 
Europe  goes  to  pieces.  'Men  will  not  always  die  quietly'  as 
Mr  Keynes  puts  it.  What  is  to  become  of  French  credit  while 
France  is  suppressing  Bolshevik  upheavals  in  Poland  or  Hun- 
gary caused  by  the  starvation  of  cities  through  the  new  economic 
readjustments?  Europe  famishes  now  for  want  of  credit.  But 
credit  implies  a  certain  dependence  upon  the  steady  course  of 
future  events,  some  assurance,  for  instance,  that  this  particular 
railway  line  to  which  advances  are  made  will  not  find  itself,  in 
a  year  or  two's  time,  deprived  of  its  traffic  in  the  interest  of 
economic  rearrangements  resulting  from  an  attempt  to  re-draw 
the  economic  map  of  Europe.  Nor  can  such  re-drawing  disre- 
gard the  present.  It  is  no  good  telling  peasants  who  have 
not  ploughs  or  reapers  or  who  cannot  get  fertilisers  because 
their  railroad  has  no  locomotives,  that  a  new  line  nmning  on 
their  side  of  the  new  frontier  will  be  built  ten  or  fifteen  years 
hence.  You  cannot  stop  the  patients  breathing  'for  just  a  few 
hours*  while  experiments  are  made  with  vital  organs.  The 
operation  must  adapt  itself  to  the  fact  that  all  the  time  he  must 
breathe.  And  to  the  degree  to  which  we  attempt  violently  to 
re-direct  the  economic  currents,  does  the  security  upon  which 
our  credit  depends  decline. ' 

*  It  is  worth  while  to  recall  here  a  passage  from  The  Economic  Con- 
sequences of  the  Peace,  by  Mr  J.  M.  Keynes,  quoted  in  Chapter  I.  of 
this  book. 

'There  is  one  aspect  of  the  possible  success  of  France  which  is  cer- 
tainly worth  consideration.  France  has  now  in  her  possession  the 
greatest  iron  ore  fields  in  Europe.    Assume  that  she  is  so  far  successful 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  327 

There  are  other  considerations.  A  French  journalist  asks 
plaintively:  'If  we  want  the  coal  why  don't  we  go  in  and  take 
it' — ^by  the  occupation  of  the  Ruhr.  The  implication  is  that 
France  could  get  the  coal  for  nothing.  Well,  France  has 
taken  over  the  Saar  Valley.  By  no  means  does  she  get  the 
coal  for  nothing.  The  miners  have  to  be  paid.  France  tried 
paying  them  at  an  especially  low  rate.  The  production  fell  off ; 
the  miners  were  discontented  and  underfed.  They  had  to  be 
paid  more.  Even  so  the  Saar  has  been  'very  restless'  under 
French  control,  and  the  last  word,  as  we  know,  will  rest  with 
the  men.  Miners  who  feel  they  are  working  for  the  enemy  of 
their  fatherland  are  not  going  to  give  a  high  production.  It  is 
a  long  exploded  illusion  that  slave  labour — ^labour  under  physical 
compulsion — is  a  productive  form  of  labour.  Its  output  in- 
variably is  small.  So  assuredly  France  does  not  get  this  coal 
for  nothing.  And  from  the  difference  between  the  price  which 
it  costs  her  as  owner  of  the  mines  and  administrator  of  their 
workers,  and  that  which  she  would  pay  if  she  had  to  buy  the 
coal  from  the  original  owners  and  administrators  (if  there  is 
a  difference  on  the  credit  side  at  all)  has  to  be  deducted  the 
ultimate  cost  of  defence  and  of  the  political  complications  that 
that  has  involved.  Precise  figures  are  obviously  not  available; 
but  it  is  equally  obvious  that  the  profit  of  seizure  is  microscopic. 

Always  does  the  fundamental  dilemma  remain.  France  will 
need  above  all,  if  she  is  to  profit  by  these  raw  materials  of 


in  her  policy  of  military  coercion  that  she  succeeds  in  securing  vast 
quantities  of  coal  and  coke  for  nothing.  French  industry  then  secures 
a  very  marked  advantage — and  an  artificial  and  'uneconomic'  one — 
over  British  industry,  in  the  conversion  of  raw  materials  into  finished 
products.  The  present  export  by  France  of  coal  which  she  gets  for 
nothing  to  Dutch  and  other  markets  heretofore  supplied  by  Britain 
might  be  followed  by  the  'dumping*  of  steel  and  iron  products  on 
terms  which  British  industry  could  not  meet.  This,  of  course,  is  on 
the  hypothesis  of  success  in  obtaining  'coal  for  nothing,'  which  the 
present  writer  regards  as  extremely  unlikely  for  the  reasons  here  given. 
But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  failure  of  French  effort  in  this  matter 
will  be  from  causes  just  as  disastrous  for  British  prosperity  as  French 
success  would  be. 


328  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

European  industry,  markets,  and  again  markets.  But  markets 
mean  that  the  iron  which  has  been  captured  must  be  returned 
to  the  nation  from  which  it  was  taken,  on  conditions  economi- 
cally advantageous  to  that  nation.  A  central  Europe  that  is 
consuming  large  quantities  of  metallurgical  products  is  a  Central 
Europe  growing  in  wealth  and  power  and  potentially  dangerous 
unless  reconciled.  And  reconciliation  will  include  economic 
justice,  access  to  the  very  'property'  that  has  been  seized. 

The  foregoing  is  not  now,  as  it  was  when  the  present  author 
wrote  in  similar  terms  a  decade  since,  mere  speculation  or 
hypothesis.  Our  present  difficulties  with  reference  to  the  in- 
demnity or  reparations,  the  fall  in  the  exchanges,  or  the  supply 
of  coal,  are  precisely  of  the  order  just  indicated.  The  con- 
queror is  caught  in  the  grip  of  just  those  difficulties  in  turning 
conquest  to  economic  account  upon  which  The  Great  Illusion  so 
repeatedly  insisted. 

The  part  played  by  credit — as  the  sensory  nerve  of  the  eco- 
nomic organism — has,  despite  the  appearances  to  the  contrary 
in  the  early  part  of  the  War,  confirmed  those  propositions  that 
dealt  with  it.  Credit — as  the  extension  of  the  use  of  money — 
is  society's  bookkeeping.  The  debauchery  of  the  currencies 
means  of  course  juggling  with  the  promises  to  pay.  The  general 
relation  of  credit  to  a  certain  dependability  upon  the  future 
has  already  been  dealt  with.  ^  The  object  here  is  to  call  attention 
to  the  present  admissions  that  the  maintenance  or  re-creation 
of  credit  is  in  very  truth  an  indispensable  element  in  the  re- 
covery of  Europe.  Those  admissions  consist  in  the  steps  that 
are  being  taken  internationally,  the  emphasis  which  the  govern- 
ments themselves  are  laying  upon  this  factor.  Yet  ten  years 
ago  the  'diplomatic  expert*  positively  resented  the  introduction 
of  such  a  subject  into  the  discussion  of  foreign  affairs  at  all. 
Serious  consideration  of  the  subject  was  generally  dismissed  by 
the  orthodox  authority  on  international  politics  with  some 
contemptuous  reference  to  'cosmopolitan  usury.' 

*  See  Part  I,  Chapter  I. 


VINDICATION  BY  EVENTS  329 

Even  now  we  seize  every  opportunity  of  disguising  the  truth 
to  ourselves.  In  the  midst  of  the  chaos  we  may  sometimes 
see  flamboyant  statements  that  England  at  any  rate  is  greater 
and  richer  than  before.  (It  is  a  statement,  indeed,  very  apt  to 
come  from  our  European  co-belligerents,  worse  off  than  our- 
selves.) It  is  true,  of  course,  that  we  have  extended  our 
Empire ;  that  we  have  to-day  the  same  materials  of  wealth  as — 
or  more  than — we  had  before  the  War ;  that  we  have  improved 
technical  knowledge.  But  we  are  learning  that  to  turn  all  this 
to  account  there  must  be  not  only  at  home,  but  abroad,  a  wide- 
spread capacity  for  orderly  co-operation ;  the  diffusion  through- 
out the  world  of  a  certain  moral  quality.  And  the  war,  for  the 
time  being,  at  least,  has  very  greatly  diminished  that  quality. 
Because  Welsh  miners  have  absorbed  certain  ideas  and  developed 
a  certain  temperament,  the  wealth  of  many  millions  who  are 
not  miners  declines.  The  idea  of  a  self-sufficing  Empire  that 
can  disregard  the  chaos  of  the  outside  world  recedes  steadily 
into  the  background  when  we  see  the  infection  of  certain  ideas 
beginning  the  work  of  disintegration  within  the  Empire.  Our 
control  over  Egypt  has  almost  vanished ;  that  over  India  is  en- 
dangered ;  our  relations  with  Ireland  affect  those  with  America 
and  even  with  some  of  our  white  colonies.  Our  Empire,  too, 
depends  upon  the  prevalence  of  certain  ideas. 


CHAPTER  VII 

COULD  THE  WAR  HAVE  BEEN  PREVENTED? 

*BuT  the  real  irrelevance  of  all  this  discussion,'  it  will  be  said, 
'is  that  however  complete  our  recognition  of  these  truths  might 
have  been,  that  recognition  would  not  have  affected  Germany's 
action.  We  did  not  want  territory,  or  colonies,  or  mines,  or 
oil-wells,  or  phosphate  islands,  or  railway  concessions.  We 
fought  simply  to  resist  aggression.  The  alternatives  for  us  were 
sheer  submission  to  aggression,  or  war,  a  war  of  self-defence.' 

Let  us  see.  Our  danger  came  from  Germany's  aggressive- 
ness. What  made  her  more  aggressive  than  other  nations,  than 
those  who  later  became  our  Allies — Russia,  Rumania,  Italy, 
Japan,  France?  Sheer  original  sin,  apart  from  political  or 
economic  circumstance? 

Now  it  was  an  extraordinary  thing  that  those  who  were  most 
clamant  about  the  danger  were  for  the  most  part  quite  ready 
to  admit — even  to  urge  and  emphasise  as  part  of  their  case — 
that  Germany's  aggression  was  not  due  to  inherent  wickedness, 
but  that  any  nation  placed  in  her  position  would  behave  in  just 
about  the  same  way.  That,  indeed,  was  the  view  of  very  many 
pre-eminent  before  the  War  in  their  warnings  of  the  German 
peril,  of  among  others.  Lord  Roberts,  Admiral  Mahan,  Mr 
Frederic  Harrison,  Mr  Blatchford,  Professor  Wilkinson. 

Let  us  recall,  for  instance,  Mr  Harrison's  case  for  German 
aggression — Germany's  'poor  access  to  the  sea  and  its  expand- 
ing population' : — 

330 


COULD  THE  WAR  HAVE  BEEN  PREVENTED  ?   331 

*A  mighty  nation  of  65,000,000,  with  such  superb  resources 
both  for  peace  and  war,  and  such  overweening  pride  in  its  own 
superiority  and  might,  finds  itself  closed  up  in  a  ring-fence  too 
narrow  for  its  fecundity  as  for  its  pretensions,  constructed  more 
by  history,  geography,  and  circumstances  than  by  design — a 
fence  maintained  by  the  fears  rather  than  the  hostility  of  its 
weaker  neighbours.  That  is  the  rumbUng  subterranean  volcano 
on  which  the  European  State  system  rests. 

*It  is  inevitable  but  that  a  nation  with  the  magnificent  re- 
sources of  the  German,  hemmed  in  a  territory  so  inadequate 
to  their  needs  and  pretensions,  and  dominated  by  a  soldier, 
bureaucratic,  and  literary  caste,  all  deeply  imbued  with  the 
Bismarckian  doctrine,  should  thirst  to  extend  their  dominions, 
and  their  power  at  any  sacrifice — of  life,  of  wealth,  and  of 
justice.  One  must  take  facts  as  they  are,  and  it  is  idle  to  be 
blind  to  facts,  or  to  rail  against  them.    It  is  as  silly  to  gloss  over 

manifest  perils  as  it  is  to  preach  moralities  about  them 

England,  Europe,  civilisation,  is  in  imminent  peril  from  German 
expansion.'  ^ 

Very  well.  We  are  to  drop  preaching  moralities  and  look 
at  the  facts.  Would  successful  war  by  us  remove  the  economic 
and  political  causes  which  were  part  at  least  of  the  explanation 

'  English  Review,  January  1913, 

Lord  Roberts,  in  his  'Message  to  the  Nation,*  declared  that  Germany's 
refusal  to  accept  the  world's  status  quo  was  'as  statesmanlike  as  it  is 
unanswerable.'    He  said  further  : — 

'How  was  this  Empire  of  Britain  founded?  War  founded  this  Em- 
pire— war  and  conquest!  When  we,  therefore,  masters  by  war  of 
one-third  of  the  habitable  globe,  when  we  propose  to  Germany  to 
disarm,  to  curtail  her  navy  or  diminish  her  army,  Germany  naturally 
refuses ;  and  pointing,  not  without  justice,  to  the  road  by  which  England, 
sword  in  hand,  has  climbed  to  her  unmatched  eminence,  declares  openly, 
or  in  the  veiled  language  of  diplomacy,  that  by  the  same  path,  if  by 
no  other,  Germany  is  determined  also  to  ascend !  Who  amongst  us, 
knowing  the  past  of  this  nation,  and  the  past  of  all  nations  and  cities 
that  have  ever  added  the  lustre  of  their  name  to  human  annals,  can  accuse 
Germany  or  regard  the  utterance  of  one  of  her  greatest  a  year  and  a 
half  ago,  (or  of  General  Bernhardi  three  months  ago)  with  any  feelings 
except  those  of  respect?'  (pp.  8-9.) 


332  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

of  German  aggression  ?  Would  her  need  for  expansion  become 
less?  The  preceding  pages  answer  that  question.  Successful 
war  by  us  would  not  dispose  of  the  pressure  of  German  popu- 
lation. 

If  the  German  menace  was  due  in  part  at  least  to  such 
causes  as  'poor  access  to  the  sea,'  the  absence  of  any  assurance 
as  to  future  provision  for  an  expanding  population,  what 
measures  were  proposed  for  the  removal  of  those  causes? 

None  whatever.  Not  only  so,  but  any  effort  towards  a 
frank  facing  of  the  economic  difficulty  was  resisted  by  the  very 
people  who  had  previously  urged  the  economic  factors  of  the 
conflict,  as  a  'sordid'  interpretation  of  that  conflict.  We  have 
seen  what  happened,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  Admiral  Mahan. 
He  urged  that  the  competition  for  undeveloped  territory  and 
raw  materials  lay  behind  the  political  struggle.  So  be  it ;  replies 
some  one;  let  us  see  whether  we  cannot  remove  that  economic 
cause  of  conflict,  whether  indeed  there  is  any  real  economic  con- 
flict at  all.  And  the  Admiral  then  retorts  that  economics  have 
nothing  to  do  with  it.  To  Mr  Frederic  Harrison  'The  Great 
Illusion  policy  is  childish  and  mischievous  rubbish.'  What  was 
that  policy?  To  deny  the  existence  of  the  German  or  other 
aggressiveness?  The  whole  policy  was  prompted  by  the  very 
fact  of  that  danger.  Did  the  policy  suggest  that  we  should 
simply  yield  to  German  political  pretensions?  Again,  as  we 
have  seen,  such  a  course  was  rejected  with  every  possible  em- 
phasis. The  one  outstanding  implication  of  the  policy  was  that 
while  arming  we  must  find  a  basis  of  co-operation  by  which 
both  peoples  could  live. 

In  any  serious  effort  to  that  end,  one  overpowering  question 
had  to  be  answered  by  Elnglishmen  who  felt  some  responsibility 
for  the  welfare  of  their  people.  Would  that  co-operation,  giv- 
ing security  to  others,  demand  the  sacrifice  of  the  interest  or 
•welfare  of  their  own  people?  The  Great  Illusion  replied.  No, 
and  set  forth  the  reasons  for  that  reply.  And  the  setting- forth 
of  those  reasons  made  the  book  an  'appeal  to  avarice  against 


COULD  THE  WAR  HAVE  BEEN  PRF\^NTED?  333 

patriotism,'  an  attempt  'to  restore  the  blessed  hour  of  money 
getting,'  Eminent  Nonconformist  divines  and  patriotic  stock- 
brokers joined  hands  in  condemning  the  appalling  sordidness 
of  the  demonstration  which  might  have  led  to  a  removal  of  the 
economic  causes  of  international  quarrel. 

It  is  not  true  to  say  that  in  the  decade  preceding  Armageddon 
the  alternatives  to  fighting  Germany  were  exhausted,  and  that 
nothing  was  left  but  war  or  submission.  We  simply  had  not 
tried  the  remedy  of  removing  the  economic  excuse  for  aggres- 
sion. The  fact  that  Germany  did  face  these  difficulties  and 
much  future  uncertainty  was  indeed  urged  by  those  of  the 
school  of  Mr  Harrison  and  Lord  Roberts  as  a  conclusive  argu- 
ment against  the  possibility  of  peace  or  any  form  of  agreement 
with  her.  The  idea  that  agreement  should  reach  to  such 
fundamental  things  as  the  means  of  subsistence  seemed  to  in- 
volve such  an  invasion  of  sovereignty  as  not  even  to  be 
imaginable. 

To  show  that  such  an  agreement  would  not  ask  a  sacrifice 
of  vital  national  interest,  that  indeed  the  economic  advantages 
which  could  be  exacted  by  military  preponderance  were  exceed- 
ingly small  or  non-existent,  seemed  the  first  indispensable  step 
towards  bringing  some  international  code  of  economic  right 
within  the  area  of  practical  politics,  of  giving  it  any  chance  of 
acceptance  by  public  opinion.  Yet  the  effort  towards  that  was 
disparaged  and  derided  as  'materialistic' 

One  hoped  at  least  that  this  disparagement  of  material  in- 
terest as  a  motive  in  international  politics  might  give  us  a  peace 
settlement  which  would  be  free  from  it.  But  economic  interest 
which  is  'sordid'  when  appealed  to  as  a  means  of  preserving  the 
peace,  becomes  a  sacred  egoism  when  invoked  on  behalf  of  a 
policy  which  makes  war  almost  inevitable. 

Why  did  it  create  such  bitter  resentment  before  the  War  to 
suggest  that  we  should  discuss  the  economic  grounds  of  inter- 
national conflict — why  before  the  War  were  many  writers  who 
now  demand  that  discussion  so  angry  at  it  being  suggested? 


334  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

Among  the  very  hostile  critics  of  The  Great  Illusion — hostile 
mainly  on  the  ground  that  it  misread  the  motive  forces  in  inter- 
national politics — was  Mr  J.  L.  Garvin.  Yet  his  own  first 
post-war  book  is  entitled :  The  Economic  Foundations  of  Peace, 
and  its  first  Chapter  Summary  begins  thus : — 

*A  primary  war,  largely  about  food  and  raw  materials:  in- 
separable connection  of  the  politics  and  economics  of  the 
peace.' 

And  his  first  paragraph  contains  the  following : — 

'The  war  with  many  names  was  in  one  main  aspect  a  war 
about  food  supply  and  raw  materials.  To  this  extent  it  was 
Germany's  fight  to  escape  from  the  economic  position  of  in- 
terdependence without  security  into  which  she  had  insensibly 
fallen — to  obtain  for  herself  independent  control  of  an  ample 
share  in  the  world's  supplies  of  primary  resources.  The  war 
meant  much  else,  but  it  meant  this  as  well  and  this  was  a  vital 
factor  in  its  causes.' 

His  second  chapter  is  thus  summarised: — 

'Former  international  conditions  transformed  by  the  revolu- 
tion in  transport  and  telegraphic  intelligence ;  great  nations  lose 
their  former  self-sufficient  basis:  growth  of  interdependence 

between  peoples  and  continents Germany  without  sea  power 

follows  Britain's  economic  example;  interdependence  without 
security:  national  necessities  and  cosmopolitan  speculation:  an 
Armageddon  unavoidable.* 

Lord  Grey  has  said  that  if  there  had  existed  in  1914  a 
League  of  Nations  as  tentative  even  as  that  embodied  in  the 
Covenant,  Armageddon  could  in  any  case  have  been  delayed, 
and  delay  might  well  have  meant  prevention.  We  know  now 
that  if  war  had  been  delayed  the  mere  march  of  events  would 


COULD  THE  WAR  HAVE  BEEN  PREVENTED?   335 

have  altered  the  situation.  It  is  unlikely  that  a  Russian  revolu- 
tion of  one  kind  or  another  could  have  been  prevented  even  if 
there  had  been  no  war;  and  a  change  in  the  character  of  the 
Russian  government  might  well  have  terminated  on  the  one 
side  the  Serbian  agitation  against  Austria,  and  on  the  other 
the  genuine  fear  of  German  democrats  concerning  Russia's  im- 
perialist ambitions.  The  death  of  the  old  Austrian  emperor 
was  another  factor  that  might  have  made  for  peace.  * 

Assume,  in  addition  to  such  factors,  that  Britain  had  been 
prepared  to  recognise  Germany's  economic  needs  and  difficul- 
ties, as  Mr  Garvin  now  urges  we  should  recognise  them. 
Whether  even  this  would  have  prevented  war,  no  man  can  say. 
But  we  can  say — and  it  is  implicit  in  the  economic  case  now  so 
commonly  urged  as  to  the  need  of  Germany  for  economic  se- 
curity— that  since  we  did  not  give  her  that  security  we  did  not 
do  all  that  we  might  have  done  to  remove  the  causes  of  war. 
'Here  in  the  struggle  for  primary  raw  materials*  says  Mr  Garvin 
in  effect  over  the  six  hundred  pages  more  or  less  of  his  book, 
'are  causes  of  war  that  must  be  dealt  with  if  we  are  to  have 
peace.'  If  then,  in  the  years  that  preceded  Armageddon,  the 
world  had  wanted  to  avoid  that  orgy,  and  had  had  the  necessary 
wisdom,  these  are  things  with  which  it  would  have  occupied 
itself. 

Yet  when  the  attempt  was  made  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
world  to  just  those  factors,  publicists  even  as  sincere  and  able 
as  Mr  Garvin  disparaged  it ;  and  very  many  misrepresented  it 
by  silly  distortion.  It  is  easy  now  to  see  where  that  pre-war 
attempt  to  work  towards  some  solution  was  most  defective :  if 
greater  emphasis  had  been  given  to  some  definite  scheme  for 

*  Lord  Loreburn  says :  The  whole  train  of  causes  which  brought  about 
the  tragedy  of  August  1914  would  have  been  dissolved  by  a  Russian 
revolution . . .  We  could  have  come  to  terms  with  Germany  as  regards 
Asia  Minor:  Nor  could  the  Alsace-Lorraine  difficulty  have  produced 
trouble.  No  one  will  pretend  that  France  would  have  been  aggressive 
when  deprived  of  Russian  support  considering  that  she  was  devoted 
to  peace  even  when  she  had  that  support.  Had  the  Russian  revolution 
come,  war  would  not  have  come.'    (How  the  War  Came,  p.  278.) 


336  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

assuring  Germany's  necessary  access  to  resources,  the  real  issue 
might  have  been  made  plainer.  A  fair  implication  of  The  Great 
Illusion  was  that  as  Britain  had  no  real  interest  in  thwarting 
German  expansion,  the  best  hope  for  the  future  lay  in  an  in- 
creasingly clear  demonstration  of  the  fact  of  community  of 
interest.  The  more  valid  conclusion  would  have  been  that  the 
absence  of  conflict  in  vital  interests  should  have  been  seized 
upon  as  affording  an  opportunity  for  concluding  definite  conven- 
tions and  obligations  which  would  assuage  fears  on  both  sides. 
But  criticism,  instead  of  bringing  out  this  defect,  directed  itself, 
for  the  most  part,  to  an  attempt  to  show  that  the  economic 
fears  or  facts  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  conflict.  Had  criticism 
consisted  in  taking  up  the  problem  where  The  Great  Illusion 
left  it,  much  more  might  have  been  done — ^perhaps  sufficient — 
to  make  Armageddon  unnecessary.* 

The  importance  of  the  phenomenon  we  have  just  touched 
upon — the  disparagement  before  war  of  truths  we  are 
compelled  to  face  after  war — ^lies  in  its  revelation  of  subcon- 
scious or  unconscious  motive.  There  grows  up  after  some  years 
of  peace  in  every  nation  possessing  military  and  naval  traditions 
and  a  habit  of  dominion,  i  real  desire  for  domination,  perhaps 
even  for  war  itself;  the  opportunity  that  it  affords  for  the  as- 
sertion of  collective  power ;  the  mysterious  dramatic  impulse  to 
'stop  the  cackle  with  a  blow ;  strike,  and  strike  home.' 

For  the  moment  we  are  at  the  ebb  of  that  feeling  and  another 
is  beginning  perhaps  to  flow.  The  results  are  showing  in  our 
policy.  We  find  in  what  would  have  been  ten  years  ago  very 
strange  places  for  such  things,  attacks  upon  the  government  for 
its  policy  of  'reckless  militarism'  in  Mesopotamia  or  Persia.    Al- 

^Mr  Walter  Lippmann  did  tackle  the  problem  in  much  the  way  I 
have  in  mind  in  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy.  That  book  is  critical  of  my 
own  point  of  view.  But  if  books  like  that  had  been  directed  at  The 
Great  Illusion,  we  might  have  made  headway.  As  it  is,  of  course,  Mr 
Lippmann's  book  has  been  useful  in  suggesting  most  that  is  good  in  the 
mandate  system  of  the  League  of  Nations. 


COULD  THE  WAR  HAVE  BEEN  PREVENTED?   337 

though  public  opinion  did  not  manage  to  impose  a  policy  of 
peace  with  Russia,  it  did  at  least  make  open  and  declared  war 
impossible,  and  all  the  efforts  of  the  Northcliffe  Press  to  in- 
flame passion  by  stories  of  Bolshevist  atrocities  fell  completely 
flat.  For  thirty  years  it  has  been  a  crime  of  Ihe  patrie  to  men- 
tion the  fact  that  we  have  given  solemn  and  repeated  pledges 
for  the  evacuation  of  Egypt.  And  indeed  to  secure  a  free 
hand  in  Egypt  we  were  ready  to  acquiesce  in  the  French  evasion 
of  international  obligations  in  Morocco,  a  policy  which  played 
no  small  part  in  widening  the  gulf  between  ourselves  and  Ger- 
many. Yet  the  political  position  on  behalf  of  which  ten  years 
ago  these  risks  were  taken  is  to-day  surrendered  with  barely 
a  protest.  A  policy  of  almost  unqualified  'scuttle'  which  no 
Cabinet  could  have  faced  a  decade  since,  to-day  causes  scarcely 
a  ripple.  And  as  to  the  Treaty,  certain  clauses  theiein,  around 
which  centred  less  than  two  years  ago  a  true  dementia — the 
trial  of  the  Kaiser  in  London,  the  trial  of  war  prisoners — we 
have  simply  forgotten  all  about. 

It  is  certain  that  sheer  exhaustion  of  the  emotions  associated 
with  war  explains  a  good  deal.  But  Turks,  Poles,  Arabs,  Rus- 
sians, who  have  suffered  war  much  longer,  still  fight.  The 
policy  of  the  loan  to  Germany,  the  independence  of  Egypt,  the 
evacuation  of  Mesopotamia,  the  refusal  to  attempt  the  removal 
of  the  Bolshevist  'menace  to  freedom  and  civilisation'  by  military 
means,  are  explained  in  part  at  least  by  a  growing  recognition 
of  both  the  political  and  the  economic  futility  of  the  military 
means,  and  the  absolute  need  of  replacing  or  supplementing  the 
military  method  by  an  increasing  measure  of  agreement  and 
co-operation.  The  order  of  events  has  been  such  as  to  induce 
an  interpretation,  bring  home  a  conviction,  which  has  influenced 
policy.  But  the  strength  and  permanence  of  the  conviction  will 
depend  upon  the  degree  of  intelligence  with  which  the  interpre- 
tation is  made.  Discussion  is  indispensable  and  that  justifies 
this  re-examination  of  the  suggestions  made  ia  The  Great 
Illusion. 

33 


538  THE  FRUITS  OF  VICTORY 

In  so  far  as  it  is  mere  emotional  exhaustion  which  we  are 
now  feeling,  and  not  the  beginning  of  a  new  tradition  and  new 
attitude  in  which  intelligence,  however  dimly,  has  its  part,  it 
has  in  it  little  hope.  For  inertia  has  its  dangers  as  grave  as 
those  of  unseeing  passion.  In  the  one  case  the  ship  is  driven 
helplessly  by  a  gale  on  to  the  rocks,  in  the  other  it  drifts  just 
as  helplessly  into  the  whirlpool.  A  consciousness  of  direction, 
a  desire  at  least  to  be  master  of  our  fate  and  to  make  the 
effort  of  thought  to  that  end,  is  the  indispensable  condition  of 
freedom,  salvation.  That  is  the  first  and  last  justification  for 
the  discussion  we  have  just  summarised. 


RETL 
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